Plaintiff-Appellee the Rutland Herald appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Office of the Attorney General (collectively the State), and to deny disclosure of records related to a criminal investigation of possession of child pornography by employees of the Criminal Justice Training Council at the Vermont Police Academy. The court concluded that the records sought by the Herald, which included inquest records, were exempt from disclosure as "records dealing with the detection and investigation of crime." The Herald asserted on appeal that a strong policy in favor of public oversight of law enforcement actions should have lead to a different result. It argued that the Legislature could not have intended that records relating to the investigation and detection of crime be confidential forever. The Supreme Court rejected the Herald's arguments, finding the investigatory records were entitled to a blanket exemption under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5) and upheld the trial court's decision. View "Rutland Herald v. Vermont State Police" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the State may prosecute an adult defendant for crimes alleged to have occurred when he was a juvenile. The prosecution was late in bringing the charged because the alleged victims did not come forward until defendant was eighteen years of age and beyond the jurisdiction of the family division.  The State tried to file the information in the criminal division.  The criminal division transferred the case to the family division because it found there was no criminal jurisdiction to adjudicate even the most serious of the offenses without first filing the matter in the family division.  The family division, however, determined it was without jurisdiction to entertain the charges because defendant had reached eighteen years of age. Accordingly, it dismissed all of the charges against defendant. On appeal, the State argued that the family division erred by dismissing the more serious felony charges because: (1) a recent legislative enactment addressing what it called a "gap" in the jurisdictional provisions of the statutes was a mere clarification  demonstrating that the Legislature had always intended that adult defendants be subject to prosecution for serious crimes committed when they were juveniles; and (2) even if the new amendment did not clarify the statutes and fill the gap, there was jurisdiction in the criminal division because that division has always had jurisdiction over all serious felonies. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the Legislature's recent enactment did not clarify existing law but rather established entirely new law that could not be applied retroactively to this case; therefore, to the extent that the Legislature has filled the "gap," it has done so only prospectively; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable at the time of the offenses  did not allow either the family or criminal division to exercise its jurisdiction over an adult defendant accused of offenses committed as a juvenile under the age of fourteen.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family division's order dismissing all charges in this case. View "In re D.K., Juvenile" on Justia Law

In 1995, Petitioner John Rhodes, a resident of the Town of Georgia, petitioned his local governing body, the selectboard, to clarify several issues surrounding two roads that bordered his land.  While this case began as a suit over the existence and use of two ancient roads, "it grew over time into a test of constitutional guarantees and a saga about abuse of power."  After almost fifteen years of litigation, including two side trips to federal court, the trial court entered judgment against the Town of Georgia.  The court found that Petitioner's request to access his land over town roads had been repeatedly and maliciously frustrated by the Town selectboard in an ongoing attempt to protect the value of a neighbor's property, a violation of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, the Common Benefits Clause.  The court concluded that Article 7 was self-executing and awarded monetary damages for the constitutional violation.  In this consolidated appeal, the Town of Georgia sought to overturn the trial court decision.  Upon careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of liability against the Town: the Court "underscore[d] the unique circumstances" of this case, finding that the "trial court's unchallenged findings describe a deliberate, decades-long course of discriminatory conduct by the Town so malicious and self-serving as to deny Rhodes his fundamental rights to due process and equal treatment under the Vermont Constitution.  Absent such egregious misconduct, and clear proof of the exacting elements necessary for relief, towns and local officials have no cause for concern about the myriad decisions made in the normal exercise of authority.  Failing to recognize a remedy in a case such as this, however, would undermine the constitutional principles that all Vermonters hold dear.  Vermont has consistently sustained its essence as one big small town by affirming and reinforcing the fundamental values that define it.  This decision affirms those values." View "In re Town Highway No. 20 Town of Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendants R. Brown & Sons, Inc., a scrap metal hauling company, and its principal, Robert Brown were found liable for breach of contract, common law fraud, trespass, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and consumer fraud.  Each of these claims stemmed from Defendants' commercial dealings with Plaintiff Rathe Salvage, Inc., a scrap metal salvage yard where Defendant would crush cars and transport the scrap for sale to steel mills.  Defendant was later granted judgment as a matter of law by the trial court overturning the jury's finding of a consumer fraud violation.  Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying judgment in its favor on the remaining claims because the verdicts were based on insufficient evidence; (2) it was entitled to a new trial because Rathe Salvage's attorney improperly argued to the jury that opposing counsel was implicated in withholding evidence; and (3) the case should be remanded due to the trial court's refusal to conduct a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of hauler's polygraph, or lie detector, testing before excluding such evidence from trial.  Rathe Salvage cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendant on the consumer fraud claim.  Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all four issues. View "Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Following Defendant Jay Handy's conviction for a sex offense, the superior court granted the State's motion to compel Defendant to submit to testing for sexually transmitted diseases under the authority of 13 V.S.A. 3256, which does not require probable cause or a warrant for testing.  On appeal, Defendant argued that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not serve any special need beyond law enforcement justifying abandonment of the normal probable-cause and warrant requirements and because, even if such a special need were present, the governmental goals advanced by the statute do not outweigh his constitutionally protected privacy interests.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order compelling the testing, but remanded the matter for the court to issue an order restricting the victim's disclosure of the test results. View "Vermont v. Handy" on Justia Law

