The Burlington Administrators’ Association and Nicolas Molander (collectively the Association) appealed a trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration decision that Molander, in his capacity as an interim assistant principal, was not entitled to the contractual and statutory protections applicable to regular assistant principals who were not hired on an interim or acting basis. In particular, they challenged the trial court’s conclusion that it had no authority to review the merits of the arbitrator’s ruling for “manifest disregard of the law,” and argued that in this case, the arbitrator’s ruling evinced such a disregard. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator’s award did not in any event reflect a manifest disregard of the law, it did not address the question whether the trial court had authority to review an arbitration award under such a standard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burlington Administrators' Ass'n v. Burlington Bd. of School Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Mother and father separately appeal from a family court judgment terminating their parental rights to the minor D.S. In March 2014, a CHINS petition as to D.S. was filed shortly before his birth based on the parents’ pattern of neglect of his older siblings. At the termination hearing, the trial court found no evidence that mother had made any progress in addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues, neither parent had visited the child consistently, and neither had taken advantage of parenting services and educational opportunities. Furthermore, father had not obtained suitable housing. Based on these findings, the court concluded that neither parent could resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time measured from the perspective of a young child’s paramount need for permanence. The child, in the interim, had adjusted well to his foster home and community. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests. On appeal of the termination, both parents contended the trial court erred in: (1) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether to transfer custody of D.S. to the State following his birth; and (2) barring relitigation of factual findings from an earlier CHINS adjudication concerning D.S. and termination-of-parental rights proceeding concerning D.S.’s siblings. Father also contended the court erred in terminating his parental rights based on factors beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Mother and father separately appeal from a family court judgment terminating their parental rights to the minor D.S. In March 2014, a CHINS petition as to D.S. was filed shortly before his birth based on the parents’ pattern of neglect of his older siblings. At the termination hearing, the trial court found no evidence that mother had made any progress in addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues, neither parent had visited the child consistently, and neither had taken advantage of parenting services and educational opportunities. Furthermore, father had not obtained suitable housing. Based on these findings, the court concluded that neither parent could resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time measured from the perspective of a young child’s paramount need for permanence. The child, in the interim, had adjusted well to his foster home and community. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests. On appeal of the termination, both parents contended the trial court erred in: (1) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether to transfer custody of D.S. to the State following his birth; and (2) barring relitigation of factual findings from an earlier CHINS adjudication concerning D.S. and termination-of-parental rights proceeding concerning D.S.’s siblings. Father also contended the court erred in terminating his parental rights based on factors beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed a trial court’s order revoking his probation. In May 2009, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of sixteen, a felony, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. The charges arose from an April 2009 incident in which defendant, then age twenty, had intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl in the back of a car after a night of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. In June 2010, the State filed a violation-of-probation complaint against defendant, alleging that he had been out of state without permission in violation of one of the conditions in his deferred-sentence agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the probation conditions that the trial court determined he had violated are unenforceable because he claims the conditions were not part of “a certificate explicitly setting forth the conditions” of probation, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c). Defendant also raised challenges to specific conditions, arguing that they are contradictory or vague and not enforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed a trial court’s order revoking his probation. In May 2009, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of sixteen, a felony, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. The charges arose from an April 2009 incident in which defendant, then age twenty, had intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl in the back of a car after a night of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. In June 2010, the State filed a violation-of-probation complaint against defendant, alleging that he had been out of state without permission in violation of one of the conditions in his deferred-sentence agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the probation conditions that the trial court determined he had violated are unenforceable because he claims the conditions were not part of “a certificate explicitly setting forth the conditions” of probation, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c). Defendant also raised challenges to specific conditions, arguing that they are contradictory or vague and not enforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

M.W. was born in August 2010. M.W. lived with his young parents in the maternal grandparents’ home for several months before moving into an apartment that the maternal grandfather built over a garage located fifty feet from the grandparents’ home. During the approximately three years that the parents lived there, the mother and her parents were M.W.’s primary caregivers, as father worked two jobs and was away from the home much of the time. In 2013, father was arrested and charged with four counts of aggravated sexual assault on minors under the age of thirteen and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. Father was also charged with two counts of obstructing justice, one count of violating an abuse prevention order, and one count of violating conditions of release. M.W. was not the putative victim of any of the charged crimes. Ten of the twelve counts were felonies, the most serious of which (aggravated sexual assault on a minor under the age of thirteen) had a potential life sentence with a mandatory minimum of ten years to serve. The lewd-and-lascivious-conduct counts had a mandatory minimum sentence of two years to serve. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) substantiated father for abuse based on the conduct that led to the criminal charges. Father administratively appealed the substantiation, and that appeal was stayed pending resolution of the criminal charges. In the meantime, a petition was filed to terminate his parental rights as to M.W. He appealed a superior court order that ultimately terminated those rights, contending that an extended pre-trial incarceration could not support the family court’s termination order. Finding no reversible error as to the termination petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

