The parties to this appeal were co-lessees in a thirty-year ground lease for a ten-acre parcel of land owned by Star Meadows Farm, Inc. and located in Walden. The parties constructed improvements on the land and shared the parcel as unmarried cohabitants prior to the events that gave rise to this action. Upon termination of their relationship, plaintiff Karen Wynkoop sought a declaratory judgment to partition the property and compensation for ouster. Defendant Gerard Stratthaus appealed the trial court’s property division and compensation to plaintiff. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the determination that partition of the leasehold was authorized by law, that plaintiff should have received credit in determining her share of the value of the property for her services as general contractor of the joint construction project, and that plaintiff was ousted by defendant from the property. The judgment was reversed and remanded for the trial court to correct errors in its final calculation of the percentage share of the value of the property held by each party consistent with this opinion and is remanded for the court to determine the value of the property and the appropriate partition remedy. View "Wynkoop v. Stratthaus" on Justia Law

The Town of Underhill appealed a trial court order that affirmed a decision of the County Road Commissioners requiring the Town to maintain a segment of Town Highway 26 (TH 26), a Class 4 highway. TH 26 has existed, in some form, for nearly 150 years. In 2001, the Town sought to reclassify a segment of TH 26 between Irish Settlement Road and Pleasant Valley Road as a legal trail, and the remainder of the roadway as a Class 4 highway. Following protracted litigation, these changes became effective in June 2010, and TH 26 became part of the Town’s six miles of Class 4 highways. Prior to the reclassification of TH 26, the Town performed periodic maintenance and repair work to both the roadway and the twenty-two culverts that were installed along and under TH 26 over the past thirty years. Although the ditches along TH 26 do not appear to have been maintained since 2010, the Town has continued to do some work, primarily the addition of base material to the roadway. Appellees David Demarest, Jeffrey Moulton, and Jonathan Fuller owned property on TH 26 in the Town of Underhill. Appellees Fuller and Demarest resided at their properties full time, while two additional residents along the road were part-time residents. In 2012, appellees filed a notice of insufficiency pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 requesting maintenance of TH 26, which had been largely deferred following the roadway reclassification. The Town denied appellees’ allegations, asserting that TH 26 was being maintained to the extent required by the necessity of the Town, the public good, and the convenience of the inhabitants of the Town. Appellees then brought an action for the appointment of County Road Commissioners pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 et seq. to compel the Town to undertake repairs of TH 26. Specifically, appellees sought repairs and maintenance to drainage, culverts, and the road surface, so as to make it reasonably safe and accessible for appellees’ use as residents of the Town. The Town contended on appeal that the trial court misconstrued and incorrectly applied the statutory provisions for the maintenance of Class 4 roads and erroneously established its own maintenance standard. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town and reversed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

The Vermont Human Rights Commission and three female employees of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the State (the DOC and the Vermont Department of Human Resources (DHR)) claiming that the DOC violated the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA) by paying a male employee in the same position as the female plaintiffs as much as $10,000 more annually without a legally defensible, gender-neutral reason. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that although plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the undisputed facts established that the wage disparity was due to legitimate business reasons and not gender-based. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' case. View "Vermont Human Rights Comm'n v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a building, with a mortgage, in Hartford, Vermont, where they operated a pizza business. In 2013, they sold the pizza business to defendant and leased him the premises. In November 2013, plaintiffs brought an eviction action, asserting that defendant had failed to pay rent. The court granted plaintiffs a default judgment and a writ of possession in December 2013. The court subsequently granted defendant’s request to vacate the default judgment and stay the writ of possession. Defendant then filed an answer and a counterclaim. In his counterclaim, defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into entering into the lease agreement and that the lease should be declared void. Alternatively, defendant argued that he had cured any breach of the lease by paying money into an escrow fund. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order granting judgment to plaintiffs on their complaint for ejectment and damages. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Panagiotidis v. Galanis" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether Mount Mansfield Company, Inc. (MMC) had unitary operations with AIG Insurance Management Services, Inc. (AIG) such that AIG was required to include MMC as part of the AIG unitary group on its Vermont corporate income tax return. It also raised the question of whether, and under what circumstances, an amended tax return restarted the statute of limitations period for collecting a deficiency. The trial court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Taxes that there were unitary operations, and concluded that MMC was a discrete business enterprise distinct from AIG’s insurance and financial business. The Department appealed, arguing that the evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "AIG Insurance Management Services, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

