Defendant was driving along a gravel country road at night in a scarcely populated area. A state trooper was traveling in the opposite direction and saw defendant's approaching vehicle. Defendant was not speeding or driving erratically, and his vehicle did not display any equipment defects or violations. The trooper decided to turn his cruiser around and follow defendant for a while. Eventually, defendant pulled his car to the right side of the road and stopped with the engine and lights on. There were no businesses, homes, or other structures in the area that would explain why defendant stopped his car there.  The trooper, who had been following at a distance of two or three car-lengths behind the car, also pulled over and stopped. The trooper then waited to see what the car or its driver would do next, but nothing immediate happened. After about thirty seconds, the trooper decided to turn on his blue lights. He testified that he thought it was "unusual" for the car to stop where it did, and decided that he should approach defendant's car to make sure defendant was "alright." While speaking with defendant, the trooper made observations that eventually led to defendant's arrest for suspected driving under the influence. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the motor-vehicle stop was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. Defendant contended that it was not and argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of the stop. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision and reversed. View "Vermont v. Button" on Justia Law

Defendant Douglas Tuthill, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Oakes, appealed a jury's award of $150,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff Doreen Carpentier and the trial court's denial of his motion for remittitur. Defendant also challenged the trial court's denial of his post-judgment motion to vacate a writ of attachment. Paul Oakes was charged with numerous crimes based on acts alleged to have occurred at plaintiff's home. Oakes killed himself shortly before his arraignment on these charges. Following Oakes's death, plaintiff sued his estate, raising claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff also requested a writ of attachment against certain real property owned by Oakes. Finding none of defendant's arguments persuasive, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carpentier v. Tuthill" on Justia Law

The Probate Court appointed Theodore Ballard's niece, Leala Bell, as Ballard's guardian. Bell signed a promissory note to a mortgage as a "borrower"; she did not expressly indicate that she was signing as Ballard's guardian or that her signature indicated only her "approval" of Ballard's action. The loan was secured by a mortgage on Ballard's real property. The mortgage deed granted and conveyed Ballard's property to CitiFinancial, including the power to sell the property. Ballard signed the mortgage deed but Bell did not. There was no showing that the probate court licensed the mortgage. CitiFinancial alleged that Ballard had failed to make the payments called for under the note and mortgage, and therefore breached these agreements. Ballard moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that he lacked the legal capacity to execute a mortgage deed and promissory note while he was under guardianship. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Ballard's argument relied on the notion that Bell participated in the transaction with CitiFinancial, subjected herself to personal liability as a cosigner of the note, signed the settlement statement as well as the promissory note, but did not actually approve Ballard's signing of the note. Although the mortgage deed purportedly executed by Ballard and the promissory note secured by that deed were executed as part of the same overall transaction, the two documents created distinct legal obligations. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in analyzing the note and mortgage as if they were one and the same, both subject to the requirement of probate court approval. Therefore the Court reversed the award of summary judgment to Ballard on CitiFinancial's claim on the promissory note and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on that claim. View "CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Balch" on Justia Law

Appellant Windham County Sheriff’s Department (WCSD) appealed a decision of the Employment Security Board that held it liable for reimbursement of unemployment compensation benefits as a base-period employer of a former employee. WCSD argued that because the employee was terminated for gross misconduct, and because an amendment to the statute governing reimbursement of unemployment compensation benefits that would have removed its liability for payments for employees terminated for gross misconduct took effect before the employee became eligible to receive any benefits, it should not have been held liable for reimbursement payments. Finding no error in the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Windham County Sheriffs Department v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed a 2012 trial court order that upheld the Town of Underhill's decision to reclassify a segment of Town Highway 26 from a Class 3 and Class 4 highway to a legal trail. Petitioners argued that: (1) the trial court should have appointed commissioners to make a report concerning the reclassification decision pursuant to 19 V.S.A. sections 740-743 rather than reviewing the reclassification decision on the record pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75; (2) the court erred in declining to stay the appeal pending resolution of a related action concerning maintenance of the segment; and (3) the evidence did not support the Town's reclassification ruling. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the question of how non-rental residential properties subject to housing-subsidy covenants should be valued for property-tax purposes. Taxpayers in two cases consolidated for the purposes of this opinion contended that the governing statute mandates an automatic reduction in valuation for properties subject to these covenants or, (what is effectively) equivalent, a mandatory tax exemption on a portion of the property's value. The towns in which these properties are located contended instead that the applicable statute requires that municipal listers give individualized consideration to the effect these covenants may have on the fair market value of a given property when they determine the appropriate assessed value for the allocation of property taxes. The Vermont League of Cities and Towns and the Vermont Assessors and Listers Association joined the towns as amici curiae. The Supreme Court agreed with the towns that the existence of a housing-subsidy covenant was but one of many factors listers and assessors must take under advisement in ascertaining a property's fair market value.  View "Franks v. Town of Essex" on Justia Law

Petitioner Catherine Harwood appealed a Human Services Board decision that applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to uphold the substantiation of her abuse of a vulnerable adult, and thereby placed her name on the adult abuse registry. Petitioner argued that she should not have been precluded from appealing the abuse substantiation because she was never given a full and fair opportunity to challenge the allegations. Petitioner is the mother of M.T., a thirty-five-year-old woman who had significant developmental disabilities and was unable to care for herself. Upon review of the Board's decision, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that she did not receive an opportunity to challenge the allegations. The Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Harwood" on Justia Law

Appellant Green Mountain Future (GMF) appealed the grant of summary judgment, which found that it was a political action committee (PAC) and violated a number of provisions of the Vermont campaign finance laws. GMF argued the trial court erred in not applying a narrowing construction created by the U.S. Supreme Court in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1 (1976)), to the definition of a PAC under Vermont campaign finance laws, and that without that construction the registration and disclosure laws are unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment and the vagueness doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State cross-appealed the $10,000 civil penalty assigned by the trial court, asserting that that court abused its discretion by misapplying certain factors and imposing a penalty for only one of GMF's violations. This case largely turned on the scope and continuing vitality of the "magic words" that GMF argued were required by "Buckley." GMF argued that its advertisements were purely issue advocacy and did not seek to affect the outcome of an election, in this case for Governor of Vermont. The State argued that GMF's advertisements were transparently employed to defeat the candidacy of Brian Dubie for Governor, although they did not state so explicitly. The Supreme Court held that the "magic words" were not required to make the applicable campaign finance statute constitutional. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision on summary judgment and the civil penalty, except that it remanded for reconsideration of the penalty for the violation of the identification requirement. View "Vermont v. Green Mountain Future" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's eviction action on account of her lawyer's failure to attend a scheduled status conference can withstand a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) given the facts of this case. After careful review of those facts, the Supreme Court concluded that it could not and reversed. View "Ying v. Heide" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the omnibus clause in a automobile insurance policy provided coverage to a permittee to whom the insured owner loans the car when that first permittee was subject to a negligent entrustment claim for loaning the car to a second permittee. A vehicle owner gave her car keys to defendant, who in turned passed them to another driver. The driver was involved in a fatal, single-car accident and the driver's estate sued defendant for negligent entrustment. Defendant sought coverage under the vehicle owner's automobile insurance policy. Defendant appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and finding that, as a matter of law, defendant did not qualify for coverage under the policy. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s entrustment of the vehicle to the driver constituted "use" under the omnibus clause of the policy and that the undisputed evidence supported the conclusion that the insured did not consent to defendant's allowing the driver to drive the car, but that a material issue of fact existed with respect to whether defendant entrusted the car keys to driver reasonably believing that driver would not drive the car. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Co. v. Colby" on Justia Law