Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Landowners Stephen and Sharon Wille Padnos appealed two Environmental Division decisions that granted summary judgment to landowner Jason Struthers. The court ruled that the City of Essex Junction could not regulate Struthers' duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations. The court found that the duck-raising operation was exempt from municipal regulation under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) as it constituted a commercial farming operation subject to the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) Rule. Additionally, the court concluded that the City could not enforce its zoning regulations on Struthers' cannabis-cultivation operations under 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2).The City’s zoning regulations do not permit agricultural, farming, or cannabis-cultivation establishments in the Residential-1 Zoning District. The City’s zoning officer initially declined to enforce these regulations against Struthers. The City’s Development Review Board (DRB) reversed the zoning officer’s decision regarding the duck-raising operation but upheld it for the cannabis-cultivation operation. The Environmental Division later granted summary judgment in favor of Struthers in both cases, concluding that the City could not regulate the duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that neither 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) nor 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2) exempts Struthers' operations from all municipal regulation. The court clarified that § 4413(d)(1)(A) prohibits municipal regulation of the specific agricultural practices required by the RAPs Rule, not all farming activities subject to the RAPs Rule. Similarly, § 869(f)(2) prevents municipal regulation of licensed outdoor cannabis cultivators only concerning the water-quality standards established by the RAPs Rule, not all aspects of cannabis cultivation. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division’s decisions and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re 8 Taft Street DRB & NOV Appeals" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law

Anna Dewdney, a children's book author, created a revocable trust in 2011, designating her daughters, Berol and Cordelia Dewdney, and her romantic partner, Ralph Duncan, IV, as beneficiaries. Initially, the trust allocated 40% of the income to each daughter and 20% to Duncan. Anna amended the trust several times, ultimately increasing Duncan's share to 50% and reducing each daughter's share to 25%. Anna passed away in 2016, and Duncan became the sole trustee. Plaintiffs allege Duncan pressured Anna to increase his share and entered into an oral agreement to make them his sole heirs in exchange for the increased distribution.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to Duncan on all claims brought by the plaintiffs, including intentional interference with expectation of inheritance (IIEI), breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and constructive fraud. The court ruled that plaintiffs needed to seek a remedy in probate court for their IIEI claim, failed to establish breach of contract due to anticipatory repudiation, could not show detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, were receiving benefits from the trust for unjust enrichment, and did not meet the legal requirements for constructive fraud.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It recognized the tort of IIEI but held that plaintiffs must first seek a remedy in probate court due to the exclusive jurisdiction over trust administration. The court found no anticipatory breach of contract as Duncan's statement did not constitute a positive and unequivocal refusal to perform. It ruled promissory estoppel inapplicable due to the existence of a contract and lack of detrimental reliance. The unjust enrichment claim was barred as it involved trust administration, and the constructive fraud claim failed for similar jurisdictional reasons. View "Dewdney v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Landowners Anne and Mark Guillemette appealed an Environmental Division order denying their motion to dismiss neighbor Michael Casey’s appeal and remanding the matter to the Monkton Development Review Board (DRB) for consideration on the merits. Casey had challenged the zoning administrator’s decision that the Guillemettes’ wood-processing facility was exempt from enforcement due to the fifteen-year limitations period. Casey filed his appeal late, relying on incorrect instructions from the zoning administrator.The Environmental Division concluded that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) allowed Casey’s appeal to proceed despite the untimely filing, as disallowing the appeal would result in manifest injustice. The court remanded the matter to the DRB for consideration on the merits.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Environmental Division’s decision. The Supreme Court held that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) does not apply to appeals from the decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as zoning administrators. Instead, it applies only to appeals from municipal regulatory proceedings to the Environmental Division. Therefore, the finality provision at 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred Casey’s untimely appeal, and the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction to permit the appeal to proceed. View "In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over parental rights and responsibilities following the divorce of a couple with two children. The mother and father began their relationship in 2011, moved to Vermont in 2014, and married in 2016. They have two children born in 2016 and 2018. The father was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 2016 and has been on disability since 2018. The mother also faced serious health issues, including thyroid cancer, and has not worked since 2018. In 2020, the mother expressed a desire to move to Michigan for family support, which led to conflicts and eventual separation in 2021. The father filed for divorce in 2022.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Family Division, awarded primary legal rights and responsibilities to the father, citing the mother's proposed relocation to Michigan as a factor. The court found that the children were well-adjusted to their current environment in Vermont and that the father's parents played a significant role in their lives. The court also granted the mother the right to make medical and dental decisions for the children to encourage her continued involvement.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found several issues with the lower court's decision. The court noted that the family division did not adequately consider the primary-care-provider factor, made erroneous findings regarding the mother's proposed move to Michigan, and divided legal responsibilities without sufficient reasoning. Additionally, the court failed to explicitly assign physical rights and responsibilities. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the father was less willing and able to foster a positive relationship between the children and the mother but reversed and remanded the award of parental rights and responsibilities for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Gordon v. Fogell" on Justia Law

