In re Trust of Virginia B. Newman

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Virginia Newman died in early 2014 at the age of ninety-eight. She created a trust in the mid-1980s after the death of her third husband. Initially, she was the sole trustee, but in 1989 she resigned, and her son Roger Lamson, Jr. was appointed sole trustee. From 1992 until 2001, Roger served as co-trustee, with Virginia and Bank of Boston. In 2001, Roger was removed as co-trustee. In 2003, the trust was amended, with Virginia, Roger, son Frank Lamson, and Bank of America serving as co-trustees. In January 2012, Roger filed a petition for accounting because he was suspicious that Frank had been using trust funds for his own benefit. In July, Roger filed a complaint for breach of trust against Frank. In February 2013, Frank petitioned to remove Roger as co-trustee of the trust. The probate division issued an order that: (1) removed Roger as co-trustee; (2) accepted Frank's resignation as co-trustee; (3) removed Virginia as co-trustee based on its contemporaneous order appointing a guardian for her; (4) accepted Bank of America's resignation as trustee; and (5) appointed Trust Company of Vermont (TCV) as sole trustee in accordance with TCV's conditions that Roger and Frank be removed as co-trustees, that neither of them have a power of attorney over Virginia's financial affairs, that TCV not be responsible for any acts or omissions of any predecessor trustee, and that TCV not have any duty to inquire into the administration or accounting of any predecessor trustee. Roger appealed the order to the civil division. The probate division lifted the automatic stay of its decision removing Roger as co-trustee, thereby making his removal effective immediately. The following day, Roger appealed the decision to lift the stay. The civil division ordered the completion of discovery in the trust case, and ruled that Roger's appeal of the probate division's order lifting the stay did not serve to create a new stay but provided Roger the opportunity to request a hearing on whether the automatic stay should have been reinstated. Meanwhile, in the breach-of-trust case that remained with the probate division, Roger obtained access to the last of the trust accounts and had an accountant prepare a report. In August 2013, Frank moved to either substitute Virginia's guardian as the petitioner or dismiss the case based on Roger's lack of standing. The probate division ruled that: (1) the issue of Roger's standing with respect to his petition for an accounting was moot because he had obtained all of the information necessary for an accounting; (2) Roger, as a former co-trustee and a remainder beneficiary to a revocable trust, had no standing to pursue his breach-of-trust action; (3) Virginia's guardian, Beth Barrett, was authorized to pursue the pending breach-of-trust action; and (4) that action would be dismissed if the guardian did not substitute herself as the petitioner in the action within the next thirty days. In so ruling, the probate division noted that Roger had "essentially conceded" that he did not have standing to pursue the breach-of-trust action. On appeal of the civil division's decision to the Supreme Court, Roger argued the court erred in granting Frank summary judgment based on Roger's lack of standing because: (1) the civil division had to resolve his appeal of the probate division's decision to remove him as co-trustee before finding that he lacked standing to pursue the breach-of-trust action; (2) its decision impaired his ability as co-trustee to fulfill his duties to safeguard the trust; and (3) he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. The Supreme Court affirmed, "notwithstanding Roger's protestations to the contrary, his appeal is moot. 'A case becomes moot if the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A case that originally presented an actual controversy may become moot if the facts or circumstances of the case change such that we can no longer grant effective relief.' That is what occurred here. When Virginia died, the parties agreed that Roger could pursue, as a beneficiary, his breach-of-trust action against Frank and that is what he is doing in a separate case." View "In re Trust of Virginia B. Newman" on Justia Law