Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, a felony under Vermont law. At arraignment, the State sought to have the defendant held without bail pending trial, arguing that the charged offense involved an act of violence, which would permit pretrial detention under Vermont’s constitutional and statutory exceptions to the general right to bail. The parties agreed that the offense was a felony and that the evidence of guilt was great, but the defendant contended that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child did not qualify as a crime involving an act of violence for purposes of denying bail.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, denied the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail. The court concluded that, despite a statutory provision designating lewd or lascivious conduct with a child as a violent act for bail purposes, the offense did not have an essential element involving an act of violence as required by the Vermont Constitution. The court relied on prior single-justice decisions, including State v. Madigan, which interpreted “violence” narrowly to require physical force or contact, and declined to give effect to the legislative designation in 13 V.S.A. § 2602(f).On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the definition of “violence” in the context of bail eligibility. The Court held that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child is a felony with an element involving an act of violence, as the offense inherently involves an abusive or unjust use of power over a child, even if physical contact is not required. The Court overruled the contrary reasoning in State v. Madigan, reaffirmed a broader definition of violence, and concluded that the statutory designation in § 2602(f) was consistent with constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on the State’s request to hold the defendant without bail. View "State v. Shores" on Justia Law

A cannabis cultivation business was licensed to operate in Vermont but became the subject of regulatory action after laboratory testing detected myclobutanil, a prohibited pesticide, in its products. The business had previously entered into a corrective action plan with the regulatory board following similar violations in 2023, agreeing to remediation, penalties, and compliance measures. In 2024, after further detections of myclobutanil in both retail and on-site samples, the regulatory board issued a notice of violation with immediate effect, including a stop-sale order for all of the business’s products, a recall requirement, and a proposed license revocation.The business contested the notice and requested a hearing before the Cannabis Control Board. At the hearing, it raised several arguments, including challenges to the Board’s authority under the Vermont Constitution, claims of bias by the Board chair, and alleged due process violations. The Board chair denied a motion for recusal, and after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the Board found that the business had violated its corrective action plan and used unauthorized pesticides. The Board dismissed one violation as duplicative but upheld others, ultimately revoking the business’s license. The business appealed to an appellate officer, who affirmed the Board’s decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that precludes reweighing factual findings unless clearly erroneous or affected by legal error. The Court held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing a stop-sale order for all products, that the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable, and that the business failed to preserve or adequately brief its constitutional and evidentiary arguments. The Court also found no due process violation regarding the impartiality of the Board chair, as the business did not make an evidentiary record to support its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of the business’s license. View "In re Holland Cannabis, LLC" on Justia Law

Three organizations—Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust, Lake Bomoseen Association, and SOLitude Lake Management—jointly applied for a permit from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to use pesticides in Lake Bomoseen to control an invasive species. Lindsey Waterhouse, who does not own property on the lake but lives nearby and is a board member of one of the applicant organizations, supported the application during public comment. ANR denied the permit, finding the proposed pesticide use posed unacceptable risks to the environment.After the denial, Mr. Waterhouse filed an appeal to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, on his own behalf as a “person aggrieved.” None of the permit applicants appealed the denial. The Environmental Division questioned whether Mr. Waterhouse, who was not an applicant, could maintain the appeal in the absence of the actual applicants. The court also addressed motions from the Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust to intervene and to be represented by Mr. Waterhouse, a nonattorney, but denied both, finding he was not authorized or qualified to represent the organization.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Division’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Waterhouse lacked standing to appeal because he did not demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from the general public and could not show that the court could redress his alleged injury, especially since the permit applicants were not pursuing the application. The Court also concluded that Mr. Waterhouse lacked standing to challenge the denial of the motions on behalf of the Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust, as he was not authorized to represent the organization’s interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Lake Bomoseen Association and Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust Denial" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a residential property in Vermont after the defendant defaulted on a $365,000 loan originally issued by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff, and the bank alleged it was the holder of the note. However, the copy of the note attached to the complaint was made out to the original lender and lacked any indorsement. Over the years, the case was delayed by mediation, bankruptcy, and various motions. At trial, the plaintiff produced the original note with an undated indorsement in blank, but could not establish when it became the holder of the note.