Defendant was convicted by jury of disorderly conduct and grossly negligent operation. He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant also challenged various conditions of probation. The charges stemmed from a March 2013 incident involving defendant and his neighbor. The neighbor was driving home on the dirt road. He was traveling approximately ten miles per hour and playing his music loudly with the windows rolled down. After passing defendant's house, the neighbor noticed a white car quickly coming up behind him. The car passed the neighbor on the left, pulled back into the middle of the road, and braked, turning sideways and blocking the road. Defendant got out of the white car and began screaming and swearing at the neighbor. He threatened the neighbor and said he was tired of the neighbor's loud music. Another person also witnessed defendant yelling. The neighbor took several pictures of the scene as he sat in his car, one of which was admitted into evidence. The picture showed tire marks across the road and defendant's car stopped in the middle of the road. The neighbor testified that had he not braked, he would have hit defendant's car. Defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf. The jury found defendant guilty, and defendant was sentenced to two concurrent thirty-to-sixty-day sentences, all suspended, with two years of probation. With regard to probation, the State requested that the court impose the "standard conditions of probation," with the exception of restrictions on defendant's out-of-state travel, the imposition of a curfew, and the restriction on his associations (other than contacting, abusing, or harassing the neighbor). As a "special" condition, the State requested that defendant visit a mental-health counselor for an initial screening, follow any recommendations thereafter, and sign the necessary waivers to allow his probation officer to monitor his attendance and participation. Defendant also voiced concern over a mental-health condition, and over any "vague" release he may be required to sign in conjunction with mental-health counseling. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, but struck several of the probation conditions. View "Vermont v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that he was illegally seized when a police officer approached his parked car twice in a short period and, during the second encounter, asked him pointed questions about drugs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed and remanded the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Winters" on Justia Law

Defendant William Stanley, Sr., appealed his conviction of sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court: (1) erroneously permitted the trial and sentencing to proceed in his absence; (2) erroneously permitted the State to introduce an uncharged prior bad act as evidence; and (3) imposed the habitual-offender enhancement in a way that may have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Claimant Roxanne Moran appealed a superior court's dismissal of her complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant, a former employee of the Vermont State Hospital, separated from state service and applied for ordinary disability-retirement benefits in November of 2011. The Medical Review Board denied benefits, and claimant requested an evidentiary hearing after which benefits were again denied. Claimant then pursued an appeal to the superior court under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and claimant appealed. On appeal, claimant argued that because the superior court had jurisdiction over the appeal the Rule 75 action should not have been dismissed. In the alternative, claimant argued that, even if the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the Board's decision, her timely filed Rule 75 complaint was sufficient to preserve the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Vermont Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. In addition to its brief directly responding to claimant's arguments on appeal, the State also filed a motion to dismiss a portion of the appeal as untimely. Finding no reversible error and that the superior court indeed lacked jurisdiction to hear claimant's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moran v. Vermont State Retirement Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Bandler and MB&Co, Ltd. ("corporation") filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling that Bandler, a non-attorney, could not represent corporation in this case. Bandler was the sole shareholder and president of corporation. Bandler sued Charter One Bank, raising several claims based on the bank's alleged failure to honor advertising promises and other representations in connection with a checking account. He argued that the trial court violated his due-process rights by ruling on the basis of the parties' respective written submissions on the issue of representation without giving him prior notice of its concerns about his representation so that he could respond "by way of papers [or] argument" before the trial court issued its ruling. Having "serious concerns about Mr. Bandler's ability to present the Corporation's claims in this case," the trial court concluded that allowing Bandler to represent corporation would be unduly burdensome to the court. The Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention on appeal, finding the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding the pending motions without a hearing or argument and without soliciting further written argument from plaintiffs. View "Bandler v. Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer, LLP" on Justia Law

