Defendants, in consolidated cases, challenged a recent amendment to Vermont's DNA-database statute as unconstitutional. As of July 2011, the amendment mandated warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection and analysis from anyone arraigned for a felony after a determination of probable cause. Defendants in these cases were all arraigned on qualifying charges and subsequently refused to give a DNA sample. All trial courts found the amendment authorized unconstitutional searches and seizures, either under the Vermont or federal constitutions. The Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that its holding pertained only to the State Constitution, and not the U.S. Constitution. "The marginal weight of the State's interest in DNA collection at the point of arraignment, balanced against the weight of the privacy interest retained by arraignees prior to conviction, persuad[ed] the [Vermont Supreme Court] to hold that 20 VSA 1933(a)(2), and associated sections, which expand[ed] the DNA sample requirement to defendants charged with qualifying crimes for which probable cause is found, violate[d] Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courts' holdings. View "Vermont v. Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Williams pled guilty to four counts of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to serve forty to sixty years in prison. These charges stemmed from a fire in an apartment house in which petitioner lived. Three young children and their grandmother died in the fire. Petitioner was nineteen years old at the time of the fire. Petitioner sought to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Following a twelve-day trial, the civil division ruled that although petitioner’s defense attorney provided adequate representation in connection with his guilty pleas, the assistance he provided to his client during sentencing fell below minimum standards of representation. Both petitioner and the State appealed the court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the court's decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea. The Court also affirmed the ruling that his representation during the sentencing phase was inadequate and that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to provide more than perfunctory assistance. The Court agreed with the PCR court that petitioner's sentence should have been vacated and a new sentencing hearing scheduled. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a contract dispute between the State of Vermont and Corizon Health, Inc., formerly known as Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS). The State appealed a declaratory judgment ruling that PHS was not contractually obligated to defend the State and its employees against certain claims brought by the estate of an inmate who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections.  Upon review of the contract in question, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that PHS had a duty to defend.View "Vermont v. Prison Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue before the Supreme Court presented centered on whether the same prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) could serve both to criminalize a refusal to submit to an evidentiary blood-alcohol test under 23 V.S.A. 1201(b) and to enhance the penalty for that offense under 23 V.S.A. 1210. The trial court held that the statute prohibited such dual use, and the State appealed that decision.  After careful consideration of the two cases, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plain language of the statute allowed the same prior DUI conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal.View "Vermont v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to vacate a default judgment against it. This dispute arose from a 2009 contract between plaintiff LaFrance Architect, d/b/a Lake Architectural, and defendant Five Point Development South Burlington, LLC. Under the contract, plaintiff was to provide defendant architectural services for the construction of a Walgreens in South Burlington. Plaintiff invoiced defendant for services rendered, but two days after the invoice was payable and three days after the store opened, defendant sent plaintiff a letter indicating that defendant was terminating plaintiff's services due to an unspecified failure to fulfill the contract and unspecified "significant design errors that caused additional costs."  Plaintiff responded by filing notice of a mechanics lien. Defendant then secured a bond to discharge the mechanics lien, but failed to send a copy of the bond to plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed suit to perfect its mechanics lien by filing a verified complaint with a request for attachment and a claim for damages. Because the parties' contract contained mandatory mediation and arbitration provisions, plaintiff also filed a motion for stay, requesting that the court consider its motion for attachment but then stay proceedings pending mediation and arbitration as required by the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly declined to consider the strength of defendant's proffered defenses to its motion to vacate the default judgment, but that defendant's Rule 60(b) motion did not establish a prima facie case to support a meritorious defense. Therefore the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "LaFrance Architect v. Five Point Development South Burlington, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1981. In 1998, husband retired from the United States Army after almost twenty-two years of service. About two years later, the parties were divorced in Vermont pursuant to a stipulated judgment. The judgment provided that husband’s military pension “shall be shared by the parties as a portion of their marital property” where, as pertinent to this case, Wife would receive 41.8% of husband’s total army pension as marital property. The DFAS thereafter garnished wife’s share of the pension and paid it directly to her. In 2009, eleven years after husband’s retirement and nine years after the parties’ divorce, he was recalled from retirement to serve as a military instructor in the ROTC program at the University of New Hampshire. He was discharged from the military in 2012, after three years in this position. During the three years of husband’s recall, his pension benefits were suspended so that neither he nor wife received any benefits. Husband’s additional service resulted in an increase in his monthly pension benefit. When contacted by husband, the DFAS indicated that it would continue to pay wife 41.8 percent of the benefit, as provided in the divorce judgment, resulting in an increase in the total amount of her payment. Husband then filed a motion to amend his