Taxpayer Blimar Team Cleaners appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Burlington Board of Tax Appeals' appraisal of its property at 150 Shelburne Road in Burlington at a value of $193,500. Taxpayer contended on appeal that: (1) there was sufficient evidence that the property was not assessed at fair market value to overcome the city appraisal's presumption of validity; and (2) the City of Burlington failed to meet its burden of proof demonstrating the property was assessed at fair market value. Finding no reason to disturb the appraisal or the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Bilmar Team Cleaners" on Justia Law

Petitioner was admitted to a nursing home in September 2010. She was eighty-seven years old at the time, and had a diagnosis of dementia and Alzheimer's disease. Petitioner's adult daughter, who had the authority to act on petitioner's behalf by virtue of a power of attorney, submitted an application for long-term care Medicaid benefits in January 2011. The application sought coverage for petitioner, retroactive to October 1, 2010, pursuant to a Medicaid rule authorizing benefits for up to three months preceding the month of application. A benefits specialist with the Department for Children and Families testified that, in response to the application, she sent two separate verification requests to petitioner's daughter and an administrator at petitioner's nursing home. The Department received no response to these requests. Accordingly, in March 2011, the Department issued a Notice of Decision ("Notice") denying the application. No appeal of the denial was filed by petitioner or a person acting on her behalf within the ninety-day limit. Petitioner's daughter would submit a total of four applications, each with a request from the Department for additional information, and each time, no information was provided, and the applications were denied. With the assistance of her son, petitioner filed a fifth application for benefits in February 2012. This time, additional information verifying petitioner's financial eligibility was provided, and the application was approved by the Department in May 2012 with benefits retroactive to November 2011, which was three months prior to the date of the fifth and final application. Petitioner appealed that decision, seeking coverage retroactive to October 2010, which would have been three months prior to her first application from January 2011. An evidentiary hearing was held in July 2013 before a Department hearing officer. The Board adopted the hearing officer's findings and issued a decision reversing the Department's decision to limit retroactive benefits to November 2011. The Board concluded that, for reasons of equitable estoppel, petitioner could be awarded benefits retroactive to October 1, 2010 based on the date of the initial application. The Department sought review by the Secretary, who reversed the Board's decision. Because petitioner did not respond to the Department's multiple requests for verification, did not advise the Department of any valid reasons for failing to respond, and informed the Department's benefits specialist that the failure to respond was her responsibility, that she had "dropped the ball." Accordingly, the Secretary found no justification to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and reversed the Board's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Secretary's reversal of the Board's ruling. View "In re Bernice Landry" on Justia Law

The subject property was two large parcels of land in the Town of Manchester. Sand, rock, and gravel had been extracted from a portion of one or both parcels for decades. In September 1990, respondents' predecessor-in-interest received an Act 250 permit authorizing a nineteen-lot residential subdivision on the northern parcel. Among other conditions, the Act 250 permit provided that it would expire one year from the date of issuance if the permittee had not demonstrated an intention to proceed with the project in accordance with 10 V.S.A. 6091(b), and otherwise would expire on October 1, 2020 unless extended by the District Environmental Commission. Other permit conditions prohibited any "changes . . . in the design or use" of the project without written approval of the district coordinator or commission, and specified that the permit and all conditions therein would "run with the land and . . . be binding upon and enforceable against . . . all assigns and successors in interest." In September 1992, the district commission issued an amendment to the permit extending the time for construction of the project to October 1994. In June 1994, respondent Dorr Oil Company purchased a portion of the property designated as a residential tract. The warranty deed expressly referenced the Act 250 permit "and any and all amendments thereto." Shortly thereafter, respondent Donald Dorr, on behalf of Dorr Oil applied for and received a further permit amendment extending the time for construction to October 1995. During this period, another company operated by Dorr, respondent MGC, Inc., purchased the southerly parcel (the "adjacent tract"), and continued to operate a gravel pit "most or all" of which the trial court found was located on the adjacent tract. Dorr took no steps to begin the actual subdivision of the project tract or the development of an internal roadway. In March 2006, following a property-tax reappraisal of the tracts by the Town, respondents