Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves two sisters, Stacey Martin and Christine Lyon, who inherited their family residence as tenants in common after their father's death in 2019. Their mother lived on the property until her death in 2022, after which the sisters agreed to prepare the property for sale. They decided to restore the property, with Christine performing most of the labor. However, their relationship deteriorated, leading Stacey to file a complaint seeking partition of the property.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, held a one-day bench trial and issued written findings. The court calculated the contributions each sister made towards the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, and agreed-upon maintenance and improvements. It credited Christine for her labor but excluded her discretionary improvements due to lack of evidence of increased property value. The court concluded that Christine's share of the equity was $187,450 and ordered her to take assignment of the property by paying Stacey $92,550. If Christine chose not to take assignment, the property would be sold, and the proceeds divided.Christine appealed the denial of her request for prejudgment interest, arguing it should be awarded as of right under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or as a matter of discretion. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is not available for partition awards, as partition is an equitable remedy, not an action for damages. The court concluded that the credits for Christine's contributions were part of the equitable distribution of the property and did not qualify as damages, thus not triggering prejudgment interest. View "Martin v. Lyon" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to subdivide a 161.6-acre property in Westminster, Vermont, to create two residential lots with frontage on Old Codding Road, a private road discontinued in 1893. The Westminster Development Review Board (DRB) granted the subdivision permit, finding that the applicant had made a "threshold showing" of the right to use Old Codding Road. Neighbors appealed, arguing that the applicant did not have a legal right-of-way over the road.The Environmental Division affirmed the DRB's decision, concluding that the applicant had made the necessary threshold showing of a right to use the road based on historical use by the applicant's predecessors and other neighbors without deeded rights-of-way. The court declined to fully evaluate whether the road was formally laid out before its discontinuance, citing a lack of jurisdiction to determine private property rights.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Environmental Division erred in requiring only a threshold showing and in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence of an easement or right-of-way. The Supreme Court held that the Environmental Division has jurisdiction to decide whether the applicant has a permanent easement or right-of-way, as required by the Vermont Planning and Development Act and the Westminster Zoning Bylaws. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the permit applicant to establish the necessary easement or right-of-way.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division's decision and remanded the case for a determination of whether the applicant has an easement or right-of-way over Old Codding Road. The Environmental Division must now fully evaluate the evidence regarding the road's layout and the applicant's claimed right-of-way. View "In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses, Jennifer Knapp and Timothy Dasler, who have a minor daughter together. After their divorce, Dasler engaged in extensive litigation against Knapp, including multiple appeals, motions, and lawsuits in various courts. Knapp sought an order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation, arguing that his filings were intended to harass and burden her.The Windsor Unit, Family Division of the Superior Court issued a final divorce order in August 2018, awarding Knapp primary custody of their daughter. Dasler appealed this order, but it was affirmed. He continued to file various motions and appeals, including attempts to modify custody and hold Knapp in contempt, all of which were denied. Dasler also initiated lawsuits in New Hampshire and federal courts, which were dismissed. In March 2023, Knapp moved for sanctions against Dasler, claiming his filings were abusive, but the court denied the motion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division’s order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation. The court found that Dasler’s repetitive filings were made to harass and intimidate Knapp, meeting the criteria for abusive litigation under 15 V.S.A. § 1181. The court concluded that Dasler’s actions, including attempts to relitigate final orders and filing numerous motions for reconsideration, were abusive. The order restricted Dasler from filing motions or engaging in litigation against Knapp unless represented by a licensed attorney or with prefiling approval from the court. The court also dismissed Dasler’s pending motions as abusive and denied his claims that the court erred in its factual findings and procedural rulings. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. The charges stemmed from allegations made by J.P., the son of the defendant’s girlfriend, who claimed that the defendant had sexually abused him over several years. The abuse allegedly began when J.P. was around four or five years old and continued intermittently until early 2018. The allegations surfaced after a physical altercation between the defendant and J.P.’s mother, which led to the defendant moving out of the home. J.P. disclosed the abuse to his mother and school employees shortly after the defendant left.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, initially tried the defendant, resulting in an acquittal on one count and a mistrial on the remaining counts. Before the second trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of J.P.’s “concerning behavior,” including possession of pornography, arguing it was relevant to show an alternative motive for J.P.’s allegations. The court excluded this evidence under Vermont’s Rape Shield Law, which prohibits evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct. The court also found that the evidence was not probative and would likely confuse the jury. The second trial resulted in convictions on the remaining counts.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the exclusion of evidence regarding J.P.’s “concerning behavior” was proper under the Rape Shield Law and that the evidence was not relevant to the case. The court also found that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments, which the defendant claimed were prejudicial, did not amount to plain error. The statements did not violate the “golden rule” prohibition, as they were aimed at supporting the credibility of J.P.’s testimony rather than asking the jurors to place themselves in J.P.’s position. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Parker" on Justia Law