Appellants Susan Beal and David Pearson appealed a Public Service Board decision to grant a certificate for public good (CPG) for the installation of a telecommunications facility by VTel Wireless, Inc. in Bennington. Appellants argued on appeal that the Board erred in finding that they had failed to demonstrate: (1) a "substantial interest" to intervene in the proceeding; and (2) a "significant issue" to warrant a hearing. Finding no reversible error in the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of VTel Wireless Inc. for a Certificate of Public Good" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Peter Goewey, then age sixty-one, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault for repeatedly performing oral sex on a young man. At a contested sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to twenty years to life. Defendant challenged this sentencing decision, alleging various constitutional and procedural errors. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Goewey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Neil and Patricia Whitney asserted that damage to their home and personal property resulting from the spraying within their home of a pesticide known as chlorpyrifos was covered by their homeowners policy. Defendant Vermont Mutual Insurance Company argued that the pollution exclusion in the policy barred the Whitneys’ claim. The superior court granted the Whitneys’ summary judgment motion on the question of coverage, concluding that the exclusion in question was ambiguous, and construing the ambiguous provision in favor of coverage. After review of the policy at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that the property damage to the Whitneys’ home was an excluded risk in the policy and reversed. View "Whitney v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The State appealed Superior Court decisions to seal certain portions of competency reports prepared in connection with court ordered competency evaluations of Anthony Gotavaskas and Grant Bercik, defendants in two separate criminal cases. Gotavaskas was charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling in one docket and providing false information and operation without the owner’s consent in a second docket. At his arraignment, Gotavaskas raised the issue of his competency and the trial court ordered a competency evaluation. A competency evaluation concluded that Gotavaskas was competent to stand trial. The State offered the competency evaluation into evidence, contending that the entire report should be admitted under 13 V.S.A. 4816(e). Gotavaskas did not contest the competency finding, but he objected to the admission of the entire report and offered a redacted version excluding portions he claimed were not relevant. The State disagreed, contending that because the evaluating doctor relied upon all of the information in the report as a basis for his opinion, the entire report should be admitted for its relevancy on the issue of Gotavaskas’ competency. The court redacted the competency report to include only information regarding the evaluator’s impressions of Gotavaskas and specific findings as to competence. Bercik was charged with simple assault. He was arraigned and pled not guilty. Several months after arraignment, Bercik filed a motion for competency and sanity evaluations, which the court granted. A competency evaluation concluded that Bercik was incompetent to stand trial. A competency hearing was held, at which time the State sought a finding of incompetency and the admission of the entirety of the evaluator’s report. Although Bercik agreed that there should be a lack of competency finding, he opposed the admittance of the entire report, requesting that the court temporarily seal the report. The court made a finding of incompetency and received the evaluator’s report under seal, deferring ruling on the admission of the report pending further briefing by the parties. Although not admitted in evidence, the court based its finding of incompetence upon the conclusions contained in the report. In review of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not make specific findings on the record as to a threshold question: “the statute contemplates that some portions of a competency report might not be relevant, and thus not required to be admitted, it does not suggest that any other application of ‘relevance’ should be used in considering what portions of a competency report are relevant for competency purposes other than that which is set forth in V.R.E. 401, the test for relevancy in Vermont courts. Whatever standard the trial court used here, it did not apply a V.R.E. 401 analysis to its decision on what portions of the reports to admit and what portions to exclude. It should have done so.” The cases were remanded for the trial court to make findings pursuant to V.R.E. 401. View "Vermont v. Gotavaskas" on Justia Law

Defendants-counterclaimants Jeanmarie Leonard and Carol Sayour appealed the grant of summary judgment on their counterclaims in favor of plaintiff Jennifer Weinstein and third-party defendants, Lloyd Weinstein, plaintiff’s husband, and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C. This case started in an application for a permit to construct a barn made by defendants in May 2012. Defendants received a zoning permit from Manchester’s zoning administrator allowing them to construct a barn on Lot #10. Pursuant to the Declaration for Rocking Stone Farm, defendants received a waiver from the Homeowner’s Association. Plaintiff appealed the permit to the Manchester Development Review Board (the “DRB”). The DRB affirmed the grant of the permit. Defendant Leonard and her husband were walking along Lot #10 with a landscape contractor when plaintiff began yelling at them from her upstairs window. Plaintiff then left her home and entered Lot #10, accompanied by a “very large dog.” Despite being asked to leave, she physically confronted the Leonards, who eventually left the lot. Two days later, plaintiff filed an appeal of the DRB’s decision to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. Plaintiff, a trained attorney, initially represented herself, but Mr. Weinstein and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C., entered an appearance as counsel for her. Both the Association and counsel for defendants advised plaintiff by letter that her opposition to the barn permit constituted a violation of the Non-Interference Clause of the Declaration, which provided that each owner of a lot in Rocking Stone Farm agreed “not [to] take any action to contest or interfere with any development in the Community so long as such development is consistent with the Land Use Approvals.” The Environmental Division rendered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff also filed suit against defendants in superior court with a ten-count complaint, alleging, among other things, that the Declaration had been breached by defendants’ construction of the barn. Defendants filed counterclaims against plaintiff for trespass, civil assault, breach of contract, tortious invasion of privacy, as well as abuse of process and third-party claims against Mr. Weinstein and his law firm for abuse of process and breach of contract. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as it did in plaintiff’s favor, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weinstein v. Leonard" on Justia Law