Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A twelve-year-old juvenile was accused of aggravated sexual assault based on allegations that he assaulted and strangled a peer in the woods, causing her to lose consciousness and suffer severe pain. The victim reported the incident to her mother, and a forensic interview provided further details. Physical evidence, including “blood-like” stains and seminal fluids, was observed on clothing worn by the victim during the alleged incident. The State filed a delinquency petition and sought a nontestimonial identification order (NTO) under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1 to obtain DNA evidence from the juvenile.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Family Division, granted the State’s request for the NTO. The juvenile moved to quash the order, arguing that Rule 41.1 did not permit NTOs in delinquency proceedings because adjudication as a delinquent child is not a criminal conviction and does not result in imprisonment. The family division denied the motion, reasoning that Rule 41.1’s definition of “offense” refers to the nature of the crime itself, not the possible consequences for the juvenile, and noted that the rule specifically applies to persons subject to delinquency proceedings. The court also observed that cases could be transferred to criminal court, making imprisonment a possibility.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal and applied a de novo standard of review to the interpretation of procedural rules. The Court held that Rule 41.1, by its plain language, applies to juveniles in delinquency proceedings and does not require that the person named in the NTO be subject to imprisonment for more than one year. The Court affirmed the family division’s denial of the motion to quash, concluding that the State’s request satisfied Rule 41.1 and that issuing NTOs in delinquency cases is consistent with statutory and rehabilitative purposes. View "In re C.L." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with felony driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. The trial court (the Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division) granted the defendant’s motion to suppress a range of evidence, including statements made in custody, drug recognition evaluation results, breath test results, and blood test evidence. Following this suppression ruling, the State sought an extension of the statutory seven-business-day deadline to appeal, which the trial court granted. The State ultimately filed its appeal after the original deadline but within the extended time.After the trial court granted the State’s request for an extension and later permission to appeal, the appeal was transmitted to the Vermont Supreme Court. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the State’s appeal was untimely because it was not filed within the mandatory seven-business-day period set by statute for interlocutory appeals in felony cases. The State contended that the extension provisions applicable to appeals as of right permitted the late filing.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the seven-business-day deadline for the State to seek interlocutory appeal of a suppression order in a felony case could be extended under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(d), which allows extensions for appeals as of right. The Court held that the statute and Rule 5 governing interlocutory appeals do not permit extensions of the seven-business-day deadline. The Court concluded that interlocutory appeals by the State are not appeals as of right and that the statutory deadline is a jurisdictional requirement. Because the State failed to meet this deadline, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely and found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. View "State v. Dodds" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of several violent crimes, including first-degree aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, first-degree unlawful restraint, and kidnapping, all committed against his then-wife. During the trial, the court admonished the defendant for conduct in the courtroom that was perceived as intimidating toward the victim. At sentencing, the defendant apologized and claimed to have taken responsibility for his actions, but the court found his explanations lacked credibility and that he had not demonstrated genuine insight into the harm caused. The court also considered risk assessment scores indicating a high risk of future violence. The defendant was sentenced to eight-to-nineteen years in prison.After his conviction was affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant moved for sentence reconsideration in the Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division. He argued that his motion was based on facts already established at sentencing and requested a hearing. The State opposed the motion, noting that no new evidence was being offered. The court denied the request for a hearing, finding it unnecessary given the reliance on the existing record, and reaffirmed its original sentencing decision after reexamining the relevant factors. The court referenced both trial and sentencing conduct by the defendant as part of its analysis.Upon appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of sentence reconsideration for abuse of discretion. The Court held that a sentencing court may consider the defendant’s conduct and demeanor observed during trial and sentencing when deciding a motion for sentence reconsideration, as such conduct is relevant to factors present at the time of original sentencing. The Court also determined that the denial of a hearing was proper and that any potential error in considering post-sentencing conduct was harmless, given the overall record and analysis. The order denying sentence reconsideration was affirmed. View "State v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The case arises from a series of contractual and property disputes among three parties in Vermont. In 2015, one party sold land to another, then was hired to construct a pond on a separate property owned by the buyer. The pond builder subcontracted a third party to clear-cut land for the pond and also hired this subcontractor to cut timber on his own property. Disagreements ensued regarding payment, completion of work, and use of equipment, resulting in a lawsuit in 2017. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract and violations under Vermont’s Prompt Pay Act against the buyer, as well as conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims against the subcontractor included breach of contract and conversion. Both defendants counterclaimed, including allegations of consumer protection violations, assault, and extortion.