Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A high school principal was terminated by his school district’s board after an internal investigation into allegations that he mistreated a female student over several years and attempted to dissuade staff from making a mandatory report of child abuse. The investigation included interviews with the student, a school counselor, the principal, and other witnesses. The board provided the principal with written notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond, after which it held a multi-day hearing where both sides presented evidence and witnesses. The board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the principal had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward the student and interfered with mandatory reporting obligations, and concluded that there was just and sufficient cause for termination.The principal appealed the dismissal to the Windham Southeast School District Board and, following the board’s decision, filed suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that the pre-termination and post-termination processes violated his constitutional rights, and asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The civil division dismissed some claims, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, and found that the board’s decision was supported by the record, that the principal was afforded adequate due process, and that no evidence supported claims of bias or other wrongdoing.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the civil division’s decision. The Court held that the principal received constitutionally adequate pre- and post-termination process, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery related to alleged bias, and that sufficient evidence supported the board’s findings and conclusion that just cause existed for dismissal. The Court also found that structural or actual bias claims were either unpreserved or unsupported. View "Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Two individuals jointly purchased a Vermont home during their marriage. After separating, they divorced in Florida, where the court assigned each a percentage ownership interest in the property but did not resolve matters concerning ongoing property expenses or order a sale or partition of the house. One party returned to Vermont and lived in the house with their children, solely paying all mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. The parties informally agreed that the out-of-state party would not assert ownership rights until their youngest child graduated college. After that event, the out-of-state party initiated a partition action in Vermont.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, found that the parties’ ownership interests were as set by the Florida court and converted their tenancy by the entirety to a tenancy in common. The court determined the party living in the house should be credited for property expenses paid but limited such credits to only those expenses incurred within the prior six years, applying Vermont’s general statute of limitations for civil actions (12 V.S.A. § 511). The court assigned the property to the in-state party, conditioned upon purchase of the other’s interest, and required that the party in possession continue to pay property expenses until transfer or sale.Upon appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that, in partition actions, contribution credits for property expenses are not subject to the six-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 511, because partition is an equitable remedy and such credits are integral to the equitable division of property. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s limitation on contribution credits, remanding for recalculation. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order requiring the party in possession to pay ongoing property expenses until the final disposition. View "Wich v. Corcoran" on Justia Law

The case involves a patient who was admitted to a hospital for acute coronary syndrome. After initially declining surgery, he agreed to undergo bypass surgery and signed a consent form authorizing three specific procedures: coronary bypass graft surgery, endoscopic vein harvest, and placement of a left atrial appendage clip. The list of procedures was handwritten on a standard consent form. The patient later received surgery in which the left atrial appendage clip was placed.Subsequently, the patient filed a lawsuit in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, alleging medical battery against the physician and the hospital. He contended that the use of the singular term “procedure” on the consent form implied consent for only one procedure and not for the placement of the atrial appendage clip. He also claimed that the physician did not discuss the atrial clip with him or conduct appropriate follow-up. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the patient had consented to all procedures listed on the form. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the patient had expressly consented to the placement of the atrial appendage clip, and dismissed the medical battery claim.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, holding that medical battery requires the absence of consent or performance of a substantially different procedure than authorized. The Supreme Court found the patient expressly consented to the placement of the left atrial appendage clip, and did not allege that the procedure performed was substantially different from the one authorized. The Court emphasized that a lack of understanding or information about the procedure is a potential claim for lack of informed consent (medical malpractice), not medical battery. The dismissal was affirmed. View "Ford v. Polomsky" on Justia Law

