Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In September 2018, six-year-old L.F. made statements to her foster mother about inappropriate touching by her stepfather, Andy LaGore. These statements were recorded and reported to the Department for Children and Families. L.F. later reiterated these allegations during an interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center, identifying LaGore as the perpetrator. LaGore was subsequently charged and convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child.During pretrial motions, LaGore sought to introduce evidence of a 2016 incident where L.F. had made similar allegations against her biological father, Jordan. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that the 2016 statements were not relevant and did not demonstrate that L.F. was confused about the identity of the perpetrator in the 2018 incident. The court found no evidence that L.F.’s statements about her biological father were false or that she was confusing the two men.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 2016 statements, as they were not relevant to the 2018 allegations. The court emphasized that the exclusion of irrelevant evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed LaGore’s conviction, finding that the trial court acted within its discretion and that LaGore’s constitutional rights were not violated. View "State v. LaGore" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Janet Cote owns a property that was previously a gas station site. After discovering significant petroleum contamination in the soil, she applied for and received reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF). The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) later denied further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and additional items on Cote’s property. The Environmental Division affirmed the ANR’s decision in part and reversed in part. Cote appealed the denied reimbursements.The Environmental Division held a two-day hearing and concluded that the ANR must reimburse Cote for electrical work, concrete work, and wastewater work, as these were pre-approved and the ANR’s subsequent denial was unreasonable. However, the court upheld the ANR’s denial of costs for a licensed engineer and other punch list items, finding the ANR’s decision reasonable and consistent with the law.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ANR’s denial of reimbursement for the licensed engineer and punch list items was reasonable. The court found the Environmental Division’s analysis lacking, as it did not adequately explain why the ANR’s denial was reasonable or provide sufficient findings of fact. The court noted that the Environmental Division merely restated the ANR’s conclusory arguments without proper analysis.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions necessary on the disputed reimbursement claims. The court emphasized the need for clear reasoning and analysis to support the decision. View "In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Julio Davila, was released on furlough in October 2021 following a 2014 conviction. In April 2022, he absconded from furlough, leading the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) to issue a "Return on Mittimus Request" and an arrest warrant. In August 2022, Davila was arrested in Massachusetts for driving with a suspended license and cocaine trafficking. He was held without bail on both the Vermont warrant and Massachusetts charges. In September 2022, Davila waived extradition to Vermont but remained incarcerated in Massachusetts until December 2023, when he was released on his own recognizance and transported to Vermont.Davila filed a grievance with the Vermont DOC, requesting credit towards his Vermont sentence for the time spent incarcerated in Massachusetts. The DOC denied his request, stating he was not under their supervision. Davila then filed a complaint in the Washington Civil Division, seeking a writ of mandamus to credit his Vermont sentence from September 2022 onwards. The court granted summary judgment to the DOC, concluding Davila was not entitled to credit for time served in Massachusetts.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under 28 V.S.A. § 808e(c), Davila was not entitled to sentence credit while a warrant was outstanding. The court also held that 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c) did not apply because Davila was not "awaiting transportation" to Vermont while incarcerated in Massachusetts. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding Davila was not entitled to credit for the 490 days spent in Massachusetts. View "Davila v. Deml" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiff Gravel & Shea PC sued defendant Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C., claiming unjust enrichment for receiving attorney’s fees without compensating plaintiff for work done to procure a settlement. The dispute arose from lawsuits involving an employee’s injury at work and his employer’s worker’s compensation insurance. Plaintiff represented the employer in a lawsuit against its insurer, Cornerstone Risk Management, LLC, while defendant represented the employee in a personal-injury lawsuit against the employer. The employee settled with Lloyd’s of London, Cornerstone’s professional-liability insurer, and defendant received its contingency fee from the settlement proceeds.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to plaintiff, concluding that under the common-fund doctrine, equities required defendant to contribute to plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The court found that plaintiff’s efforts in the Cornerstone action led to the settlement from which defendant received its fees. The court also held a bench trial on damages and awarded damages to plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly expanded the common-fund doctrine and that the facts did not support a claim of unjust enrichment.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the common-fund doctrine did not apply because there was no common fund created by plaintiff’s efforts that benefitted both parties. The court emphasized that the common-fund doctrine is limited to cases where a party’s efforts create a fund that benefits others who did not contribute to the litigation costs. The court remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that plaintiff could not maintain an unjust-enrichment claim under the circumstances. View "WWSAF Special Partners Group, LLC (Series D) v. Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C." on Justia Law

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Petitioner James Fredrick filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement in Vermont on a governor’s warrant pending extradition to New York for a second-degree murder charge. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that the extradition process requirements were met. On appeal, Fredrick argued that the governor’s warrant and New York’s extradition application lacked an authenticated copy of the indictment as required by Vermont law.The Caledonia Superior Court, Civil Division, held a hearing and denied Fredrick’s request, reasoning that the governor’s warrant was prima facie evidence that the extradition requirements were satisfied. The court found that the documents showed Fredrick was lawfully charged by indictment. Fredrick appealed the decision on January 9, 2025.During the appeal, Governor Scott recalled the original governor’s warrant and issued a new one, including a copy of the indictment signed by the grand jury foreperson. Fredrick filed another habeas corpus petition challenging the new warrant, which was also denied, and an appeal is pending.