Defendant Brian Aubuchon appealed the superior court’s denial of his request under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 for additional credit toward his aggregated minimum sentence. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Vermont v. Aubuchon" on Justia Law

The Town of Monkton brought a consolidated appeal from decisions of the state appraiser in three property tax cases challenging the Town's 2011 assessment. At issue was the manner in which the Town assessed land that had the potential for subdivision and further development. The state appraiser ruled that the Town had treated taxpayers inequitably by adding additional "home-site values" to undeveloped parcels that are subject to a permitted and recorded subdivision plan. The Town did not add this additional element of appraised value to other undeveloped parcels that may be eligible for subdivision without a permit due to their history or configuration. The Town argued it acted fairly in applying different valuation methods to properties with different characteristics. From the Town’s perspective, the appraised value of a parcel of land with a permit for more than one home should reflect additional development value, and land that could be subdivided but is not the subject of a permit is not similarly situated for purposes of tax appraisal. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town's arguments and reversed the state appraiser. View "Lathrop v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

Developer Vermont North Properties (VNP) appealed from the trial court’s decision in favor of the Village of Derby Center. The dispute centered on VNP’s rights, if any, to water and sewer allocations from the systems managed by the Village in connection with a VNP construction project. The trial court determined that: the Village could charge fees for reserved water and sewer allocations; the Village’s fees were reasonable; the Village could revoke VNP’s reserved allocations for nonpayment of fees; and the Village was not estopped from denying water and sewer connections to VNP on account of nonpayment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that VNP had enforceable reserved water and sewer allocations, but the Village could charge equitable fees for these reservations and may revoke the reservations for nonpayment. Furthermore, the Court concluded that VNP failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Village’s reservation fees, and on that basis the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont North Properties v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

In February 2005, tenants Brian Ayer and Debbie Martell began leasing a single-family home from landlord-plaintiff JW, LLC. Tenants resided in the home with their children and animals, including dogs and chickens. At the time tenants moved in, the house was relatively new and in excellent condition. The monthly rent was $1300. Tenants paid no rent in March and April 2012. They paid rent in May 2012 plus $300 in arrears, but made no further rental payments. Landlord filed for eviction in July 2012. The court issued a rent escrow order. Tenants made only a partial rental payment in August, and the court issued an order for a writ of possession. The writ issued on August 10, 2012 and was served ten days later. The writ stated that tenants had to vacate the premises by midnight on September 6, 2012. On the return of service, the sheriff noted that he had explained the writ and tenants had no questions, and, although tenants refused to take the paperwork, the sheriff left it at the residence. Landlord denied tenant further access to the residence to claim property. Landlord also denied tenant access to the items that landlord had retained. Landlord claimed that the justification for retaining tenants’ personal property was based on two statutes. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the status of tenants’ personal property, which landlord cleared from the leased premises at the time a writ of possession was executed. The trial court concluded that landlord did not rightfully have possession of the property and ordered landlord to return it to tenant. Landlord argued that pursuant to statute he was entitled to retain the property, and, in the alternative, the court erred in denying his request for a writ of attachment for the property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court that 12 V.S.A. 4854a only allowed a landlord who has evicted a tenant to dispose of trash without the threat of liability, and for other property requires a landlord "to make reasonable efforts to find out what tenant plans to do and to store the property for 60 days." Because the dwelling unit was not abandoned and the tenant did not vacate, 9 V.S.A. 4462 did not apply, and there was no statutory basis to require a landlord to store property remaining in a dwelling unit after an eviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "JW, LLC v. Ayer and Martell" on Justia Law

Employer Maple Leaf Farm Association, Inc. appealed a decision of the Employment Security Board finding that its former employee Katherine Kelley was involuntarily terminated from her position and therefore eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Employer operated an intensive inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. Claimant worked for employer as a part-time treatment counselor for seven years. Due to a conflict with a supervisor, claimant resigned from her position in writing on August 29, 2013. She stated in her letter to employer that her last day would be September 19, 2013, and employer allowed her to continue working. Four days later, on September 3, employer terminated her employment and escorted her off the premises. Claimant applied for unemployment compensation. The claims adjudicator determined that she was not entitled to benefits for the first two weeks after her termination because the accrued vacation pay that employer paid her during that period was in excess of her weekly benefit amount. The claims adjudicator further determined that claimant was not entitled to benefits because she had left employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer. Employer appealed the referee’s decision to the Employment Security Board, which adopted the referee’s findings and affirmed its conclusions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Kelley v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire attempted to extradite Vermont resident and petitioner William LaPlante for failing to appear at a 2009 hearing allegedly related to a criminal conviction in New Hampshire in 1998. Following a Governor’s warrant from Vermont, petitioner requested a writ of habeas corpus from the Vermont superior court in Rutland, which was granted on grounds that the warrant lacked information required by statute. Vermont appealed this grant of habeas corpus relief, contesting the court’s holding and its findings regarding the contents of the Governor’s warrant. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaPlante" on Justia Law

