This case arose out of relationships among three women: the victim, "Amy", and Defendant Lisa Lampman.  Amy and the victim were romantically involved for two and a half years.  After that relationship ended, Amy moved in with Defendant.  In January 2009, the three women encountered each other in a gas station parking lot where a fight ensued.  Four individuals were criminally charged as a result of the fight: Defendant, Amy, Nathan (Amy's son), and Anthony.  The proprietor of the gas station witnessed the victim being beaten and trying to defend herself.  Amy stated that she observed Defendant deliver a "football style kick" to the victim's face.  Throughout trial, Defendant maintained that the victim was the instigator, starting the fight by pushing Amy and that Defendant had merely acted in self defense.  Defense counsel objected a question posed to one of the witnesses, to which the trial court responded, "I'm finding independently that there was a conspiracy, at least an implicit conspiracy to beat up [the victim]," thus overruling defendant's objection. Defendant made no objection to this ruling at trial, nor did she request a limiting instruction or move for a mistrial.  Further, she did not raise any issue with the court's statement in her motion for a new trial.  However, on appeal, Defendant argued that by finding a conspiracy, the judge usurped the jury's role as fact finder on the ultimate issue of self-defense and deprived her of the right to a trial by jury.  Upon review of the trial record and briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court found that because this claim was argued for the first time in this appeal, Defendant failed to preserve her claim of error. With regard to other issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and that Defendant's conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Lampman" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliott Russell appealed his jury conviction for aggravated assault, arguing: (1) it was an error to admit certain correspondence he sent while incarcerated because its content was irrelevant and prejudicial; (2) the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty; and (3) the court's denial of his request for a jury charge on the lesser offense of simple assault was in error.  This case arose from a 2007 incident at bar in Bennington where Defendant was drinking with a group of companions, including Henry Dummeyer.  The victim and his friend, Felix Rivera, were also drinking in the pub.  Defendant and Dummeyer were smoking outside the pub when Dummeyer's girlfriend told them that the victim had made an upsetting comment directed at her. When Dummeyer and Defendant confronted the men, Dummeyer began yelling about the victim's behavior toward his girlfriend.  As they exchanged angry words back and forth, Defendant and the victim became engaged in a physical altercation. The two men separated, and Rivera saw the victim holding his stomach and defendant with a knife in his hand.  The victim came to Rivera's aid, kicking Defendant out of the way, at which point defendant left the scene.  Dummeyer began physically attacking the victim who tried to fight back while exclaiming "I've been stabbed."  At some point Dummeyer too left the scene.  Rivera contacted emergency services while driving the victim to the hospital and indicated the victim had started the fight.  At the hospital, doctors treated the victim for injuries to the head, chest, and abdomen, consistent with stab wounds. Aggravated assault requires specific intent to harm.  To that end, the State sought to introduce certain letters defendant wrote before the altercation in which he threatened another victim. Over defendant's objections, the court allowed portions of the letters to be read at trial.  The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault, and Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the admission of the letters probative with regard to Defendant's intent to harm. Further, the Court was "unconvinced that the evidence reasonably supported an instruction" for the lesser offense of simple assault. Under these circumstances, the evidence did not reasonably support an instruction on simple assault.  The Court found trial court's determination was therefore proper. View "Vermont v. Russell" on Justia Law

Defendant Applejack Art Partners, Inc., appealed a trial court enforcing an arbitration award and entered judgment in Plaintiff Albert Stephens, III's favor for $1,538,164.50 plus interest. Plaintiff began working with the company in September 2006 and subsequently invested $1,125,000 in the company in exchange for stock shares.  In April 2008, Applejack terminated plaintiff's employment.  Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Applejack, Jack P. Appelman, Aaron S. Young, and William Colvin (collectively, Applejack) and Applejack counterclaimed.  Applejack also sought an order enforcing its right to repurchase Plaintiff's stock.  The parties engaged in binding arbitration and following four days of evidentiary hearings, the arbitrator issued his decision.  He found that in October 2006, plaintiff executed an employment contract, stock purchase agreement, and shareholders' agreement.  Pursuant to the stockholder's agreement, the executive stockholders had the right to buy out plaintiff's shares in the event that plaintiff's employment was terminated.  