Plaintiff Linda Stone sued the Town of Irasburg alleging that the selectboard had acted unlawfully in ordering her, as town treasurer, to raise her bond to $1,000,000. She sought monetary damages based on common law defamation, tortious interference with office, violation of the Vermont Constitution, and deprivation of due process. She also asserted that the Town was obligated to pay her attorney’s fees pursuant to statute. In several different orders, the trial court granted the Town summary judgment on all counts. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. The Court concluded plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a question of fact as to whether a July 12 hearing adequately protected her due process rights. "To remedy a stigma-plus violation through a post-deprivation name-clearing hearing, due process requires more than a chance to speak. It requires an opportunity to clear one’s name before a body which is sufficiently neutral that a person has some realistic chance of success. [. . .] It was error to make a contrary factual determination in favor of the Town in the context of summary judgment." The Court affirmed the trial court with regard to plaintiff's civil rights, tortious interference and defamation claims, and affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stone v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

"Belle" is an eleven-year-old German wirehaired pointer who was greatly loved by husband and wife. The parties had no minor children, and they were able to reach an agreement on the division of their property and other financial issues - except for Belle. They came to the final hearing for a ruling on which one of them would receive the dog in the divorce decree. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court awarded the dog to husband. It found that either party would provide the dog with a good life, but gave a slight edge to husband because the dog was accustomed to the routine of going to the clinic every day. The court balanced that factor against the dog’s familiarity with the marital home, which the parties agreed wife would receive as part of the property settlement. It found that husband "treats the dog like a dog," while wife is more doting and treats the dog like a child. The court concluded that the dog would do better with husband’s balanced attitude towards the animal. On appeal, wife claimed that the court erred in refusing to consider allocating the dog to both spouses in a joint arrangement. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court decision on two grounds: (1) the factors identified and considered by the court in allocating the dog were appropriate; and (2) the family division cannot enforce a visitation or shared custody order for animals: "[t]he court need not specify the weight given to each factor, but is required only to provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why." View "Hament v. Baker" on Justia Law

Father appealed a trial court’s order adjudicating B.R. a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He argued that the court’s decision was not supported by evidence. B.R. was born in November 2012. On Monday, March 4, 2013, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that B.R. was CHINS, and it obtained an emergency care order. Shortly before the CHINS petition was filed, an affidavit was filed describing the circumstances surrounding mother’s March 1, 2013, arrest for driving under the influence of drugs with her two older children in the car; mother’s statements to the arresting officers about being stopped the day before for possessing a methadone pill and crystal methamphetamine, drugs that she stated belonged to father; mother’s admission to the arresting officers that she had cooked methamphetamine with father at the family’s home the night before her DUI arrest; mother’s concern at that time about B.R.’s welfare in father’s care, and her fears that father had taken the three-month-old child to a "meth house" in New York; and mother’s subsequent statements to police on Saturday, March 2, that she had retrieved B.R. from a "meth house" in New York where father had taken him. Finding sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.R." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the family division had exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital property acquired during a marriage that ended in annulment. In 2011, wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Family Division of the Franklin Superior Court. Both parties represented themselves. Following a hearing, the family division determined that wife was still married to her first husband at the time of her marriage to husband in March 2000. Wife had received divorce papers filed by her first husband and believed that their marriage had ended in divorce. The family division initially ruled that the marriage between the parties in this case was void by operation of law. The only issue was division of property. Wife was ordered to turn over property belonging to husband. A few months later, the family division changed its mind concerning the property division: "[s]ince the marriage was void at its beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. The parties are referred to the civil division. Either party may start an action there. The family court’s case is closed." Husband followed the court's instructions, and subsequently filed two small claims cases against wife seeking money damages for property he claims was his. The small claims judge entered judgment in favor of wife. Husband appealed to the civil division, which held that the civil division and the small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the civil division. View "Cameron v. Rollo" on Justia Law

