Plaintiffs owned a building, with a mortgage, in Hartford, Vermont, where they operated a pizza business. In 2013, they sold the pizza business to defendant and leased him the premises. In November 2013, plaintiffs brought an eviction action, asserting that defendant had failed to pay rent. The court granted plaintiffs a default judgment and a writ of possession in December 2013. The court subsequently granted defendant’s request to vacate the default judgment and stay the writ of possession. Defendant then filed an answer and a counterclaim. In his counterclaim, defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into entering into the lease agreement and that the lease should be declared void. Alternatively, defendant argued that he had cured any breach of the lease by paying money into an escrow fund. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order granting judgment to plaintiffs on their complaint for ejectment and damages. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Panagiotidis v. Galanis" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether Mount Mansfield Company, Inc. (MMC) had unitary operations with AIG Insurance Management Services, Inc. (AIG) such that AIG was required to include MMC as part of the AIG unitary group on its Vermont corporate income tax return. It also raised the question of whether, and under what circumstances, an amended tax return restarted the statute of limitations period for collecting a deficiency. The trial court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Taxes that there were unitary operations, and concluded that MMC was a discrete business enterprise distinct from AIG’s insurance and financial business. The Department appealed, arguing that the evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "AIG Insurance Management Services, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

Appellants Susan Beal and David Pearson appealed a Public Service Board decision to grant a certificate for public good (CPG) for the installation of a telecommunications facility by VTel Wireless, Inc. in Bennington. Appellants argued on appeal that the Board erred in finding that they had failed to demonstrate: (1) a "substantial interest" to intervene in the proceeding; and (2) a "significant issue" to warrant a hearing. Finding no reversible error in the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of VTel Wireless Inc. for a Certificate of Public Good" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Peter Goewey, then age sixty-one, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault for repeatedly performing oral sex on a young man. At a contested sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to twenty years to life. Defendant challenged this sentencing decision, alleging various constitutional and procedural errors. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Goewey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Neil and Patricia Whitney asserted that damage to their home and personal property resulting from the spraying within their home of a pesticide known as chlorpyrifos was covered by their homeowners policy. Defendant Vermont Mutual Insurance Company argued that the pollution exclusion in the policy barred the Whitneys’ claim. The superior court granted the Whitneys’ summary judgment motion on the question of coverage, concluding that the exclusion in question was ambiguous, and construing the ambiguous provision in favor of coverage. After review of the policy at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that the property damage to the Whitneys’ home was an excluded risk in the policy and reversed. View "Whitney v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The State appealed Superior Court decisions to seal certain portions of competency reports prepared in connection with court ordered competency evaluations of Anthony Gotavaskas and Grant Bercik, defendants in two separate criminal cases. Gotavaskas was charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling in one docket and providing false information and operation without the owner’s consent in a second docket. At his arraignment, Gotavaskas raised the issue of his competency and the trial court ordered a competency evaluation. A competency evaluation concluded that Gotavaskas was competent to stand trial. The State offered the competency evaluation into evidence, contending that the entire report should be admitted under 13 V.S.A. 4816(e). Gotavaskas did not contest the competency finding, but he objected to the admission of the entire report and offered a redacted version excluding portions he claimed were not relevant. The State disagreed, contending that because the evaluating doctor relied upon all of the information in the report as a basis for his opinion, the entire report should be admitted for its relevancy on the issue of Gotavaskas’ competency. The court redacted the competency report to include only information regarding the evaluator’s impressions of Gotavaskas and specific findings as to competence. Bercik was charged with simple assault. He was arraigned and pled not guilty. Several months after arraignment, Bercik filed a motion for competency and sanity evaluations, which the court granted. A competency evaluation concluded that Bercik was incompetent to stand trial. A competency hearing was held, at which time the State sought a finding of incompetency and the admission of the entirety of the evaluator’s report. Although Bercik agreed that there should be a lack of competency finding, he opposed the admittance of the entire report, requesting that the court temporarily seal the report. The court made a finding of incompetency and received the evaluator’s report under seal, deferring ruling on the admission of the report pending further briefing by the parties. Although not admitted in evidence, the court based its finding of incompetence upon the conclusions contained in the report. In review of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not make specific findings on the record as to a threshold question: “the statute contemplates that some portions of a competency report might not be relevant, and thus not required to be admitted, it does not suggest that any other application of ‘relevance’ should be used in considering what portions of a competency report are relevant for competency purposes other than that which is set forth in V.R.E. 401, the test for relevancy in Vermont courts. Whatever standard the trial court used here, it did not apply a V.R.E. 401 analysis to its decision on what portions of the reports to admit and what portions to exclude. It should have done so.” The cases were remanded for the trial court to make findings pursuant to V.R.E. 401. View "Vermont v. Gotavaskas" on Justia Law

