Defendant Rebekah VanBuren raised a facial challenge to Vermont's "revenge porn" (disclosure of nonconsensual pornography) statute. Vermont’s law, enacted in 2015, makes it a crime punishable by not more than two years’ imprisonment and a fine of $2,000 or both to “knowingly disclose a visual image of an identifiable person who is nude or who is engaged in sexual conduct, without his or her consent, with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the disclosure would cause a reasonable person to suffer harm.” The law makes clear that “[c]onsent to recording of the visual image does not, by itself, constitute consent for disclosure of the image.” The images at issue here were sent privately to a man using Facebook Messenger. Defendant described herself as the man's girlfriend. The complainant stated that the night before the pictures were publicly posted, she learned through a friend that defendant had been asking about her. The man denied a relationship with defendant, "[defendant] was obsessed with him." The complainant discovered the pictures on the man's Facebook page. A judge found probable cause for the charge against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the revenge porn statute violated her First Amendment rights. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the statute was constitutional, granted the State's petition for extraordinary relief, and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. VanBuren" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Coalition for a Livable City (CLC) appealed the denial of its Public Records Act (PRA) and its request to the City of Burlington for an unredacted financial feasibility study provided by a private developer to a contractor hired by the City of Burlington to help the City assess the viability of the developer’s plans. The development plans included some public improvements to be financed with tax dollars. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the redacted information fell under the PRA trade-secrets exemption, and as such, was exempt from disclosure. View "Long v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Claimant Lionel Beasley appealed a decision of the Employment Security Board, which denied him unemployment compensation benefits because it found that he performed services for an educational institution and was considered to have a reasonable assurance to perform services in a similar capacity for the next regularly scheduled academic term under 21 V.S.A. 1343(c)(1). Claimant was first employed by Champlain College as an adjunct professor during the 2015-2016 academic year. He taught three classes during both the fall and spring terms. At the end of the spring 2016 term, claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits. Although his claim was initially denied by a claims adjudicator, on appeal, an administrative judge reversed and granted benefits. In granting benefits, the administrative judge noted that because claimant had not received an employment offer letter for the upcoming academic term and had been notified that at least one of his classes may not be offered due to low enrollment, “the uncertainties for the upcoming term are sufficiently great that [claimant] cannot be said to have a reasonable assurance of returning to the same or similar work that he performed in the previous academic term.” However, at the end of the spring 2017 term, he again applied for unemployment compensation benefits and was denied. The claims adjudicator found he had a reasonable assurance of employment during the following term. The administrative judge agreed with the claims adjudicator that claimant had reasonable assurance to perform the same services during the next academic term and noted that claimant “and his attorney want[ed] to interpret the term ‘reasonable assurance’ as an absolute guarantee of employment, and that simply is not the correct interpretation.” The administrative judge commented that “the Department [of Labor] must only find that it is highly probable that the same job is available, and the credible facts in the record show[ed] that to be the case in this instance.” Claimant appealed the administrative judge’s decision to the Employment Security Board. After hearing and review, the Board issued a decision upholding the denial because it found the administrative judge’s conclusions “factually supported and legally correct.” Finding no reversible error in the Board's adjudication, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed denial of benefits. View "Beasley v. Department of Labor (Champlain College, Inc., Employer)" on Justia Law

Defendant Walker Edelman appealed a trial court order denying his motion to suppress and dismiss, in which the trial court concluded that the Vermont Legislature had effectively granted automatic and presumptive consent to an evidentiary breath test by means of the implied consent statute and therefore defendant could not challenge admission of an evidentiary breath sample as involuntarily obtained. The Vermont Supreme Court found that determination of whether consent was voluntary depended on adequate factfinding in the first instance. Here, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of voluntariness after defendant raised it, deciding instead that such a challenge was precluded by Vermont’s implied consent law. On this record, the Court could not determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to law enforcement’s request for an evidentiary breath sample. Accordingly, the Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. View "Vermont v. Edelman" on Justia Law

A husband appealed a final divorce order, challenging the trial court’s property division, and claimed the court erred in awarding him an amount of spousal maintenance outside the statutory guideline without stating a reason for diverging from the guideline. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jaro v. Jaro" on Justia Law