support obligation, asserting that payment of the “straight percentage” provided in the divorce judgment would result in “over-payments” to wife. He proposed modified language that wife’s payment would to be calculated based on husband’s completed service at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband's motion. Husband appealed, arguing: the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) denying the motion, and (2) failing to hold a hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed. "[T]his is not a case where [. . .] the parties’ intentions about husband’s post-divorce service were “inescapably speculative,” as one might reasonably conclude in the more typical divorce situation involving the division of a spouse’s pension who was still employed at the time of the divorce." The case was remanded to afford the parties a hearing to address whether the modification sought by husband was absolutely necessary to “prevent hardship or injustice.” View "Spencer v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a trial court’s final divorce order. She asserted that the court erred in granting the parties a divorce because the statutory requirements for divorce were not satisfied. She also challenged the court’s award of primary legal and physical custody of the parties’ five children (including her son, but father’s stepchild) to father. Lastly, she argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of parent-child contact. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s order in all respects with the exception of its decision to award father primary parental rights and responsibilities in his stepchild. On this issue, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "LeBlanc v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Vermont State Employees' Association (VSEA) appealed a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision which found that the State was not required to give certain compensation to state employees in the weeks and months following Tropical Storm Irene.The storm had a particularly devastating effect on the complex of state buildings in Waterbury. Governor Peter Shumlin authorized the complete closure of Vermont state government for one day. The closure notice stated that only authorized critical staff persons should report for work. In the days that followed, various work arrangements were necessary because the Waterbury complex was generally unusable. The Vermont Department of Human Resources indicated that agencies with offices in the complex had implemented their Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP). These plans allow only specifically authorized critical staff to work in order to continue an agency’s essential functions during and immediately following an emergency situation. All other employees in the complex were instructed that they "should not report to work unless specifically authorized to do so by a supervisor." Eventually, most of the state employees in the complex were assigned to new work stations as agencies moved their operations. At first, there was uncertainty about the work requirements and compensation for state employees who had worked in the complex. Over time, management reached a position on those policies. The position was unacceptable to VSEA, the union that represents the state’s classified employee workforce. VSEA charged that the State’s position was inconsistent with three collective bargaining agreements as well as a state personnel policy. When the parties could not resolve the conflict, VSEA appealed to the Vermont Labor Relations Board. VSEA contended that the Board erred in interpreting certain terms of the emergency closing provision of the collective bargaining agreements between the State and VSEA. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Grievance of VSEA" on Justia Law

Defendant Aidan Brunner appealed his conviction for possession of brass knuckles or a similar weapon with intent to use it. He argued arguing that the implement at issue is neither brass knuckles nor a similar weapon under State law. The weapon was described as having retractable blades. There was a slot that permitted the wielder to insert his or her fingers and hold the weapon. The concave curve of the metal fit against the palm; once grasped, one section is within the closed grip of the fist, and the remaining portions protrude along the front of the fingers/knuckles. The bar has sharp, serrated teeth. Finding that description fit the statutory definition of "brass knuckles" [or similar weapon], the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Brunner" on Justia Law

In Fall 2013, defendant pled guilty to a felony charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child as well as four counts of prohibited acts. The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and a psychosexual evaluation. Sentencing occurred after submission of the PSI report and the evaluation. In the course of the sentencing hearing, the defense sought testimony from the victim, who was thirteen years old at the time the offense conduct began and sixteen at the time of sentencing. The victim was defendant's younger sister. The defense requested that the judge speak privately with the victim. The State objected although it agreed "to allow the victim to express her preference to the Court outside the presence of counsel." Specifically, the record reflected that when the judge inquired if anyone "would object to my meeting briefly with [the victim] to find out exactly what her comfort level is," the State responded that it had no objection. The judge met with the child in chambers. A record was kept of their conversation. Reading from a prepared statement, the victim told the judge that she did not want her brother to go to jail. During the conversation, the judge discussed general sentencing principles with the victim. The trial judge offered the victim a mixture of advice and sympathy and discussed ways to overcome traumatic experiences in life. At the close of the conversation, the victim stated that she did not want to provide any additional testimony in open court. The court sentenced defendant to two-to-eight years, all suspended except ninety days on the lewd-and-lascivious conduct charge. The State petitioned for extraordinary relief, raising two issues concerning defendant’s sentencing: an objection to a private meeting in chambers between the judge and the minor victim of the offenses and the court’s decision to impose a "split" probationary sentence on the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, first offense. The Supreme Court found no violation of the sentencing provisions applicable to this offense. Accordingly, it denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Vermont v. Fontaine" on Justia Law