Petitioner Cherie Hyde brought an action for post-conviction relief (PCR), challenging her felony conviction and sentence for aiding another as an accessory to commit sexual assault on a child under the age of sixteen. She appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the State on that PCR petition, arguing: (1) the three-year statute of limitations governing aiding in the commission of a sexual assault had expired; (2) she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to raise the statute-of-limitations defense; and (3) the court failed to establish a factual basis for the claim, and therefore, her plea was not voluntary. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Cherie Hyde" on Justia Law

David Gauthier began work at Green Mountain in May 2007 on an at-will basis as a full-time maintenance technician and was responsible for maintaining and repairing production machinery. In response to a request by Gauthier’s supervisor that the human resources (HR) department investigate internet use in the maintenance department, a Green Mountain HR generalist requested a “Websense” report for eleven maintenance technicians, including Gauthier (a Websense report “provides detailed information about internet use and access in connection with a particular employee’s log in information.”) The report showed that, during July 2011, Gauthier had 41,750 internet hits, an amount of internet hits “more than double the internet usage that [Green Mountain] generally considered excessive usage.” The day after the report was requested, but several days before it had been compiled, Gauthier sustained an injury while at work. Gauthier made a workers’-compensation claim, which Green Mountain accepted, and he continued to work until the day before he underwent an operation for his injury. Based in part on the result of the Websense report, an HR generalist submitted a disciplinary action plan to Gauthier's supervisor recommending that Gauthier be terminated. The report recounted that Gauthier was not required to access the internet frequently for business purposes and that he had been “engaged in the [Green Mountain] discipline process” for several years, including being placed on a CAP and receiving a written warning for violation of Green Mountain’s internet-use policy." Due to the timing with Gauthier’s workers’-compensation claim, however, the HR generalist was instructed to first send Gauthier a letter indicating that “there were some issues related to his performance that needed to be discussed once he returned from leave.” When Gauthier returned to work from his medical leave, he was placed administrative leave, then ultimately terminated. Gauthier filed a three-count complaint alleging: (1) workers’-compensation retaliation; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Green Mountain successfully moved for summary judgment on all three counts. This appeal followed, with Gauthier arguing that the court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of Green Mountain on his claim for workers’-compensation retaliation and abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend his complaint. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gauthier v. Keurig Green Mountain" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Board hired plaintiff Juanita Burch-Clay as principal of West Rutland School with a two-year contract beginning July 1, 2011. Plaintiff’s contract authorized the Board to not renew her contract by providing written notice of its reasons for non-renewal on or before March 15. By letter dated March 14, the Board notified plaintiff of its decision not to renew her contract, citing “school climate” as the reason for non-renewal. The letter also stated that the Board would be willing to reconsider its decision upon plaintiff’s successful participation in a remedial plan developed and approved by the superintendent and the Board. Plaintiff followed up with a letter dated March 19 expressing her desire to work collaboratively with the Board to address its concerns. While plaintiff and the Board made inroads into fixing "deficiencies" raised by a review of her performance, plaintiff refused to stipulate to those deficiencies as characterized by the evaluation. The Board affirmed its earlier decision not to renew plaintiff's contract. Plaintiff filed a motion at the superior court for review under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74, raising claims of both procedural defects and a lack of just cause for her termination. The superior court found no error in the conduct of the hearing and concluded that the Board had just and sufficient cause for termination. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burch-Clay v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Brown petitioned for post-conviction relief following the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State based on a determination that the criminal court complied with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4) in deviating from the original plea agreement. In 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a minor and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. In total, petitioner agreed to a five-to-fifteen-year split sentence, with two years to serve, as well as the imposition of sex-offender probation conditions. Petitioner and the criminal court engaged in a colloquy, and the court accepted petitioner’s guilty plea but reserved final sentencing until after the release of the presentence investigation report (PSI). The criminal court reviewed the PSI, which differed from the original plea agreement in two important aspects: (1) the PSI recommended a three-to-twenty-year straight sentence; and (2) the report recommended three additional probation conditions. The State acknowledged that these conditions were not part of the original plea agreement and stated, “I suppose, in theory, if the court was not willing to accept the plea agreement without those conditions . . . then that would be a change in the plea agreement and the defendant would have a right to withdraw from it.” The court stated that it was going forward with the sentence as outlined in the original plea agreement, with the addition of the special probation conditions recommended in the PSI, minus the alcohol condition. Petitioner inquired about the two special conditions, which he felt were contradictory. The court explained the conditions and made sure that petitioner understood them; petitioner confirmed that he did. The court directed the clerk to impose the five-to-fifteen-year split sentence with the two added conditions. In 2014, petitioner filed his PCR petition, alleging that the criminal court violated Rule 11(e)(4) when it failed to explicitly inform him that he had the right to withdraw his plea after the criminal court imposed the additional probation conditions. Finding that the State was entitled to summary judgment based on its review of the criminal court record, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief. View "In re Derrick Brown" on Justia Law

