Defendant Junior's Pizza, Inc. appealed a superior court decision that confirmed an arbitration award and awarded attorney's fees to Plaintiff UniFirst Corporation. The Superior Court held that Junior's waived its right to object to arbitration by failing to challenge the award within thirty days of receiving notice. In June 2009, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the parties' contracts, UniFirst filed a demand for final and binding arbitration. Junior's declined to submit to arbitration, stating that it would reconsider if UniFirst produced a valid agreement. UniFirst subsequently provided copies of the contract provision to both Junior's and the arbitrator. In July 2009, the arbitrator notified the parties that UniFirst had met all filing requirements and arbitration would proceed absent a court order staying the matter. Junior's never sought a court order staying arbitration. UniFirst did not seek a court order compelling Junior's to participate. Notice of the arbitration hearing was provided to both parties, and the hearing took place. Junior's did not participate. UniFirst was awarded damages and attorney's fees, and Junior's was ordered to reimburse UniFirst in administrative fees associated with conducting the arbitration. The next day, the arbitrator notified Junior's of the award by email and certified mail. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Junior's argued (1) it did not waive its right to object to the arbitration award, (2) UniFirst was required to petition to compel arbitration prior to engaging in arbitration without Junior’s participation, and (3) the arbitration was not conducted in strict accordance with the terms of the contracts. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the arbitration award. View "UniFirst Corp. v. Junior's Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Alexander Stolte appealed the decision of the Orange Criminal Division that denied his motion for bail review.  Defendant was charged with second-degree murder and held without bail. He requested that the court review bail based on evidence developed after his initial bail hearing in March 2010.  The criminal division refused to consider the new evidence and to reopen the question of whether the evidence of Defendant's guilt was "great," as required to deny bail under the Vermont Constitution and 13 V.S.A. 7553, on the ground that it is "modifying evidence."  Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration of whether the proffered evidence, if relevant, was undisputed as to its origin and result as a matter of fact.  If a genuine dispute as to either arose, then the evidence would then be considered modifying evidence.  But if no such conflict existed, the court would then have to determine whether, if admissible, the evidence would have made a difference to its initial determination on whether the state's prima facie evidence of guilt was "great" for purposes of holding defendant without bail. View "Vermont v. Stolte" on Justia Law

This condemnation case was filed in July 1992, "making it very, very old."  On its fourth time reviewing this matter, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the superior court abused its discretion when it declined to find that there had been a material increase in the value of a sand pit owned by Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Company (HS&G) between 2000 and 2009.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the court’s denial of HS&G’s motion to amend the final judgment. View "In re Chittenden Solid Waste District" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Margaret Murray appealed a superior court's order that dismissed her tax abatement appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that she could not appeal the abatement decision because she failed to challenge the valuation of the property in the appraisal process.  Upon review, the Court concluded that Taxpayer's abatement appeal to the superior court was not foreclosed by her failure to appeal the valuation of her property, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Murray v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

The central issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case arose from a purported agreement to bifurcate the allowance of a will from the future allowance of a codicil. Farwell W. Perry died leaving behind a wife and four adult children (three sons and a daughter). The probate court set a hearing to consider the allowance of the will. Shortly before the hearing, the decedent's sons filed a motion to continue the hearing to allow the interested persons to determine whether they wished to consent to the allowance of both the will and a newly discovered two-page letter from decedent to his children purporting to be a codicil to his will. The codicil involved a single, discrete piece of the estate: a trust which previously had been established with daughter as sole beneficiary would now include all four children as equal beneficiaries. The probate court granted a continuance and rescheduled the hearing. The decedent’s daughter moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. The probate court denied the motion to dismiss, and the daughter appealed to the superior court. A letter from sons' attorney to the register of the probate court representing that "[t]he several parties have reached an agreement to allow the Last Will and Testament of [decedent]," and that they "have agreed to hold in abeyance the need to hold a hearing on the allowance of the purported Codicil to the will" appeared clear on its face. However, the order issued by the probate court allowing the will made no mention of any bifurcation of the allowance of the will from consideration of the purported codicil. While the parties all knew about the codicil at that time, and the order purported to allow any codicils, only the will itself was admitted. The court order did not grant an exception to the principle that wills and their codicils are considered one instrument. The Supreme Court found the superior court's decision to be made in error: "the law is therefore clear: an order allowing a will normally includes any known codicils, and any later effort to allow a codicil is an impermissible collateral attack on a final order." The Court held that the codicil could not be admitted, reversed the superior court's decision and denied the sons' petition to allow the codicil. View "In re Estate of Perry" on Justia Law