A husband died, naming his niece and nephew as beneficiaries to his Individual Retirement Account, rather than his wife. The wife declaratory judgment action, arguing that the beneficiary designation should be declared void under 14 V.S.A. 321 and that the IRA funds should pass through husband’s estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding for several reasons that wife was not entitled to relief under section 321. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that section 321 did not apply here because wife took under husband’s will rather than electing her statutory share of his estate. View "Hayes v. Hayes" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeremy Amidon appealed his conviction by jury of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child. He argued: (1) the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial after the State asked prejudicial questions during voir dire that tainted the jury; (2) the court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior incarceration; and (3) that the State was improperly permitted to impeach the defense’s sole witness with a question concerning the molestation of her daughter. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Amidon" on Justia Law

Allco Renewable Energy Limited (Allco) appealed the Vermont Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) denial of Allco’s motion to intervene as a party in proceedings concerning whether Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP) could purchase power generation facilities outside of Vermont. Allco argued that it should have been allowed to intervene because it meets the criteria for intervention set out in the PUC’s own rules. In particular, Allco argued it had a substantial interest in the proceedings both as a ratepayer and as a competing supplier of power. Allco also appealed the PUC’s eventual decision to allow the purchases. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s denial of Allco’s motion to intervene and accordingly dismissed Allco’s second appeal. View "In re Petition of Green Mountain Power Corp. for Approval to Invest in Hydroelectric Generation Facilities Located Outside Vermont (Allco Renewable Energy Limited, Appellant)" on Justia Law

Mark Ogilbee (father) and Caroline Lee (mother) were married in January 1995 and separated in December 2015. Mother filed a complaint for divorce in March 2016 and requested that the court grant her sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities. Father conceded sole physical rights to mother, but he sought liberal parent-child contact. He proposed several alcohol-related conditions to ensure his sobriety during his time with their daughter, including abstaining from alcohol during her visits, sending mother frequent breathalyzer tests, and attending treatment groups to support his sobriety. Father also sought legal parental rights and responsibilities in decision-making for their daughter, 50% of the marital estate, and alimony. Father appeals the trial court’s final divorce order, challenging the court’s parent-child contact plan, parental rights and responsibilities determination, and property division. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to setting the parent-child contact schedule. However, the Court determined the trial court's decision failed to adequately explain the rationale behind the division of parental rights and responsibilities, and that portion of the decision was reversed and remanded for further findings and conclusions. The trial court also erred in its property-division determination by valuing the parties' marital assets as of the date of the parties' separation rather than the date of the final divorce hearing. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Ogilbee" on Justia Law

In 2014, Michael Messier and Kay Bushman were involved in an auto accident. Both were the drivers of their respective vehicles and were then-alleged to be Vermont residents. In 2017, shortly before the statute of limitations was to expire, Messier filed suit against Bushman and her auto insurer, Travelers, for damages he claimed to have sustained in the accident. The claim against Bushman sounded in negligence, the claim against Travelers asserted breach of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Bushman and a motion to dismiss filed by Travelers. Messier appeals both decisions. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the motion filed by Bushman was one that challenged the sufficiency of service of process: the trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Messier did not send a copy of the return of service on the Commissioner to Bushman as required by 12 V.S.A. 892(a). The Supreme Court reversed as to Bushman's motion because the issues concerning what was included in the mailing and whether the affidavit contained sufficient specificity to comply with section 892(a) were contested and needed to be resolved through factual determination by the trial court. Regarding Messier's claim against Travelers, the Supreme Court found his claim was brought under the CPA, but references unfair claims settlement practices which were part of Vermont Insurance Trade Practices Acts (ITPA). The Court found Messier did not purchase anything from Travelers- his only connection was that Bushman was insured by Travelers. Thus, Messier was not a consumer with respect to Bushman's Travelers insurance policy, and therefore had to CPA claim against them. The case was remanded for further proceedings with respect to the claim against Bushman; dismissal of the claim against Travelers was affirmed. View "Messier v. Bushman" on Justia Law