Plaintiff Natalie Billings appealed a family court's final judgment order in favor of her husband Jireh Billings, Sr.  Plaintiff argued on appeal: (1) the family court abused its discretion by granting husband's motion in limine excluding evidence of any revocable trusts or wills under which he may be a beneficiary; (2) the family court abused its discretion when it refused to include as marital property suitable for distribution two irrevocable trusts of which husband is a beneficiary; and (3) the family court abused its discretion by nullifying husband's maintenance arrearage of $8,312.74.  Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the family court's decision with regard to the distribution of property and the maintenance award. The Court affirmed the family court on all other issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Billings v. Billings" on Justia Law

John Pegues (Father) appealed a family court's denial of his motion to reinstate parent-child contact with his daughter following a voluntary suspension of such contact due to an allegation of child sexual abuse.  Father and Ann Marie DeSantis (Mother) were married in 1991, adopted their daughter in 1996, and separated in 2004. The parties worked out an informal visitation schedule, though there was no overnight contact due to Mother's concerns about Father's drinking. Mother was also concerned about Father's "physical boundary" issues: the level of play between Father and the daughter and its intensity became a source of concern for Mother. For two years following the divorce, that "play" would ultimately end in allegations of sexual abuse against Father. In 2006, Father was charged with felony aggravated sexual assault of his daughter.  After an eighteen-month investigation, the state dismissed the charges with prejudice.  Father moved to dissolve an interim suspension order in July 2008. The family court concluded that the effect of abuse on daughter and on her relationship with father was "the most critical factor in this case," and that it was not in the daughter's best interest to have visitation with her Father. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the family court's finding of sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence was insufficient to support the family court's order that effectively terminated Father's parental rights.  The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DeSantis v. Pegues" on Justia Law

Tinotenda Rutanhira (Father) appealed a family division order awarding Sara Rutanhira (Mother) primary legal rights and responsibilities for the parties' daughter based on the court's conclusion that Father exercised poor judgment in desiring to take his daughter to his birth country, Zimbabwe.  On appeal, Father contended that the trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence outside of the proceeding.  He also challenged the court's finding that he planned to leave daughter in Zimbabwe while he traveled to South Africa and claimed the court erred when it considered testimony regarding his desire to travel to Zimbabwe because of an earlier stipulated agreement between the parties.  Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in relying on evidence gathered outside the proceeding, which Father did not have an opportunity to contest. The Court reversed and remanded the case for the family court to rehear this matter. View "Rutanhira v. Rutanhira" on Justia Law

Margaret Chickanosky appealed a family court order granting Michael Chickanosky sole physical and legal rights and responsibilities over their child. On appeal, the mother contended that: (1) the family court's findings and legal conclusions are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial and are based on inadmissible evidence; (2) the family court erred in failing to consider her argument that father's reason for moving should be considered when deciding whether there has been a change in circumstance, such that the co-parent's rights to physical custody are reduced; and (3) the family court erred in failing to consider her argument that mother should maintain physical custody when father decided to move and mother had the majority of physical custody. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found that the family court concluded that the father should have been awarded primary physical rights and responsibilities because "this would best allow daughter to maintain relationships with both parents and families and develop independence and autonomy. We will not overturn such an award when, as here, it reflects the sound judgment of the family court in light of the evidence." View "Chickanosky v. Chickanosky" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village granted to its co-applicants, the current owners of Killington Resort Village and SP Land Company. The District One Environmental Commission originally granted this administrative amendment authorizing the creation of fifteen subdivided lots over approximately 368 acres of Killington Resort Village for transfer to SP Land Company for "future development purposes" pursuant to Act 250 Rule 34(D). Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appealed the Environmental Court's denial of its motion to alter and amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of SP Land. Mountainside argued that the Environmental Court erred because: (1) administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit, and (2) co-applicants' fifteen-lot subdivision cannot be approved without demonstrating compliance with all Act 250 criteria under 10 V.S.A. 6086(a), as required by 10 V.S.A. 6081(a). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mountainside's argument and reversed the Environmental Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re SP Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Diana Charland appealed her sentence following her jury conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), third or subsequent offense.  She argued that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence, without advance notice to her, based on its unsupported assumptions that her husband gave perjured testimony at her trial and that she suborned that false testimony.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough we have addressed each of defendant's arguments, we acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court held in 'Dunnigan' that when a defendant objects to sentence enhancement resulting from the court's conclusion that the defendant committed perjury at trial, the trial court 'must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out.'  In this case, the trial court made no findings meeting the standards of Dunnigan.  The court concluded that defendant had suborned her husband's perjured trial testimony, but offered no rationale for that conclusion other than that it was obvious.  While defendant's failure to object meant that the Dunnigan findings requirement was not triggered, we do not suggest that the court's bare conclusion would have been sufficient if there had been an objection.  We affirm on this record because the record demonstrates that the court could reach the conclusion that it did." View "Vermont v. Charland" on Justia Law

Defendant Rebecca Wetter was charged with and convicted of three counts of endeavoring to incite a felony and one count of conspiracy.  The charges were based on allegations that Defendant and her daughter Jennifer desired to have Defendant's husband killed, and had asked several mutual friends if they would commit the murder or find someone else who would. Defendant contended that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing a detective to testify regarding the contents of a telephone conversation between Defendant and an informant which the detective listened to over a speaker phone with the informant's knowledge.  Defendant also argued it was error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of renunciation, and that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing.  Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error committed by the trial court, and affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Wetter" on Justia Law

The issue on this appeal centers on who should bear responsibility for the cost of cleaning up petroleum contamination caused by releases from a gas station's underground storage tanks. The controversy in this appeal was between the State of Vermont, which runs the Vermont Petroleum Cleanup Fund (VPCF) and Stonington Insurance Co. (Stonington), which insured Bradford Oil, the owner of the underground storage tanks, for approximately a three-and-a-half-year period. The State appealed the trial court's judgment limiting Stonington's liability to a 4/27 share of past and future cleanup costs and awarded the State $45,172.05. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the Supreme Court's application of time-on-the-risk allocation in "Towns v. Northern Security Insurance Co." did not preclude joint and several liability under all standard occurrence-based policy language; (2) the circumstances here, including the reasonable expectations of the insured and the equity and policy considerations, support imposing joint and several liability on Stonington for all of the State's VPCF expenditures; and (3) even if time-on-the-risk allocation would otherwise be appropriate, Stonington was not entitled to such allocation because it failed to show sufficient facts to apply this allocation method in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Towns" was the controlling case law here, and the Court was unconvinced by the State's reasonable expectations, equity, and policy arguments to distinguish the "Towns" decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Bradford Oil Co. v. Stonington Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Southwick v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

Defendant Yai Bol appealed his conviction for giving false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. He argued that the trial court erred by preventing his counsel from using a peremptory challenge to strike a black member of the jury pool. After it was seated and the trial conducted, the jury acquitted Defendant of the assault charges but convicted him of providing false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court misstated federal constitutional jurisprudence in maintaining that the United States Supreme Court had ruled it impermissible to strike the sole black juror from the venire without stating a reason. He concluded that the court's erroneous denial of his peremptory challenge should result in a new trial because this ruling denied him a fair trial. Having found that the court erred in barring Defendant's peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court turned to the question of appropriate remedy: "[i]t is settled Vermont law that when a defendant is left with an undesired juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges in response to the trial court's failure to remove a juror properly challenged for cause, the court's error is reversible error." The Court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Bol" on Justia Law