Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute stemming from a loan agreement between Christopher Huber and Janet Currie. In 2019, Currie sought to purchase a hemp business and borrowed $185,000 from Huber, agreeing to repay $370,000 within approximately six months—an effective annual interest rate of 200%. The agreement also required Currie to provide a mortgage to secure the loan, which she did not do. After acquiring the business, Currie transferred the property to another entity she controlled without compensating Huber and failed to repay the loan. Huber sued Currie and related entities for breach of contract and fraudulent transfer, seeking the contract amount, interest, and an equitable lien on the property.The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, granted partial summary judgment to Huber on the breach-of-contract claim because Currie did not contest the essential facts or substantiate her listed affirmative defenses, including usury, in her response to Huber’s motion. The court denied summary judgment on the fraudulent-transfer claim. Currie later moved to vacate the summary-judgment order, arguing that the contract was usurious under Vermont law. The court denied this motion, finding Currie had waived the usury defense by failing to raise it at the summary-judgment stage. The court awarded Huber $185,000 with interest at the legal rate and imposed an equitable lien, but did not rule on Currie’s third-party claims.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for Huber, holding that Currie procedurally waived the usury defense by not properly raising it in response to the summary-judgment motion, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to revisit the issue. The Court remanded the case for consideration of Currie’s outstanding third-party claims. View "Huber v. Currie" on Justia Law

A married couple entered into a premarital agreement shortly before their 2017 wedding. At the time, the wife was a special-education teacher and the husband was a co-owner and operator of a family dairy farm in Vermont. The husband owned a farmhouse, which was used as the couple’s primary residence both before and during the marriage. The premarital agreement stated that each party would retain their own separate property, specifically listing the farmhouse as the husband’s separate property. On the same day the agreement was executed, the husband signed a will granting the wife a life estate in the farmhouse if she survived him. The couple had three children and separated in 2023.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Family Division, reviewed the premarital agreement during divorce proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, it found that the agreement was generally enforceable but held that the provisions allocating the farmhouse to the husband were unconscionable at the time of the agreement’s formation. Alternatively, it found that the husband had constructively abandoned those provisions through his estate planning. The court awarded the farmhouse to the husband but ordered him to pay the wife one-third of its equity, with the possibility of sale if he could not pay.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the family division’s decision. The Court held that the premarital agreement’s provisions allocating the farmhouse to the husband were not unconscionable at the time of formation, as they simply ensured each party would retain their own separate property. The Court further held that the husband’s will did not constitute constructive abandonment of the premarital agreement, as the documents were executed simultaneously and the agreement explicitly allowed such testamentary gifts without waiving its terms. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Wakefield v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

A FedEx Express courier was injured while delivering a package to the residence of the defendants. He slipped and fell on a white board that blended with the snow near the garage, an area where he regularly left packages. The fall resulted in a broken ankle, requiring surgery and a second procedure to remove hardware. During his recovery, the plaintiff experienced pain and was unable to participate in activities he previously enjoyed.The case was tried before a jury in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. The jury found both parties negligent, assigning 60% fault to the defendants and 40% to the plaintiff. The jury awarded him economic damages for medical expenses and lost wages, as well as $5,000 in noneconomic damages, resulting in a total judgment of $59,239.99 after reductions for comparative fault and costs. The plaintiff then moved for additur or a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the noneconomic damages were inadequate and the verdict was a product of compromise, and further challenged the jury instructions on liability and insurance.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s denial of a new trial, concluding that the trial court properly applied the appropriate standard and that the jury’s noneconomic damages award was supported by the evidence presented. The Court held that the instructions given accurately reflected Vermont law on premises liability and were not confusing or prejudicial. It rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding juror discord and the insurance instruction, finding no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court. Thus, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, as modified by the jury’s allocation of fault and the damages awarded, was affirmed. View "Tiedemann v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