Defendant Randy J. Rouleau appealed the decision of the Washington Civil Division which held that Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., as Trustee for the registered holders of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Security Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-CF2 (Wells Fargo), was entitled to enforce his personal guaranty of a promissory note secured by mortgages on five mobile home parks.  The civil division concluded that Wells Fargo could enforce the guaranty as the holder of the note under 9A V.S.A. § 3-301(i), which defines who may enforce a negotiable instrument.  Defendant argued that the court erred in ruling that Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the guaranty because Wells Fargo could not prove the chain of assignments from the original lender to itself and therefore that Wells Fargo, and not some third party, is the assignee of the guaranty.  Defendant also argued that the court erred in treating assignment of the note as sufficient to show assignment of the guaranty because the guaranty, in contrast to the note, is a separate contract that must be expressly assigned.  Finally, defendant argued that because Wells Fargo lacked standing to enforce the guaranty, the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement action.  Based on the evidence presented, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the court's finding that Wells Fargo was assigned the note and mortgage was clearly erroneous.  Moreover, the court's finding on this point, essential to Wells Fargo's status as a holder, directly supports its conclusion that Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the guaranty.  Because Wells Fargo had standing, Defendant's final argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement action has no merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the civil division. View "Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Rouleau" on Justia Law

Mother Jacqueline Parker appealed a superior court judgment that transferred physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father Brian Parker.  She contended that the court erred in concluding that her desire to relocate to Buffalo, New York satisfied the threshold requirement of changed circumstances and supported its decision to transfer physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father. The court's rationale noted that the parties' ability to communicate effectively with each other was "completely dysfunctional," although they were able to exercise legal parental rights and responsibilities in most areas.  After noting that the children's "relationship to Father has been constant and multi-day on a weekly basis," the court concluded that a permanent move to Buffalo "[was] not in the children's best interest, and is so far in derogation of the obligation to promote and provide maximum parent-child contact under 15 V.S.A. § 655(b)(5), that it trumps [Mother's] primary caretaker role, as well as other statutory factors that might otherwise trend in [Mother's] favor." On appeal, Mother emphasized that she was not challenging the court's denial of her motion to modify or her request to move to Buffalo with the children, but rather only the court's transfer of physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father.  She argued that the court erred by arriving at its threshold finding of changed circumstances and its best-interests determination based solely on Mother's conditional intent to relocate. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case for more findings, taking no position on the family court's decision: "our examination of the transcript of the custody hearing reveals abundant testimony by both Mother and Father on issues surrounding the breakdown of the parties' relationship, their inability to communicate, and the children's best interests generally.  Thus, on remand, the trial court may in its discretion conclude that additional evidence is not required in order to make supplemental findings and may instead clarify its rationale, or even alter its decision if duly supported, on the basis of the existing transcript and case file." View "Parker v. Parker" on Justia Law