The agreement identified a specific formula for valuing the stock shares and allowed for Applejack to either pay for the stock in full or provide a 10% down payment and a promissory note for payment of the balance in three equal annual installments, plus interest. Plaintiff refused to sell his stock, in part because he misunderstood the terms of the stock purchase agreement.  An arbitrator concluded that Applejack had the right to buy the shares, and it ordered Plaintiff to transfer his stock into an escrow account, pending full performance of all payment obligations. Applejack did not meet its obligation on the first payment and Plaintiff brought an enforcement action.  Plaintiff sought both a judgment confirming the arbitration award as well as an immediate judgment for all amounts awarded by the arbitrator due to Applejack's default.  The court granted Plaintiff's request.  It found that Applejack's default went to the essence of the arbitrator's award and that Applejack could not now resort to the terms of the promissory note to delay its payments. Applejack argued on appeal that the court should have remanded this case to the arbitrator for clarification, although it was not clear what part of the award Applejack believed was ambiguous.  Applejack also suggested (apparently for the first time on appeal) that notwithstanding the arbitrator's decision Plaintiff should simply keep the stock shares because Applejack was unable to pay for them.  Finally, Applejack asserted that the court erred in ordering full payment of the award suggesting that by doing so, the court modified the arbitration award under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) without authority to do so.  It also argued that there was no clear basis for accelerating the payments due. Upon review of the arbitration record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court nor from the arbitration proceedings and affirmed the decision against Applejack: [t]he court imposed an appropriate remedy for Applejack's default, and there was no error." View "Stephens III v. Applejack Art Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a 180-foot telecommunications tower in the town of Hardwick would have an undue adverse effect on the aesthetics of the area in violation of Criterion 8 of Act 250.  Neighboring landowners appealed the issuance of an Act 250 land-use permit for the project.  Specifically, they contested (1) whether the project violated a clear, written community standard intended to preserve the aesthetics of the area, and (2) whether a reduction of the tower's height was a mitigating step that the developer should have taken to improve the harmony of the project with its surroundings.  Upon review of the briefs submitted by all interested parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Environmental Division of the Superior Court that determined that the tower would not have an undue adverse effect under Criterion 8. View "In re Rinkers, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant David Boglioli appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and raised multiple grounds for reversal.  Among them, Defendant alleged he was denied a fair trial when he was precluded from presenting evidence of the victim's threats against others.  Defendant claimed reversible error on various theories regarding the jury instructions.  He also argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict of guilty for voluntary manslaughter and that this verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.  Prior to the killing, Defendant and his victim had a history.  The two were neighbors and the victim made a habit of tormenting Defendant.  According to the evidence presented at trial, the victim physically assaulted defendant on numerous occasions and shot projectiles at defendant's home including BBs, darts, pellets, rocks, and bullets.  He also threatened to kill and hurt Defendant and verbally harassed him. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of self-defense.  The State requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, which the trial court granted over Defendant's objection.  The jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter. Upon review of all of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court took all in turn and affirmed the trial court's decision in its entirety. View "Vermont v. Boglioli" on Justia Law

In this complaint for review of governmental action under Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 75, Plaintiff-inmate Brian LeClair appealed a superior court's refusal to order the Department of Corrections to give him double credit for time served in a correctional facility after his furlough status was improperly revoked.  In November 2006, Plaintiff was charged with burglary. This charge was based on an incident that occurred in April 2004, before Plaintiff's conviction on previous charges.  The new charge arose when DNA evidence connected Plaintiff to the earlier offense.  At the time of the new charge, Plaintiff had completed his minimum, but not his maximum, sentence.  Although he was on conditional reentry furlough when the new charge was filed, he was incarcerated for what was to be a short period of time for violating the terms of his conditional reentry furlough agreement.  When the new charge was filed, however, the Department revoked Plaintiff's furlough status, and he remained incarcerated.  