Wife challenged the superior court’s property distribution, including its award of property in lieu of spousal maintenance, in this divorce action. The parties began a romantic relationship in 2002 when they were both married and had children. Their respective divorces were finalized in the spring of 2004, and they began living together, marrying in June 2007 and separating in February 2014. No children were born of the marriage, which was the second for both parties. Wife brought into the marriage assets totaling approximately $1.8 million, most of which she obtained through her divorce from her first husband. Husband brought into the marriage between $4.4 and $5.4 million in assets, which he accumulated through his work in the financial services industry from 1985 to 2000. To preserve wife’s spousal support from her first husband, the parties initially kept their finances separate. They did not open their first joint bank account until early 2008, six months after they married. The superior court issued its divorce order in October 2016, concluding it would be inequitable to simply apportion the marital estate by the percentage each party brought into the marriage, even though the marriage was relatively brief. The court concluded that it was appropriate and preferable to award wife additional property in lieu of maintenance, considering “the substantial size of the marital estate, the acrimonious state of the parties’ relationship, and the brief duration of the marriage.” On appeal, wife argued that: (1) the court erred in failing to consider the length of the parties’ premarital relationship and cohabitation in establishing its property distribution and maintenance award; (2) by awarding her an undifferentiated lump-sum payment that was partially property settlement and partially a maintenance award, the superior court failed to explain how its division of marital assets was equitable and whether the unspecified maintenance award would enable her to continue the lifestyle established during the marriage; and (3) the court made multiple errors in valuing the marital estate. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the superior court acted within its discretion in not including the parties’ premarital relationship and cohabitation period in calculating the duration of the marriage as a factor in determining an equitable property distribution and just maintenance award. The Court was compelled, however, to remand the property distribution to the superior court for further consideration and findings with respect to what property was to be included in the marital estate and how it was supposed to be allocated: “the court at times seemed to suggest that it considered all of husband’s deferred compensation earned in 2013 and 2014 to be a marital asset subject to distribution and that it was awarding all the remaining unvested deferred compensation to husband. On the other hand, the court repeatedly stated that any of the deferred compensation acquired after the date of the parties’ separation is not a marital asset subject to distribution between the parties.” View "Forstmann MacKenzie v. MacKenzie" on Justia Law

Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. (Allco) appealed the denial of its motion to intervene, and its renewed motion to intervene, in a certificate-of-public-good (CPG) proceeding for a solar electric generation facility. The applicant, GMPSolar–Richmond, LLC (GMPSR), was an affiliate of Green Mountain Power Corp. (GMP), an electricity utility, owned by GMP and an investor. Allco was developing a number of solar electric generation facilities in Vermont. A hearing officer denied Allco’s request for intervention as of right and permissive intervention; the Public Service Board (PSB) also denied the motion for reconsideration. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, Allco argued PSB used the wrong framework in reviewing its request and incorrectly applied the intervention criteria. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the PSB. View "In re Petition of GMPSolar-Richmond, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2015, a jury found defendant Juan Villar guilty of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The trial court sentenced defendant to six months to three years, all suspended except for fifteen days to serve, and placed him on probation. Defendant appealed; his sentence was not stayed pending appeal. "The appeals process was slow." The issue on appeal this case addressed was whether the government could dismiss an indictment or information pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) while the case was pending on appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that it may. Accordingly, the Court held the trial court erred in denying the state’s attorney’s notice of dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 48(a), the Court vacated the conviction and dismiss the underlying charges. View "Vermont v. Villar" on Justia Law

