A mother appealed the family court’s adjudication of her daughter B.A. as a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She argued that the court erred in combining the merits of the CHINS proceeding with the disposition of a concurrent delinquency proceeding. Mother contended that the court lacked statutory authority to combine the hearings and that striking the CHINS adjudication is necessary to cure the error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Edward Wesolow was among the signers of a petition to place two articles on the warning for the Town of Lowell’s 2012 annual meeting. One of those articles was an advisory article expressing opposition to a wind power development in town. The Lowell selectboard warned the article, designated "Article 8," and the article was duly introduced at the town meeting. After a motion to accept the article, and a second, but before any discussion, a motion was made to pass over the article. That motion to pass over the article passed on a voice vote, and the article was not discussed further at the meeting. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the question of whether 17 V.S.A. 2661 permitted a petition for reconsideration of an article "passed over" by vote of town residents at town meeting. The trial court concluded that it does. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wesolow v. Town of Lowell" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions.View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

The State appealed the grant of defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on his civil driver's license suspension. The trial court held that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 or above at the time he operated a motor vehicle. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.View "Vermont v. Nugent" on Justia Law

Defendants, in consolidated cases, challenged a recent amendment to Vermont's DNA-database statute as unconstitutional. As of July 2011, the amendment mandated warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection and analysis from anyone arraigned for a felony after a determination of probable cause. Defendants in these cases were all arraigned on qualifying charges and subsequently refused to give a DNA sample. All trial courts found the amendment authorized unconstitutional searches and seizures, either under the Vermont or federal constitutions. The Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that its holding pertained only to the State Constitution, and not the U.S. Constitution. "The marginal weight of the State's interest in DNA collection at the point of arraignment, balanced against the weight of the privacy interest retained by arraignees prior to conviction, persuad[ed] the [Vermont Supreme Court] to hold that 20 VSA 1933(a)(2), and associated sections, which expand[ed] the DNA sample requirement to defendants charged with qualifying crimes for which probable cause is found, violate[d] Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courts' holdings. View "Vermont v. Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Williams pled guilty to four counts of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to serve forty to sixty years in prison. These charges stemmed from a fire in an apartment house in which petitioner lived. Three young children and their grandmother died in the fire. Petitioner was nineteen years old at the time of the fire. Petitioner sought to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Following a twelve-day trial, the civil division ruled that although petitioner’s defense attorney provided adequate representation in connection with his guilty pleas, the assistance he provided to his client during sentencing fell below minimum standards of representation. Both petitioner and the State appealed the court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the court's decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea. The Court also affirmed the ruling that his representation during the sentencing phase was inadequate and that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to provide more than perfunctory assistance. The Court agreed with the PCR court that petitioner's sentence should have been vacated and a new sentencing hearing scheduled. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a contract dispute between the State of Vermont and Corizon Health, Inc., formerly known as Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS). The State appealed a declaratory judgment ruling that PHS was not contractually obligated to defend the State and its employees against certain claims brought by the estate of an inmate who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections.  Upon review of the contract in question, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that PHS had a duty to defend.View "Vermont v. Prison Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue before the Supreme Court presented centered on whether the same prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) could serve both to criminalize a refusal to submit to an evidentiary blood-alcohol test under 23 V.S.A. 1201(b) and to enhance the penalty for that offense under 23 V.S.A. 1210. The trial court held that the statute prohibited such dual use, and the State appealed that decision.  After careful consideration of the two cases, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plain language of the statute allowed the same prior DUI conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal.View "Vermont v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to vacate a default judgment against it. This dispute arose from a 2009 contract between plaintiff LaFrance Architect, d/b/a Lake Architectural, and defendant Five Point Development South Burlington, LLC. Under the contract, plaintiff was to provide defendant architectural services for the construction of a Walgreens in South Burlington. Plaintiff invoiced defendant for services rendered, but two days after the invoice was payable and three days after the store opened, defendant sent plaintiff a letter indicating that defendant was terminating plaintiff's services due to an unspecified failure to fulfill the contract and unspecified "significant design errors that caused additional costs."  Plaintiff responded by filing notice of a mechanics lien. Defendant then secured a bond to discharge the mechanics lien, but failed to send a copy of the bond to plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed suit to perfect its mechanics lien by filing a verified complaint with a request for attachment and a claim for damages. Because the parties' contract contained mandatory mediation and arbitration provisions, plaintiff also filed a motion for stay, requesting that the court consider its motion for attachment but then stay proceedings pending mediation and arbitration as required by the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly declined to consider the strength of defendant's proffered defenses to its motion to vacate the default judgment, but that defendant's Rule 60(b) motion did not establish a prima facie case to support a meritorious defense. Therefore the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "LaFrance Architect v. Five Point Development South Burlington, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1981. In 1998, husband retired from the United States Army after almost twenty-two years of service. About two years later, the parties were divorced in Vermont pursuant to a stipulated judgment. The judgment provided that husband’s military pension “shall be shared by the parties as a portion of their marital property” where, as pertinent to this case, Wife would receive 41.8% of husband’s total army pension as marital property. The DFAS thereafter garnished wife’s share of the pension and paid it directly to her. In 2009, eleven years after husband’s retirement and nine years after the parties’ divorce, he was recalled from retirement to serve as a military instructor in the ROTC program at the University of New Hampshire. He was discharged from the military in 2012, after three years in this position. During the three years of husband’s recall, his pension benefits were suspended so that neither he nor wife received any benefits. Husband’s additional service resulted in an increase in his monthly pension benefit. When contacted by husband, the DFAS indicated that it would continue to pay wife 41.8 percent of the benefit, as provided in the divorce judgment, resulting in an increase in the total amount of her payment. Husband then filed a motion to amend his support obligation, asserting that payment of the “straight percentage” provided in the divorce judgment would result in “over-payments” to wife. He proposed modified language that wife’s payment would to be calculated based on husband’s completed service at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband's motion. Husband appealed, arguing: the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) denying the motion, and (2) failing to hold a hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed. "[T]his is not a case where [. . .] the parties’ intentions about husband’s post-divorce service were “inescapably speculative,” as one might reasonably conclude in the more typical divorce situation involving the division of a spouse’s pension who was still employed at the time of the divorce." The case was remanded to afford the parties a hearing to address whether the modification sought by husband was absolutely necessary to “prevent hardship or injustice.” View "Spencer v. Spencer" on Justia Law