Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of residents opposed the construction of energy and telecommunications projects in Vermont by seeking to intervene in proceedings before the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). The PUC granted certificates of public good (CPG) for both projects—one for a solar project and the other for a telecommunications tower. After these decisions, the intervenors filed timely motions under PUC Rule 2.221 to alter or amend the PUC’s orders. The PUC denied both motions, finding that Rule 2.221 incorporated the language of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and that the intervenors had not met the necessary standard for relief. The intervenors then appealed the denials to the Vermont Supreme Court.The developers moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that the notices of appeal were filed more than thirty days after the PUC’s final decisions and were therefore untimely. They contended that PUC Rule 2.221 motions did not toll the time to appeal under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), as those rules reference only motions filed in the superior court and not with the PUC.The Vermont Supreme Court held that a timely motion to alter or amend filed with the PUC under Rule 2.221 is substantively the same as a Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion. The Court explained that, under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(5), such motions toll the time for filing an appeal from a PUC decision. The Court distinguished prior cases involving appeals from municipal panels, where the rules did not allow for tolling. Because the intervenors’ motions were timely and tolled the appeal period, the Court denied the motions to dismiss, allowing the appeals to proceed. View "In re Petition of VT Real Estate Holdings 1 LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault against his niece, N.H., based on events that occurred between 2005 and 2011, when N.H. was a child. The charges alleged both oral and penetrative sexual contact. The main evidence at trial included N.H.’s testimony describing multiple assaults, with a focus on specific incidents that occurred in the defendant’s barn, particularly an incident when N.H. was in the sixth grade. N.H. also testified that the assaults stopped when she was around eleven or twelve years old.After the jury convicted the defendant on both counts in the Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant appealed. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that N.H. was under thirteen at the time of the barn assault (Count Two), that the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt violated his constitutional rights, and that the admission of prior-bad-act evidence was an abuse of discretion. The trial court had previously denied his motion for acquittal on Count Two, finding there was enough evidence for the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that N.H. was under thirteen at the relevant time, affirming the denial of acquittal. However, the Court determined that the trial court’s instruction defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” impermissibly lowered the government’s burden of proof, violating the defendant’s federal due process rights. This was deemed plain error, requiring reversal of the convictions and a remand for a new trial. The Court did not address the evidentiary issue regarding prior bad acts. The main holding is that defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” constitutes plain error warranting reversal and a new trial. View "State v. Kolts" on Justia Law

Seventeen property owners in Burlington sought a declaratory judgment that the city’s newly adopted ordinances regulating short-term rentals did not apply to their twenty-two nonowner-occupied properties, arguing that these uses were preexisting and nonconforming, and thus exempt from the new regulations. The city’s ordinances, passed in 2022, imposed significant restrictions on short-term rentals, including prohibiting most nonhost-occupied rentals and establishing new definitions and requirements. The property owners asserted that the ordinances threatened their ability to continue operating their properties as short-term rentals.Previously, these owners brought a similar action in the Civil Division of the Vermont Superior Court, seeking a declaration that their properties were legally permitted nonconforming uses. The Civil Division dismissed their claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that issues of nonconforming use arose under Chapter 117 of Title 24, over which the Environmental Division had exclusive jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal in a prior case—32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington—concluding that the Civil Division properly declined jurisdiction.While that earlier appeal was pending, the owners filed a new declaratory judgment action in the Environmental Division. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was not ripe and that the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction because the ordinance at issue was not enacted under the zoning statutes. The Environmental Division agreed, concluding that the owners’ claims were premature, involved factual issues inappropriate for declaratory relief, and should first be addressed through the statutory appeals process.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s dismissal. The Court held that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate because the owners’ claims were not ripe: no enforcement action was imminent, and the factual questions about each property’s status required more concrete controversy. The owners were not left without remedy, as they could pursue administrative determinations or appeals if enforcement occurred. View "32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

