Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs own a historic farm property in Vermont crossed by two public trails established by the Town in 1987. After purchasing the land, the plaintiffs maintained these trails for hiking, but opposed the idea of bicycle use and eventually stopped maintaining the trails, allowing them to become overgrown. The Town subsequently adopted procedures for private individuals to apply for permission to maintain and repair the trails. The plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the Town lacked authority to conduct maintenance or repairs on these public trails crossing their property.Initially, the Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, finding the issue was not ripe because no one had actually applied for or received permission to maintain the trails. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ allegations showed a concrete threat of interference with their property rights. Remanded, the civil division considered cross-motions for summary judgment, ultimately granting judgment for the Town. The court found that, under both historical and current statutes and common law, public trails constitute easements allowing towns to maintain them to ensure public access, and that the 1986 statutory amendments did not strip towns of this authority.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court applied the same summary judgment standard and interpreted Title 19. The Court held that public trails are public rights-of-way, and towns have authority to maintain and repair them to ensure public access for intended purposes. The Court found that neither statutory language nor legislative history supported the plaintiffs’ argument that the 1986 amendments removed town authority. The main holding is that Vermont towns retain the authority to maintain and repair public trails across private land, and the judgment for the Town was affirmed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

A grandmother, who was the court-appointed guardian of a minor child since birth, sought to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents and adopt the child. After filing petitions for adoption and termination, the grandmother attempted to obtain parental consent, but the documents submitted did not comply with statutory requirements. The grandmother was unable to locate the parents for proper service of process, despite efforts including communication attempts and seeking assistance from child protective agencies.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Probate Division, reviewed the case. It determined that although the grandmother had exercised due diligence, the relevant statute, 15A V.S.A. § 3-403(a), required parents to be “personally served” with process. The probate division interpreted “personal service” to mean only in-hand service or delivery at the parent’s home, excluding service by publication. As a result, the court dismissed the grandmother’s petitions for lack of service.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court considered whether “personally served” under § 3-403(a) precluded service by publication. The Court reviewed statutory interpretation and the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. It concluded that the legislative intent was to adopt all forms of “personal service” as defined in Rule 4(d) at the time of enactment, which included service by publication when due diligence to serve by other means fails. The Court found no constitutional bar to service by publication under such circumstances and reversed the probate division’s order dismissing the grandmother’s petition. The Vermont Supreme Court held that service by publication is permitted when the petitioner demonstrates that other forms of service cannot be made with due diligence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re O.R.G." on Justia Law

A mother and her husband sought to terminate the parental rights of the biological father to their minor child, K.P., and permit the husband to adopt K.P. The parents had divorced in 2019, with the mother awarded sole legal and physical custody, and the father granted twice-weekly visits. Following the divorce, the mother remarried and moved with K.P., and contact between K.P. and the father diminished. The mother and her husband initially filed an adoption petition in the probate division without serving the father. Years later, the mother served the father with a petition to terminate his parental rights. After consolidation, both the adoption and termination matters were transferred to the family division, which held evidentiary hearings. The father faced obstacles including unstable housing, lack of transportation, mental health issues, and interference from the mother and her husband.After the probate division dismissed its proceedings and the case was consolidated in the Lamoille Superior Court, Family Division, the court appointed counsel for the father and held a hearing. The family division found the father had not exercised parental responsibility for six months before the termination petition, but determined he had good cause due to interference by the mother and her husband and his personal hardships. The court found no clear and convincing evidence that the father was unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care, or that termination was in K.P.’s best interests. The court denied the termination and adoption petitions and ordered gradual reintroduction of father-child contact.The appellants also appealed to the Lamoille Civil Division, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed both appeals. It held that the civil division correctly dismissed the appeal, as family division orders are appealable only to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s denial of the termination and adoption petitions, finding its factual findings supported and no legal error. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

