Plaintiff-inmate Kirk Wool appealed the dismissal of his claim that the Vermont Department of Corrections violated a statutory obligation to negotiate and award a contract to provide telephone services to inmates serving in state correctional facilities in a manner that provided for the lowest reasonable cost to inmates. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for money damages, but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for mandamus relief and remanded for further proceedings. As plaintiff alleged, DOC was required by Vermont law, albeit not specifically and exclusively by the statute he identified in his complaint, to use a competitive bidding process in contracting for telephone services for inmates. The Court found plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to confer standing and give fair notice to DOC of the claim and the grounds upon which it rested. View "Wool v. Menard" on Justia Law

At issue for the Vermont Supreme Court’s review was a determination of whether the evidence and findings supported the trial court’s conclusion that a child with significant mental-health issues was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because she was “without or beyond the control of . . . her parent, guardian, or custodian,” or “CHINS-C.” After review, the Court concluded that a child with significant mental illness who cannot be safely cared for by a parent in the home is not CHINS-C if the parent has effectively exercised parental authority to ensure that the child’s care is properly managed in another setting. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s merits determination that M.L. was a child in need of supervision. View "In re M.L." on Justia Law

Claimant Louis LaFountain appealed pro se the Employment Security Board’s denial of his claim for unemployment benefits. Claimant was employed as a store manager at the Eden General Store for three-and-a-half years. Claimant sought unemployment compensation benefits, and a claims adjudicator denied his request. The claims adjudicator found that claimant left his employment due to a certified health condition, which precluded the discharge of duties inherent in such employment. She further found that claimant was currently unable to work and that he therefore was ineligible for unemployment compensation. Claimant appealed this decision to an administrative law judge (ALJ). Following a hearing, the ALJ found claimant had Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), which worsened during his last year of employment to the point that he had to reduce his hours to part-time and eventually stop working. Claimant needed a well-ventilated or purified-air environment to prevent exacerbation of his COPD. Claimant has been working with Vocational Rehabilitation (VocRehab) to explore part-time employment. Several months earlier, in late February 2017, claimant had applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. The ALJ concluded that claimant was not able to work, and thus, he was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Vermont Supreme Court found the purpose of the unemployment compensation law was not “to provide sick benefits nor to compensate those who cease working because of illness.” Instead, the law was designed “to assist members of the working force who are made jobless by operations of the economy over which they have no individual control.” The Court determined the Board’s findings did not adequately support its conclusion: Claimant testified that he wanted to work and that he could work part-time. Claimant stated that he had not been applying for any work but that he had been going to VocRehab every week and that his counselor was trying to match him up with a job that fit his needs. Claimant believed that he could continue to do retail work as long as he was sitting down. He also stated that he could perform computer work, preferably from home. Claimant testified that he had experience working on his computer from home and that he was exploring this type of work with his VocRehab counselor. Claimant’s VocRehab counselor did not testify at the hearing. View "LaFountain v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Respondents Francis and Barbara Supeno, and Barbara Ernst, appealed an order of the Environmental Division imposing a penalty of $27,213 for water and wastewater permit violations. Respondents Francis Supeno and Barbara Supeno were siblings and jointly owned property in Addison. Barbara Supeno and Barbara Ernst lived adjacent to the property. In 2009, the siblings obtained a wastewater system and potable water supply permit, which authorized the replacement of a seasonal cottage with a year-round, one bedroom residence. The permit included the construction of an on-site well and wastewater disposal system. The water supply for the property was provided through a public water system. In 2014 the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) received a complaint of an alleged violation of the wastewater permit. ANR also became aware that the property was advertised as a two-bedroom, two-bathroom rental. An ANR enforcement officer went to the property and Barbara Supeno denied ANR access to the house. The Environmental Division granted ANR’s petition for an access order and ANR received access to the property. During the visit, the enforcement officer observed two water lines entering the basement; the officer also observed the permitted bedroom on the second floor and an additional non-permitted bedroom in the basement. Based on the officer’s observations, an emergency administrative order (EAO) was issued, wherein: (1) respondents failed to obtain a permit before modifying the rental home to add a second bedroom; (2) respondents spliced into the public water supply line serving the adjacent property and connected it to the rental property without obtaining a permit; and (3) respondents created an unapproved cross-connection at the rental property, which allowed it to switch between the well water and the public water system and created a risk that potentially polluted water could contaminate the public water supply. The EAO eventually became an Administrative Order (AO), imposing the penalty at issue here. Respondents argued that their due process rights were violated, the penalty assessment was precluded by res judicata, and the amount of the penalty was excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division. View "Agency of Natural Resources v. Supeno" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathaniel Peatman appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for first-degree aggravated domestic assault, aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest. Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the jury instructions failed to guarantee unanimous verdicts. The Vermont Supreme Court found that all of the alleged acts (as grounds for defendant’s convictions) took place over a span of six minutes as part of one continuous assault. From this, the Court concluded, it was clear that this case fit within the “election exception” because the acts were “inextricably intertwined” as one continuous offense. Therefore, the trial court’s initial instructions, which included a list of alleged acts that the court suggested the jury consider, and its answer to the jury question, which clarified that the jury did not have to elect specific acts and instead had to be unanimous that the element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was not in error. “It breathed the true spirit of the law” that there is an exception to the election rule in multiple-act acts and that the evidence presented qualified this case for said exception. Thus the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Peatman" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathaniel Peatman appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for first-degree aggravated domestic assault, aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest. Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the jury instructions failed to guarantee unanimous verdicts. The Vermont Supreme Court found that all of the alleged acts (as grounds for defendant’s convictions) took place over a span of six minutes as part of one continuous assault. From this, the Court concluded, it was clear that this case fit within the “election exception” because the acts were “inextricably intertwined” as one continuous offense. Therefore, the trial court’s initial instructions, which included a list of alleged acts that the court suggested the jury consider, and its answer to the jury question, which clarified that the jury did not have to elect specific acts and instead had to be unanimous that the element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was not in error. “It breathed the true spirit of the law” that there is an exception to the election rule in multiple-act acts and that the evidence presented qualified this case for said exception. Thus the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Peatman" on Justia Law