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff’s initial summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiff had not established standing under the Uniform Commercial Code. A later summary judgment was vacated due to procedural errors. After a hearing, the court found the plaintiff was currently a holder of the note and that the defendant had defaulted, but concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, as required by U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Kimball. Judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff’s post-judgment motion to designate the judgment as without prejudice was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that a foreclosure plaintiff must demonstrate standing by showing it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, declining to overrule or limit Kimball. The Court also declined to address whether the judgment should be designated as without prejudice, leaving preclusion consequences to future proceedings. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Quinn" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with several offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, grand larceny, unlawful mischief, carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony, and assault and robbery, following an incident in which he ran at a teenager who was leaving a friend’s house, causing the teenager to abandon his belongings out of fear. The defendant then destroyed some of the teenager’s property and took the rest. The complainant testified that the defendant appeared to be holding a knife, which contributed to his fear and decision to flee.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, presided over the trial. After the State presented its evidence, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all but the unlawful-mischief charge, arguing insufficient evidence, particularly regarding the presence of a knife and intent to place the complainant in fear. The court granted acquittal on the grand-larceny charge due to insufficient evidence of value but denied acquittal on the remaining charges. The jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony but convicted him of unlawful mischief, larceny from the person, and assault and robbery. The defendant’s post-trial motion to vacate the assault and robbery conviction, based on alleged inconsistency with the acquittals, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of assault and robbery, even without proof that he possessed a knife. The Court also held that the jury instructions did not require proof of a knife and that the verdicts were not inconsistent. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a vehicle late at night on a rural road in Vermont, where the passenger-side wheels of the vehicle left the paved portion of the road twice in quick succession. The road had only a center line and no edge markings. The officer, who had extensive training and experience in detecting impaired driving, interpreted the vehicle’s movements as erratic and indicative of possible impairment. The officer stopped the vehicle, and the driver was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license. The officer’s observations were recorded on the cruiser’s camera.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding that the observed driving behavior—specifically, the vehicle’s wheels leaving the paved road twice—constituted erratic driving and provided reasonable suspicion of impairment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the DUI charge and appealed the denial of her suppression motion to the Vermont Supreme Court. The charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed with prejudice.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether those facts met the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, specifically the erratic driving observed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law

A lender initiated a foreclosure action against a homeowner after the homeowner defaulted on a mortgage loan originally obtained in 2007. The mortgage was assigned several times before the foreclosure action began, and the lender’s predecessor filed suit in 2015. After a trial in 2018, the Vermont Superior Court, Civil Division, found in favor of the lender, concluding that the lender held the original note and mortgage at the time of filing and at trial, and that the homeowner had defaulted. The court issued a judgment of foreclosure by judicial sale, setting a redemption period for the homeowner.Following the expiration of the redemption period, the case was temporarily dismissed due to the homeowner’s bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy discharge, the lender successfully moved to reopen the case. The parties attempted mediation, which was unsuccessful. The lender then sought to substitute a new party as plaintiff due to post-judgment assignments of the mortgage, but later withdrew this request after issues arose regarding the validity of the assignments and the status of the note. The court vacated the substitution and ordered the lender to prove who the real party in interest was, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal for lack of prosecution. After a hearing, the court found the lender failed to establish the real party in interest, dismissed the case with prejudice, and vacated the foreclosure judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. The Supreme Court found no evidence of undue delay or failure to pursue the case by the lender, and concluded that the action could continue in the name of the original plaintiff under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the foreclosure judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ditech Financial LLC v. Brisson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with aggravated stalking, violation of an abuse-prevention order, and violation of conditions of release. The charges stemmed from allegations that the defendant, who was subject to a relief-from-abuse order and criminal conditions of release due to an earlier assault, approached the complainant in a Walmart parking lot, maintained eye contact, circled the lot, and parked behind her, in violation of the orders prohibiting contact.