Mallets Bay Homeowner’s Association appealed the trial court’s partial denial of its motion to stay the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Mongeon Bay Properties (MBP) following the termination of the Association’s ground lease. Members of the Mongeon family set up a partnership to own the land under approximately 25 camps, and the partnership entered into a ground lease with the Association, rather than the individual owners of each residence. The ground lease was due to expire in 2036. The lease contained a forfeiture clause, providing that the lease would terminate “if the [Association] shall fail to perform or comply with any terms of this Lease.” MBP sued the Association in January 2012, seeking damages and termination of the ground lease because the Association had failed to perform reasonable repairs and upkeep as required by the lease. The trial court concluded that the Association’s failure to properly maintain the property and the resulting damage amounted to “waste,” and therefore the Association had violated the lease. However, the trial court determined that terminating the lease under the default provision was inequitable and instead awarded MBP damages to cover the cost of repairing the property. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Association had breached the lease, but remanded for reconsideration of MBP’s remedy. In 2016, the Association requested that the trial court stay the issuance of a writ of possession, arguing there was good cause for the court to stay the writ until 2036, when the lease was set to expire. The trial court entered judgment in favor of MBP, terminated the ground lease, and held MBP was to be granted a writ of possession for the property. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order in part, and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion. On remand, the question about which the trial court should exercise its discretion was whether to grant a longer stay than reflected in an October 31 order. The trial court could exercise that discretion on the basis of the parties’ pleadings, or decide to not hold any further hearings unless it chooses to. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Mallets Bay Homeowner's Assn., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Sullivan was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) with death resulting, and leaving the scene of a fatal accident. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s jury instructions, admission of expert testimony, and denial of his motion for access to necessary services as a needy person pursuant to 13 V.S.A. section 5231(a)(2). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. However, based on its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by not continuing the sentencing hearing to allow defendant to present testimony of his expert witness, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for resentencing. View "Vermont v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael and Denise Regan appealed the trial court’s decision denying them relief with respect to their complaint alleging that the redirecting of surface waters by defendant Town of Fayston and defendants Alan and Maria Spector and the Spector Retirement Trust caused ongoing flood damage to their property. In May 2009, “a huge rainstorm occurred with devastating consequences for all parties,” including the Spectors, the Regans, and other neighbors downhill from the Spectors’ lot. A culvert on the hillside above the Spectors’ property plugged, causing large amounts of water to skip over a culvert, which would have carried the water away from the Regans' property. The trial court concluded that “the conditions on the ground of which Regan complains are due almost entirely to the natural evolution of a seepage wetland that was disturbed by and is incorporating over time the installation of two unnatural and unmaintained ponds.” On appeal, the Regans argued that the trial court: (1) abused its discretion by imposing a discovery sanction that precluded them from submitting evidence on money damages; (2) applied the wrong legal standard in rejecting their claim of inverse condemnation; and (3) erred in rejecting their nuisance and trespass claims because the Spectors’ construction of the stone-lined channel in 2008 constituted an alteration of the pattern of flow within the watershed. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Regan v. Spector" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Ladue appealed his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that: (1) the State’s principal witness testified on a matter that violated the trial court’s pretrial ruling granting defendant’s motion in limine; (2) the court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecutor eliciting testimony from the State’s principal witness that defendant never reported to police that he was not driving his vehicle on the night in question; (3) the prosecutor made several impermissible statements during his opening statement and closing argument regarding defendant’s failure to inform police that he was not the driver; and (4) in attempting to define the term “reasonable doubt,” the court diminished the constitutional burden of proof imposed on the State, thereby committing structural error that requires reversal of defendant’s conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Ladue" on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas Cassani appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff H&E Equipment Services, Inc. on its complaint to collect on a 2001 Arizona judgment. Defendant argued that the action was time-barred under 12 V.S.A. 506. Alternatively, he contended that there was a material dispute of fact as to whether the Arizona court had personal jurisdiction over him at the time it entered its judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "H&E Equipment Services, Inc. v. Cassani Electric, Inc." on Justia Law

