Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The claimant worked for the defendant when he suffered a hernia in March 2021. The defendant accepted liability for the injury. Shortly after, the claimant left his job with the defendant and began working at Meeting House Furniture Restoration. In July, he also started working at Black Back Pub, holding both jobs concurrently until he left Meeting House in September 2021. The claimant continued working at the Pub until October 8, 2021, when he underwent hernia surgery. The parties agree that the claimant was disabled from work as of the surgery date.The Commissioner of Labor reviewed the case and determined that the claimant's disability benefits should be calculated based on his "average weekly wages" as defined by 21 V.S.A. § 650(a). The claimant argued that his wages from both Meeting House and Pub should be included in this calculation. However, the Commissioner applied Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Disease Rule 8.1500, which states that only wages from employers the claimant was working for at the time of disability should be included. The Commissioner concluded that Rule 8.1500 was a valid exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority and excluded the wages from Meeting House.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. The Court held that Rule 8.1500 is consistent with 21 V.S.A. § 650(a)(4), which requires that wages from concurrent employment be included in the average weekly wage calculation only if the claimant was employed by multiple employers at the time of injury. The Court found that the rule was within the Department’s legislative grant of authority and did not compromise the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, the rule was a valid exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority. View "Hill v. Agri-Mark, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Curtis Hier requested records from the Slate Valley Unified School District related to incidents of restraint and seclusion of students at Fair Haven Grade School. Specifically, he sought redacted copies of "Rule 4500 forms" from January to April 2021, documents related to the use of certain rooms between 2015 and 2022, and any redacted restraint and seclusion documents concerning the assistant principal. The school district denied the requests, claiming the records were student records and thus exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act.The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, denied the school district's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. The court found that the Rule 4500 forms were not student records but were meant for monitoring the use of restraint and seclusion in schools. It ordered the school district to disclose the forms with specific redactions to protect student privacy. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment to remove certain redactions.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Rule 4500 forms are categorically exempt from disclosure as student records under the Public Records Act. The court emphasized that the language of the student records exception is broad and unqualified, similar to its previous ruling in Caledonian-Record Publishing Co. v. Vermont State Colleges. The court concluded that the forms, which contain information related to specific students and incidents, fall squarely within the statutory exception for student records and are not subject to redaction or disclosure. View "Hier v. Slate Valley Unified School District" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of felony unlawful mischief. The charges stemmed from an incident where the defendant allegedly slapped the complainant's arm, pushed her into a wall, and slammed her onto the floor, causing her head to hit the ground. Additionally, the defendant was accused of damaging the complainant's laptop and phone.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, admitted a 911 caller's statement that the defendant was beating the complainant, excluded a statement by an investigating officer that the situation was "a wash," and did not strike the complainant's testimony that police had to tell her she had been assaulted. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to one-to-three years, suspended except for 120 days to serve, and five years of probation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court upheld the admission of the 911 caller's statement, finding it admissible as a present sense impression and rationally based on the caller's perception. The court also upheld the exclusion of the officer's statement, agreeing that it was an opinion on the defendant's guilt, which was for the jury to decide. The court found no plain error in the trial court's failure to strike the complainant's testimony about the police chief's explanation.However, the court found that the jury instruction on the intent required for the unlawful mischief charge was erroneous. The instruction allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty if he acted knowingly, which is a lower standard than the statute's requirement of intent. This error was not harmless, as the defendant's intent was the central issue. Consequently, the court reversed and remanded the unlawful mischief conviction for a new trial but affirmed the other convictions. View "State v. Lyddy" on Justia Law

Employee Paul Westcott was terminated by his employer, Mack Molding Co., Inc., for lying about secretly recording conversations at work. Westcott sued the employer, claiming that his recording activities were protected under Vermont’s Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and Worker’s Compensation Act (WCA), and also alleged breach of contract and promissory estoppel.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the employer. The court concluded that Westcott’s recording activities were not protected under FEPA or WCA. It also found that Westcott could not sustain his breach-of-contract claim because the employee handbook clearly stated that employment was at-will and could be terminated for any reason. Additionally, the court held that Westcott’s promissory estoppel claim failed because his termination was not connected to any promise made by the employer regarding his return to work after short-term disability leave.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Westcott’s covert recording of workplace conversations did not constitute protected activity under FEPA or WCA. The court also agreed that the employee handbook did not create a binding contract that altered Westcott’s at-will employment status. Furthermore, the court found no basis for the promissory estoppel claim, as there was no specific promise breached by the employer related to Westcott’s termination.In summary, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that Westcott’s recording activities were not protected, his employment was at-will, and there was no breach of a specific promise that could support a promissory estoppel claim. View "Westcott v. Mack Molding, Co., Inc." on Justia Law

S.S. was receiving temporary housing assistance through the Department for Children and Families (DCF) and staying at a shelter. After a confrontation with shelter staff over a mistakenly reassigned locker, S.S. was asked to vacate the shelter without prior warning. Consequently, DCF imposed a thirty-day period of ineligibility for further temporary housing assistance due to the shelter-rule violation. S.S. requested a fair hearing to challenge this decision, and a hearing officer recommended reversing the ineligibility period, which DCF subsequently did.S.S. then filed a motion with the Human Services Board to adopt the hearing officer’s findings and issue a final order. The hearing officer questioned the mootness of the case since DCF had already lifted the ineligibility period. The Board ultimately dismissed the case as moot, concluding there was no further relief it could provide since DCF had already granted S.S. the requested relief.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court held that the Board lacked the statutory authority to provide the relief S.S. sought, as the Board can only affirm, modify, or reverse DCF decisions and provide appropriate relief. Since DCF had already reversed the ineligibility period, there was no live controversy for the Board to address. The Court also found that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply, as S.S. did not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of being subjected to the same action again. Consequently, the Board’s dismissal of the case was appropriate. View "In re appeal of S.S." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendant, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after the defendant reported to the police that the plaintiff had sexually and physically assaulted her. This report led to the plaintiff being criminally charged, arrested, and held without bail for almost two years before being acquitted. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's report was false and made with malicious intent to harm him.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged as communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding. The court also granted the defendant's special motion to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1041, and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as an exercise of her right to petition the government.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, agreeing that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged. The Court held that public policy supports extending absolute privilege to such statements to encourage free and full disclosure to law enforcement without fear of civil liability. The Court also affirmed the trial court's application of the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the defendant's statements were made in connection with a public issue and were an exercise of her constitutional rights. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court had not adequately addressed. View "Talandar v. Manchester-Murphy" on Justia Law

The Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) proposed a project to reconstruct the interchange between Interstate 89 and U.S. Routes 2 and 7 in Colchester, Vermont, into a Diverging Diamond Interchange (DDI). Timberlake Associates, LLP, the landowner of a gas station at the southeast corner of the interchange, contested the necessity of the land takings required for the project. Timberlake argued that AOT did not fulfill its pre-suit obligation to negotiate and that the trial court erred in its determination of necessity.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a four-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Timberlake failed to demonstrate bad faith or abuse of discretion by AOT. The court found that AOT had satisfied its burden of demonstrating the necessity of taking Timberlake’s property to the extent proposed. Timberlake appealed the decision, arguing that AOT did not adequately consider the statutory factors of necessity and failed to negotiate in good faith.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court found that AOT presented sufficient evidence showing it considered the statutory factors, including the adequacy of other property and locations, the effect on the landowner’s convenience, and the environmental impacts. The Court also determined that AOT’s selection of the DDI design was justified based on its superior performance in increasing capacity, reducing congestion, and improving safety compared to other alternatives. Additionally, the Court concluded that AOT made reasonable efforts to negotiate with Timberlake before filing suit, as required by statute.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining the necessity of the takings and that AOT fulfilled its pre-suit obligation to negotiate. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

An applicant sought admission to the Vermont Bar through a transferred Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) score after passing the UBE in Maine on her sixth attempt. Vermont Rule 13(c) requires that a passing UBE score be achieved within no more than four sittings. The applicant requested a waiver of this requirement, arguing that her unique circumstances and qualifications warranted an exception.The Board of Bar Examiners denied the applicant's request for admission, stating that Rule 13(c) does not allow for a waiver of the four-sittings requirement. The applicant appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the court should read an implied waiver provision into Rule 13(c) and that the absence of such a provision was an oversight.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, holding that the plain language of Rule 13(c) does not allow for a waiver and that it would be inappropriate to read such a provision into the rule. The court emphasized that the rules are designed to ensure that attorneys meet the standards for professional competence and that limiting the number of attempts to pass the bar examination is rationally connected to this goal. The court also noted that the applicant's arguments regarding fairness and public policy are best directed toward the Board's formal rulemaking process. The court rejected the applicant's request to waive the rule and admit her, stating that it would be inconsistent with the plain language of the rule and the established process for assessing professional competence. View "In re Granger" on Justia Law

Dawna Pederzani operated the Vermont English Bulldog Rescue from her home in Williston, Vermont, providing temporary foster care to rescued dogs. Her home is located in a residential zoning district governed by the Williston Development Bylaw. In September 2022, she received a notice of zoning violation for operating the rescue without a permit. She applied for an "after-the-fact" zoning permit as a "home business," which was denied by the Development Review Board. She then filed a new application in January 2023, which was initially approved by the zoning administrator but later reversed by the Board upon appeal by her neighbors.The Environmental Division granted summary judgment in favor of the neighbors, affirming the denial of the home-business permit. The court held that the bylaw's home-business provision prohibited any outdoor use for the business in the residential zoning district. It rejected Pederzani's argument that her operation qualified as a "kennel," which the bylaw allows in residential districts, reasoning that the kennel provision was limited by the outdoor restriction for home businesses.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and reversed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the rescue operation qualifies as a kennel under the bylaw, which allows kennels as home businesses in residential districts. The Court found that the kennel provision, which contemplates some outdoor use, should be read as an exception to the general home-business provision that prohibits outdoor workspaces. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Pederzani Administrative Appeal" on Justia Law

A group of Burlington residents appealed a summary judgment order from the Environmental Division that upheld a permit for the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Parish Charitable Trust to demolish church structures on its property. The residents argued that the court erred in concluding that 24 V.S.A. § 4413(a)(1)(C) prevented the City of Burlington from applying its Comprehensive Development Ordinance (CDO) to restrain the demolition. They also contended that the court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery regarding the pending sale of the property to a nonreligious buyer, asserting that the sale was relevant to the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C).The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the Trust, finding that the intended functional use of the property was for religious purposes, specifically the deconsecration of the Cathedral through demolition, which was an ecclesiastical process. The court concluded that applying the CDO would interfere with this intended functional use. The court also denied the residents' motion to compel discovery, determining that the information sought was unrelated to the issue on appeal, which was limited to whether § 4413(a)(1)(C) exempted the property from regulation under the CDO.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C) depends on the intended functional use of the property at the time of the application, not on the identity of the owner or potential future uses. The Court found that the Trust's intended use of the property for religious deconsecration through demolition was protected under § 4413(a)(1)(C). The Court also upheld the denial of the motion to compel discovery, as the future use of the property by a potential buyer was irrelevant to the current application. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the Trust was affirmed. View "In re Cathedral of the Immaculate Parish Charitable Trust Appeal" on Justia Law