In July 2014, defendant Kelly Taylor was stopped by a police officer in Lyndonville on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). At the stop, defendant submitted to a preliminary breath test showing an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Defendant was arrested and taken to the Vermont State Police barracks in St. Johnsbury, where she took an evidentiary breath-alcohol test using a DataMaster DMT breath-alcohol testing device. This test showed that defendant’s alcohol concentration was 0.158, above the legal limit. Defendant appealed the civil suspension of her driver’s license. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of showing that the breath-alcohol concentration “testing methods were valid and reliable” and that “[t]he test results were accurate and accurately evaluated,” when the printout (“ticket”) generated by the DataMaster device was not admitted into evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a minor under the age of thirteen. Defendant was the victim's uncle. After the incident, T.B. left the house and waited in the farm store across the street from her home until her aunt came home. Later that night, T.B. wrote a letter about the incident and about how she no longer felt safe in her home. The next morning on the bus, she showed the letter to a friend, who encouraged her to tell the school principal. T.B. showed the letter to the vice principal, and the school officials called the police and a Department for Children and Families case worker. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements under Vermont Rule of Evidence 804a; (2) admitting expert testimony under Vermont Rule of Evidence 702; and (3) coercing a jury verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Perley was charged with numerous crimes in March 2013, including: leaving the scene of an accident; violating conditions of release; operating with a suspended license driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; and refusing to submit to an evidentiary test. Defendant pled nolo contendere to the first three charges. Defendant appealed his conviction for refusing to submit to an evidentiary test, arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove the “reasonableness” of the State’s request for an evidentiary breath test beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Perley" on Justia Law

Equinox on the Battenkill Management Association, Inc., appealed a superior court's grant of summary-judgment denying insurance coverage. The appeal arose from a declaratory judgment action against management association’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, Inc., to determine coverage under a commercial general liability policy for damage to cantilevered balconies on condominium units it managed in Manchester. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether "Gage v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Co,." (169 A.2d 29 (1961)) was still good law with regards to the meaning of "collapse" and whether "Gage" controlled the result here. After review, the Court concluded that the policy language in this dispute was broader than the language in Gage and that therefore Gage did not control. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for that court to resolve disputed questions of fact and interpret the applicable policy language. View "Equinox on the Battenkill Management Assn., Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

R.B. was born in September 2008; O.B. in December 2009; and K.C. in September 2011. In August 2012, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because they were without proper parental care. The court found it best to place the children with relatives if possible, and determined that the children's father's cousin Kristin and her wife Tammy Hall could take proper care of the children, at least in the short run, while work was done on a disposition plan. It was ultimately recommended that the children be placed for adoption, and the parental rights to both parents be terminated. The trial court found that Mother suffered from Munchausen’s disorder and Munchausen’s disorder by proxy. The court could not find that mother was likely to recover from these disorders at any particular time. It found no reasonable probability that mother could resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time. Father was unwilling or unable to take over responsibility for the children’s medical care and appointments and ensure that recommendations and plans provided by DCF were implemented. As of the date of the TPR hearing, father continued to live with mother and had not developed the parenting and other skills needed to care for the children safely. It would be impossible, the court explained, for father to care for mother, protect the children, meet all of their needs, and support the family. Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, although he was receiving some money for his work as a caretaker for mother. The parties received state benefits, which were barely sufficient to meet their financial needs. Finding no abuse of discretion in terminating the parents' rights to the three children, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination decision. View "In re R.B., O.B. and K.C." on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Aiken appealed a superior court order denying his motion to suppress his refusal to submit to an evidentiary breath test on grounds that he was denied his right to counsel. Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to operating the vehicle, and preliminary breath and field sobriety tests indicated that defendant’s blood-alcohol content was above the legal limit. Defendant was detained and taken to the police barracks for processing. During processing, the sergeant read defendant his rights under Vermont’s implied-consent law. Defendant asked to speak with an attorney, and two on-call public defenders were telephoned. Defendant explained to the sergeant that he had been on hold for ten minutes, the sergeant again attempted to call both public defenders. There was no answer at any of the numbers called for the on-call attorney, and the back-up attorney’s line was busy. The sergeant told defendant that he had ten more minutes and that if neither public defender returned his call he would have to decide whether or not to take the evidentiary breath test regardless of obtaining legal consultation. After the thirty minutes elapsed, the sergeant asked defendant if he would submit to the breath test. Defendant refused to answer, and the sergeant understood this as a refusal to take the test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant renewed on appeal his argument that Vermont case law holding that the defender general’s office had a statutory obligation to provide twenty-four-hour legal consultation to DUI detainees, and while he was on hold for a public defender, defendant received no substantive advice. "Although the consultation here was brief, an attorney-client relationship was formed," and the Supreme Court believed "that peering behind the veil of that privacy to ascertain the quality of the consultation would open the door to eroding the privacy afforded to detainees in their right to counsel." Because defendant failed to make a decision on whether or not to take the test, the trial court did not err in denying is motion to suppress. View "Vermont v. Aiken" on Justia Law