Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with several serious crimes, including second-degree murder and aggravated assault, following an incident in which he allegedly attacked his parents with a baseball bat, killing his father and injuring his mother, before fleeing in a vehicle and colliding with a game warden's truck. After his arrest, the court ordered a neutral psychiatric examiner to conduct a competency examination to determine whether the defendant was fit to stand trial. The examiner interviewed the defendant multiple times but concluded that further psychometric testing was necessary. The examiner stated that defense counsel must be excluded from the testing, citing copyright and professional ethics concerns, and warned that she would otherwise submit a report without a competency finding.The defendant objected, asserting that his attorney had a constitutional right to be present during the competency examination, referencing both the Sixth Amendment and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The State argued that the competency examination was not a critical stage of the prosecution, and thus the right did not attach. The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division denied the defendant's motion, holding there was no constitutional right to counsel’s presence during the examination. The defendant sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo for constitutional questions and for abuse of discretion on procedural rulings. The Court held that a competency examination is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, citing United States Supreme Court precedent and the practices of numerous jurisdictions. The Court further held that Vermont law and the Fifth Amendment adequately protect defendants’ rights during such examinations. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude counsel, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. View "State v. Lawyer" on Justia Law

A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan.The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law

An inmate serving a sentence for second-degree murder in Vermont challenged the constitutionality of a statutory amendment affecting earned-time credits. The original law allowed inmates to earn sentence reductions for good behavior, and this petitioner received such credits for several months in early 2021. However, a 2021 amendment excluded inmates convicted of second-degree murder and other serious offenses, if they were sentenced on or before January 1, 2021, from earning further reductions after April 26, 2021. The petitioner, who falls into this category, retained credits earned before the amendment but was prohibited from earning future credits.The petitioner initially filed a pro se complaint in the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, seeking declaratory relief to continue earning sentence reductions. After a parallel federal case, Baird v. Deml, decided in favor of the Department of Corrections, the petitioner amended his complaint to assert violations of his due process rights and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. Both parties sought summary judgment, and the civil division adopted the reasoning of Baird, granting summary judgment to the Department of Corrections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that procedural due process requirements do not apply to legislative actions such as statutory amendments, and the legislative process provided all the process that was due. Regarding substantive due process, the Court found that the law did not implicate a fundamental constitutional right and was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—protecting victims’ expectations about offenders’ sentences. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Common Benefits Clause, concluding that the exclusion of certain inmates from earned-time credits was reasonably and justly related to the legislative purpose. The judgment was affirmed. View "Murphy v. Deml" on Justia Law

A claimant worked as an adjunct professor for a college that operated on a trimester system, offering fall, spring, and summer terms. For many years, the claimant taught during the spring and fall terms, but not consistently during the summer. In 2024, the claimant had contracts to teach in the spring and fall terms but was not offered a summer teaching assignment. After the spring term concluded, the claimant applied for unemployment benefits for the summer period.A claims adjudicator initially denied the request, finding that the claimant had reasonable assurance of employment for the next “regularly scheduled academic term”—the fall—even though the summer intervened. The claimant appealed, and an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the denial, citing the claimant’s established pattern of not teaching in the summer. The claimant then appealed to the Vermont Department of Labor Employment Security Board, which reversed the denial. The Board concluded that because the claimant did not have reasonable assurance of employment for the successive term—summer 2024—he was eligible for unemployment benefits during that period.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied a de novo standard to the statutory interpretation at issue. The Court held that under 21 V.S.A. § 1343(c)(1), unemployment benefits are not payable to employees of educational institutions for periods between two regular, but not necessarily successive, terms if there is an agreement to work both terms and reasonable assurance of continued employment. The Court found that the claimant had such an agreement and reasonable assurance for the spring and fall terms, and that the summer period fell within the statutory exclusion. Therefore, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Board’s decision, holding that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits for the summer term under the statute. View "Vermont State Colleges v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