A.M. was born in October 2011 to parents who admitted to their struggle with substance abuse. A.M. was taken into emergency DCF custody in June 2013. In its petition alleging that A.M. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS), DCF indicated that A.M. had been found in a motel room with parents in the presence of heroin and drug paraphernalia. The court issued a temporary-care order on June 4, 2013 transferring temporary legal custody of the child to DCF, and A.M. was placed with his maternal grandmother. A.M.'s Mother appealed the trial court’s disposition order continuing legal custody of the minor child A.M. with the Department for Children and Families (DCF). She argued that the court erred by failing to take evidence on whether the disposition plan should be amended to include reunification with A.M.’s maternal grandmother as a third concurrent goal. Mother contended that the court should not have taken judicial notice of a prior ruling concerning grandmother’s unsuitability to provide even temporary care for A.M. Based on these assertions, mother argued that the court’s order was unsupported by any findings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Two disputes were presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review in this opinion. One dispute stemmed from a landowner’s replacement of his boathouse and construction of retaining walls that encroached onto his neighbors’ property. This dispute included claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages on account of the landowner’s alleged trespass. The neighbors challenged the trial court’s conclusions that the landowner was entitled to build the encroaching structure by virtue of a deeded easement and that they could not prevail in a claim for trespass on account of consent or estoppel. The second dispute (flowing from and intertwined with the first dispute) involved acts of vandalism to the disputed boathouse by the occupant of the neighbors’ property. The occupant appealed the judgment against him, and the landowner cross-appealed, raising a host of issues in connection with that judgment. After review of the particular facts entered into the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s construction of the deeded easement was erroneous, and the court improperly addressed the other issues in derogation of the neighbors’ request for a jury trial. The trial court was reversed with respect to the first dispute. Finding no error with regard to the second, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "LeBlanc v. Snelgrove" on Justia Law

Defendant David Tracy's daughter was one of fifteen girls on a junior high school girls’ basketball team. The basketball coach did not play defendant’s daughter in the first two games of the season. Shortly after the end of the second game, defendant approached the coach and the coach’s nineteen-year-old daughter in the school parking lot. The coach and the coach’s daughter both testified that defendant was calm at the start of the conversation, but that the exchange soon became heated and agitated. Defendant began by saying that “he just wanted to know why [the coach] wouldn’t put his daughter in a game.” That exchange lead to charges against defendant for disorderly conduct by “abusive . . . language.” The trial court, following a bench trial, concluded that defendant’s language was not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it constituted “fighting words.” On appeal, defendant argued that the “abusive language” prong of Vermont’s disorderly-conduct statute was overbroad and impermissibly chills a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech without serving a compelling state interest. He further argued that, even if the statute was constitutional on its face, the speech for which he was convicted in this case was constitutionally protected. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the speech for which defendant was convicted was beyond the reach of the abusive-language prong of the disorderly-conduct statute, and reversed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Tracy" on Justia Law

The City of Burlington and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) applied for an Act 250 permit amendment to complete a project known as the "Champlain Parkway," a roadway designed to route traffic more efficiently from Interstate 89 in South Burlington to the City of Burlington’s downtown area. The environmental court concluded that the application complied with Act 250’s transportation criterion subject to conditions requiring that applicants monitor and report on the project’s traffic-congestion and safety impacts, and work with the opposing party in this proceeding, Fortieth Burlington, LLC, to resolve any remaining issues. Fortieth appealed, arguing that: (1) the conditions imposed by the court were not supported by the evidence and findings, exceeded the court’s authority, and were insufficient to mitigate the project’s adverse impacts; (2) the court misapplied the burdens of production and proof; and (3) the court erred in rejecting Fortieth’s proposed conditions. After review, the Supreme court "discern[ed] no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding that Fortieth failed to provide sufficient “details of [the alleged] improvement or the corresponding impacts on traffic,” and no ground to disturb the judgment." View "In re Champlain Parkway Act 250 Permit (Fortieth Burlington LLC, Appellant)" on Justia Law

On an afternoon in February 2009, two cars collided on State Route 63 in the Town of Berlin. The westbound car crossed the center line and crashed into plaintiff Kathleen Vanderbloom's car, which was heading east. The driver of the westbound car was killed. Plaintiff suffered serious, disabling physical injuries. Plaintiff filed an action against the State of Vermont, alleging that it negligently designed and constructed a state highway, causing her to suffer injuries in a car crash. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State on sovereign-immunity grounds. Finding no reversible error in the dismissal of plaintiff's case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vanderbloom v. Vermont Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law