Defendants-counterclaimants Jeanmarie Leonard and Carol Sayour appealed the grant of summary judgment on their counterclaims in favor of plaintiff Jennifer Weinstein and third-party defendants, Lloyd Weinstein, plaintiff’s husband, and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C. This case started in an application for a permit to construct a barn made by defendants in May 2012. Defendants received a zoning permit from Manchester’s zoning administrator allowing them to construct a barn on Lot #10. Pursuant to the Declaration for Rocking Stone Farm, defendants received a waiver from the Homeowner’s Association. Plaintiff appealed the permit to the Manchester Development Review Board (the “DRB”). The DRB affirmed the grant of the permit. Defendant Leonard and her husband were walking along Lot #10 with a landscape contractor when plaintiff began yelling at them from her upstairs window. Plaintiff then left her home and entered Lot #10, accompanied by a “very large dog.” Despite being asked to leave, she physically confronted the Leonards, who eventually left the lot. Two days later, plaintiff filed an appeal of the DRB’s decision to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. Plaintiff, a trained attorney, initially represented herself, but Mr. Weinstein and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C., entered an appearance as counsel for her. Both the Association and counsel for defendants advised plaintiff by letter that her opposition to the barn permit constituted a violation of the Non-Interference Clause of the Declaration, which provided that each owner of a lot in Rocking Stone Farm agreed “not [to] take any action to contest or interfere with any development in the Community so long as such development is consistent with the Land Use Approvals.” The Environmental Division rendered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff also filed suit against defendants in superior court with a ten-count complaint, alleging, among other things, that the Declaration had been breached by defendants’ construction of the barn. Defendants filed counterclaims against plaintiff for trespass, civil assault, breach of contract, tortious invasion of privacy, as well as abuse of process and third-party claims against Mr. Weinstein and his law firm for abuse of process and breach of contract. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as it did in plaintiff’s favor, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weinstein v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Defendant-landlords appealed a jury verdict and post-judgment order involving warranty-of-habitability and consumer-protection claims. Landlords William and Susan O’Brien purchased the subject property in the 1980s, which included a two-story house and brick building (referred to as the creamery) with a common wall to the rear of the house. In December 2002, following foreclosure proceedings on their home, plaintiff-tenants, Timothy and Penny Terry, along with their two children, accepted landlords’ offer to occupy the house rent-free for a short period. After their first year in the house, tenants began paying rent. There was no written rental agreement, but from at least December 2005, six years before tenants filed this lawsuit, there was an oral agreement to pay monthly rent in an amount that varied over the years. Eventually, the parties’ relationship deteriorated. In March 2005, Burlington Code Enforcement (BCE) inspected the house and cited landlords for multiple problems that required repair. A follow-up inspection in January 2006 confirmed that most of the repairs had been completed. BCE inspected the property again later in 2006 and found additional items that required repair, most of which were completed soon thereafter. In 2008, BCE performed several more inspections and issued notices of violations, many of which concerned the creamery. In May 2008, Vermont Gas inspected the house’s furnace and determined that it needed to be repaired or replaced because it was in extremely poor condition. In November 2008, landlords had space heater installed on the first floor of the house, but it was insufficient to heat the second floor. As a result, tenants began using space heaters on the second floor at night. In late 2008, a fire broke out in the attic of the house above one of the bedrooms. The state fire investigator determined that the fire had begun at an electrical splice located in the attic. The investigator also noted tenants’ use of multiple extension cords and supplemental wiring due to the insufficient number of functioning outlets. The investigator concluded that the fire was caused by a combination of the load on the older electrical system, moisture from the cellulose insulation, and the inability of the knob-and-tube wiring to shed heat due to it being buried in the insulation. In 2011, the Terrys filed suit against landlords, alleging: (1) breach of the oral rental agreement; (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (with respect to public health hazards); (4) violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA); (5) negligence; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tenants sought, among other things, compensatory, consequential, punitive, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Landlords counterclaimed for unpaid rent. Landlords’ arguments on appeal of the jury verdict were: (1) the trial court’s jury instructions misled the jury on tenants’ habitability and CPA claims, resulting in prejudice to landlords; (2) the court erred by vacating the jury’s unpaid-rent award in its post-judgment order; and (3) the court abused its discretion by awarding tenants attorney’s fees on their habitability and CPA claims and by denying landlords’ attorney’s fees based on tenants’ contributory negligence. The Supreme Court found that the trial court’s CPA instruction was overly broad and prejudicial to the landlords, and therefore the verdict was vacated with respect to the CPA claim. Absent their habitability claim, there was no basis for tenants to withhold rent. Therefore, the jury’s verdict regarding unpaid rent must stand. The Court also vacated the award of attorney fees, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Terry v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dow Tillson underwent an elective procedure to remove a cataract in his left eye. Defendant Dr. Richard Lane, M.D., performed the procedure at Springfield Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that within twenty-four hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson’s left eye showed signs of infection. Dr. Lane made a presumptive diagnosis of endopthalmitis, but did not refer Mr. Tillson to a retinologist for treatment. Within forty-eight hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson was permanently blind in his left eye. Plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, and defendants the doctor and hospital, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the superior court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tillson v. Lane" on Justia Law

M.M. was born in September 2006; C.M. was born on June 25, 2014. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) began working with mother in June 2012. On June 25, 2014, DCF filed a petition alleging that M.M. and C.M. were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). The parties agreed to a conditional care order with mother retaining custody subject to extensive conditions. Father was incarcerated at the time. Following a January 2015 merits hearing, the court found the children to be CHINS. Mother appealed the trial court’s order finding M.M. and C.M. to be CHINS. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the record supported the court’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.M. and C.M." on Justia Law