A renewable energy developer was awarded a standard-offer contract in 2014 to build a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, with a requirement to commission the project by 2016. The developer repeatedly sought and received extensions to this deadline, while simultaneously pursuing a certificate of public good (CPG), which is also required for construction. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) granted the CPG in 2018, but it was appealed, reversed, and ultimately denied on remand due to violations of local land conservation measures and adverse impacts on aesthetics. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the final CPG denial in 2023.While litigation over the CPG was ongoing, the developer continued to seek extensions of its standard-offer contract’s commissioning milestone. The fifth extension request, filed in 2021, asked for a deadline twelve months after the Supreme Court’s mandate in the CPG appeal. The hearing officer recommended granting it, but the PUC did not act on the request until 2024, by which time the developer’s CPG had been finally denied. The PUC dismissed the fifth extension request as moot, finding the contract had expired by its own terms. The PUC also denied the developer’s motion for reconsideration and a sixth extension request, on the same grounds.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the PUC’s actions with deference, upholding its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and its discretionary decisions unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the PUC properly concluded the requested extension was moot, the contract was null and void by its terms, and there was no abuse of discretion. The Court also rejected arguments that the PUC’s actions were inconsistent with other cases or violated constitutional rights. The orders of the PUC were affirmed. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a revocable trust created by Marsha Milot in 2009, with herself as trustee and lifelong beneficiary. After Milot stepped down from her trustee role due to alleged incapacity, her daughter, Valerie Wiederhorn, and her husband, Curtis Hennigar, became co-trustees. Jennifer Milot, a stepdaughter and remainder beneficiary, petitioned for access to the trust instrument and additional information about the trust’s administration, including documentation related to settlor’s incapacity and trustee actions. She alleged improper denial of her requests, and further claimed that Wiederhorn made unauthorized loans to herself from the trust and retaliated against Jennifer for seeking information.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Probate Division, initially ordered co-trustees to provide the trust instrument and unsealed it after review. When Jennifer sought further information and asserted she was now a qualified beneficiary due to settlor’s incapacitation, the court found the initial relief was “more or less” satisfied. It declined to invoke equitable powers or compel additional disclosures, relying on 14A V.S.A. § 603, which states that while a trust is revocable, beneficiaries’ rights are subject to settlor’s control. The court ultimately dismissed Jennifer’s petition, concluding she was not entitled to the information sought and that co-trustees owed no duty to her at that time.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal. It held that, under Vermont Trust Code § 813 and § 603, Jennifer was not entitled to trust information while the trust remained revocable and settlor was alive. However, the Court found the probate division erred by not considering Jennifer’s request to amend her petition to seek removal of co-trustee Wiederhorn under § 706, and reversed and remanded the case for the probate division to address that request. View "In re Trust of Milot" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs own a historic farm property in Vermont crossed by two public trails established by the Town in 1987. After purchasing the land, the plaintiffs maintained these trails for hiking, but opposed the idea of bicycle use and eventually stopped maintaining the trails, allowing them to become overgrown. The Town subsequently adopted procedures for private individuals to apply for permission to maintain and repair the trails. The plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the Town lacked authority to conduct maintenance or repairs on these public trails crossing their property.Initially, the Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, finding the issue was not ripe because no one had actually applied for or received permission to maintain the trails. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ allegations showed a concrete threat of interference with their property rights. Remanded, the civil division considered cross-motions for summary judgment, ultimately granting judgment for the Town. The court found that, under both historical and current statutes and common law, public trails constitute easements allowing towns to maintain them to ensure public access, and that the 1986 statutory amendments did not strip towns of this authority.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court applied the same summary judgment standard and interpreted Title 19. The Court held that public trails are public rights-of-way, and towns have authority to maintain and repair them to ensure public access for intended purposes. The Court found that neither statutory language nor legislative history supported the plaintiffs’ argument that the 1986 amendments removed town authority. The main holding is that Vermont towns retain the authority to maintain and repair public trails across private land, and the judgment for the Town was affirmed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

A grandmother, who was the court-appointed guardian of a minor child since birth, sought to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents and adopt the child. After filing petitions for adoption and termination, the grandmother attempted to obtain parental consent, but the documents submitted did not comply with statutory requirements. The grandmother was unable to locate the parents for proper service of process, despite efforts including communication attempts and seeking assistance from child protective agencies.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Probate Division, reviewed the case. It determined that although the grandmother had exercised due diligence, the relevant statute, 15A V.S.A. § 3-403(a), required parents to be “personally served” with process. The probate division interpreted “personal service” to mean only in-hand service or delivery at the parent’s home, excluding service by publication. As a result, the court dismissed the grandmother’s petitions for lack of service.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court considered whether “personally served” under § 3-403(a) precluded service by publication. The Court reviewed statutory interpretation and the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. It concluded that the legislative intent was to adopt all forms of “personal service” as defined in Rule 4(d) at the time of enactment, which included service by publication when due diligence to serve by other means fails. The Court found no constitutional bar to service by publication under such circumstances and reversed the probate division’s order dismissing the grandmother’s petition. The Vermont Supreme Court held that service by publication is permitted when the petitioner demonstrates that other forms of service cannot be made with due diligence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re O.R.G." on Justia Law