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, conducted a jury trial on most claims. The plaintiff was awarded $7,500 for breach of contract against the buyer, plus interest. The buyer received $5,000 for assault, and the subcontractor was awarded $15,100 on his civil extortion claim. Both the plaintiff and buyer requested attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act, each arguing they were the substantially prevailing party. The court denied both motions, finding neither party substantially prevailed in the construction dispute. The court also allowed the subcontractor’s civil extortion claim to proceed.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. It held that the determination of a substantially prevailing party under the Prompt Pay Act is within the trial court’s discretion and confirmed that neither party substantially prevailed. The Supreme Court also upheld the recognition of a civil claim for restitution based on economic duress, consistent with Vermont precedent, and affirmed the damages awarded for extortion. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Lamson v. Goode" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with second-degree murder after the remains of a missing woman were discovered and identified through DNA testing. The defendant and the victim were in a relationship prior to her disappearance, and several witnesses reported that the defendant had made statements indicating involvement in her death. The defendant was held without bail and also faced federal drug charges, resulting in his placement in federal custody. The murder trial was rescheduled multiple times due to conflicts with the defendant's federal proceedings and other scheduling issues. Shortly before the trial, the State requested a continuance because it had failed to obtain confirmatory DNA testing, which the trial court denied.After the denial, the State dismissed the prosecution without prejudice but publicly stated its intent to refile the charge once DNA testing was complete. The defendant then moved to dismiss the case with prejudice, arguing the State had improperly used its dismissal power to circumvent the trial court's denial of a continuance. The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, granted the defendant's motion, concluding that the State’s actions were an improper attempt to obtain a continuance and dismissed the case with prejudice, reasoning that factors from State v. Sauve did not apply since the case was already dismissed.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court had authority to impose a sanction, including dismissal with prejudice, when the State abuses its dismissal power to secure a denied continuance. However, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by not considering the factors set forth in State v. Sauve before dismissing with prejudice. The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for the trial court to evaluate the Sauve factors and determine whether dismissal with prejudice or a lesser sanction is warranted. View "State v. Moffitt" on Justia Law

A union representing state employees challenged a new workplace policy implemented by the State of Vermont. After years of allowing certain employees to request telework arrangements under a bargained-for policy that gave agency “appointing authorities” broad discretion to approve or terminate such arrangements, the State adopted a new “Hybrid Work Standard.” This new standard, announced in 2025, required all executive branch employees to be physically present in the office for at least three days per week, rescinded all prior telework agreements, and established a process for exceptions only for “compelling reasons.” The union alleged that this new standard unilaterally changed an existing condition of employment without negotiation, amounting to an unfair labor practice.The Vermont Labor Relations Board considered the union’s unfair labor practice charge. It found that the new Hybrid Work Standard materially changed the terms of the Telework Policy by removing discretion from individual agency heads and imposing a uniform, statewide minimum in-office requirement. The Board concluded that the Governor’s unilateral action, rather than action by appointing authorities, was not permitted under the Telework Policy. The Board ordered the State to rescind the Hybrid Work Standard, return to the prior telework practices, and reinstate any affected employees.The Supreme Court of Vermont reviewed the case. It held that the plain language of the Telework Policy gave the State, as employer, broad discretion to approve, deny, or terminate telework arrangements and did not limit that discretion to appointing authorities as distinct from the Governor. The Court concluded that the Hybrid Work Standard was a permissible exercise of the State’s management authority under the existing policy and did not constitute an unlawful unilateral change. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the Board’s decision. View "Vermont State Employees' Association v. State of Vermont" on Justia Law

A high school principal was terminated by his school district’s board after an internal investigation into allegations that he mistreated a female student over several years and attempted to dissuade staff from making a mandatory report of child abuse. The investigation included interviews with the student, a school counselor, the principal, and other witnesses. The board provided the principal with written notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond, after which it held a multi-day hearing where both sides presented evidence and witnesses. The board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the principal had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward the student and interfered with mandatory reporting obligations, and concluded that there was just and sufficient cause for termination.The principal appealed the dismissal to the Windham Southeast School District Board and, following the board’s decision, filed suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that the pre-termination and post-termination processes violated his constitutional rights, and asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The civil division dismissed some claims, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, and found that the board’s decision was supported by the record, that the principal was afforded adequate due process, and that no evidence supported claims of bias or other wrongdoing.