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the original governor’s warrant was withdrawn and Fredrick’s confinement is now based on a new warrant. The court found no applicable exceptions to mootness, as Fredrick did not demonstrate that the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review, nor did he show negative collateral consequences. The court concluded that there was no longer an actual controversy, and the appeal was dismissed. View "In re James Fredrick" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The case involves a dispute between Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts and the Attorney General. The Auditor sued the Attorney General, alleging non-compliance with the statutory obligation to provide legal advice. The Auditor sought a declaratory judgment affirming his right to retain counsel to sue the Attorney General and mandamus to compel the Attorney General to answer specific legal questions. The trial court dismissed the Auditor’s claims and denied his request for attorneys’ fees.The dispute arose from the Auditor’s audit of a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district. The Auditor encountered a perceived gap in TIF statutes and sought advice from the Attorney General, who answered one question but directed the Auditor to other entities for the remaining questions. The Auditor claimed this was a violation of the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159 and threatened to sue. The Attorney General responded, explaining her statutory obligations and asserting that the Auditor lacked authority to sue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claims for mandamus and declaratory judgment related to the specific TIF questions, concluding that the Attorney General had provided legal advice as required by 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the broader declaratory judgment claim, finding no live controversy as the Attorney General had provided legal advice and there was no policy of refusing to do so.However, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding his right to retain counsel and sue for mandamus. The court held that the Auditor has implied statutory authorization to seek mandamus to enforce the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees, finding Rule 54 inapplicable for the relief sought by the Auditor. View "Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Aleksandra Veljovic, filed a lawsuit against TD Bank, N.A. and its former employee, Zlata Cavka, alleging negligence, negligent supervision, and respondeat superior. Veljovic claimed that Cavka negligently notarized a fraudulent document used by her ex-husband to secure a divorce order in Serbia, which resulted in the loss of her marital property. Veljovic argued that TD Bank should be held liable for Cavka's actions. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Veljovic's complaint with prejudice, concluding that she could not recover for purely economic losses and failed to demonstrate a special relationship between the parties. The court also denied her post-judgment request to amend her complaint.TD Bank moved to dismiss the complaint under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Veljovic's claims were barred by the economic-loss rule, that neither TD Bank nor Cavka owed her an independent duty of care, and that she failed to plead facts establishing necessary causation. The court granted the motion, finding that Veljovic sought compensation solely for economic losses and did not establish a special relationship with the defendants. The court also dismissed the claims against Cavka after Veljovic failed to respond to a show-cause order.Veljovic appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint and denying her motion to amend. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Veljovic did not allege sufficient facts to show a special relationship with the defendants and that her claims were barred by the economic-loss rule. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying her motion to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have established a special relationship or overcome the economic-loss rule. View "Veljovic v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, owners of a dairy farm and residences adjacent to Burlington International Airport, sued the City of Burlington for soil and water contamination caused by runoff from the airport. The contamination was due to the use of aqueous film-forming foam containing PFAS by the Vermont Air National Guard, which leased part of the airport. Plaintiffs alleged negligence, trespass, private nuisance, de facto taking, violation of the Vermont Groundwater Protection Act, increased water surface drainage, and direct negligence.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint for failure to join the United States and the Guard as necessary and indispensable parties, and on the basis of municipal immunity. The court found that the United States and the Guard were necessary parties because their actions were central to the claims and their absence could lead to inconsistent obligations for the City. The court also held that municipal immunity applied to the claims related to firefighting services.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim (Count 1) because it was based on the Guard’s firefighting activities, making the United States and the Guard necessary parties. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the other claims (Counts 2-5 and 7), which were based on the City’s failure to contain contaminated water on its property. The court found that these claims did not require the presence of the United States or the Guard as necessary parties.The court also remanded the case for further consideration of whether municipal immunity applied to the City’s maintenance and operation activities alleged in the surviving counts. The court noted that municipal airport operations are generally considered proprietary functions, which are not protected by municipal immunity. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Belter v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

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In 2012, the plaintiff was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to five years to life in prison. In August 2020, his conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was released after serving over eight years. In June 2023, the plaintiff sued the State of Vermont under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), seeking over $400,000 in damages for his imprisonment. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the VIPA only allows claims for those exonerated through DNA evidence proving actual innocence.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, granted the State's motion in January 2024. The court found that the VIPA's plain language limits claims to those exonerated through DNA testing. The court noted that the statute's language, particularly in § 5572, specifies that a person exonerated "pursuant to this chapter" must have been exonerated through the DNA testing process outlined in subchapter 1 of chapter 182 of Title 13. Since the plaintiff's conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, he did not qualify for compensation under the VIPA.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the VIPA's plain language clearly limits compensation to individuals exonerated through DNA testing. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute allows for broader claims of exoneration, emphasizing that the statute's provisions must be read together and that the only means of exoneration authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing. The court also denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff's claim survived his death under Vermont's survival statutes. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law