In this case, a dispute arose among extended family members over the ownership interests in a lakeside property in Vermont. The property was originally conveyed in 1958 by Thelma L. Lillie to Hazel R. Rathbun and her three sons, Leslie, Ernest, and Albert Soothcage. The 1958 deed’s granting clause transferred title to all four individuals, and its habendum clause described the conveyance as being “as joint tenants with right of survivorship their heirs and assigns forever.” In 1977, Hazel Rathbun issued a quitclaim deed transferring her 1/4 interest to her three sons. Over subsequent decades, Leslie and Albert died, and in 2021, Ernest, as the last surviving original grantee, conveyed his interest to his daughters (the plaintiffs), who later filed suit after Ernest’s death, seeking a declaration that they owned the property outright.The case was initially heard in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found that the 1958 deed created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The court determined that the 1977 deed severed Hazel Rathbun’s 1/4 share, converting it to a tenancy in common, but left the remaining 3/4 share as a joint tenancy among the three sons. Upon Ernest’s death, the trial court concluded that his heirs (the plaintiffs) held a 5/6 interest in the property and granted them partial summary judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court held that the 1958 deed did not clearly and definitively express the intent to create a joint tenancy, citing inconsistencies in its language, especially the inclusion of “their heirs and assigns forever.” Therefore, the Court determined the deed created a tenancy in common by default and reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. View "Kirshon v. Abodeely-Mills" on Justia Law

A municipality sought to condemn a parcel of land owned by a private entity along the shore of Malletts Bay for the purpose of constructing a stormwater treatment facility. This parcel, containing a residential structure leased to tenants, was already subject to a longstanding easement permitting the town to maintain a stormwater drainpipe and catch basin. After a pipe rupture in 2019 caused damage, which the owner addressed through a settlement with the town, the town repaired the pipe and subsequently initiated condemnation proceedings, citing the need to facilitate regulatory compliance and reduce potential liability.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial to determine the necessity of the taking as required by Vermont’s condemnation statute. The court found that the town failed to prove the necessity of taking the land. It concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the project was a reasonable means of achieving stated public goals, such as reducing phosphorus runoff. The court also determined that the town did not adequately consider alternative locations, the inconvenience and expense to the property owner, or the effect of the project on local revenues and home rights. Additionally, the court found that the taking was initiated in bad faith.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion or made clearly erroneous findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the town did not carry its burden to prove necessity. The Court found that the town failed to present competent evidence on several statutory factors and did not meaningfully consider alternatives before selecting the property. The Supreme Court did not address the lower court’s finding of bad faith, concluding that the insufficient showing of necessity was dispositive. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 2004 and separated in April 2023. They initiated divorce proceedings, and after a hearing in April 2024, the family division of the Superior Court approved stipulated agreements on parental rights, contact, and some marital assets. The court then heard evidence on contested issues, including the division of the husband’s retirement accounts and spousal maintenance. In May 2024, the court issued a final divorce order, finding the current balances of the husband's three retirement accounts and providing for an equitable division of marital property, with the wife to receive 50% of the value of the husband's accounts as of the date of separation.After the final order, both parties filed motions to amend: the husband sought credit for maintenance payments under Rule 59, which the court granted. Later, the wife moved under Rule 60, arguing that the property division reflected an intent to use the balances as of the date of the final hearing, not separation. The husband responded, challenging the motion's timeliness and arguing that the wife failed to comply with the dispute-resolution procedure. The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Family Division, granted the wife's motion and amended the order to reflect the values as of the date of the final hearing, reasoning this correction merely conformed the order to the court’s intent.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the lower court erred in amending the divorce order under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). The Supreme Court held that the court’s correction was proper under Rule 60(a), as it reflected the court’s original intent and was a clerical error rather than a substantive change. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended divorce order and found any alleged procedural errors in handling the wife’s motion harmless, given the court’s authority to correct such errors at any time. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