Medicaid recipient John Doe and the State appealed a trial court's decision allowing the State to partially recover the amount of its lien against Doe's settlement with a third party. In 1992 when Doe was nine years old, he was catastrophically injured and paralyzed in an automobile accident.  Due to Doe's injuries, his mother applied for Medicaid on his behalf in 1994.  Doe later brought suit in New York Supreme Court against the alleged third-party tortfeasors.  He also sued New York State Transit Authority (NYSTA) in the New York Court of Claims.  The State of Vermont notified Doe in January 2001 that it claimed a lien against any award, judgment, or settlement stemming from the accident.  In 2001, Doe settled the lawsuit against the third parties for $8.75 million. Doe's suit against NYSTA went to trial, and in 2004, the Court of Claims awarded Doe approximately $42 million and allocated approximately $2.9 million to Doe's past medical expenses from the date of injury to the date of trial. Between the 2001 and 2006 settlements, the State paid approximately $771,111 in medical expenses for Doe's care, in addition to the medical expenses paid up to the date of the first settlement.  The State claimed a lien on the 2006 settlement for $506,810, which was the difference between the amount the State paid for Doe's medical care under Medicaid and the State's share of litigation expenses. Doe sued the State of Vermont, seeking a declaratory judgment that he satisfied the State's lien by partial payment.  On summary judgment, the court concluded that it would not undo the 2001 settlement because it was an accord and satisfaction of all claims paid for medical expenses incurred to that point in time. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court should have reduced the Court of Claims' findings of future economic damages to present value before making its lien allocation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the parties' agreement resolved the issues surrounding the State's lien on Doe's first settlement, while leaving open the possibility that Doe would obtain a judgment against or settlement with the NYSTA.. On these facts, the Court agreed with the trial court that there was an accord and satisfaction, and that the State accepted $594,209.03. The case was reversed and remanded to recalculate the State's lien against $771,111 in medical expenses and reasonable attorney's fees, but affirmed in all other respects.  View "Doe v. Vermont Office of Health Access" on Justia Law

Husband Robert Molleur appealed the property and maintenance components of a divorce order issued by the family division of the superior court.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the parties a divorce and awarded Wife Susan Molleur: (1) as her share of the marital property, 75% of the marital component of husband's pension (which generated approximately 41.67% of husband's total monthly pension payment; (2) maintenance in the amount of $1900 to $2100 per month for years 2011 to 2013 and $500 per month permanently thereafter, subject to an inflation adjustment; and (3) $2500 in attorney's fees.  Husband appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by awarding wife 75% of the marital component of the pension and permanent maintenance.  Husband also argued that the court erred by ordering an automatic adjustment of maintenance for inflation based upon an arbitrary formula that did not take into account his income. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings on this point have support in the record. The Court affirmed in all respects, except that the case was remanded for the trial court to amend the maintenance award's automatic inflation-adjustment provision. View "Molleur v. Molleur" on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Bain was incarcerated as a habitual offender following convictions in 2005 for possession of stolen property and possession of marijuana.  He believed that police unlawfully entered his home following his May 2003 arrest, and he pursued this claim in numerous suits. Beginning in 2006, Plaintiff filed a series of lawsuits against Windham County Sheriff Keith Clark and others in federal court, focusing on allegations of police misconduct.  All of those complaints were dismissed.  In November 2008, Plaintiff filed this complaint against Defendants Clark and Windham County State Attorney Tracy Shriver, reiterating his allegation that police had unlawfully entered his home without a warrant five and a half years earlier.  Plaintiff maintained that Defendants were unlawfully withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of his rights.  He sought the production of "any and all computer, telephone or otherwise generated radio dispatch unit log[s] of [his] arrest and the bona fide activities of law enforcement for the days of May 22 and 23, 2003" under the Vermont Access to Public Records Act (PRA).  Plaintiff stated that he had requested these documents from Clark in December 2007, but received no response.  He did not allege that he requested the documents from Shriver.  Both Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.  Shriver pointed out that Plaintiff failed to make a public records request from her office, and that he thereby failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called on to consider whether "radio dispatch and unit logs" generated by police were exempt from disclosure under the PRA.  The trial court found the records exempt from disclosure, and dismissed Plaintiff's claim against Shriver for lack of jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision as to Shriver, and reversed and remanded as to Clark: "because the evidence in this case has not yet been fully developed, [the Court could not] discern if police radio and dispatch unit logs are the type of records that the Legislature intended to shield from view." View "Bain v. Clark " on Justia Law