K.M., an adult with multiple disabilities, including autism and a seizure disorder, has been receiving Medicaid-funded developmental disabilities services for over twenty years. These services, provided by Washington County Mental Health Services (WCMHS), were supposed to include more than thirty hours of community support each week. However, since March 2020, K.M. has only received two to five hours of support weekly, leading to negative health effects.K.M. petitioned the Human Services Board to order the Department of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living (DAIL) to provide the full services he is entitled to. The Board dismissed his petition, stating it failed to specify the action required for compliance and that an order to provide services without available staff was too vague. The Board also interpreted K.M.'s request as seeking a broader policy change, which it deemed outside its authority, citing Husrefovich v. Department of Aging & Independent Living.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Board's dismissal. The Court held that the Board has the statutory authority to order DAIL to provide the services K.M. is entitled to under federal and state law. The Court clarified that while the Board cannot issue broad policy injunctions, it can provide specific relief to individuals. The Court found K.M.'s request for services clear and specific enough to inform DAIL of the required action. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Appeal of K.M." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of cruelty to a child after a jury trial. The case involved a one-year-old child, O.S., who lived with his mother and the defendant. O.S. began showing symptoms of a stomach bug and was later found to have multiple fractures and bruises, which medical experts determined were consistent with child abuse. The mother recalled incidents where the defendant was rough with O.S. and noticed unexplained bruises. The defendant suggested that O.S. might have been injured accidentally during a shower.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, allowed the State to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for cruelty to a child from 2012 to demonstrate intent. The court excluded evidence of a 2009 incident due to lack of a conviction. The jury was instructed to consider the prior conviction only for assessing the defendant’s intent and not as evidence of propensity. The jury found the defendant guilty.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the admission of the prior conviction did not constitute plain error. The evidence was relevant to proving the defendant’s intent, a necessary element of the charge. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Vermont Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also noted that the trial court provided limiting instructions to the jury to mitigate any potential prejudice. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the admission of the prior conviction did not affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings. View "State v. Nicholas" on Justia Law

In this case, a mother sought to set aside a family division order that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, G.L. The mother alleged that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) committed fraud on the court by withholding information about G.L.'s foster parents. The trial court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Family Division, initially terminated the mother's parental rights in December 2021, citing her volatile behavior and inconsistent contact with G.L. The court found that the mother had not made sufficient progress toward her case plan goals and that it was in G.L.'s best interests to terminate parental rights. The mother appealed this decision, but the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the termination order in June 2022.The mother then filed a motion to set aside the termination order, arguing that DCF had committed fraud on the court by not disclosing negative information about the foster parents. She claimed that this information was relevant to the termination proceedings and that DCF's failure to disclose it constituted fraud. The family division held an evidentiary hearing and found that DCF's practice of storing certain records separately was not intended to hide information. The court also found that the DCF worker and attorneys were not aware of the negative information during the termination proceedings.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division's decision. The court held that fraud on the court requires a showing of intentional deception or a deliberate scheme to defraud. The court found that the mother failed to prove that DCF engaged in such conduct. The court also noted that the information about the foster parents was not central to the termination decision, which was based primarily on the mother's inability to resume parenting within a reasonable time. Therefore, the court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's motion to set aside the termination order. View "In re G.L." on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

Daniel Pomerantz appealed the Cannabis Control Board’s denial of his request to waive application and licensing fees for his proposed commercial cannabis cultivation establishment. Pomerantz claimed he qualified as a “social equity applicant” due to past incarceration for a cannabis-related offense and coming from a community historically impacted by cannabis prohibition. The Board determined he did not meet the criteria and denied his request.Initially, Pomerantz applied for a Tier 5 cultivation license on behalf of Rebel East, LLC, asserting he qualified for social equity status due to a past cannabis-related offense in Nevada. The Board found he was not eligible because his sentencing was deferred, and he was not incarcerated as a penalty for the offense. Pomerantz then argued he qualified as a socially disadvantaged individual due to his residency in Humboldt County, California, a region he claimed was disproportionately affected by cannabis prohibition. The Board allowed him to amend his application but ultimately found he did not demonstrate personal harm from living in Humboldt County.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision. The Court upheld the Board’s interpretation that “incarcerated” meant serving a prison sentence as a penalty for a cannabis-related conviction, which Pomerantz did not. The Court also agreed with the Board’s assessment that merely living in Humboldt County did not automatically qualify Pomerantz as being from a disproportionately impacted community. Furthermore, the Court found that Pomerantz did not sufficiently demonstrate personal harm from his residency in Humboldt County, noting his significant personal and professional advancements during that time.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that Pomerantz did not qualify as a social equity individual applicant under the Board’s rules. View "Pomerantz v. Cannabis Control Board" on Justia Law

William and Mary Fulton purchased a 32-acre property in Jericho, Vermont, in August 2021. The property was enrolled in the Agricultural and Managed Forest Land Use Value Appraisal Program (Current Use program) under a forest management plan that generally prohibited tree cutting. Before finalizing the purchase, the Fultons contacted the Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation (FPR) and the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) to inquire about converting the property to agricultural use. They were informed that any tree cutting in violation of the plan would lead to disenrollment from the program and tax penalties. Despite this, the Fultons cut trees on the property shortly after purchasing it.The Fultons did not file the required application to continue the property's enrollment in the Current Use program or submit a notice of withdrawal. In September 2021, the county forester received a complaint about the tree cutting and confirmed the violation. FPR issued an adverse-inspection report in December 2021, leading to the property's removal from the Current Use program and tax penalties. The Fultons appealed to the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, which granted summary judgment in favor of FPR, concluding that the property was still enrolled in the program at the time of the tree cutting and that the Fultons' actions constituted "development" under the program's rules.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the property was not automatically disenrolled from the Current Use program when the Fultons failed to submit the required application and fee. Instead, disenrollment occurs only upon the Director of PVR's action. The Court also held that the Fultons' tree cutting did not fall under the statutory exemption for "development" because it was not related to the construction or alteration of a structure for farming, logging, forestry, or conservation purposes. Therefore, the Fultons' tree cutting violated the forest management plan, justifying the property's removal from the Current Use program. View "Fulton v. Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation" on Justia Law