The case concerns several quarry operations in Chester, Vermont. Chandler Quarry, operated on an eight-and-a-half-acre parcel, had been exempt from Vermont’s Act 250 land use permitting requirements since its operations predated the Act’s passage in 1970. In 2018, a landowner acquired Chandler Quarry, as well as North and South Quarries located nearby. The landowner then began coordinating operations across all three quarries, including processing stone from North and South at Chandler Quarry and constructing a new building to house processing equipment. This expanded activity increased quarrying, noise, and traffic, resulting in complaints from neighboring landowners.Following these complaints, the District 2 Environmental Commission issued a jurisdictional opinion in 2023, determining that Chandler Quarry’s integration into the larger quarry operation constituted a substantial change, subjecting it to Act 250 permitting requirements. The landowner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which, in March 2024, affirmed that Chandler Quarry’s coordinated operation with the other quarries triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. Afterward, the Land Use Review Board (LURB) issued an administrative order in June 2025, imposing a civil penalty and a stop-work order, requiring cessation of Chandler Quarry operations until appropriate permits were obtained. The landowner requested a merits hearing, during which it was shown that Chandler Quarry operations had been reduced to pre-2018 levels and decoupled from North and South Quarries.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that Chandler Quarry remains subject to Act 250 jurisdiction, despite the reduction of operations, because the expanded, unpermitted commercial activity persisted for years and caused lasting environmental impacts. The Court distinguished this case from In re Audet, finding that the landowner’s sustained jurisdiction-triggering activities could not be undone simply by reverting to previous operational levels. The Court also held that the Environmental Division’s affirmation of the stop-work order was not an abuse of discretion, as the Division reasonably considered statutory factors, including economic effects on employees. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "Land Use Review Board v. 3643 VT Route 103, N, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with several serious crimes, including second-degree murder and aggravated assault, following an incident in which he allegedly attacked his parents with a baseball bat, killing his father and injuring his mother, before fleeing in a vehicle and colliding with a game warden's truck. After his arrest, the court ordered a neutral psychiatric examiner to conduct a competency examination to determine whether the defendant was fit to stand trial. The examiner interviewed the defendant multiple times but concluded that further psychometric testing was necessary. The examiner stated that defense counsel must be excluded from the testing, citing copyright and professional ethics concerns, and warned that she would otherwise submit a report without a competency finding.The defendant objected, asserting that his attorney had a constitutional right to be present during the competency examination, referencing both the Sixth Amendment and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The State argued that the competency examination was not a critical stage of the prosecution, and thus the right did not attach. The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division denied the defendant's motion, holding there was no constitutional right to counsel’s presence during the examination. The defendant sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo for constitutional questions and for abuse of discretion on procedural rulings. The Court held that a competency examination is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, citing United States Supreme Court precedent and the practices of numerous jurisdictions. The Court further held that Vermont law and the Fifth Amendment adequately protect defendants’ rights during such examinations. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude counsel, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. View "State v. Lawyer" on Justia Law

A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan.The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law

An inmate serving a sentence for second-degree murder in Vermont challenged the constitutionality of a statutory amendment affecting earned-time credits. The original law allowed inmates to earn sentence reductions for good behavior, and this petitioner received such credits for several months in early 2021. However, a 2021 amendment excluded inmates convicted of second-degree murder and other serious offenses, if they were sentenced on or before January 1, 2021, from earning further reductions after April 26, 2021. The petitioner, who falls into this category, retained credits earned before the amendment but was prohibited from earning future credits.The petitioner initially filed a pro se complaint in the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, seeking declaratory relief to continue earning sentence reductions. After a parallel federal case, Baird v. Deml, decided in favor of the Department of Corrections, the petitioner amended his complaint to assert violations of his due process rights and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. Both parties sought summary judgment, and the civil division adopted the reasoning of Baird, granting summary judgment to the Department of Corrections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that procedural due process requirements do not apply to legislative actions such as statutory amendments, and the legislative process provided all the process that was due. Regarding substantive due process, the Court found that the law did not implicate a fundamental constitutional right and was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—protecting victims’ expectations about offenders’ sentences. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Common Benefits Clause, concluding that the exclusion of certain inmates from earned-time credits was reasonably and justly related to the legislative purpose. The judgment was affirmed. View "Murphy v. Deml" on Justia Law