An agricultural supply company sought to recover payment for cattle feed delivered to a dairy farm owned by a married couple, Melissa and Jason. The couple separated in 2018, agreeing that Melissa would no longer be responsible for farm expenses. Jason continued operating the farm, and the company allowed him to accumulate a large debt, expecting it to be paid after the couple’s divorce. Jason died before the divorce was finalized, after which Melissa ceased farming and sold the cattle. The company then sued Melissa to recover the outstanding feed account balance, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and detrimental reliance.The Vermont Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Civil Division, denied summary judgment for the company on its contract claim and granted partial summary judgment for Melissa, concluding that a novation had occurred, releasing Melissa from future obligations. At trial, the court treated the summary judgment ruling as the law of the case, and ultimately found that a novation occurred when the company and Jason agreed that he alone would pay the debt. The court also found that the company had waived its unjust enrichment claim by not contesting summary judgment on that count and, even had it not, the claim would be barred by unclean hands.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court found the trial court erred in concluding a novation had occurred, holding there was no evidence that the company intended to release Melissa from her contractual obligations. The Supreme Court held that, absent evidence of a mutual agreement to discharge Melissa’s obligations, the finding of novation was clearly erroneous. The Court also held that the company failed to preserve its arguments regarding unjust enrichment for appeal. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings solely on the contract claim. View "Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. St. Pierre" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute stemming from a loan agreement between Christopher Huber and Janet Currie. In 2019, Currie sought to purchase a hemp business and borrowed $185,000 from Huber, agreeing to repay $370,000 within approximately six months—an effective annual interest rate of 200%. The agreement also required Currie to provide a mortgage to secure the loan, which she did not do. After acquiring the business, Currie transferred the property to another entity she controlled without compensating Huber and failed to repay the loan. Huber sued Currie and related entities for breach of contract and fraudulent transfer, seeking the contract amount, interest, and an equitable lien on the property.The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, granted partial summary judgment to Huber on the breach-of-contract claim because Currie did not contest the essential facts or substantiate her listed affirmative defenses, including usury, in her response to Huber’s motion. The court denied summary judgment on the fraudulent-transfer claim. Currie later moved to vacate the summary-judgment order, arguing that the contract was usurious under Vermont law. The court denied this motion, finding Currie had waived the usury defense by failing to raise it at the summary-judgment stage. The court awarded Huber $185,000 with interest at the legal rate and imposed an equitable lien, but did not rule on Currie’s third-party claims.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for Huber, holding that Currie procedurally waived the usury defense by not properly raising it in response to the summary-judgment motion, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to revisit the issue. The Court remanded the case for consideration of Currie’s outstanding third-party claims. View "Huber v. Currie" on Justia Law

A married couple entered into a premarital agreement shortly before their 2017 wedding. At the time, the wife was a special-education teacher and the husband was a co-owner and operator of a family dairy farm in Vermont. The husband owned a farmhouse, which was used as the couple’s primary residence both before and during the marriage. The premarital agreement stated that each party would retain their own separate property, specifically listing the farmhouse as the husband’s separate property. On the same day the agreement was executed, the husband signed a will granting the wife a life estate in the farmhouse if she survived him. The couple had three children and separated in 2023.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Family Division, reviewed the premarital agreement during divorce proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, it found that the agreement was generally enforceable but held that the provisions allocating the farmhouse to the husband were unconscionable at the time of the agreement’s formation. Alternatively, it found that the husband had constructively abandoned those provisions through his estate planning. The court awarded the farmhouse to the husband but ordered him to pay the wife one-third of its equity, with the possibility of sale if he could not pay.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the family division’s decision. The Court held that the premarital agreement’s provisions allocating the farmhouse to the husband were not unconscionable at the time of formation, as they simply ensured each party would retain their own separate property. The Court further held that the husband’s will did not constitute constructive abandonment of the premarital agreement, as the documents were executed simultaneously and the agreement explicitly allowed such testamentary gifts without waiving its terms. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Wakefield v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