Claimant Catherine Lyons appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Labor Commissioner (the Commissioner), which found she did not qualify for workers’ compensation benefits for an injury sustained while student teaching at a school in the defendant supervisory union. Because the Vermont Supreme Court held claimant fell within the statutory definition of an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. View "Lyons v. Chittenden Central Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Claimant Catherine Lyons appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Labor Commissioner (the Commissioner), which found she did not qualify for workers’ compensation benefits for an injury sustained while student teaching at a school in the defendant supervisory union. Because the Vermont Supreme Court held claimant fell within the statutory definition of an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. View "Lyons v. Chittenden Central Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Following a decision from a three-justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court issued June 26, 2017 involving these parties and this litigation and affirming a final judgment order, the civil division attempted to conduct further hearings as if the matter had been remanded. The Poons challenged continuation of the litigation by the trial court, asserting that, in the absence of an express remand from the Vermont Supreme Court, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further hearings. The trial court denied the motion and the Poons were granted permission by the Supreme Court to appeal the denial on an interlocutory basis. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Poons were correct that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider this case further and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted. The judgment rendered June 26th by the Supreme Court did not include a remand, and was final. To remove uncertainty in the event of a future suit between these parties, the Court addressed the Poons’ additional contention that res judicata (also known as claim preclusion), barred the trial court from further consideration of any trespass claim for damages or injunctive relief as a result of the final judgment previously rendered. The final judgment in this case barred relitigation of an alleged trespass by the Poons that was or could have been litigated in this action. “A subsequent suit seeking an injunction or damages from trespass may not be barred, however, if it is based on facts that could not have been addressed in the first litigation because this would amount to a new cause of action.” View "Moyers v. Poon" on Justia Law

Following a decision from a three-justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court issued June 26, 2017 involving these parties and this litigation and affirming a final judgment order, the civil division attempted to conduct further hearings as if the matter had been remanded. The Poons challenged continuation of the litigation by the trial court, asserting that, in the absence of an express remand from the Vermont Supreme Court, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further hearings. The trial court denied the motion and the Poons were granted permission by the Supreme Court to appeal the denial on an interlocutory basis. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Poons were correct that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider this case further and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted. The judgment rendered June 26th by the Supreme Court did not include a remand, and was final. To remove uncertainty in the event of a future suit between these parties, the Court addressed the Poons’ additional contention that res judicata (also known as claim preclusion), barred the trial court from further consideration of any trespass claim for damages or injunctive relief as a result of the final judgment previously rendered. The final judgment in this case barred relitigation of an alleged trespass by the Poons that was or could have been litigated in this action. “A subsequent suit seeking an injunction or damages from trespass may not be barred, however, if it is based on facts that could not have been addressed in the first litigation because this would amount to a new cause of action.” View "Moyers v. Poon" on Justia Law