M.W. was born in August 2010. M.W. lived with his young parents in the maternal grandparents’ home for several months before moving into an apartment that the maternal grandfather built over a garage located fifty feet from the grandparents’ home. During the approximately three years that the parents lived there, the mother and her parents were M.W.’s primary caregivers, as father worked two jobs and was away from the home much of the time. In 2013, father was arrested and charged with four counts of aggravated sexual assault on minors under the age of thirteen and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. Father was also charged with two counts of obstructing justice, one count of violating an abuse prevention order, and one count of violating conditions of release. M.W. was not the putative victim of any of the charged crimes. Ten of the twelve counts were felonies, the most serious of which (aggravated sexual assault on a minor under the age of thirteen) had a potential life sentence with a mandatory minimum of ten years to serve. The lewd-and-lascivious-conduct counts had a mandatory minimum sentence of two years to serve. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) substantiated father for abuse based on the conduct that led to the criminal charges. Father administratively appealed the substantiation, and that appeal was stayed pending resolution of the criminal charges. In the meantime, a petition was filed to terminate his parental rights as to M.W. He appealed a superior court order that ultimately terminated those rights, contending that an extended pre-trial incarceration could not support the family court’s termination order. Finding no reversible error as to the termination petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

In December 2014, defendant Jeremy Gates was charged with felony extortion, domestic assault, and unlawful mischief in the amount of $250 or less following an incident involving his mother. Defendant appealed a 2016 superior court ruling revoking his right to bail under 13 V.S.A. 7575 after repeated violations of conditions of release (VCRs). Defendant argued that the trial court ruled on inadequate grounds, without making the necessary findings, and based on probable cause affidavits, rather than on an independent determination by a preponderance of direct evidence required for bail revocation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that defendant had violated section 7575(1) so as to revoke his conditions of release. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-taxpayers Fred Osier and Eugene Shaver sued defendants Burlington Telecom, the City of Burlington and the City’s former Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) Jonathan Leopold to recover and restore to the City of Burlington’s general fund $16.9 million in cost overruns incurred by the City in connection with the operation of Burlington Telecom (BT). BT was a City-owned enterprise that provided an optical fiber-to-the-home network to Burlington residents and businesses. The trial court granted judgment to defendants. Taxpayers appealed, challenging the court’s denial of their request for an accounting from the City and its denial of their request to hold Leopold personally liable for the $16.9 million in City funds used for BT. Leopold cross-appealed, offering additional reasons why he should not have been held liable. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying taxpayers’ request for an accounting. The Court also agreed that Leopold was not personally liable for the $16.9 million in cost overruns. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the standard identified by the court in its pretrial ruling and held that any claim against Leopold had to include an element of bad faith. That critical element was lacking here. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision as to Leopold’s liability on that basis. View "Osier v. Burlington Telecom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Matthew Burgess appealed decisions of the superior court’s civil division which dismissed certain defendants and granting summary judgment to another defendant with respect to plaintiff’s claim that he was entitled to either a tax collector’s deed conveying him property he redeemed from foreclosure or damages compensating him for not being conveyed the deed. Plaintiff’s parents, John and Virginia Burgess, mortgaged property located in defendant Town of Morristown through defendant Lamoille Housing Partnership, Inc. (LHP), a nonprofit corporation that assisted people in finding affordable housing. The Burgesses purchased the property through LHP’s Home Land Program, by which ownership of the underlying land was severed from ownership of the house in which the Burgesses resided. Under the arrangement, a warranty deed from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Development conveyed the land and improvements to the Burgesses, who granted a mortgage deed to the USDA Rural Development encumbering both the land and improvements. The Burgesses then conveyed the land to LHP, retaining only the title to the improvements. LHP and the Burgesses then entered into a ground lease granting the Burgesses a leasehold interest in the land for a ninety-nine-year term subject to certain terms and conditions, including that the Burgesses pay the property taxes on the entire property. The Burgesses later disputed their obligation to pay property taxes, which ultimately resulted in their son attempting to redeem the property through foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "a simple review of the governing statutes reveals that redemption of property sold at a tax sale does not entitle the redeeming party to a collector’s deed." View "Burgess v. Lamoille Housing Partnership" on Justia Law