filed a request with the district commission to declare the Act 250 permit as abandoned through non-use. The commission, in response, issued a notice of intent to abandon the permit. The owners of a nearby residential property filed an objection, asserting that respondents had made a "material change" to the use authorized by the Act 250 permit by expanding gravel extractions activities onto the residential project tract. The commission then "tabled" the abandonment request "pending a jurisdictional opinion from the district coordinator on the material change question." The district coordinator thereupon requested further information from the parties, visited the site with respondent Dorr and his attorney, and issued a draft jurisdictional opinion for comment. In January 2007, the coordinator issued a formal opinion, finding that the "Dorr gravel pit has expanded onto the parcel covered by [the Act 250 permit]," that this constituted "a material change to that permit," and therefore that "a permit amendment [was] required." Respondents neither appealed the jurisdictional opinion to the Environmental Division, applied for a permit amendment, nor abated the gravel extraction activities on the project tract. Following respondents' inaction, in October 2008, the NRB chair issued an administrative order determining that respondents had violated conditions of the Act 250 permit by making a material change to the project without a land-use permit amendment. Respondents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division's judgment affirming the NRB's decision that respondents' gravel-extraction activities violated an Act 250 residential-subdivision permit. Respondents argued the ruling was in error because the permit had expired. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nat. Resources Bd. Land Use Panel v. Dorr" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a superior court (family division) order finding that her five-year-old son, M.K., was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on a single incident of abuse. She argued that the CHINS determination must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegation of abuse. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.K." on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff was severely injured when a 2000 Dodge Neon that she was driving was struck from behind by another vehicle. In July 2010, she filed a personal-injury action against Midstate, the automobile dealer that sold her the vehicle; Chrysler Group LLC, successor-in-interest to Chrysler Corporation, which manufactured the vehicle but later declared bankruptcy; JCI, which manufactured the vehicle's driver's seat; and Autoliv ASP, Inc., which manufactured the vehicle's seatbelts. In September 2012, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with Midstate and Chrysler Group. Based on the settlement agreement, the trial court issued an order of dismissal with prejudice in favor of Midstate and Chrysler Group. A jury trial in June 2013 on plaintiff's remaining action against JCI resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the products-liability claim. The trial court also entered a final judgment in favor of JCI and against Midstate on the cross-claim for indemnity. Midstate appealed that judgment. The issue primarily briefed by the parties on appeal was whether an indemnitee invoking common law equitable indemnity must extinguish the liability of the indemnitor to collect indemnity. The Supreme Court found no basis to distrub the judgment in favor of JCI, and affirmed. View "Heco v. Foster Motors" on Justia Law

The Vermont Spay/Neuter Incentive Program (VSNIP) was created in 2006 to subsidize dog, cat, and wolf-hybrid sterilization procedures for low-income Vermonters. Sue Skaskiw and the organization she directed, Vermont Volunteer Services for Animals Humane Society (VVSA), administered the VSNIP program from its inception in 2006 until the expiration of Skaskiw's contract in October 2012. Defendant Vermont Agency of Agriculture initially managed the program but responsibility was transferred to defendant Department for Children and Families (DCF), a department within the Agency of Human Services, in 2011. Defendant Kristin Haas was an employee of the Agency of Agriculture; defendants Kathleen Smith and Carol Maloney were employees of DCF. Sometime after the program's inception, the Agency of Agriculture contracted with Skaskiw to run VSNIP. She still held the contract when responsibility shifted to DCF in 2011, but at that time DCF put the contract out for a competitive bid. Two bidders, Skaskiw and VT-CAN!, submitted proposals, and VT-CAN! won the contract. Skaskiw subsequently filed this lawsuit. Skaskiw appealed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss of defendants Vermont Agency of Agriculture, Department for Children and Families, Haas, Smith, and Maloney on Skaskiw's claims of defamation, violation of due process, economic interference, and failure to discharge a mandatory duty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marilyn Davis appealed the trial court's grant of defendants' Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss her claims, which sought to rectify alleged harms stemming from disagreements among Davis and various American Legion officials and staff. Davis brought her four-year-old granddaughter to karaoke night at The American Legion, Barre Post No. 10 club hoping to have her