Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In April 2019, the respondent, Jessica Morrill, pled nolo contendere to assault and robbery. In September 2023, she filed a motion in the criminal division to vacate her conviction, arguing that it was obtained as a result of her being a victim of human trafficking, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction and that the motion should have been filed in the civil division. The criminal division concluded it had jurisdiction and granted the motion, finding that the respondent met the statutory requirements for relief.The State filed a notice of appeal, acknowledging it did not have a right to appeal under the relevant statutes and rules but requested the Vermont Supreme Court to construe the appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief. The Vermont Supreme Court granted the State's request for review due to the importance of the issue and the purely legal nature of the question.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the criminal division has jurisdiction over motions to vacate convictions under 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme, including the context and language used by the legislature, indicates that the criminal division is the appropriate venue for such motions. The Court noted that the legislature explicitly assigned jurisdiction to the civil division in other sections of the statute but did not do so for § 2658. Additionally, the Court found that the nature of the relief sought under § 2658, which includes expungement, aligns with the criminal division's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "State v. Morrill" on Justia Law

James Needham and Roxanne O. Smith purchased a residential property as joint tenants. Smith later vacated the property and transferred her interest to the Roxanne O. Smith Trust. After Smith's death, both parties filed crossclaims for partition. The trial court assigned the property to Needham and awarded the Trust an equitable sum for its interest. The court declined to offset Needham's contributions by the fair-market rental value for the time Smith left the property, concluding that Needham did not prevent Smith from accessing the property and that the Trust had not established the fair-market rental value.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, held a two-day bench trial and found that Smith left the property due to fear of Needham but was not denied access. The court assigned the property to Needham, who was to pay the Trust for its interest. The court rejected the Trust's request for an offset due to ouster, finding no evidence that Needham excluded Smith from the property. The court also found that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property, as the trustee's testimony lacked sufficient foundation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property. The court noted that the trustee's testimony was insufficient to establish rental value and that the trial court was not obligated to assign it any persuasive value. The court also declined to remand the case for additional evidence on rental value, as the Trust did not demonstrate any reason why remand was warranted. View "Needham v. Smith Trust" on Justia Law

Robert Caldwell was recruited by Champlain College's then-president Don Laackman in September 2016 and worked as Vice President of Advancement and later as Chief Advancement Officer from January 2017 to September 2019. His role was primarily as chief fundraiser. In fiscal year 2018, he missed his fundraising goal by approximately seventeen percent, and in fiscal year 2019, he missed his goal by more than 56 percent, resulting in a shortfall of over 2.2 million dollars. In May 2019, Caldwell was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease and informed President Laackman of his diagnosis. Laurie Quinn replaced Laackman as interim-president in June 2019 and discussed Caldwell's performance with him in July 2019. Caldwell mentioned he was dealing with health issues. In September 2019, Quinn fired Caldwell, citing his poor fundraising performance.Caldwell sued Champlain College in March 2021, alleging disability discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and promissory estoppel. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division granted summary judgment in favor of Champlain College on both claims. Caldwell appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework for assessing disability discrimination claims and found that Champlain College provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Caldwell's termination—his failure to meet fundraising goals. Caldwell failed to provide evidence that this reason was pretextual. Additionally, the court found that Caldwell did not present any evidence of a specific and definite promise that would support his promissory estoppel claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Champlain College. View "Caldwell v. Champlain College Inc." on Justia Law

A husband appealed a final divorce order that set aside a prenuptial agreement and instead allocated an equitable division of property. The family division found the agreement unconscionable because it would prevent the wife from receiving any significant property settlement or spousal maintenance. The husband argued that the court applied an incorrect standard of unconscionability and made errors in the property settlement proceedings.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division, initially found that both parties had made full financial disclosures and entered the agreement voluntarily. However, the court later concluded that the agreement was unconscionable because it left the wife in the same financial situation as if they had not married, which the court believed undermined the status of marriage. The court also quashed subpoenas for the wife's father and sister and incorrectly calculated the length of the marriage.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the family division applied the wrong standard for assessing unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that prenuptial agreements are enforceable if they are entered into voluntarily, with full financial disclosure, and are not unconscionable at the time of execution. The court found that the agreement's terms, which left the parties in the same financial situation as before marriage, were not inherently unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the family division's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the wife's alternative arguments regarding the enforceability of the agreement, including whether the husband's behavior constructively forced her to file for divorce. View "Lacroix v. Rysz" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct, and obstruction of justice. The charges stemmed from allegations made by the defendant's daughter, K.O., who reported that her father had sexually assaulted her over a period of seven years, starting when she was ten years old. The State charged the defendant with multiple counts, including sexual assault and aggravated repeated sexual assault of K.O., as well as lewd and lascivious conduct against K.O. and another minor, A.S. The defendant was also charged with obstruction of justice based on his actions during the investigation.The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated due to jury irregularities, that evidentiary rulings undermined his right to a fair trial, and that the jury instructions were misleading. The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division, had previously denied the defendant's motions to exclude certain jurors for cause and had admitted various pieces of evidence over the defendant's objections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's challenges for cause against certain jurors, as there was no evidence of implied bias. The court also found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the audio recording of K.O.'s conversation with police, the prenuptial agreement, the photo display, and the diagram of the vulva, as these pieces of evidence were relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not misleading and did not direct a verdict on any element of the crime. The court also found no plain error in the description of the sexual acts necessary to convict the defendant on each charge. View "State v. Orost" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Kristina and Stephen Polak, and defendants, Felipe Ramirez-Diaz and Yesica Sanchez de Ramirez, are neighbors in St. Albans. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after defendants allegedly made false reports to police and the court accusing plaintiffs of criminal activity. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants falsely reported an assault and a gun threat, leading to anti-stalking complaints and an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) petition against Kristina Polak, which were ultimately denied. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants repeated these false claims to neighbors and community members.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Civil Division, granted defendants’ special motion to strike plaintiffs’ claims under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that defendants’ statements were protected petitioning activity in connection with public issues. The court also imposed a discovery sanction on plaintiffs for failing to respond to defendants’ interrogatories and requests for production, prohibiting plaintiffs from introducing evidence that should have been disclosed. The court subsequently awarded summary judgment to defendants on the remaining defamation claim, noting plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific defamatory statements or produce evidence of actual harm.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in granting the special motion to strike. The Supreme Court held that defendants’ statements were not made in connection with a public issue, as they concerned a private dispute between neighbors and did not affect a large number of people or involve a matter of widespread public interest. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings on the stricken claims. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the discovery sanction and the award of summary judgment on the remaining defamation claim, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Polak v. Ramirez-Diaz" on Justia Law

