Husband John Warren appealed the trial court’s denial of his and wife Sandra Penland's (Warren) joint motion to modify their final divorce order. The issue in this case was whether the trial court had jurisdiction under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to modify a property-division order based on the agreement of the parties after the divorce order has become absolute. The Vermont Supreme Court held the court did have jurisdiction, and accordingly reversed and remanded. View "Penland (Warren) v. Warren" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Clark appealed pro se the dismissal of his complaint regarding his eligibility for prison work camp. Petitioner is an inmate under the custody and control of the DOC. He pled guilty to driving under the influence, fourth offense, in July 2016 pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement included a “recommendation to work camp.” The DOC subsequently deemed petitioner ineligible for work camp because petitioner had an earlier conviction that involved a violent assault against a law enforcement officer. Petitioner grieved this decision within the DOC, and his grievances were denied. The trial court concluded that it lacked authority to review this Department of Corrections (DOC) programming decision. Vermont case law "makes clear that it is for the DOC to assess petitioner’s eligibility for work camp." The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and thus affirmed its decision. View "Clark v. Menard" on Justia Law

Jason Lillie appeals the Employment Security Board’s denial of his claim for unemployment benefits. In July 2014, Lillie was an employee of Amerigas Propane, Inc. and suffered an injury while working. He reported the injury to his employer, which in turn reported it to its worker’s compensation insurer. He sought medical attention for his injury shortly after being hurt but was able to continue working for several weeks, most of it on modified or light duty. In October, Amerigas fired Lillie for an alleged safety violation. A few days later, Lillie’s doctor indicated he was medically unable to work. Lillie expressed concern that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was not able to work but was told he must apply in order to receive economic benefits. Lillie then sought workers’ compensation temporary disability benefits, which were initially denied by the insurer. Without any income or compensation disability benefits for several weeks, Lillie sought economic assistance from the Vermont Economic Services Division of the Department for Children and Families. Lillie was told by Economic Services that in order to be eligible for economic assistance he would have to file for unemployment benefits, even if he felt he would not qualify for them. With his workers’ compensation claim still in dispute, and based upon the information he had received from Economic Services, Lillie filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Unemployment Division found him to be monetarily eligible for unemployment benefits when he sought them in December 2014. While he had the necessary base period wages to make him monetarily eligible for benefits, Lillie was not able to work and available for work, as required by 21 V.S.A. 1343(a)(3), because he was medically unable to work. He was, therefore, denied unemployment compensation. "At a minimum, coordination of the important information between the Unemployment Division and Economic Services concerning monetary eligibility, the establishment of a benefit year, and the use of wages and the use of wages prior to disability in connection therewith in the case of a worker injured on the job may have avoided this quagmire. Following the advice given by Economic Services, which we do not doubt was provided in good faith to Lillie, resulted in the unintended consequence of his loss of unemployment benefits once he regained his ability to work in 2017." The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits; the Unemployment Division applied the law properly, and the Court was "not at liberty to rewrite the applicable statutes to obtain a different outcome." View "Lillie v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Defendant Liana Roy was convicted of custodial interference for taking her four-year-old daughter, who was then in Department for Children and Families (DCF) custody, on a two-day trip out of the state without DCF’s permission. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, concluding that, in the absence of a court order specifying defendant’s parent-child contact, defendant was not criminally liable. The central question presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a parent may be convicted of custodial interference under 13 V.S.A. 2451 for interfering with the custody of the DCF in the absence of a court order specifying the schedule and limitations of the parent’s visitation. The Court held section 2451 did not require such an order and that the evidence of defendant’s knowing and egregious actions in derogation of DCF’s custodial rights supported her conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Vermont v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant Emily St. Peter appealed her conviction on five counts of cruelty to animals, arguing the trial court erred in declining to suppress evidence about five horses she voluntarily surrendered during a cruelty investigation. In particular, defendant contended that because the humane officer failed to have the horses timely examined and assessed by a licensed veterinarian within seventy-two hours of her voluntary surrender of them, as required by 13 V.S.A. 354(b)(1), the court should have excluded any evidence acquired by a humane officer, veterinarian, or other witness following that surrender. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded, based on reasoning in Vermont v. Sheperd, 170 A.3d 616 (2017), the trial court properly declined to grant defendant’s suppression motion, and accordingly affirmed. View "Vermont v. St. Peter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought relief from the City of Rutland after suffering sewage backups in their homes. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding plaintiffs failed to adequately support their negligence, nuisance, trespass, and constitutional takings claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing they produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. Agreeing with the trial court, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Lorman v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were inmates in the custody of the Vermont Department of Corrections who claimed a statute and certain administrative policies enacted after their incarceration operated together to retroactively increase the length of their sentences, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an ex post facto violation and therefore affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the Department in each case. View "Wool v. Pallito / Carter v. Menard" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Cady appeals the trial court’s decision, rejecting his coram nobis petition challenging the validity of the plea colloquy preceding his conviction for driving under the influence, second offense (DUI-2). The trial court found the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, and entered a guilty judgment. Defendant did not appeal the DUI-2 conviction. After complying with all sentencing terms, the trial court discharged defendant from probation. In January 2017, defendant was charged with DUI-3. In June 2017, defendant filed a petition for coram nobis in the DUI-2 docket, alleging that the trial court failed to ensure that a factual basis existed for the plea under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) in that case. Defendant asserted that he would suffer collateral consequences because the DUI-2 conviction would be used to enhance the penalty for the pending DUI-3 charge. The trial court denied defendant’s petition for coram nobis, concluding that although coram nobis was available because defendant had no other remedy available to challenge the DUI-2 conviction, his plea colloquy nevertheless satisfied Rule 11(f). In so finding, the trial court concluded that the change-of-plea court sufficiently inquired into the facts as they related to each element of the offense. The issue this case raised for the Vermont Supreme Court was whether a defendant who was not currently suffering a collateral consequence of an enhanced sentence, but faced the threat of an enhanced sentence due to a prior conviction, could preemptively challenge the plea colloquy preceding the prior conviction using coram nobis. The Supreme Court concluded that because individuals, like defendant, can raise the adequacy of a plea colloquy in a prior conviction through post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings once sentenced, coram nobis relief was not available, "Coram nobis relief is only available as a last resort and cannot supplant other forms of relief such as direct appeal, post-judgment motions, or PCR petitions under 13 V.S.A. 7131." View "Vermont v. Cady" on Justia Law

