Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Landowners Anne and Mark Guillemette appealed an Environmental Division order denying their motion to dismiss neighbor Michael Casey’s appeal and remanding the matter to the Monkton Development Review Board (DRB) for consideration on the merits. Casey had challenged the zoning administrator’s decision that the Guillemettes’ wood-processing facility was exempt from enforcement due to the fifteen-year limitations period. Casey filed his appeal late, relying on incorrect instructions from the zoning administrator.The Environmental Division concluded that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) allowed Casey’s appeal to proceed despite the untimely filing, as disallowing the appeal would result in manifest injustice. The court remanded the matter to the DRB for consideration on the merits.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Environmental Division’s decision. The Supreme Court held that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) does not apply to appeals from the decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as zoning administrators. Instead, it applies only to appeals from municipal regulatory proceedings to the Environmental Division. Therefore, the finality provision at 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred Casey’s untimely appeal, and the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction to permit the appeal to proceed. View "In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over parental rights and responsibilities following the divorce of a couple with two children. The mother and father began their relationship in 2011, moved to Vermont in 2014, and married in 2016. They have two children born in 2016 and 2018. The father was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 2016 and has been on disability since 2018. The mother also faced serious health issues, including thyroid cancer, and has not worked since 2018. In 2020, the mother expressed a desire to move to Michigan for family support, which led to conflicts and eventual separation in 2021. The father filed for divorce in 2022.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Family Division, awarded primary legal rights and responsibilities to the father, citing the mother's proposed relocation to Michigan as a factor. The court found that the children were well-adjusted to their current environment in Vermont and that the father's parents played a significant role in their lives. The court also granted the mother the right to make medical and dental decisions for the children to encourage her continued involvement.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found several issues with the lower court's decision. The court noted that the family division did not adequately consider the primary-care-provider factor, made erroneous findings regarding the mother's proposed move to Michigan, and divided legal responsibilities without sufficient reasoning. Additionally, the court failed to explicitly assign physical rights and responsibilities. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the father was less willing and able to foster a positive relationship between the children and the mother but reversed and remanded the award of parental rights and responsibilities for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Gordon v. Fogell" on Justia Law

Applicant sought permission from the Town’s Development Review Board (DRB) to build a senior-living facility in Castleton, Vermont, which included independent-living, assisted-living, and memory-care units. The DRB approved the project with conditions, including that each unit have a kitchen, but did not approve the memory-care unit, classifying it as a nursing home, which exceeded the allowed number of residents.Applicant appealed to the Environmental Division, which reviewed the case de novo. The court struck the condition requiring kitchens in each unit and concluded that the project was a multi-family dwelling, not a nursing home, based on state law definitions. Neighbors did not appeal but challenged the project’s height and the classification of the memory-care unit. The court dismissed the height challenge for lack of jurisdiction and found that the project met the multi-family dwelling definition.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision on the jurisdictional issue, agreeing that the height challenge was outside the scope of the court’s review. However, it found that the Environmental Division erred in using state law definitions instead of the town’s zoning bylaws to classify the memory-care unit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding the memory-care unit and remanded for further findings on whether it met the bylaw’s definition of a nursing home, which requires in-house nursing care for residents suffering from illness or disease. The court also upheld the Environmental Division’s decision to strike the kitchen condition for the independent and assisted-living units but required further consideration of the memory-care unit’s compliance with the cooking requirement in the zoning ordinance. View "In re Dousevicz, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant, Stacey Vaillancourt, operated a daycare facility in her home. In January 2019, six-month-old H.B. was dropped off at the daycare. On January 24, 2019, H.B. was found unresponsive in her crib and later declared dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed that H.B. died from diphenhydramine intoxication, a substance found in medications like Benadryl, which is not recommended for infants without a prescription. H.B. had not been prescribed diphenhydramine, and her parents and other caregivers denied giving it to her.The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Criminal Division, denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found her guilty of involuntary manslaughter and cruelty to a child with death resulting. The defendant renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, which was again denied by the trial court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts. The evidence showed that the defendant, an experienced childcare provider, administered diphenhydramine to H.B., leading to her death. The court found that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant acted with criminal negligence and willfully exposed H.B. to danger, knowing the risks involved.The court also rejected the defendant's arguments that the verdicts were inconsistent and violated double jeopardy. The court explained that the mental states required for the two charges were not mutually exclusive and that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments for the same conduct under different statutes. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of video evidence showing H.B.'s developmental capacity, as it was relevant to the State's case and not unduly prejudicial. View "State v. Vaillancourt" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) increased the rental fees for hangar space at state-owned airports. Five tenants, who own hangar facilities at the Northeast Kingdom International Airport and the Stowe-Morrisville State Airport, appealed the rate increases to the Transportation Board. They argued that the rent increase did not comply with the terms of their leases and was arbitrary. The leases allowed AOT to adjust rent based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), current market value for the land, and maintenance costs for the airport. The tenants contended that AOT improperly considered changes outside the previous lease term.The Transportation Board consolidated the tenants' appeals and reviewed the administrative records and memoranda submitted by both parties. The Board found that AOT had invested significantly in airport improvements and conducted a market-value analysis for leased space. However, the Board noted that details of the analysis were not included in the administrative record. The Board concluded that AOT was permitted to consider changes to market value and maintenance costs outside of the prior lease term but admonished AOT to provide a clearer analysis in the future.The tenants appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the rent increases were arbitrary and capricious due to a lack of transparent methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's conclusion that AOT could consider changes outside the prior lease term but reversed and remanded the decision concerning the fairness of the rent increases. The Court held that the Board should have sought a complete record from AOT to determine whether the rent levels were fair and conducted a new adjudication consistent with this opinion. View "In re State Airport Hangar Lease Disputes" on Justia Law