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the civil division’s decision. The Court held that the principal received constitutionally adequate pre- and post-termination process, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery related to alleged bias, and that sufficient evidence supported the board’s findings and conclusion that just cause existed for dismissal. The Court also found that structural or actual bias claims were either unpreserved or unsupported. View "Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Two individuals jointly purchased a Vermont home during their marriage. After separating, they divorced in Florida, where the court assigned each a percentage ownership interest in the property but did not resolve matters concerning ongoing property expenses or order a sale or partition of the house. One party returned to Vermont and lived in the house with their children, solely paying all mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. The parties informally agreed that the out-of-state party would not assert ownership rights until their youngest child graduated college. After that event, the out-of-state party initiated a partition action in Vermont.The Vermont Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, found that the parties’ ownership interests were as set by the Florida court and converted their tenancy by the entirety to a tenancy in common. The court determined the party living in the house should be credited for property expenses paid but limited such credits to only those expenses incurred within the prior six years, applying Vermont’s general statute of limitations for civil actions (12 V.S.A. § 511). The court assigned the property to the in-state party, conditioned upon purchase of the other’s interest, and required that the party in possession continue to pay property expenses until transfer or sale.Upon appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that, in partition actions, contribution credits for property expenses are not subject to the six-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 511, because partition is an equitable remedy and such credits are integral to the equitable division of property. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s limitation on contribution credits, remanding for recalculation. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order requiring the party in possession to pay ongoing property expenses until the final disposition. View "Wich v. Corcoran" on Justia Law

The case involves a patient who was admitted to a hospital for acute coronary syndrome. After initially declining surgery, he agreed to undergo bypass surgery and signed a consent form authorizing three specific procedures: coronary bypass graft surgery, endoscopic vein harvest, and placement of a left atrial appendage clip. The list of procedures was handwritten on a standard consent form. The patient later received surgery in which the left atrial appendage clip was placed.Subsequently, the patient filed a lawsuit in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, alleging medical battery against the physician and the hospital. He contended that the use of the singular term “procedure” on the consent form implied consent for only one procedure and not for the placement of the atrial appendage clip. He also claimed that the physician did not discuss the atrial clip with him or conduct appropriate follow-up. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the patient had consented to all procedures listed on the form. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the patient had expressly consented to the placement of the atrial appendage clip, and dismissed the medical battery claim.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, holding that medical battery requires the absence of consent or performance of a substantially different procedure than authorized. The Supreme Court found the patient expressly consented to the placement of the left atrial appendage clip, and did not allege that the procedure performed was substantially different from the one authorized. The Court emphasized that a lack of understanding or information about the procedure is a potential claim for lack of informed consent (medical malpractice), not medical battery. The dismissal was affirmed. View "Ford v. Polomsky" on Justia Law

The case concerns several quarry operations in Chester, Vermont. Chandler Quarry, operated on an eight-and-a-half-acre parcel, had been exempt from Vermont’s Act 250 land use permitting requirements since its operations predated the Act’s passage in 1970. In 2018, a landowner acquired Chandler Quarry, as well as North and South Quarries located nearby. The landowner then began coordinating operations across all three quarries, including processing stone from North and South at Chandler Quarry and constructing a new building to house processing equipment. This expanded activity increased quarrying, noise, and traffic, resulting in complaints from neighboring landowners.Following these complaints, the District 2 Environmental Commission issued a jurisdictional opinion in 2023, determining that Chandler Quarry’s integration into the larger quarry operation constituted a substantial change, subjecting it to Act 250 permitting requirements. The landowner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which, in March 2024, affirmed that Chandler Quarry’s coordinated operation with the other quarries triggered Act 250 jurisdiction. Afterward, the Land Use Review Board (LURB) issued an administrative order in June 2025, imposing a civil penalty and a stop-work order, requiring cessation of Chandler Quarry operations until appropriate permits were obtained. The landowner requested a merits hearing, during which it was shown that Chandler Quarry operations had been reduced to pre-2018 levels and decoupled from North and South Quarries.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that Chandler Quarry remains subject to Act 250 jurisdiction, despite the reduction of operations, because the expanded, unpermitted commercial activity persisted for years and caused lasting environmental impacts. The Court distinguished this case from In re Audet, finding that the landowner’s sustained jurisdiction-triggering activities could not be undone simply by reverting to previous operational levels. The Court also held that the Environmental Division’s affirmation of the stop-work order was not an abuse of discretion, as the Division reasonably considered statutory factors, including economic effects on employees. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "Land Use Review Board v. 3643 VT Route 103, N, LLC" on Justia Law