Allen Avery (testator) died testate in 2008 and left property to his spouse and children. His spouse, children, and the executor of the estate disputed how the estate’s administrative expenses should have been allocated. The civil division determined that expenses should be paid out of spouse’s share of the personal estate until paid in full or until they exhaust her share, and that children’s share of the personalty should contribute to administrative expenses only if spouse’s share of the personalty is insufficient. Spouse appealed. Finding no error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Avery v. Estate of Allen D. Avery" on Justia Law

Father Andrew Bratton appealed the denial of his motion to modify legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities in the parties’ son D.B. Father argued that the court improperly treated the child’s maternal grandfather as a “fictive parent” and gave him too much weight in evaluating the statutory best-interests factors. Notwithstanding a court order, mother Laura Holland (Bratton) did not turn D.B. over to father. In an October 2016 ruling, the court found that mother failed to abide by its orders or purge herself of prior contempts. It issued a separate arrest warrant requiring that mother be brought before the court as soon as she was found. A North Carolina court subsequently issued an order for expedited enforcement of a foreign child custody order, and mother finally turned D.B. over to father on October 18, 2016. In the ensuing months, court records revealed mother treated father’s contact with D.B. as a nuisance, which she would occasionally grant if father begged enough and if it was convenient. When D.B. was with his father, mother sent messages intimating that his home was with her and suggesting that she was trying to “rescue him” from Vermont. The court found little positive to say about mother’s parenting other than that she loved D.B. Grandfather, however, provided mother with a job and a nice house in a nice neighborhood. The court found that grandfather was “really D.B.’s fictive parent in North Carolina.” D.B. enjoyed a higher standard of living, better housing, and was engaged in more activities in North Carolina than in Vermont. The court determined that mother engaged in a calculating and knowing attempt to thwart visitation and that D.B. was harmed by her actions. Nonetheless, it concluded that the statutory best-interests factors narrowly favored mother having physical custody of D.B. and “only due to [grandfather]’s presence in D.B.’s life.” While the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that changed circumstances exist, it reversed and remanded its best-interests analysis for additional proceedings: "[t]he court’s belief that mother’s behavior would change was a linchpin of its decision. Because this belief is unsupported by any findings or evidence, and because the court erred in its evaluation of the statutory best-interests factors." View "Bratton v. Holland (Bratton)" on Justia Law