A husband and wife entered into a premarital agreement before their 2018 marriage, which set forth a comprehensive division of assets in case of divorce. The agreement categorized both parties’ assets and anticipated inheritances as separate property, except for their marital home. It specified that, upon divorce, the wife would receive 50% of the increase in the appraised value of the marital home, paid by the husband in installments. The agreement also required proportional contributions to living expenses, allocation of taxes, and provided for attorney’s fees if either party breached the agreement.After their separation in 2021, the husband filed for divorce in 2023. Both parties sought enforcement of the premarital agreement in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Family Division. The wife moved to enforce the agreement, including her share of the marital home’s appreciation and attorney’s fees, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over the home designated as separate property. The husband claimed offsets for damages the wife allegedly caused to the home and for her failure to pay household expenses and taxes. The family division granted the wife’s motion, enforced the agreement in her favor, and awarded attorney’s fees, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the husband’s counterclaims, which it said belonged in civil court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the family division had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the premarital agreement—including claims of breach—within the context of divorce proceedings under Vermont statutes. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to the family division to determine whether the wife materially breached the premarital agreement and to consider appropriate remedies, if any, consistent with principles governing such contracts. View "Gade v. Gade" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged in December 2017 with one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, based on allegations that she had inappropriately touched a six-year-old girl, A.G., who was the daughter of her then-boyfriend. Before trial, the court allowed both the admission of the child’s statements from a 2017 police interview and permitted A.G. to testify. In 2019, the State requested that A.G. testify outside the defendant’s presence via video, citing potential trauma. After a hearing in 2020, the trial court granted this request, finding that testifying in front of the defendant would traumatize and impair A.G.’s ability to testify. In 2023, as A.G. had aged, the defense sought a new hearing on this issue. At the new hearing, a school counselor testified about A.G.’s general emotional state and possible trauma but did not specifically link trauma to testifying in the defendant’s presence.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, relying on the counselor’s testimony, again permitted A.G. to testify outside the defendant’s presence. A jury trial followed in October 2023, during which A.G. testified by video and the jury found the defendant guilty. The court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that although the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s post-arrest silence, this was harmless error.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the requirements of Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and the Confrontation Clause were met. The Court held that the trial court’s finding—that requiring A.G. to testify in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma substantially impairing her ability to testify—was clearly erroneous because the evidence did not specifically support such trauma would result from the defendant’s presence. As a result, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated. View "State v. Sylvester" on Justia Law

An energy developer proposed to construct a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, near an existing solar facility that it had previously built. Both the new and existing facilities were located on adjacent parcels, shared similar ownership structures, and would use connected infrastructure to access the electric grid. The developer submitted bids for three projects; only the first was initially awarded a contract and then built. Later, the developer resubmitted bids for the other two projects, which were awarded contracts. When the developer sought a Certificate of Public Good (CPG) for the second facility, concerns were raised about whether this new facility and the existing one constituted a “single plant” under state law, which would make them ineligible for the state’s Standard Offer Program due to a cap on plant capacity.The Vermont Public Utility Commission reviewed the CPG application for the new facility. It held evidentiary hearings and ultimately concluded that, under the statutory definition, the two facilities were a single plant because they had common ownership, were developed in a contiguous timeframe, were physically proximate, and shared necessary grid infrastructure. This meant the combined facility exceeded the program’s capacity limit. The Commission denied the CPG and rejected the developer’s motion for reconsideration, prompting an appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Commission’s decision. It affirmed, holding that the Commission applied the correct two-prong “single plant” test as previously explained in its own precedents, properly considered all statutory factors, and acted within its discretion in finding the facilities to be a single plant. The Court rejected arguments about due process violations, claim and issue preclusion, and the application of alternative legal standards. The Supreme Court also found no error in the procedures followed by the Commission and did not grant a remand or new hearing. The decision of the Public Utility Commission was affirmed. View "In re Petition of Otter Creek Solar LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves the eligibility of H.D. for Vermont’s General Assistance Emergency Housing Program as of July 1, 2025. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) determined that H.D. had exceeded the program’s eighty-day housing limit by counting days she received before the start of fiscal year 2026 (FY26). H.D. contended that only the days received during FY26 should count toward the limit, based on the language of the Fiscal Year 2026 Appropriations Act. At the time of the appeal, H.D. had exhausted her eighty days under the Board’s interpretation, no longer lived in emergency housing, and was ineligible for further benefits under the statute.The Human Services Board reviewed DCF’s determination and ruled in H.D.’s favor. The Board interpreted the statute to mean that only days received during FY26 should be counted, making H.D. eligible for emergency housing at the time of her application. DCF then appealed this decision to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court determined that the case was moot. It found that, because H.D. had already exhausted her eighty-day benefit and was no longer eligible for emergency housing under the statute, there was no longer an actual controversy between the parties. The Court also rejected DCF’s argument that the case was “capable of repetition but evading review,” concluding that DCF failed to show a reasonable expectation that H.D. would be subject to the same action again. The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction is limited to live controversies and that it cannot issue an advisory opinion on the statutory interpretation for future cases. As a result, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "In re Appeal of H.D." on Justia Law