A FedEx Express courier was injured while delivering a package to the residence of the defendants. He slipped and fell on a white board that blended with the snow near the garage, an area where he regularly left packages. The fall resulted in a broken ankle, requiring surgery and a second procedure to remove hardware. During his recovery, the plaintiff experienced pain and was unable to participate in activities he previously enjoyed.The case was tried before a jury in the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division. The jury found both parties negligent, assigning 60% fault to the defendants and 40% to the plaintiff. The jury awarded him economic damages for medical expenses and lost wages, as well as $5,000 in noneconomic damages, resulting in a total judgment of $59,239.99 after reductions for comparative fault and costs. The plaintiff then moved for additur or a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the noneconomic damages were inadequate and the verdict was a product of compromise, and further challenged the jury instructions on liability and insurance.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s denial of a new trial, concluding that the trial court properly applied the appropriate standard and that the jury’s noneconomic damages award was supported by the evidence presented. The Court held that the instructions given accurately reflected Vermont law on premises liability and were not confusing or prejudicial. It rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding juror discord and the insurance instruction, finding no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court. Thus, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, as modified by the jury’s allocation of fault and the damages awarded, was affirmed. View "Tiedemann v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

A physician assistant was employed at a medical spa operated by a corporation in Vermont, with the president as a co-defendant. The plaintiff worked part-time initially, then full-time beginning in 2018. Her employment agreement was amended that year to provide an annual salary, a bonus formula based on the employer’s gross sales for each calendar year, and paid vacation. She received bonuses in 2018 and 2019 but was terminated in December 2020 without receiving a bonus or payment for unused paid time off for that year.The plaintiff sued in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, alleging breach of contract for underpaid bonuses in 2018 and 2019, failure to pay the 2020 bonus and unused PTO, and statutory wage violations. The trial was split, with contractual claims presented to a jury and wage claims to the court. After the plaintiff’s case, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on the 2020 claims, finding insufficient evidence for breach or violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found for the plaintiff on her bonus claims for 2018 and 2019, awarding damages, which the court doubled under Vermont’s wage statutes. Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law post-trial, arguing insufficient evidence of gross sales, and the trial court ultimately granted their motion after reconsideration, entering judgment for defendants on all counts.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that the employer’s gross sales exceeded the thresholds required for higher bonuses in 2018 and 2019. The Court also affirmed judgment for defendants on the 2020 bonus and PTO claims, holding there was no evidence of bad faith or intent to deprive the plaintiff of accrued benefits. The Court reversed the denial of attorney’s fees for defendants and remanded for reconsideration of that request. View "Rossetti v. Bare, Ltd." on Justia Law

A child disclosed to their pediatrician at age seventeen that their father had sexually abused them multiple times during childhood. This led to a police investigation and criminal charges against the father for multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault and lewd or lascivious conduct, with incidents alleged to have occurred in various Vermont locations and one count referencing acts in Massachusetts. At trial, the child recounted specific memories of being sexually assaulted in Vermont and Massachusetts, along with related inappropriate conduct, while an expert for the prosecution testified about the effects of trauma on memory and reasons for delayed reporting in child sexual abuse cases.Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude evidence of uncharged acts in Massachusetts and to bar the expert’s testimony as unqualified, but the Vermont Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, denied both motions, finding the evidence relevant and the expert qualified. The defendant was convicted by a jury on four counts (aggravated sexual assault and lewd or lascivious conduct) and acquitted on one; the court sentenced him to multiple concurrent terms. Post-trial, the defendant sought acquittal on one count due to insufficient evidence and a new trial based on evidentiary claims, but the trial court denied these motions.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence for one count, the admission of prior bad acts, the qualifications of the expert witness, and alleged improper prosecutorial statements. The court held that circumstantial evidence and expert testimony sufficed to support the conviction, the evidence of uncharged acts was properly admitted for context and to explain delayed reporting, the expert was suitably qualified, and no plain error occurred in the prosecutor’s comments. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Chamberlin" on Justia Law