In December 2011, wife Andrea Joseph filed for divorce after twenty-three years of marriage to husband Neil Joseph. In October 2012, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to equally divide certain joint Morgan Stanley accounts. They also agreed in the stipulation that husband would continue to pay, out of the portion of the joint accounts designated to him, “those obligations that were being paid prior to the divorce action, which would include but not be limited to: mortgages, taxes, insurance and utilities for the properties that are owned by either one or both of the parties.” The trial court approved the stipulation and entered it as a court order. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the effect of an arrearage accrued under a temporary order following a final divorce decree when the arrearage was not incorporated into the final order or otherwise reduced to judgment. Wife appealed the family court’s denial of her motion to enforce husband Neil Joseph’s obligations under the temporary order after the final divorce decree issued. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis as to the impact of the final divorce order on the allegedly unsatisfied obligations pursuant to the temporary order, and affirmed. View "Joseph v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rodney Demag worked for a car dealership which also provided automobile service. As a convenience for customers, he picked up vehicles belonging to customers, leaving his own vehicle and returning the customer’s vehicle at the end of the day. Plaintiff provided this service to defendant Better Power Equipment, Inc.'s (BPE) general manager and his wife, picking up their cars from BPE’s parking lot. This occurred five to six times a year. The arrangement had existed for approximately ten years. In 2009, plaintiff drove to defendant for scheduled service, parking in his usual spot next to the vehicle of the general manager and his wife. Although this area was not generally used for parking by BPE customers, the general manager and his wife typically parked there, and other employees sometimes parked there in the winter. Plaintiff spoke briefly with the general manager about the service needed for his vehicle. Plaintiff then returned to his own vehicle, retrieved a few items, took a step and fell into an uncovered storm drain. He filed this case to recover damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of that fall. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment against him in the resulting personal injury case. The trial court found that plaintiff was a licensee of defendant, [ . . .] rather than an invitee. It concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a lesser standard of care from BPE, which allowed for summary judgment against him. The Supreme Court determined "that the time has come to abolish Vermont’s common-law negligence distinction between licensees and invitees" and reversed and remanded. View "Demag v. Better Power Equipment" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Girouard appealed the superior court’s denial of a motion to reopen his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 post-conviction relief petition and to order the Department of Corrections (DOC) to release him on furlough. Petitioner argued that the superior court’s 2009 order directing DOC to evaluate petitioner for furlough was the law of the case and the superior court had “inherent authority” to enforce it. Petitioner alleged that DOC’s actions constituted a “bad faith evasion” of the court’s order and argued that the superior court erred by failing to develop a factual record to determine whether DOC followed the court’s mandate. The State counters that DOC complied with the 2009 superior court order, and that its programming decisions are unreviewable under Rule 75. "The fact that a colorable constitutional claim implicates a programming decision committed to the DOC’s discretion does not insulate the alleged constitutional violation from judicial review. [. . .] To the extent that petitioner is not merely challenging the propriety of the programming decision here, but is raising a colorable constitutional claim, his claim is reviewable. [. . . ] Petitioner’s allegations state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal." The Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Girouard" on Justia Law

Appellant-taxpayer Elaine Hoiska appealed the Vermont State Appraiser’s valuation of her property in the Town of East Montpelier. She argued that the appraisal incorrectly treated her property as comprising two contiguous lots under common ownership, and accordingly assigns a higher value to the property than if it were a single developable lot. More specifically, appellant took issue with the appraiser’s legal conclusion that she legally subdivided the land in 1978 by procuring a survey, not filed in the land records, that includes a line purportedly dividing the lot into two parcels. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state appraiser’s findings did not support the legal conclusion that appellant effectively subdivided her property in 1978, and reversed. View "Hoiska v. Town of East Montpelier" on Justia Law