sing, but staff asked them to leave. Davis was a member of the Barre Post No. 10 Auxiliary Unit, a group affiliated with Post 10, but she is not a member of Post 10. Post 10's regularly scheduled karaoke nights, like the one in question, are open to the public. However, a Post 10 club rule explicitly prohibited minors at the club after 7:00 p.m., except by special permission of the governing body of Post 10, the Post 10 House Committee. Davis claims the Committee had previously granted her special permission to bring her granddaughter to karaoke night and stay until 7:30 p.m. At 7:00 p.m. on the night in question, however, on-hand staff monitoring the karaoke event sought to enforce the no-minors rule by asking Davis and her granddaughter to leave. Davis protested and followed a House Committee member into the parking lot. A disagreement ensued. Eventually, Davis and her granddaughter left the premises, but were not refunded their six-dollar combined entry fee. Over the next two days, feeling wronged by that night's events, Davis posted messages on the Legion Post Barre Facebook page criticizing the organization, certain members, and club staff. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling granting the motion to dismiss, and affirmed on substantially the same grounds. View "Davis v. American Legion" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI). He argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds to stop him, and thus, the court should have granted his motion to suppress and dismiss. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathleen Langlois owned a building with commercial space on the first floor and an apartment on the second. She failed to pay the water bill for the property. Plaintiff alleged that she arranged with a representative of the Town of Proctor to disconnect the water service so she would not incur further water expenses, but that the Town failed to do so. In reliance on the Town's promised undertaking, plaintiff discontinued heating the building, causing the pipes containing water to freeze and split under the first floor of the building, which, in turn, flooded the first floor and basement, causing extensive damage to the building. Plaintiff brought this action with four counts: negligence, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. With respect to the negligence count, the Town argued that it had no duty to disconnect the water service or to disconnect the service with reasonable care or, alternatively, that any duty was based on its contractual obligations and could not give rise to tort liability. With respect to the contract claim, the Town argued that it had no contractual obligation to disconnect the water service and that it was exercising its right under a statutory delinquency collection procedure. It further argued that the contractual relationship between plaintiff and the Town was terminated when plaintiff failed to pay her water bill. The case was then tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff. In answering the special interrogatories, the jury found that there was a contract between plaintiff and the Town "regarding the turning off of her water service," but that the Town had not breached that contract. It found that the Town was negligent, that its negligence was a proximate cause of harm to plaintiff, and that plaintiff's damages were $64,918.44. Among the things the Town argued on appeal, it argued that the court should have instructed the jury to apply comparative negligence, and that the instructions on damages were erroneous because the proper measure of damages was the diminution in value of the building and, in any event, there was no evidence of that diminution. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the jury instructions improperly failed to allow the jury to find that the Town breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court rejected the Town's argument on appeal that it had no tort duty to properly turn off plaintiff's water. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury: "the instructions as a whole did not contain the spirit of the law. If we could determine from the damages award or the interrogatories that the jury found that plaintiff was not negligent and was not obligated to mitigate damages, we could find an absence of prejudice. We cannot do so here; the damages awarded by the jury were less than plaintiff claimed." On remand, the trial court was ordered to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. Because of the defect in the jury instructions, the Court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Langlois v. Town of Proctor" on Justia Law

Latonia Congress was convicted by jury of second-degree murder. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, in a murder prosecution, a jury can find a defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, on grounds that the evidence of defendant's actions were influenced by a serious psychological condition that does not rise to the level of insanity, and does not negate the defendant's specific intent to kill. The Court concluded after review of the particular circumstances of this case, that the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's psychological condition as a basis for convicting her of voluntary manslaughter, and rejected defendant's challenges on appeal to several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. View "Vermont v. Congress" on Justia Law