A mother and her husband sought to terminate the parental rights of the biological father to their minor child, K.P., and permit the husband to adopt K.P. The parents had divorced in 2019, with the mother awarded sole legal and physical custody, and the father granted twice-weekly visits. Following the divorce, the mother remarried and moved with K.P., and contact between K.P. and the father diminished. The mother and her husband initially filed an adoption petition in the probate division without serving the father. Years later, the mother served the father with a petition to terminate his parental rights. After consolidation, both the adoption and termination matters were transferred to the family division, which held evidentiary hearings. The father faced obstacles including unstable housing, lack of transportation, mental health issues, and interference from the mother and her husband.After the probate division dismissed its proceedings and the case was consolidated in the Lamoille Superior Court, Family Division, the court appointed counsel for the father and held a hearing. The family division found the father had not exercised parental responsibility for six months before the termination petition, but determined he had good cause due to interference by the mother and her husband and his personal hardships. The court found no clear and convincing evidence that the father was unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care, or that termination was in K.P.’s best interests. The court denied the termination and adoption petitions and ordered gradual reintroduction of father-child contact.The appellants also appealed to the Lamoille Civil Division, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed both appeals. It held that the civil division correctly dismissed the appeal, as family division orders are appealable only to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s denial of the termination and adoption petitions, finding its factual findings supported and no legal error. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

In this case, a dispute arose among extended family members over the ownership interests in a lakeside property in Vermont. The property was originally conveyed in 1958 by Thelma L. Lillie to Hazel R. Rathbun and her three sons, Leslie, Ernest, and Albert Soothcage. The 1958 deed’s granting clause transferred title to all four individuals, and its habendum clause described the conveyance as being “as joint tenants with right of survivorship their heirs and assigns forever.” In 1977, Hazel Rathbun issued a quitclaim deed transferring her 1/4 interest to her three sons. Over subsequent decades, Leslie and Albert died, and in 2021, Ernest, as the last surviving original grantee, conveyed his interest to his daughters (the plaintiffs), who later filed suit after Ernest’s death, seeking a declaration that they owned the property outright.The case was initially heard in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found that the 1958 deed created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The court determined that the 1977 deed severed Hazel Rathbun’s 1/4 share, converting it to a tenancy in common, but left the remaining 3/4 share as a joint tenancy among the three sons. Upon Ernest’s death, the trial court concluded that his heirs (the plaintiffs) held a 5/6 interest in the property and granted them partial summary judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court held that the 1958 deed did not clearly and definitively express the intent to create a joint tenancy, citing inconsistencies in its language, especially the inclusion of “their heirs and assigns forever.” Therefore, the Court determined the deed created a tenancy in common by default and reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. View "Kirshon v. Abodeely-Mills" on Justia Law

A municipality sought to condemn a parcel of land owned by a private entity along the shore of Malletts Bay for the purpose of constructing a stormwater treatment facility. This parcel, containing a residential structure leased to tenants, was already subject to a longstanding easement permitting the town to maintain a stormwater drainpipe and catch basin. After a pipe rupture in 2019 caused damage, which the owner addressed through a settlement with the town, the town repaired the pipe and subsequently initiated condemnation proceedings, citing the need to facilitate regulatory compliance and reduce potential liability.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial to determine the necessity of the taking as required by Vermont’s condemnation statute. The court found that the town failed to prove the necessity of taking the land. It concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the project was a reasonable means of achieving stated public goals, such as reducing phosphorus runoff. The court also determined that the town did not adequately consider alternative locations, the inconvenience and expense to the property owner, or the effect of the project on local revenues and home rights. Additionally, the court found that the taking was initiated in bad faith.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion or made clearly erroneous findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the town did not carry its burden to prove necessity. The Court found that the town failed to present competent evidence on several statutory factors and did not meaningfully consider alternatives before selecting the property. The Supreme Court did not address the lower court’s finding of bad faith, concluding that the insufficient showing of necessity was dispositive. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law