In April 2019, the respondent, Jessica Morrill, pled nolo contendere to assault and robbery. In September 2023, she filed a motion in the criminal division to vacate her conviction, arguing that it was obtained as a result of her being a victim of human trafficking, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction and that the motion should have been filed in the civil division. The criminal division concluded it had jurisdiction and granted the motion, finding that the respondent met the statutory requirements for relief.The State filed a notice of appeal, acknowledging it did not have a right to appeal under the relevant statutes and rules but requested the Vermont Supreme Court to construe the appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief. The Vermont Supreme Court granted the State's request for review due to the importance of the issue and the purely legal nature of the question.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the criminal division has jurisdiction over motions to vacate convictions under 13 V.S.A. § 2658. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme, including the context and language used by the legislature, indicates that the criminal division is the appropriate venue for such motions. The Court noted that the legislature explicitly assigned jurisdiction to the civil division in other sections of the statute but did not do so for § 2658. Additionally, the Court found that the nature of the relief sought under § 2658, which includes expungement, aligns with the criminal division's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "State v. Morrill" on Justia Law

James Needham and Roxanne O. Smith purchased a residential property as joint tenants. Smith later vacated the property and transferred her interest to the Roxanne O. Smith Trust. After Smith's death, both parties filed crossclaims for partition. The trial court assigned the property to Needham and awarded the Trust an equitable sum for its interest. The court declined to offset Needham's contributions by the fair-market rental value for the time Smith left the property, concluding that Needham did not prevent Smith from accessing the property and that the Trust had not established the fair-market rental value.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, held a two-day bench trial and found that Smith left the property due to fear of Needham but was not denied access. The court assigned the property to Needham, who was to pay the Trust for its interest. The court rejected the Trust's request for an offset due to ouster, finding no evidence that Needham excluded Smith from the property. The court also found that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property, as the trustee's testimony lacked sufficient foundation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property. The court noted that the trustee's testimony was insufficient to establish rental value and that the trial court was not obligated to assign it any persuasive value. The court also declined to remand the case for additional evidence on rental value, as the Trust did not demonstrate any reason why remand was warranted. View "Needham v. Smith Trust" on Justia Law

Robert Caldwell was recruited by Champlain College's then-president Don Laackman in September 2016 and worked as Vice President of Advancement and later as Chief Advancement Officer from January 2017 to September 2019. His role was primarily as chief fundraiser. In fiscal year 2018, he missed his fundraising goal by approximately seventeen percent, and in fiscal year 2019, he missed his goal by more than 56 percent, resulting in a shortfall of over 2.2 million dollars. In May 2019, Caldwell was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease and informed President Laackman of his diagnosis. Laurie Quinn replaced Laackman as interim-president in June 2019 and discussed Caldwell's performance with him in July 2019. Caldwell mentioned he was dealing with health issues. In September 2019, Quinn fired Caldwell, citing his poor fundraising performance.Caldwell sued Champlain College in March 2021, alleging disability discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and promissory estoppel. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division granted summary judgment in favor of Champlain College on both claims. Caldwell appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework for assessing disability discrimination claims and found that Champlain College provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Caldwell's termination—his failure to meet fundraising goals. Caldwell failed to provide evidence that this reason was pretextual. Additionally, the court found that Caldwell did not present any evidence of a specific and definite promise that would support his promissory estoppel claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Champlain College. View "Caldwell v. Champlain College Inc." on Justia Law

A husband appealed a final divorce order that set aside a prenuptial agreement and instead allocated an equitable division of property. The family division found the agreement unconscionable because it would prevent the wife from receiving any significant property settlement or spousal maintenance. The husband argued that the court applied an incorrect standard of unconscionability and made errors in the property settlement proceedings.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division, initially found that both parties had made full financial disclosures and entered the agreement voluntarily. However, the court later concluded that the agreement was unconscionable because it left the wife in the same financial situation as if they had not married, which the court believed undermined the status of marriage. The court also quashed subpoenas for the wife's father and sister and incorrectly calculated the length of the marriage.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the family division applied the wrong standard for assessing unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that prenuptial agreements are enforceable if they are entered into voluntarily, with full financial disclosure, and are not unconscionable at the time of execution. The court found that the agreement's terms, which left the parties in the same financial situation as before marriage, were not inherently unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the family division's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the wife's alternative arguments regarding the enforceability of the agreement, including whether the husband's behavior constructively forced her to file for divorce. View "Lacroix v. Rysz" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct, and obstruction of justice. The charges stemmed from allegations made by the defendant's daughter, K.O., who reported that her father had sexually assaulted her over a period of seven years, starting when she was ten years old. The State charged the defendant with multiple counts, including sexual assault and aggravated repeated sexual assault of K.O., as well as lewd and lascivious conduct against K.O. and another minor, A.S. The defendant was also charged with obstruction of justice based on his actions during the investigation.The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated due to jury irregularities, that evidentiary rulings undermined his right to a fair trial, and that the jury instructions were misleading. The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division, had previously denied the defendant's motions to exclude certain jurors for cause and had admitted various pieces of evidence over the defendant's objections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's challenges for cause against certain jurors, as there was no evidence of implied bias. The court also found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the audio recording of K.O.'s conversation with police, the prenuptial agreement, the photo display, and the diagram of the vulva, as these pieces of evidence were relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not misleading and did not direct a verdict on any element of the crime. The court also found no plain error in the description of the sexual acts necessary to convict the defendant on each charge. View "State v. Orost" on Justia Law