The question central to this appeal was whether a petitioner could raise a challenge to a Department of Corrections’ (DOC) disciplinary conviction that was not presented in the underlying DOC proceedings. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 appeal of a DOC disciplinary determination. Because petitioner did not preserve before the DOC the issue he raised for the first time before the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pratt v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Wilbur Shriner, the holder of a homeowner’s insurance policy from Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica), appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Amica and denial of his cross-motion for summary judgment. Shriner owned a glassblowing studio in Burlington until he sold the property in December 2007 and moved the glassblowing equipment to his home in Charlotte. He and his friend set up the equipment in the garage at Shriner’s property and began making glass in late 2008 or early 2009. From 2009 to 2012, Shriner and his friend “sometimes made glass for a week or two, and then would shut down for weeks due to lack of money.” During that three-year period, they made glassware approximately one time per week on average, and glassmaking was never more than an occasional or part-time activity for him. Throughout those three years, Shriner earned income from glassblowing, as well as from the redevelopment and rental of investment properties and from an organic honey and vegetable operation. In early 2012, the furnace exhaust system in a piece of glassmaking equipment malfunctioned and caused a fire that destroyed the garage and all of the property and equipment inside it. At the time, Shriner’s home was covered by his homeowner’s policy with Amica, which covered losses from fire and provided replacement coverage for buildings and personal property. The policy carried a $25,000 deductible and contained an exclusion from coverage for structures from which a business was conducted. Shriner submitted a personal property inventory for the property destroyed in the fire, with a replacement cost totaling $88,354.91. Amica accepted Shriner’s fire-loss claim and determined the replacement cost of the garage to be $42,422.97. Amica applied the policy’s $25,000 deductible and made an actual cash-value payment of $1460.53 as an advance partial payment to Shriner for the garage. Amica then changed positions and, asserting that Shriner’s glassblowing activities constituted a “business” for the purposes of the policy’s exclusion, refused to make any further payments to replace the garage. Amica paid Shriner $11,613 for nonbusiness property that was destroyed in the garage but capped its payment for other property in the inventory at $2500, which was the maximum reimbursement permitted under the policy for “business” personal property. Shriner brought suit to recover the full amount of his claim, and the court granted summary judgment to Amica. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shriner v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A group of landowners (neighbors) adjacent to a proposed planned unit development (PUD) challenged the Environmental Division’s affirmance of the PUD permit. On appeal, neighbors argued that the Environmental Division improperly required them to amend their original statement of questions and then erred by refusing to consider all of the issues raised by neighbors’ Amended Statement of Questions. Neighbors also claimed that the court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that adequate notice was posted of the public hearing on the PUD permit. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court did not err when it required neighbors to file an amended statement of questions under Environmental Proceedings Rule 5(f). The Supreme Court did concluded, however, that, after requiring neighbors to file a new statement of questions, the court was obligated to resolve all of the issues raised by the Amended Statement of Questions. “The court limited its decision on the merits to those issues specifically relating to PUD regulations. This was error. By declining to specifically address these regulations, the court left open issues presented by the Amended Statement of Questions.” Because the parties presented evidence on the regulations and the regulations were before the court, the Environmental Division should have addressed them in its decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Environmental Division did not err when it determined that Atwood satisfied the notice requirements to obtain approval of the project. View "In re Atwood Planned Unit Development" on Justia Law

In late 2016, Vermont State Police received a call from defendant William Bailey in which defendant told the police that he had accidentally shot his friend Daniel Hein and that Hein was likely dead. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Hein’s dead body in the back seat of defendant’s car; he had been shot in the head. Defendant was charged with manslaughter, and the court set bail at $50,000. Defendant later filed a motion to review bail, and the court held two bail review hearings. The court lowered bail to $25,000, but determined, after hearing testimony from both defendant’s father and defendant’s girlfriend, there was no responsible adult to whom defendant could be released. In cases of bailable offenses, there is a presumption that the defendant may be released before trial either on his or her own recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond. However, the presumption is rebutted if the court determines that such conditions are insufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance at future court proceedings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order to set bail at $25,000 and its determination that neither his father nor his girlfriend were responsible adults to whom he can be released. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court’s requirement that he post a secured appearance bond in the amount of $25,000 with a ten percent deposit to be paid to the court. Defendant was being held for lack of bail, and he argued that the amount set by the trial court was excessive. Although a court must consider a defendant’s financial resources in determining conditions of release, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the U.S. nor Vermont Constitution nor the applicable Vermont statutes required trial courts to find that a defendant has a present ability to raise bail in the amount set by the court. "Although courts must consider a defendant’s financial resources when they set bail, courts may set bail at a level that a particular defendant cannot secure. In setting bail, courts must always be guided by the goal of securing a defendant’s appearance at trial, and should not set bail at an unattainable level for the purpose of detaining a defendant rather than assuring the defendant’s appearance." View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law