Independent of his furlough revocation, Plaintiff was held for lack of bail on the new charge. In an August 2007 decision, the superior court ruled that because the sole basis of the revocation was plaintiff's alleged violation of his promise in the furlough agreement not to commit any illegal act, his furlough status had been improperly revoked based on an incident that occurred before he signed the agreement. Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of governmental action under Rule 75, arguing that the Department was compelled to award him credit for the 279 days between the revocation of his furlough and his conviction on the new burglary charge not only against his original sentences, but also against his sentence on the new charge.  In a May 2010 decision, the superior court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to double credit for those 279 days, notwithstanding the fact that his furlough status had been improperly revoked. According to the State, the expiration of Plaintiff's underlying sentences and his acceptance into drug court on the most recent charge means that the Supreme Court's decision on the merits of Plaintiff's appeal would have no impact on Plaintiff, and thus there is no live controversy.  Plaintiff responded that a live controversy continued to exist because, if the Court found in his favor in this appeal, his maximum sentence would be considered completed in February 2010, before the latest charge, and thus he could receive credit against any new sentence for the time he spent in custody after the new charge was filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal as moot. View "In re LeClair" on Justia Law

Appellant, Testator Orville Tucker's daughter, sought to reverse a trial court judgment that declined to admit Testator's purported last will and testament to probate.  This judgment followed a trial by jury, which rendered a special verdict that found Testator lacked testamentary capacity.  Appellant raised various issues relating to the burden of proof, the use of the doctrine of suspicious circumstances, the jury instructions, and the denial of post-judgment motions.  Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that all of Appellant's claims were moot or unpreserved, and accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "In re Estate of Orville Tucker" on Justia Law

On the afternoon of June 5, 2009, Defendant Theodore de Macedo Soares was stopped on Interstate 91 and issued a citation for speeding.  The citation stated that Defendant was traveling eighty miles per hour in a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed zone.  The citation further stated that the accused could either pay the specified waiver amount or challenge the ticket. For the latter, if the prosecution proved its case, any fine within the specified penalty range could be imposed.  The citation noted that the waiver amount plus $50 for court costs is commonly assessed following a hearing.  The citation indicated a waiver amount of $140 and a penalty range from $36 to $1186. Defendant elected to contest the ticket at a judicial bureau hearing.  At the hearing, Defendant did not testify but cross-examined the state trooper who had cited him for speeding.  At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the citation and fined defendant $140 plus $50 for court costs, noting that defendant had been stopped for speeding nine times.  Defendant appealed to the district court, which upheld the judicial bureau's judgment.  The Supreme Court then granted defendant's request for permission to appeal. Defendant first argued that the traffic citation was unconstitutional because: (1) the penalty range applies only when a defendant chose to maintain a constitutionally protected right to challenge the citation; (2) the $50 in court costs is assessed only if a defendant is found guilty following a hearing; (3) the waiver amount is an improper incentive to settle that chills a defendant's right to challenge a citation; (4) the solicitation of a guilty plea violates the principle of a presumption of innocence; and (5) the process for issuing a citation does not assure a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court found "no constitutional violation and no merit to these arguments." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Vermont v. de Macedo Soares" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa and Thomas Ketchum as trustees for the Saddlebrook Farm and North Farm Trusts appealed the Town of Dorset's decision to reclassify a town road from a class 3 to a class 4 highway.  Plaintiffs argued that the court erred in reviewing the selectboard's reclassification using a deferential standard instead of a de novo procedure involving appointment of a panel of commissioners.  In the alternative, Plaintiffs contended that, even under a deferential standard, the court's decision was erroneous because the findings were not supported by the evidence and they were denied an opportunity to supplement the record on appeal.  Plaintiffs own property that is serviced by a town highway known as Upper Kirby Hollow Road.  There is one residence on the road, and the remaining properties are undeveloped.  Some of the property is under a conservation easement and open to the public for recreational activities.  