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Criminal Division, granted the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail, finding that aggravated stalking was a felony involving an act of violence, as required by the Vermont Constitution and relevant statutes. The defendant appealed the hold-without-bail order. A specially assigned single Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and concluded that aggravated stalking did not necessarily involve an act of violence as an element of the offense. The single Justice reversed the hold-without-bail order, imposed interim conditions, and remanded the case for the trial court to set conditions of release. The trial court then imposed conditions of release. The State subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the single Justice’s order.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the State had a statutory right to appeal the single Justice’s decision. The Court held that the State does not have a statutory right to appeal a single Justice’s order reversing a hold-without-bail decision under the relevant statutes. The Court reasoned that the statutory language only provides the State with a right to appeal from trial court orders regarding release, not from decisions of a single Justice of the Supreme Court. As a result, the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal. View "State v. Beldiman" on Justia Law

Central Vermont Medical Center (CVMC) submitted its proposed budget for fiscal year 2025, seeking an 11.9% increase in net patient service revenue (NPR) and a 5.5% increase in commercial rates, both of which exceeded the benchmarks set by the Green Mountain Care Board. The Board’s benchmarks, established in its annual guidance, were 3.5% for NPR growth and 3.4% for commercial rate growth. The Board required hospitals exceeding these benchmarks to provide credible justification, such as evidence of improved access or quality of care. CVMC’s submission was reviewed through hearings and public comment, during which the Board found that CVMC’s justifications were insufficient, particularly regarding efficiency, productivity, and cost containment.The Green Mountain Care Board, after considering the evidence and statutory obligations, modified CVMC’s budget, allowing a 6% NPR growth and a 3.4% commercial rate increase. The Board found that CVMC could achieve financial sustainability through cost reductions and improved productivity rather than higher price increases. The Board imposed specific terms and conditions on the budget, emphasizing the need for efficient operations and balancing financial needs with statewide health care affordability and access.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision under a deferential standard, presuming the Board’s actions valid unless shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. The Court rejected CVMC’s arguments that the Board acted with unfettered discretion, violated procedural due process, or was required to regulate on a per-capita basis. The Court found that the Board’s process was guided by statutory standards, rules, and annual guidance, and that CVMC had adequate notice and opportunity to participate. The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the Board’s decision. View "In re Central Vermont Medical Center Fiscal Year 2025" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder of his wife and second-degree attempted murder of his mother-in-law after a violent attack with a meat cleaver in October 2017. Following his arrest, he was evaluated by multiple mental health experts, all of whom opined that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. The initial prosecution was dismissed without prejudice by the Chittenden County State’s Attorney, who concluded there was insufficient evidence to rebut the insanity defense. After the defendant was released from psychiatric care, the Vermont Attorney General refiled the same charges.In the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant moved to dismiss the renewed charges, arguing that the prior dismissal barred further prosecution under principles of collateral estoppel and judicial admissions, and that the Attorney General lacked authority to refile. The trial court denied these motions, finding that dismissal without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits and did not preclude reprosecution. The case proceeded to trial, where the defendant raised an insanity defense, but the jury convicted him on both counts.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant raised five claims: (1) the prior dismissal barred the second prosecution; (2) his rights to a public trial and to participate in his defense were infringed; (3) the jury instructions were confusing and incomplete; (4) the court failed to protect jury impartiality by allowing unsupervised access to a graphic video; and (5) the court did not ensure competent language interpretation. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had authority to refile charges, that dismissal without prejudice did not bar reprosecution, and that collateral estoppel did not apply. The Court found no reversible error in the conduct of jury selection, jury instructions, video access, or interpretation services, and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Gurung" on Justia Law