A physician assistant was employed at a medical spa operated by a corporation in Vermont, with the president as a co-defendant. The plaintiff worked part-time initially, then full-time beginning in 2018. Her employment agreement was amended that year to provide an annual salary, a bonus formula based on the employer’s gross sales for each calendar year, and paid vacation. She received bonuses in 2018 and 2019 but was terminated in December 2020 without receiving a bonus or payment for unused paid time off for that year.The plaintiff sued in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, alleging breach of contract for underpaid bonuses in 2018 and 2019, failure to pay the 2020 bonus and unused PTO, and statutory wage violations. The trial was split, with contractual claims presented to a jury and wage claims to the court. After the plaintiff’s case, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on the 2020 claims, finding insufficient evidence for breach or violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found for the plaintiff on her bonus claims for 2018 and 2019, awarding damages, which the court doubled under Vermont’s wage statutes. Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law post-trial, arguing insufficient evidence of gross sales, and the trial court ultimately granted their motion after reconsideration, entering judgment for defendants on all counts.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that the employer’s gross sales exceeded the thresholds required for higher bonuses in 2018 and 2019. The Court also affirmed judgment for defendants on the 2020 bonus and PTO claims, holding there was no evidence of bad faith or intent to deprive the plaintiff of accrued benefits. The Court reversed the denial of attorney’s fees for defendants and remanded for reconsideration of that request. View "Rossetti v. Bare, Ltd." on Justia Law

A child disclosed to their pediatrician at age seventeen that their father had sexually abused them multiple times during childhood. This led to a police investigation and criminal charges against the father for multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault and lewd or lascivious conduct, with incidents alleged to have occurred in various Vermont locations and one count referencing acts in Massachusetts. At trial, the child recounted specific memories of being sexually assaulted in Vermont and Massachusetts, along with related inappropriate conduct, while an expert for the prosecution testified about the effects of trauma on memory and reasons for delayed reporting in child sexual abuse cases.Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude evidence of uncharged acts in Massachusetts and to bar the expert’s testimony as unqualified, but the Vermont Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, denied both motions, finding the evidence relevant and the expert qualified. The defendant was convicted by a jury on four counts (aggravated sexual assault and lewd or lascivious conduct) and acquitted on one; the court sentenced him to multiple concurrent terms. Post-trial, the defendant sought acquittal on one count due to insufficient evidence and a new trial based on evidentiary claims, but the trial court denied these motions.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence for one count, the admission of prior bad acts, the qualifications of the expert witness, and alleged improper prosecutorial statements. The court held that circumstantial evidence and expert testimony sufficed to support the conviction, the evidence of uncharged acts was properly admitted for context and to explain delayed reporting, the expert was suitably qualified, and no plain error occurred in the prosecutor’s comments. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Chamberlin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute among siblings arising from mutual wills executed by their parents, John and Patricia, after their divorce. The parents structured their assets as joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, intending that the survivor would use the property during their lifetime and then have it pass equally to their three children upon death. In 1997, both parents executed mutual wills in Arizona, agreeing not to alter or revoke them without mutual consent, and expressing a clear intention that all property owned at death would be divided equally among their children. After John’s death in 2010, all jointly titled assets passed to Patricia outside probate. Patricia later executed a new will in 2006, disinheriting her daughter Susan except for small bequests to Susan’s children and transferring major properties to her other two children, Gregory and Nancy, before she died in 2016.A Vermont probate court allowed Patricia’s 2006 will, rejecting Susan’s attempt to admit the earlier will. The Vermont Supreme Court, in a prior appeal, affirmed the admission of the 2006 will but noted Susan might have other remedies. Susan subsequently brought civil claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found for Susan on her unjust enrichment claims against Gregory and Nancy, holding that the mutual wills formed a binding contract to divide all property equally among the siblings and that Patricia breached it by transferring properties and disinheriting Susan.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that the mutual wills were a binding contract requiring equal distribution of all property owned by the survivor at death, regardless of how it was acquired. The Court found that Patricia’s actions unjustly enriched Gregory and Nancy and upheld the remedies awarded, including a monetary judgment and a constructive trust. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest on the monetary portion of the judgment. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law