In this case, a search warrant was issued to search the home of Defendant Richard Chaplin, and the search turned up incriminating evidence. In response to a motion to suppress however, the superior court determined that the warrant was not supported by an affidavit showing probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime under the standards contained in V.R.Cr.P. 41(c). Upon review of the warrant in question and the applicable legal standard, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court and affirmed its decision. View "Vermont v. Chaplin" on Justia Law

Claimant Katherine St. Martin appealed the Employment Security Board's determination that she voluntarily left her job without good cause, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits. She argued on appeal that her decision to quit her job was with good cause because she reasonably believed she would not receive a paycheck for her work. Claimant worked for almost two years for her employer as an assistant financial supervisor, which required her to prepare payroll information weekly. At some point, her employer began to have financial difficulties, and the payroll submission day was moved back to later in the week. The president of Claimant’s employer told claimant not to submit payroll because there were inadequate funds to cover the checks. The president then attempted to borrow money to meet the payroll, which ultimately proved "fruitless." The chief of operations persuaded the president to close the business and pay the employees. Claimant submitted the payroll after being given permission to do so by the president. She then printed the checks, and distributed them to the employees. After the president told claimant that the checks would bounce due to lack of funds, Claimant quit. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Claimant should not have been penalized for leaving her job when she was told not to expect a paycheck. The president's statement amounted to "good cause." View "St. Martin v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendants Tristan Vaughan and Grace Zambon purchased all outstanding shares of defendant Northland Specialties, Inc., from Plaintiffs Philip and Patricia Pierce.  Under the terms of the promissory note, Defendants would repay $30,000 in three installments, due annually on the first day of April. In 2007, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants.  The complaint alleged that Defendants had entered into two verbal agreements following the sale of the business whereby Defendants allegedly agreed to buy a specified list of materials and hardware for $20,000, with payments to be made over time as the materials were used.  The suit alleged Defendants had failed to make any payments under either of these verbal agreements and therefore owed Plaintiffs for breach of contract and damages.  The first payment of $10,000 came due on the promissory note.  Defendants were not able to make this payment on time, nor did they communicate with Plaintiffs regarding when the payment would be made. Three days later, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment.  Grace Zambon prepared a response which was received by Plaintiffs' attorney but was not filed with the court. Plaintiffs' attorney allegedly "interpreted this documents [sic] as an offer to settle."  Despite the response, he moved forward with a motion for default judgment, which the superior court granted. Two months later, Plaintiffs filed a second suit against Vaughan and Zambon, this time to recover the balance of the purchase price under the original stock purchase agreement.  After exchanging settlement offers, the parties reached a settlement agreement.  Roughly three years later, Plaintiffs filed a motion for trustee process in order to collect on the default judgment entered in the first lawsuit.  Defendants filed a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from the default judgment.  In 2010, the superior court held a hearing on this motion and granted the relief from judgment as sought by Defendants.  In early 2011, the Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs permission to take an interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the superior court erred in granting the 60(b) motion. More specifically, the issue was whether the court could grant the motion beyond the one-year limitations period for mistake or inadvertence when the parties had reached an agreement after the default judgment entered. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's grant of Defendants' 60(b) motion was in error, and reversed the lower court's decision. View "Pierce v. Vaughan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Ali Abdi (a Somali Bantu immigrant) was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual assault on a child. He moved for a new trial based in part on a claim of jury misconduct resulting from a juror's acquisition of information on the internet concerning Somali culture--a subject that played a significant role at trial. The trial court held a hearing, questioned the jurors, and issued a written decision denying Defendant's motion. The court concluded that though the extraneous information had the capacity to affect the jury's verdict, it was a harmless error. Finding that "if even a single juror’s impartiality is overcome by an improper extraneous influence, the accused has been deprived of the right to an impartial jury," the Supreme Court concluded the State had not met its burden of proving the jury had not been improperly influenced. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Abdi" on Justia Law

Defendant Jennifer Wyrocki appealed her conviction of disturbing the peace by telephone. The State charged her with making repeated and anonymous terrifying, intimidating, threatening, harassing, or annoying telephone calls. Defendant first argues that the trial court incorrectly found that the calls were "anonymous," and that as applied to this case, 13 V.S.A. 1027 violated the First Amendment of the federal constitution because it criminalizes protected speech. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant that her calls were not "anonymous" within the meaning of the statute, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Wyrocki" on Justia Law