In October 2008, the Town provided notice that it intended to consider altering the classification of certain town highways, including a 0.55 mile section of Kirby Hollow Road.  The selectboard made a site visit to the property.  The Town also held a public meeting and heard from interested parties.  Plaintiffs attended and spoke against reclassification.  Other members of the public also opposed reclassification and questioned whether it would have an impact on the public's ability to use the conserved property.  The Town road foreman supported reclassification and testified that the road is dangerous to maintain and snow plow because it is narrow and steep.  In December 2008, the Town issued a written decision, finding, among other things, that: the road's width is too narrow to allow two vehicles to safely pass one another or for access for emergency vehicles; Town snow removal vehicles have slid off the road causing danger to the vehicles and impairing snow removal of other roads; and the cost to improve the road is prohibitive.  The Town also found that the road services only one seasonal residence with limited winter usage.  The Town concluded that continuing summer maintenance and winter plowing did not serve the public good of the Town and reclassified the road. The trial court concluded that there was no statutory authority providing for review of the reclassification and therefore the only jurisdiction for the appeal was pursuant to Rule 75 in the nature of certiorari.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while Plaintiffs argued that their opinions and evidence should have been weighed more heavily, the selectboard did not err in resolving the competing considerations in the manner that it did.  The decision was within the Town's authority and not erroneous. The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "Ketchum v. Town of Dorset" on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this appeal asked the Supreme Court Court to decide if an eighteen-year-old has a duty to control the behavior of a fifteen-year-old friend and, if the fifteen-year-old later commits suicide, whether the eighteen-year-old is at fault.  Alexandra Brown was fifteen years old when she committed suicide in the early morning of February 21, 2007.  Two nights before, she and eighteen-year-old Defendant Kayla Leonard decided to go to a party at an acquaintance's apartment.  Each girl had lied to her parents, telling them that she was sleeping over at the other's house.  Kayla picked Alex up at her home and drove them both to the apartment.  There the girls danced and drank alcohol Alex provided. Ultimately, the girls spent the night, sharing a room with a nineteen-year-old man who lived in the apartment.  During the night Alex had sexual intercourse with the nineteen-year-old.  Kayla was aware the two were intimate but did not know they had intercourse. Kayla drove Alex home the next morning.  Her stepfather became suspicious when he saw Alex leave the house, walk down the driveway to a car, and drive away.  He called Alex's mother, who was in Florida at the time, and told her of his suspicions.  Alex's mother called the girl's house and found out that there were no plans for Alex to spend the night.  She then called Alex's cell phone and left a message to confront Alex.  The police were called. Alex's mother called several more times and left messages, including one that threatened "massive, massive consequences" because of Alex's behavior. Throughout the night, while driving around Rutland with a friend and later alone at her house, Alex sent numerous text messages to her friends telling them she had been caught by her parents and describing the trouble she was in.  She also sent numerous text messages to her boyfriend, who was away at college, one of which said, "I got caught tonight.  I'm grounded forever. Goodbye." While she mentioned suicide in some of her text messages, she never sent Kayla such a message. At some point in the evening, back at her house, Alex composed a suicide note.  Alex carried out the plan she had discussed in her note and hanged herself from a tree in her yard.  Her body was discovered by a neighbor the next morning. Plaintiff, Alex's mother acting as administrator of her estate, sued Kayla alleging that Kayla was negligent for bringing Alex to the apartment party, that Kayla should have intervened to prevent Alex from having sexual intercourse with the nineteen-year-old, and that, because she failed to do so, Kayla negligently caused Alex to suffer emotional harm.  Plaintiff further claimed that Kayla's negligence caused a delirium or insanity in Alex and "as a proximate result thereof, she committed suicide."  Kayla moved for summary judgment arguing that she owed no duty to Alex and that her actions were not the proximate cause of Alex's suicide.  The trial court granted Kayla's motion, and from that decision Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant and concluded she had no duty to intervene to prevent the tragedy that occurred: "Plaintiff essentially advocates that we find a duty simply because one girl was eighteen and the other was fifteen.  The law does not impose such a duty in this situation a duty for an eighteen-year-old to protect a high school friend who has not reached the age of majority from the consequences of the younger person's independent behavior or to control such behavior." View "Lenoci v. Leonard" on Justia Law