Two consolidated appeals challenged the Environmental Division’s decisions concerning applications for site-plan approval and an Act 250 permit for the proposed construction of a Hannaford’s supermarket in the Town of Hinesburg. In challenging the trial court’s site-plan approval, Neighbors argued: (1) the trial court erred in declining to enforce a setback limit reflected in the final plat plan for the subdivision as approved in 1987; (2) Hannaford’s site-plan application violated “front yard” parking restrictions set forth in the Town’s 2009 zoning regulations; (3) the east-west swale proposed in the site-plan application will not control and treat stormwater as predicted by Hannaford’s expert; and (4) Hannaford did not satisfy its burden regarding stormwater control because part of the discharge system was proposed to be located on land outside of its control. In cross-appeals, Hannaford and the Town challenged the trial court’s condition requiring Hannaford to install a traffic signal before the project may be completed, and the Town challenged the court’s elimination in its amended decision of a condition requiring Hannaford to perform a post-development traffic study. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded Hannaford’s proposed site plan violated the setback limit in the final plat plan approved in 1987; and Hannaford’s parking scheme did not violate the site-plan approval standards in the applicable zoning regulations. The Court did not reach issues raised in that appeal concerning the east-west swale and traffic control. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Environmental Division’s approval of the site plan. Regarding the Act 250 appeal, the Court concluded the project did not violate a requirement in the original approved subdivision permit that development be primarily “small scale,” and that the proposed project would not materially interfere with the public’s use and enjoyment of the canal path. The case was remanded for further development of evidence concerning the east-west swale and traffic issues. View "In re Hinesburg Hannaford Act 250 Permit / In re Hinesburg Hannaford Site Plan Approval" on Justia Law

This case began in 2014 when the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that B.K. and L.K., then six and seven years old respectively, were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). In September 2014, the parents stipulated to a CHINS adjudication, which was adopted by the family court. In the stipulation, the parents admitted that over the previous four years they had not engaged in recommended services for domestic violence and substance abuse, and that the children had suffered severe trauma due to witnessing violence in the home and had frequent unexcused absences and tardiness from school. ness from school during the 2013-14 school year. The court approved a case plan with concurrent goals of reunification with mother and father or adoption, with interim custody with DCF. The case plan called for father to participate in parenting classes and domestic violence treatment, and for mother to participate in substance abuse and mental health treatment. Father made significant progress toward the case plan goals. Mother, by contrast, attended visits and therapy inconsistently, and was incarcerated for a period in 2015. Since December 2015, mother has had no contact with the children. In April 2016, DCF filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of both parents. However, the court found that father played a constructive role in the children’s lives and that it would not be in their best interests to lose father as they had mother. By 2017, the trial court issued its decision terminating father's parental rights, finding permanency should have been given greater weight in its analysis, and that the best interests of the children were ultimately served by termination. On appeal, father argues that the court’s decision lacked a rational basis and that it erred by terminating his parental rights based on findings that were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. DCF argued the trial court did not base its decision on any new findings of fact, but merely reconsidered the law. The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed, finding the trial court made clear that it learned two new facts at the hearing upon which it relied in reweighing the best-interest factors. The original decision did not include these findings, which were based upon statements made by the attorneys and the foster mother at the hearing. The court based its decision to terminate father’s parental rights at least in part on these new facts. For that reason, the Court could not hold that error to be harmless. View "In re B.K. and L.K." on Justia Law

A mother and father appealed a trial court's order denying their motions to reopen a termination decision. Mother alleged that she had been in a car accident the day before she relinquished, had a concussion, and was not in the “right state of mind.” Father also cited the car accident as the reason for asking to reopen the termination decision and stated that he had not been represented by his attorney correctly. At the hearing, parents appeared, but were seated without their court-assigned attorneys, who were present in the courtroom. Mother indicated that she wanted a continuance to find a new lawyer. Father explained that parents had fired their lawyers for lying to them and asked for a continuance to find new counsel. When asked by the court whether they were intending to hire private counsel, father indicated that he was hoping to have assigned counsel. Counsel indicated that given parents’ allegations they would seek to withdraw. The court granted the motions to withdraw. After fifteen days, parents did not find private counsel. They failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing, and the trial court dismissed their motion. Parents thereafter filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, which was denied. On appeal, the parents argued the trial court erred by denying them assigned counsel to represent them on their motions to reopen. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in declining to appoint counsel to represent parents in connection with their Rule 60(b) motion, and that parents suffered prejudice as a result. View "In re M.T., G.T., B.T. and N.T., Juveniles" on Justia Law