This case arose following a fire that destroyed a commercial building in Rutland in 2010. Plaintiff Johnathan Lasek leased the northern half of the building and used the space as a workshop for his house-staining business. He stored staining products and other equipment and constructed a business office in the northeastern corner of the building. The southwestern corner of the building contained a fully enclosed room that was occupied by another commercial tenant, Vermont Vapor Inc. (VVI). The remainder of the building was used by landlord Downing Properties, LLC, as storage for ATVs, motorcycles, and snowmobiles. VVI used its space as a laboratory for mixing the liquid filler for electronic cigarettes. VVI owner Adam Tredwell and his father Warren altered the room to Adam's specificationsm, adding sheetrock and other materials to create a “clean room.” He also installed an eight-inch fan on the south wall of the laboratory that vented to the outside of the building. An industrial space heater was suspended from the rafters of the warehouse, above the ceiling of the laboratory. The Tredwells connected the heater to a propane tank so that they could heat the space in the winter months. Warren was the last person in the laboratory the night before the fire. When firefighters arrived shortly after the fire was reported, the northwest corner of the building (plaintiff's corner) had a large hole in the roof and was heavily engulfed in flames. VVI's corner was not on fire at that time. Plaintiff sued VVI for negligence and strict liability, alleging that VVI had caused the fire by mishandling liquid nicotine. He also sued landlord for breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commercial use, negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and unjust enrichment. After plaintiff's presentation of his case, the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness on causation; (2) in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) in excluding an eyewitness's statements to police; (4) by denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (5) by awarding all deposition costs to defendants; and (6) in refusing to disqualify counsel for defendant-landlord. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects, with the exception of the award of deposition costs. View "Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc." on Justia Law

Mother and father appealed a family court order adjudicating the minor A.W. to be a Child in Need of Care and Supervision (CHINS). They argued on appeal: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); and (2) the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that the child was without proper parental care. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.W." on Justia Law

The Father, Jonathan Pahnke, appealed the modification of a foreign child support order. He argued that he was never properly served with the motion to modify child support, that the Vermont family division lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him and this matter, and that the magistrate improperly ruled that mother did not owe him arrears for the period preceding the modification. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded the case for recalculation of the mother's child support arrearage. View "Pahnke v. Pahnke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Foti sold most of his fuels business to defendant James Kurrle and agreed to sell gasoline to defendant through a retained wholesale distributorship. When the business relationship soured, plaintiff sued defendant for one month's nonpayment of gasoline and other claims. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), all stemming from the original purchase of plaintiff's business. Defendant appealed the trial court's judgments as a matter of law on the counterclaims in favor of plaintiff, specifically the CFA counterclaim, arguing that the court should not have considered plaintiff’s motion because plaintiff did not raise the argument that the CFA did not cover the transaction until after trial, and that the court erred in holding that the transaction was not "in commerce." Furthermore, defendant appealed the court’s ruling on the breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing counterclaims arising from the non-competition provision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court concluded, as the trial court did, that the CFA did not apply to this transaction as a matter of law. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court should have sent the case to the jury on the contract claims. View "Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Daniel Brown appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment to the State on his claim of employment discrimination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. He argued that summary judgment was improper because genuine material issues of fact remained as to whether his membership in the Vermont National Guard was a motivating factor in the State's decisions not to promote him, and ultimately to terminate him from his position. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Vermont" on Justia Law

For over sixty years, the testator lived with her husband "Bill" Agan in the Town of Ludlow, where both were active in a variety of community organizations and activities. After Bill died, the testator placed her assets into trust. The original trust beneficiaries were the testator's brother, sisters, and the testator's niece and nephew. In 1996, the testator amended the trust to reduce the bequest to her brother (with whom she had a falling out), and to add bequests to three local community organizations: the Building Fund of the United Church of Ludlow, the Black River Academy Museum of Ludlow, and the Black River Valley Senior Center of Ludlow. A third trust amendment in May 2004 deleted the brother as a beneficiary. Additional trust amendments in December 2004, February 2005, and May 2005 variously altered the trustee, successor trustee, and trust account. Relatives and others who dealt with the testator during the period from 2004 to 2005, observed personality changes and signs of confusion. Her primary care physician diagnosed dementia in June 2004, and prescribed several medications in 2005 to help arrest the effects of dementia. In May 2005, the testator contacted an attorney to draft a number of additional changes to her trust. Less than a week after that contact, the testator's sister Patricia filed an involuntary guardianship petition, referencing the doctor's dementia diagnosis and recommending the appointment of a guardian. Following a hearing, Patricia withdrew her petition and the probate court granted the testator's petition, finding that the testator understood the nature and consequences of the requested voluntary guardianship. The testator died in May 2008. The estate at the time was worth in excess of eight million dollars. In April 2009, three members of the testator's family named as beneficiaries under a seventh amended trust, the testator's sister Joanne Curran, nephew Michael Curran, and niece Cathleen Curran (plaintiffs), filed a complaint for declaratory relief in superior court naming as defendants the nonprofit organizations receiving bequests under the trust. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the testator lacked the capacity to execute the seventh trust amendment, and that the amendment was the product of undue influence and was invalid as a result. The court found sufficient evidence of "suspicious circumstances" to shift the burden of proof to defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the seventh trust amendment was not the product of undue influence. 11. The jury returned a special verdict, finding that the testator had the capacity to execute the seventh trust amendment, and that it was not the product of undue influence. The court denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Curran v. Building Fund of the United Church of Ludlow" on Justia Law