Father filed a parentage action on March 19, 2015. On April 8, 2015, mother filed a stipulation of parentage and a motion that she be granted sole parental rights and responsibilities for the children and that father be denied any right to parent-child contact. Father appealed a Family Division order that awarded mother sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities but did not award father any parent-child contact at the time. The order contained a provision permitting father to file a motion for parent-child contact, even without any change in circumstances, within forty-five days after the pending criminal charges against him had been resolved. On appeal, father argued that: (1) the court effectively terminated his parental rights without finding by clear and convincing evidence that doing so was in the best interests of the children; and (2) that the court erred in creating a prerequisite to the resumption of contact (that is, the resolution of the criminal charges) beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Groves v. Green" on Justia Law

In involuntarily hospitalized patient diagnosed with schizophrenia appealed a trial court’s order allowing for his involuntary medication. Patient argued that the court erred by: (1) incorrectly applying the competency standard under 18 V.S.A. 7625; and (2) failing to address whether a previously prepared document reflecting his desire not to be given psychiatric medication was a “competently expressed written . . . preference[] regarding medication” under 18 V.S.A. 7627(b). After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s findings supported its conclusion under section 7625, but agreed that the trial court did not squarely address patient’s argument under section 7627 in its findings. Accordingly, the Court reversed on that issue and remanded for the trial court to issue findings addressing the applicability of section 7627(b). View "In re I.G." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's consideration centered on the circumstances a child support order could compel an obligor parent whose income was below the self-support reserve to make monthly payments toward outstanding arrearages on a child support surcharge. Father appealed pro se a family court order affirming a magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to modify a child support order that related solely to outstanding arrearages owed for surcharges. He argued that because his limited income from social security disability benefits was below the self-support reserve, he should not have been ordered to make $50 monthly payments toward outstanding surcharges. The magistrate considered the possibility of reducing or eliminating father’s monthly payment obligation, as opposed to discharging the underlying judgment. The magistrate noted that father’s living circumstances had changed on account of a recent divorce and that his income had fallen. However, the magistrate found that his modest monthly income was still sufficient to meet his modest expenses and allow him to continue paying $50 per month toward his surcharge arrearages. In addition, the magistrate found that father’s consistent payment of the $50 per month over the course of years supported the finding that he was, in fact, able to afford the payment. For these reasons, the magistrate declined to reduce father’s monthly surcharge arrearage payment. The statute relating to computation of a parent’s support obligation provided that if a noncustodial parent’s available income is less than the self-support reserve, the court shall use its discretion in determining support and shall require payment of a nominal support amount. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The magistrate made no findings that mother had shown good cause why the payment of arrears should be ordered notwithstanding father’s monthly income below the self-support reserve. Nor did the magistrate make any findings from which we might infer a determination of good cause, such as a finding that, notwithstanding his low monthly income, father has access to significant assets, or a finding that for some other reason this case was extraordinary. View "Leitgeb v. Leitgeb" on Justia Law

The LaBerges appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a Notice of Violation (NOV) issued by the Town of Hinesburg Zoning Administrator (ZA) for violation of a Town noise ordinance arising from use of a motocross track on their property. On appeal, the LaBerges argued the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and that the Environmental Division’s conclusion that the LaBerges violated the ordinance is clearly erroneous. Finding no such error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaBerge NOV" on Justia Law

Neighbor Mary Bourassa appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a zoning permit application by Philip and Barbara Wagner and Christopher Guay, who wanted to build a single family residence and detached garage on two merged lots of a six-lot subdivision in Grand Isle. Bourassa, an owner of another lot in the subdivision, opposed development, chiefly on the ground that the proposed house would not be constructed within the “tree line” on the property, as required by the subdivision plat plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wagner & Guay Permit" on Justia Law

This case was the latest in a series of lawsuits, spanning more than thirty years, between defendant Alpine Haven Property Owners’ Association, Inc. (AHPOA) and certain home/lot owners. Plaintiffs filed the underlying suit against AHPOA in May 2011. Plaintiffs asserted that their property was not part of a common-interest-community (CIC) and that they were not required by their deeds to be AHPOA members. Plaintiffs acknowledged an obligation to pay the reasonable costs of services provided and accepted, including maintaining the right-of-way, snowplowing, street lighting, and garbage collection. They argued, however, that they should not have to pay AHPOA for special assessments, annual meeting costs, insurance, road expansion or improvements, or any other AHPOA expenses not specified in their deeds. Plaintiffs also argued that a 2011 “Amended and Restated” declaration was not validly adopted. The dispositive question for the Vermont Supreme Court's review was whether the undisputed facts supported the trial court’s conclusion that “chalets” within Alpine Haven constituted a preexisting CIC governed by Title 27A of the Vermont Statutes Annotated. The trial court found a “series of deeds” sufficient to constitute a “declaration” of a CIC under the Vermont Common Interest Ownership Act (VCIOA). Plaintiffs argued that the court erred in reaching this conclusion. The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiffs, and therefore reversed and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Khan v. Alpine Haven Property Owners' Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Toby Charbonneau pleaded guilty to felony possession of stolen property and misdemeanor possession of stolen property. He was subsequently ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $35,791. On appeal, he challenged the restitution order, arguing: (1) whether an order of restitution had to relate to the damage caused by the criminal conduct for which defendant pleaded guilty; (2) whether restitution was limited to items that were not recovered and returned to the victim; and (3) whether the trial court was required to make findings as to a defendant’s ability to pay in a restitution order. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed on the first issue: "Defendant was not charged with burglary, and pleaded only to possession of stolen property, a plea based on the recovery of some of the victims’ stolen property from his residence. The restitution order, however, was based on the value of the property burgled from the victims’ residence. [. . .] That defendant had in his possession some of the property stolen from the victims’ home does not mean the criminal act for which defendant was convicted included the burglary of the victims’ home. Possession of stolen property and burglary are entirely separate crimes." View "Vermont v. Charbonneau" on Justia Law

Husband appealed a final divorce order, arguing that the Family Division: (1) inequitably divided the marital assets; (2) committed reversible errors of fact; and (3) issued a decision based on impermissible bias. Finding no reversible error in the Family Division's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Casavant (Allen) v. Allen" on Justia Law

Following an altercation with his wife and an ensuing conflict with police, defendant Miles Dow was charged with several counts, related to his conduct both towards his wife and to the responding police officers. During trial, based on improper questions from defense counsel, the court declared a mistrial on all counts involving defendant’s wife (the complainant). The trial continued, and the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon and attempted simple assault by menace on a law enforcement officer. Defendant appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence, the jury instructions were faulty, and his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendant also moved to dismiss the charges for which a mistrial was granted, arguing that the grounds for a mistrial were insufficient and jeopardy had attached. The court denied this motion, but granted defendant’s request to bring an interlocutory appeal. After its review of defendant’s direct and interlocutory appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s aggravated-assault conviction, vacated his simple assault conviction and reversed the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "Vermont v. Dow" on Justia Law

Defendant Kerri Nicholas was convicted of one count of domestic assault, and one count of cruelty to a child. The child's teacher observed bruises and notified the Department of Children and Families. Defendant had a romantic relationship with the child's mother and moved in with the mother in April 2012. The teacher observed the bruises when school started that year in September. On appeal, defendant argued that the child-cruelty conviction should have been reversed because the trial court’s jury instructions allowed for a non-unanimous verdict, and that the State’s conduct during the trial created a risk of undue prejudice with respect to both counts. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Nicholas" on Justia Law