Applicant sought permission from the Town’s Development Review Board (DRB) to build a senior-living facility in Castleton, Vermont, which included independent-living, assisted-living, and memory-care units. The DRB approved the project with conditions, including that each unit have a kitchen, but did not approve the memory-care unit, classifying it as a nursing home, which exceeded the allowed number of residents.Applicant appealed to the Environmental Division, which reviewed the case de novo. The court struck the condition requiring kitchens in each unit and concluded that the project was a multi-family dwelling, not a nursing home, based on state law definitions. Neighbors did not appeal but challenged the project’s height and the classification of the memory-care unit. The court dismissed the height challenge for lack of jurisdiction and found that the project met the multi-family dwelling definition.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision on the jurisdictional issue, agreeing that the height challenge was outside the scope of the court’s review. However, it found that the Environmental Division erred in using state law definitions instead of the town’s zoning bylaws to classify the memory-care unit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding the memory-care unit and remanded for further findings on whether it met the bylaw’s definition of a nursing home, which requires in-house nursing care for residents suffering from illness or disease. The court also upheld the Environmental Division’s decision to strike the kitchen condition for the independent and assisted-living units but required further consideration of the memory-care unit’s compliance with the cooking requirement in the zoning ordinance. View "In re Dousevicz, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant, Stacey Vaillancourt, operated a daycare facility in her home. In January 2019, six-month-old H.B. was dropped off at the daycare. On January 24, 2019, H.B. was found unresponsive in her crib and later declared dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed that H.B. died from diphenhydramine intoxication, a substance found in medications like Benadryl, which is not recommended for infants without a prescription. H.B. had not been prescribed diphenhydramine, and her parents and other caregivers denied giving it to her.The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Criminal Division, denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found her guilty of involuntary manslaughter and cruelty to a child with death resulting. The defendant renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, which was again denied by the trial court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts. The evidence showed that the defendant, an experienced childcare provider, administered diphenhydramine to H.B., leading to her death. The court found that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant acted with criminal negligence and willfully exposed H.B. to danger, knowing the risks involved.The court also rejected the defendant's arguments that the verdicts were inconsistent and violated double jeopardy. The court explained that the mental states required for the two charges were not mutually exclusive and that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments for the same conduct under different statutes. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of video evidence showing H.B.'s developmental capacity, as it was relevant to the State's case and not unduly prejudicial. View "State v. Vaillancourt" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) increased the rental fees for hangar space at state-owned airports. Five tenants, who own hangar facilities at the Northeast Kingdom International Airport and the Stowe-Morrisville State Airport, appealed the rate increases to the Transportation Board. They argued that the rent increase did not comply with the terms of their leases and was arbitrary. The leases allowed AOT to adjust rent based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), current market value for the land, and maintenance costs for the airport. The tenants contended that AOT improperly considered changes outside the previous lease term.The Transportation Board consolidated the tenants' appeals and reviewed the administrative records and memoranda submitted by both parties. The Board found that AOT had invested significantly in airport improvements and conducted a market-value analysis for leased space. However, the Board noted that details of the analysis were not included in the administrative record. The Board concluded that AOT was permitted to consider changes to market value and maintenance costs outside of the prior lease term but admonished AOT to provide a clearer analysis in the future.The tenants appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the rent increases were arbitrary and capricious due to a lack of transparent methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's conclusion that AOT could consider changes outside the prior lease term but reversed and remanded the decision concerning the fairness of the rent increases. The Court held that the Board should have sought a complete record from AOT to determine whether the rent levels were fair and conducted a new adjudication consistent with this opinion. View "In re State Airport Hangar Lease Disputes" on Justia Law

In April 2019, the respondent, Jessica Morrill, pled nolo contendere to assault and robbery. In September 2023, she filed a motion in the criminal division to vacate her conviction, arguing that it was obtained as a result of her being a victim of human trafficking, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction and that the motion should have been filed in the civil division. The criminal division concluded it had jurisdiction and granted the motion, finding that the respondent met the statutory requirements for relief.The State filed a notice of appeal, acknowledging it did not have a right to appeal under the relevant statutes and rules but requested the Vermont Supreme Court to construe the appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief. The Vermont Supreme Court granted the State's request for review due to the importance of the issue and the purely legal nature of the question.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the criminal division has jurisdiction over motions to vacate convictions under 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme, including the context and language used by the legislature, indicates that the criminal division is the appropriate venue for such motions. The Court noted that the legislature explicitly assigned jurisdiction to the civil division in other sections of the statute but did not do so for § 2658. Additionally, the Court found that the nature of the relief sought under § 2658, which includes expungement, aligns with the criminal division's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "State v. Morrill" on Justia Law

James Needham and Roxanne O. Smith purchased a residential property as joint tenants. Smith later vacated the property and transferred her interest to the Roxanne O. Smith Trust. After Smith's death, both parties filed crossclaims for partition. The trial court assigned the property to Needham and awarded the Trust an equitable sum for its interest. The court declined to offset Needham's contributions by the fair-market rental value for the time Smith left the property, concluding that Needham did not prevent Smith from accessing the property and that the Trust had not established the fair-market rental value.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, held a two-day bench trial and found that Smith left the property due to fear of Needham but was not denied access. The court assigned the property to Needham, who was to pay the Trust for its interest. The court rejected the Trust's request for an offset due to ouster, finding no evidence that Needham excluded Smith from the property. The court also found that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property, as the trustee's testimony lacked sufficient foundation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property. The court noted that the trustee's testimony was insufficient to establish rental value and that the trial court was not obligated to assign it any persuasive value. The court also declined to remand the case for additional evidence on rental value, as the Trust did not demonstrate any reason why remand was warranted. View "Needham v. Smith Trust" on Justia Law