Acting pro se, Mother appealed a trial court’s denial of her motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities for son L.C. Through their actions, father and stepmother deprived mother of any contact with L.C. for many years and “destroyed the child’s formerly good relationship with mother.” The trial court found father and stepmother solely responsible for the trauma caused by this alienation; despite this egregious behavior, the trial court declined to modify parental rights and responsibilities for the child. The Vermont Supreme Court upheld this decision on appeal, “not because the father and stepmother are correct in their accusations, or to reward or endorse the course of conduct in which they have engaged, but because the trial court’s judgment regarding the best-interest criteria was factually based and legally correct.” The Supreme Court emphasized that mother was not without recourse should father and stepmother continue to interfere with her attempts at reunification or should they defy the trial court’s orders. In the pendency of a 2015 appeal, father and stepmother continued to wage war against mother. In October 2015, mother filed the emergency motion to modify at issue here, arguing father continued to deliberately and repeatedly undermine and defy the court’s orders. The trial court agreed. At a September 2016 hearing, the court concluded that father’s serious and blatant violations of its prior order constituted a real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances. The court explained, it had expressly prohibited the parties from publishing L.C.’s medical records to any third person, yet stepmother had provided L.C.’s private medical information (a trauma therapy report) to the media, which father had at least “tacitly condoned.” Father’s attorney also submitted this same report as an exhibit to a motion to stay father’s deposition in a separate civil suit that mother had filed. The court observed that father did not repudiate his attorney’s actions or attempt to rescind this filing. Regarding mother’s emergency motion, although the trial court found that mother had shown a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances, it concluded that transferring custody to mother at this juncture was not in L.C.’s best interests. Mother argued the court’s findings did not support its conclusion, particularly given its determination that father and stepmother were not credible witnesses. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing L.C.’s best interests and therefore affirmed its decision. The Court emphasized that the trial court set a clear benchmark for father and stepmother’s behavior, and any further attempts at alienation may well affect the best-interest analysis and warrant a change in custody. View "Knutsen v. Cegalis (2017 VT 62)" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a family court could, after concluding that a custodial parent’s relocation constitutes an unanticipated change in circumstances, maintain physical rights and responsibilities with that parent but then decline to modify parent-child contact, effectively barring the custodial parent from moving because it determined that the move was not in the child’s best interests. Custodial mother appealed the family court’s denial of her motion to modify parent-child contact to facilitate her relocation with the child. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family court applied the wrong framework in evaluating mother’s motion, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Quinones v. Bouffard" on Justia Law

In May 2008, the Town of Granville established an Ancient Roads Committee and Process for identifying “ancient roads,” all roads that were at one time established as public highways and had not been officially discontinued. In August 2009, the Committee recommended that certain roads, including Sabin Homestead Road, be added to the Town Highway Map. Sabin Homestead Road crosses defendant Joseph Loprete’s land for about 100 feet. In December 2009, after notice to defendant and several public hearings, the selectboard adopted the Committee’s revised recommendation to add Sabin Homestead Road back to the Town Highway Map. The road appeared on the Vermont Agency of Transportation’s official Town Highway Map. In late 2012, defendant blocked Sabin Homestead Road by putting a large storage container in the right-of-way. He refused to move the container, even after the selectboard asked him to do so. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare Sabin Homestead Road an existing town highway and public road that was properly established in 1850 following the statutory procedures required at that time. The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts established that in 1850 the selectboard took official action to lay out the road and that they created and recorded a survey. The trial court denied summary judgment based on the Town’s failure to demonstrate that it met the third requirement: that in connection with the creation of the road, the town had filed a certificate of opening. The parties subsequently agreed that the court could decide this question based on undisputed facts and they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed that no certificate of opening could be found. Defendant argued that this disposed of the case. However, the court concluded that the Town’s circumstantial evidence, along with the explanations provided by the Town’s affiants for the inability to locate an actual certificate of opening in the town records, supported a finding that a certificate of opening was in fact created and recorded, but had since been lost or destroyed. It thus determined that the road had been properly created and granted summary judgment to the Town. Defendant argued on appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court that the Town was required, and failed, to produce sufficient evidence that the Town certified the road as open for public travel in 1850. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Town met its burden of proof, and it was entitled to summary judgment in its favor. View "Town of Granville v. Loprete" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Webster was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and careless and negligent operation. Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress statements he gave to the police following his arrest, an evidentiary ruling at trial permitting certain expert testimony, the trial court’s refusal to charge voluntary manslaughter, the denial of his motion for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument, and the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of forty years to life on the murder conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Webster" on Justia Law