Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A company sought permission from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) to build and operate a solar facility. After the PUC denied this request, the company filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision had been made on grounds different from the proposal for decision, and later sought to serve interrogatories on the PUC Commissioners to determine if they had read the record as required by Vermont law. The PUC denied both motions, stating it had complied with statutory requirements, that Commissioners had sufficient opportunity to review the record, and that discovery from Commissioners acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not permitted.After these denials, the company appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court regarding the underlying certificate denial and, separately, filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court under 3 V.S.A. § 809b, challenging the PUC's denial of discovery. The PUC moved to dismiss this complaint, asserting that § 809b did not cover orders denying discovery and that appeals of interlocutory PUC orders were governed by another, more specific statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding it lacked jurisdiction, since § 809b only applies to orders compelling discovery, not those denying it, and that appeals from PUC orders must proceed directly to the Supreme Court under 30 V.S.A. § 12.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal de novo. It held that 3 V.S.A. § 809b does not authorize challenges to agency orders denying discovery and is limited to orders compelling action. Because the PUC’s order at issue denied, rather than compelled, discovery, the Superior Court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

Two U.S. citizens who reside and vote in Burlington challenged a city charter amendment that allows noncitizens to vote in school board and school budget elections. The amendment, approved by the Legislature, permits noncitizens who are legal residents of the United States, live in Burlington, and take the Voter’s Oath to participate in these elections, but does not grant them the right to vote in state or federal elections. The plaintiffs argued that, although school elections appear local, they are actually statewide in nature because Burlington’s education budget is funded through the State Education Fund and these votes impact state finances and the interests of Vermonters statewide.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that school elections are local in nature, focusing on issues such as selecting school board members and approving the school budget, and concluded that the noncitizen-voting provision did not implicate the Vermont Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Court held that the distinction between local and statewide elections depends on which level of government has authority over the election matter. If a question has been lawfully delegated to local government, the election is local; if not, it is statewide. The Court found that Vermont law delegates authority over school board and budget elections to localities. Although education is a matter of statewide concern, the State may constitutionally delegate decision-making over local school budgets to local voters. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the delegation was unlawful or that school elections are statewide under the Vermont Constitution.Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that Burlington school elections are local and the charter amendment allowing noncitizen voting in those elections does not violate the Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections. View "Morin v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old child suffered severe burns after trespassing into an electrical substation owned by a utility company. The substation was secured by a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire and posted with multiple warning signs about high voltage and danger. Despite these precautions, the child managed to enter the substation through the gate and was injured after coming into contact with, or near, electrified equipment.The child, through his representative, brought a negligence claim against the utility, alleging the company failed to adequately protect children from the dangers posed by the substation. Both parties agreed the child was a trespasser. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the utility, ruling that Vermont’s common law does not impose a duty of care on landowners to protect trespassers from injury caused by dangerous conditions, except to avoid willful or wanton misconduct. The court noted it was bound by prior Vermont Supreme Court decisions rejecting the attractive-nuisance doctrine and thus could not recognize an exception for child trespassers.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the child asked the Court to adopt the attractive-nuisance doctrine as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, which would permit child trespassers to pursue certain claims against landowners under specific conditions. The Vermont Supreme Court declined to overrule its longstanding precedent, reaffirming that Vermont landowners owe no duty to trespassers, including children, absent willful or wanton conduct. The Court held that any change to this rule, given its policy implications and legislative context, should be made by the Legislature, not by judicial action. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Treadway v. Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged and convicted of felony lewd and lascivious conduct after an incident involving an eighteen-year-old victim who was staying overnight at a friend’s house, where the defendant was also present. During the night, the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the sleeping victim, including touching her breast and genitals, and masturbating over her. The victim disclosed the incident days later, and the defendant subsequently admitted his actions. The jury found the defendant guilty of the felony offense and not guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor. The court sentenced him to two-to-four years, with all but ninety days suspended, and imposed probation.After sentencing, the defendant appealed, raising a constitutional challenge to the proportionality of his sentence and arguing it was disproportionate to his conduct, which he characterized as “misdemeanor-level.” The Vermont Supreme Court, in an earlier direct appeal, reviewed the proportionality argument for plain error due to lack of preservation and did not find plain error. Following that decision, the defendant filed a motion for sentence reconsideration under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in the Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, arguing his sentence violated the Vermont Constitution and seeking a reduction based on mitigating factors.The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority under Rule 35(a) to address constitutional challenges to the underlying conviction and that the arguments presented had already been considered at sentencing. On further appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 35(a) cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction or to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction, and that the defendant’s sentence was within the statutory limits. The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case arose after the Vermont Legislature passed two laws requiring the Fish and Wildlife Board to adopt new rules: one regulating the pursuit of coyotes with dogs and another modernizing best management practices for trapping. The Board proposed a rule in response, which included definitions of “control” of coyote-hunting dogs, “public trail,” and an exemption from setback requirements for traps set in water or under ice. The Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules (LCAR) formally objected to these definitions and the exemption, asserting inconsistency with legislative intent. The Board made some revisions, but ultimately adopted the rule over LCAR’s objections.After the rule’s adoption, several nonprofit organizations challenged the validity of the objected-to portions in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Board failed to prove the rule was consistent with legislative intent and that certain provisions were arbitrary. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction and later upheld the rule, finding the Board met its burden to prove legislative consistency and that plaintiffs had not shown the provisions were arbitrary. The court also determined that the Board only lost the presumption of validity on the grounds for which LCAR objected and was not required to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that LCAR’s objections shifted the burden to the Board to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the objected-to portions of the rule satisfied all factors in 3 V.S.A. § 842(c)(2), including legislative intent and arbitrariness, but not by clear and convincing evidence. The Court concluded the Board met its burden and that the challenged rule provisions were consistent with legislative intent and not arbitrary. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Protect Our Wildlife v. Fish and Wildlife Board" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault, one without consent and one involving a victim under sixteen years of age. While awaiting sentencing, he was released under restrictive curfew conditions, which were occasionally relaxed. The parties agreed to a plea deal specifying a split-to-serve sentence, with the minimum incarceration period to be contested at sentencing. The defendant could argue for three years and the State for seven years.The Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, held a change-of-plea hearing, accepted the guilty pleas, and scheduled a sentencing hearing. At sentencing, both sides presented arguments and victim-impact statements were given. The defendant objected to certain statements, arguing they were speculative or outside the record. The court overruled these objections but clarified that it would not consider allegations beyond the documented offenses. The defendant requested jail credit for time spent under curfew, which the court denied, citing lack of authority. The court ultimately imposed a sentence aligned with the plea agreement: ten years to life (suspended with seven years to serve) for the first count and ten-to-twenty years (suspended except for seven years to serve) for the second, to run concurrently.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in handling the plea agreement, considering victim-impact statements, and refusing credit for restrictive curfew time. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had not accepted the plea agreement at the change-of-plea hearing but deferred its decision and properly followed Rule 11. It found no error in the handling of victim-impact statements, as the court did not rely on improper information. Finally, it affirmed the denial of credit for curfew time, consistent with precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "State v. Hirzel" on Justia Law

The dispute involved property owners who sought a declaration that the Town had no rights in a right-of-way crossing their land, arguing the right-of-way was never validly established as a public road or, if it was, had been discontinued. Their predecessors-in-interest had previously litigated similar claims with the Town, ultimately settling by agreeing that the Town would discontinue one road and alter and reclassify the disputed right-of-way as a public trail for non-motorized recreational use. This settlement was memorialized in a stipulation, binding on successors, and accompanied by a map showing the right-of-way’s location.After the stipulation, the Town completed proceedings to discontinue the other road and, together with neighboring towns, held hearings and officially reclassified the right-of-way as a public trail. The property was later conveyed to the current plaintiffs, who brought a new suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, again disputing the Town’s rights. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, finding that the prior owners had clearly intended to dedicate the right-of-way for public use under the common-law doctrine of dedication and acceptance, and that the Town had accepted this dedication.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that the undisputed facts, including the language of the stipulation, the prior owners’ conduct, and their acquiescence to public use and statutory proceedings, demonstrated clear intent to dedicate the right-of-way for public use as a trail. The Court further concluded that the Town had accepted the dedication. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Gerlach v. Town of Chittenden" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under Vermont law. The charges stemmed from allegations by the defendant’s step-daughter, J.B., who reported that between 2018 and 2019, when she was between nine and ten years old, the defendant repeatedly touched her buttocks under her clothing, both in the family car and while sitting together at home. Evidence at trial included J.B.’s testimony detailing the frequency and nature of the acts, the defendant’s own admissions during a police interview (including his acknowledgment that the conduct was “wrong”), and testimony about the defendant’s behavior toward his biological children, which did not include similar conduct after they were very young.After a jury found the defendant guilty in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his acts were lewd or that he had the requisite intent for conviction. The trial court denied this motion both after the State’s case and post-conviction. The defendant also requested that the jury be instructed on a lesser-included offense—specifically, “open and gross lewdness” under a different statute—but the trial court denied this request, holding that the lesser charge was not a lesser-included offense of the crime charged.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant acted with the intent to gratify sexual desires, and that his conduct was lewd. The Court also held that “open and gross lewdness” is not a lesser-included offense of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, as the elements of the two crimes are not identical. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Lovejoy" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 1990 of burglary and three counts of sexual assault after forcibly entering a victim’s apartment, threatening her and her infant son with a weapon, and committing multiple assaults. At sentencing, defense counsel reviewed the presentence investigation report with the petitioner, filed written objections, and argued for a sentence with a suspended portion to permit inpatient treatment. The court ultimately imposed a forty-five-to-eighty-five-year sentence, emphasizing punishment and public safety.The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He subsequently filed multiple petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR), including a sixth petition that alleged ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the sixth petition as an abuse of the writ, a decision later affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court. The instant petition, his seventh, again alleged ineffective assistance at sentencing. At the merits hearing, the petitioner presented expert and psychotherapist testimony to support his claim. The court denied the petition on the merits and, alternatively, found it barred by claim preclusion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the civil doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to PCR proceedings, but that the error in applying it here did not require reversal because the petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court found the petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced the outcome. The exclusion of a 2024 report on historical abuse at a school the petitioner attended was also found not to be an abuse of discretion or prejudicial. The Court affirmed the denial of the PCR petition. View "In re Bruyette" on Justia Law

A tenant leased a commercial space from a landlord beginning in December 2020. The landlord alleged that the tenant failed to pay rent during 2022 and 2023, leading to an ejectment action in early 2024 seeking both possession of the premises and damages for unpaid rent. After the court ordered rent escrow and the tenant failed to comply, the landlord obtained a writ of possession, and the tenant vacated the property. The remaining dispute centered on alleged rent arrearages. The tenant requested a jury trial and was allowed limited discovery. Prior to trial, the tenant sought continuances based on alleged inadequate discovery responses and personal health concerns, which were denied. The tenant failed to appear for jury draw, and the landlord moved for default judgment.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted default judgment to the landlord on the same day as the missed jury draw, without holding a separate hearing or providing the tenant with seven days’ notice. The court later entered judgment awarding the landlord damages and attorney’s fees. The tenant appealed, challenging the denial of continuances, discovery rulings, and the procedure used to enter default judgment.The Vermont Supreme Court held that, under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)(4), when a party has appeared in a case, the court must provide at least seven days’ written notice and hold a hearing before entering default judgment. The Court found that these requirements were not met because the hearing on default judgment occurred without notice and immediately after the tenant’s nonappearance. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and remanded for the trial court to provide the required notice and hearing before considering default judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s discovery rulings and declined to address inadequately briefed arguments. View "Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC" on Justia Law