A claimant worked as an adjunct professor for a college that operated on a trimester system, offering fall, spring, and summer terms. For many years, the claimant taught during the spring and fall terms, but not consistently during the summer. In 2024, the claimant had contracts to teach in the spring and fall terms but was not offered a summer teaching assignment. After the spring term concluded, the claimant applied for unemployment benefits for the summer period.A claims adjudicator initially denied the request, finding that the claimant had reasonable assurance of employment for the next “regularly scheduled academic term”—the fall—even though the summer intervened. The claimant appealed, and an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the denial, citing the claimant’s established pattern of not teaching in the summer. The claimant then appealed to the Vermont Department of Labor Employment Security Board, which reversed the denial. The Board concluded that because the claimant did not have reasonable assurance of employment for the successive term—summer 2024—he was eligible for unemployment benefits during that period.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied a de novo standard to the statutory interpretation at issue. The Court held that under 21 V.S.A. § 1343(c)(1), unemployment benefits are not payable to employees of educational institutions for periods between two regular, but not necessarily successive, terms if there is an agreement to work both terms and reasonable assurance of continued employment. The Court found that the claimant had such an agreement and reasonable assurance for the spring and fall terms, and that the summer period fell within the statutory exclusion. Therefore, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Board’s decision, holding that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits for the summer term under the statute. View "Vermont State Colleges v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

An agricultural supply company sought to recover payment for cattle feed delivered to a dairy farm owned by a married couple, Melissa and Jason. The couple separated in 2018, agreeing that Melissa would no longer be responsible for farm expenses. Jason continued operating the farm, and the company allowed him to accumulate a large debt, expecting it to be paid after the couple’s divorce. Jason died before the divorce was finalized, after which Melissa ceased farming and sold the cattle. The company then sued Melissa to recover the outstanding feed account balance, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and detrimental reliance.The Vermont Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Civil Division, denied summary judgment for the company on its contract claim and granted partial summary judgment for Melissa, concluding that a novation had occurred, releasing Melissa from future obligations. At trial, the court treated the summary judgment ruling as the law of the case, and ultimately found that a novation occurred when the company and Jason agreed that he alone would pay the debt. The court also found that the company had waived its unjust enrichment claim by not contesting summary judgment on that count and, even had it not, the claim would be barred by unclean hands.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court found the trial court erred in concluding a novation had occurred, holding there was no evidence that the company intended to release Melissa from her contractual obligations. The Supreme Court held that, absent evidence of a mutual agreement to discharge Melissa’s obligations, the finding of novation was clearly erroneous. The Court also held that the company failed to preserve its arguments regarding unjust enrichment for appeal. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings solely on the contract claim. View "Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. St. Pierre" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute stemming from a loan agreement between Christopher Huber and Janet Currie. In 2019, Currie sought to purchase a hemp business and borrowed $185,000 from Huber, agreeing to repay $370,000 within approximately six months—an effective annual interest rate of 200%. The agreement also required Currie to provide a mortgage to secure the loan, which she did not do. After acquiring the business, Currie transferred the property to another entity she controlled without compensating Huber and failed to repay the loan. Huber sued Currie and related entities for breach of contract and fraudulent transfer, seeking the contract amount, interest, and an equitable lien on the property.The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, granted partial summary judgment to Huber on the breach-of-contract claim because Currie did not contest the essential facts or substantiate her listed affirmative defenses, including usury, in her response to Huber’s motion. The court denied summary judgment on the fraudulent-transfer claim. Currie later moved to vacate the summary-judgment order, arguing that the contract was usurious under Vermont law. The court denied this motion, finding Currie had waived the usury defense by failing to raise it at the summary-judgment stage. The court awarded Huber $185,000 with interest at the legal rate and imposed an equitable lien, but did not rule on Currie’s third-party claims.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for Huber, holding that Currie procedurally waived the usury defense by not properly raising it in response to the summary-judgment motion, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to revisit the issue. The Court remanded the case for consideration of Currie’s outstanding third-party claims. View "Huber v. Currie" on Justia Law