The University of Vermont appealed a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision that predoctoral fellows and trainees are employees under the State Employees Labor Relations Act (SELRA). United Auto Workers, Local 2322, filed a petition to represent a bargaining unit of select graduate students, including predoctoral fellows and trainees. The University objected, arguing that these individuals were not employees under SELRA. The Board held a three-day hearing and concluded that predoctoral fellows and trainees were employees, as they provided services for compensation and were supervised or monitored by the University.The Board found that approximately 1700 graduate students were enrolled at the University, with 57 being predoctoral fellows and trainees. These fellows and trainees received stipends, tuition reimbursement, and health insurance, and were required to adhere to specific program requirements, such as internships and professional development. However, they did not receive W-2s, and the University did not withhold taxes from their stipends. The Board concluded that all individuals in the proposed bargaining unit, including predoctoral fellows and trainees, were employees because they worked for the University in return for compensation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Board's findings did not support its conclusion that predoctoral fellows and trainees were employees. The Court noted that the Board made no findings that these individuals worked for the University or that their tasks benefited the University. The Court also highlighted the lack of findings regarding the University's control over the fellows and trainees' work. Consequently, the Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the issue. View "In re United Auto Workers, Local 2322" on Justia Law

Two state senators filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that Governor Phil Scott exceeded his authority by appointing Zoie Saunders as Secretary of Education on an interim basis without the Vermont Senate's advice and consent. The Governor appointed Saunders after the Senate rejected her initial nomination. The senators contended that the Governor's action bypassed the Senate's constitutional role.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the suit on the merits. The court found that the Governor had the constitutional authority to make interim appointments without the Senate's advice and consent. It concluded that the relevant statutes did not apply to interim appointments and rejected the senators' arguments about bad faith and the invalidity of Saunders' actions.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found it moot due to subsequent events. In November 2024, the Governor appointed Saunders as Secretary of Education while the Legislature was in recess, and her nomination was later submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. This appointment superseded the earlier interim appointment, rendering the controversy over the April 30 appointment no longer live. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that any opinion on the April 30 appointment would be advisory and that the case did not meet the criteria for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. View "McCormack v. Scott" on Justia Law

M.R., a minor, was substantiated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for sexual abuse of another minor. DCF sent the notice of substantiation to M.R.'s father, who requested an administrative review but did not participate in it. The review upheld the substantiation, and M.R.'s father did not appeal further. M.R. later sought a second review from the Human Services Board after the appeal period had expired, claiming he was unaware of the substantiation and the review. The Board dismissed his appeal as untimely.The Human Services Board found that M.R.'s appeal was not filed within the required 30-day period after the administrative review decision. M.R. argued that he was entitled to personal notice under the statute, that the lack of direct notice deprived him of due process, and that there was good cause for his delay in filing the appeal. The Board rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The Court held that the statutory requirement to send notice to the minor's parents or guardian was sufficient and did not violate due process. The Court found that the procedures in place were reasonably calculated to apprise the minor and their parents of the substantiation decision and their rights to request reviews. The Court also held that there was no good cause for M.R.'s untimely appeal, as the failure to appeal was due to factors within his father's control. Therefore, the Board's dismissal of the appeal as untimely was upheld. View "In re Appeal of M.R." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct, attempted assault on a law enforcement officer with bodily fluids, and misdemeanor unlawful mischief after an incident where he threatened a bystander and spat on an officer. Following his arrest, the defendant urinated, spat, and rubbed his genitals on various parts of his holding cell, leading to the cell's closure and $75 in clean-up costs.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, granted a judgment of acquittal on the disorderly conduct charge but denied acquittal on the attempted assault and unlawful mischief charges. The jury found the defendant guilty of both remaining charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that his actions did not constitute "damage" under the unlawful-mischief statute, 13 V.S.A. § 3701(c).The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the term "damage" in the statute should be interpreted broadly to include actions that impair the use or function of property, even if they do not cause physical harm. The Court found that the defendant's actions resulted in a substantial impairment of the holding cell's use, as it had to be taken out of service and cleaned, incurring additional costs. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant's conduct constituted "damage" under the statute.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the jury had sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of misdemeanor unlawful mischief. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law