A landlord leased a rental property unit to a tenant, who later filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The HRC, acting on behalf of the tenant, filed suit against the landlord, seeking legal and equitable relief for these alleged violations. After the suit was filed, the landlord died. His wife, who jointly owned the property, then also passed away. Ownership of the rental property shifted by operation of law and through an enhanced life-estate deed to their four adult children. No estate was opened in the landlord’s name.After being notified of the landlord’s death, the HRC moved in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, to substitute the landlord’s four children and his wife’s estate as parties, intending to amend the complaint to impose liability on the new parties due to their receipt of the property. The trial court denied this motion, concluding the proper party for substitution under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 25 would be the decedent’s estate or those standing in its place, not unrelated individuals against whom new claims were sought. The court gave HRC an opportunity to file further pleadings to name a proper party but, when HRC declined, dismissed the case without prejudice.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 25 in denying substitution. The Supreme Court held that, although the underlying remedial claim survived the landlord’s death, the HRC failed to demonstrate that the proposed substitute parties—the children and wife’s estate—were proper parties for substitution under Vermont law, as there was no evidence they were executors, heirs, devisees, or legatees of an estate. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to substitute and upheld the dismissal. View "Human Rights Commission v. Durkee" on Justia Law

A company sought permission from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) to build and operate a solar facility. After the PUC denied this request, the company filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision had been made on grounds different from the proposal for decision, and later sought to serve interrogatories on the PUC Commissioners to determine if they had read the record as required by Vermont law. The PUC denied both motions, stating it had complied with statutory requirements, that Commissioners had sufficient opportunity to review the record, and that discovery from Commissioners acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not permitted.After these denials, the company appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court regarding the underlying certificate denial and, separately, filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court under 3 V.S.A. § 809b, challenging the PUC's denial of discovery. The PUC moved to dismiss this complaint, asserting that § 809b did not cover orders denying discovery and that appeals of interlocutory PUC orders were governed by another, more specific statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding it lacked jurisdiction, since § 809b only applies to orders compelling discovery, not those denying it, and that appeals from PUC orders must proceed directly to the Supreme Court under 30 V.S.A. § 12.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal de novo. It held that 3 V.S.A. § 809b does not authorize challenges to agency orders denying discovery and is limited to orders compelling action. Because the PUC’s order at issue denied, rather than compelled, discovery, the Superior Court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

Two U.S. citizens who reside and vote in Burlington challenged a city charter amendment that allows noncitizens to vote in school board and school budget elections. The amendment, approved by the Legislature, permits noncitizens who are legal residents of the United States, live in Burlington, and take the Voter’s Oath to participate in these elections, but does not grant them the right to vote in state or federal elections. The plaintiffs argued that, although school elections appear local, they are actually statewide in nature because Burlington’s education budget is funded through the State Education Fund and these votes impact state finances and the interests of Vermonters statewide.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that school elections are local in nature, focusing on issues such as selecting school board members and approving the school budget, and concluded that the noncitizen-voting provision did not implicate the Vermont Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Court held that the distinction between local and statewide elections depends on which level of government has authority over the election matter. If a question has been lawfully delegated to local government, the election is local; if not, it is statewide. The Court found that Vermont law delegates authority over school board and budget elections to localities. Although education is a matter of statewide concern, the State may constitutionally delegate decision-making over local school budgets to local voters. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the delegation was unlawful or that school elections are statewide under the Vermont Constitution.Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that Burlington school elections are local and the charter amendment allowing noncitizen voting in those elections does not violate the Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections. View "Morin v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old child suffered severe burns after trespassing into an electrical substation owned by a utility company. The substation was secured by a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire and posted with multiple warning signs about high voltage and danger. Despite these precautions, the child managed to enter the substation through the gate and was injured after coming into contact with, or near, electrified equipment.The child, through his representative, brought a negligence claim against the utility, alleging the company failed to adequately protect children from the dangers posed by the substation. Both parties agreed the child was a trespasser. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the utility, ruling that Vermont’s common law does not impose a duty of care on landowners to protect trespassers from injury caused by dangerous conditions, except to avoid willful or wanton misconduct. The court noted it was bound by prior Vermont Supreme Court decisions rejecting the attractive-nuisance doctrine and thus could not recognize an exception for child trespassers.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the child asked the Court to adopt the attractive-nuisance doctrine as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, which would permit child trespassers to pursue certain claims against landowners under specific conditions. The Vermont Supreme Court declined to overrule its longstanding precedent, reaffirming that Vermont landowners owe no duty to trespassers, including children, absent willful or wanton conduct. The Court held that any change to this rule, given its policy implications and legislative context, should be made by the Legislature, not by judicial action. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Treadway v. Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law