In 1997, the Village of Derby Center and the City of Newport entered into a contract whereby the Village would supply 10,000 gallons of water per day to the City. The City claimed that the contract did not authorize the Village to adopt a new rate schedule in 2006 that included a ready-to-serve fee on top of actual water usage charges. The Village counterclaimed, alleging that the City connected customers who were not authorized under the contract, and that the City’s water use was chronically underreported due to equipment malfunction. After a trial, the superior court ruled for the City on its contract claim, holding that the ready-to-serve fee was not authorized by either contract or statute. As to the Village’s counterclaims, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the unauthorized-connection claim, and referred the water-usage-reconstruction claim to mediation. The Village appealed on all counts. The Supreme Court found: the plain language of the agreement authorized the use of a ready-to-serve fee to support the Village’s maintenance of its facilities. "The court erred in concluding otherwise." With respect to the Village's counterclaims, the Supreme Court found that the trial court indicated that it was clear, based on the billing periods showing a reading of zero usage by the City, that there were some erroneous readings, but it referred the Village’s claims to mediation without further resolution. After the City brought suit, the Village filed a motion to allow its counterclaim as to the underreported usage, which the trial court granted. The trial court’s decision to refer the Village’s counterclaim to mediation in its order, after it had already granted the Village’s motion to allow the counterclaim at trial, served only to create greater delay and expense to the parties, thus undermining the purpose of the alternative dispute resolution clause. "Even if the trial court would ordinarily have discretion over whether to send a counterclaim to mediation, under these circumstances the trial court could not properly rescind its decision, relied on by the parties, to allow the counterclaim after the trial had already taken place. Therefore, we remand the Village’s counterclaim for resolution by the trial court." View "City of Newport v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

The parties in this case met in 2002 or 2003 and had a romantic relationship. In August 2007, the pair bought a house in Orwell. Prior to the purchase, plaintiff had been renting an apartment within the house from the owners of the property, the Tricketts. After the sale, defendant moved in with plaintiff. The parties bought the house for $245,000: Defendant’s mother contributed $200,000, defendant paid about $4,300 in closing costs, and the Tricketts financed a $45,000 private mortgage to the parties. Defendant’s mother did not ask for a promissory note, and her contribution was a gift rather than a loan. In particular, the contribution was intended as a gift to defendant, not to plaintiff. Although both parties signed the promissory note to the Tricketts, plaintiff took responsibility for making those payments, and was supposed to pay the balloon payment on the mortgage in August of 2010. The property was titled to the parties as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Sometime after the closing, plaintiff signed an indemnification agreement that expressly acknowledged that defendant paid $200,000 plus the closing costs, that plaintiff was solely responsible for the $45,000 mortgage debt, and that plaintiff would indemnify defendant for any default on that debt. Plaintiff testified that she always believed that each party had a fifty percent interest in the property, while defendant testified that his understanding was that the parties had interests in the property commensurate their respective contributions. The trial court expressly rejected plaintiff’s testimony and concluded that both parties understood that their interests were defined by their respective contributions to the purchase price. The parties’ relationship ended, and defendant moved out of the house in 2009. In February, he stopped paying the expenses for the property and ignored plaintiff’s requests for assistance. Plaintiff has rented out a portion of the house since April 2010, collecting $700 per month. As of the trial, plaintiff had earned $27,300 from renting the house. She did not share any of this income with defendant. Plaintiff did not pay the balloon payment on the mortgage, and in 2010, the Tricketts filed a petition for foreclosure. In November 2011, plaintiff filed for bankruptcy to avoid losing the property. Plaintiff’s mother helped her to redeem the property by borrowing $143,000 against the equity in her own home. Plaintiff paid toward the mortgage on her mother’s house used to finance the redemption of the parties' house, $56,691 to the Trinketts, $12,031 for past-due property taxes, and $71,722 to pay off a home equity loan. In August 2011, in the face of an inevitable foreclosure sale, the court ordered plaintiff to sell the house. Plaintiff did not comply with the order, and the court found plaintiff in contempt on that basis. In a partition action, plaintiff sought to keep the house and buy out defendant’s interest. Defendant wanted the property awarded to him so that he could sell it and then disburse the amounts allocated by the court to plaintiff. Neither party sought to divide the property into two lots. The property was appraised at $240,000. The parties submitted the matter to the court. Plaintiff challenged the partition order reflecting the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had an 81.7% interest in the home and for applying various setoffs for contributions to the maintenance of the home after the parties purchased it. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "Currie v. Jané" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Perry appealed the trial court's issuance of a mittimus ordering the Department of Corrections (DOC) not to give defendant credit for time served in connection with prior convictions. The State did not challenge defendant's claim that the mittimus violated the parties' plea agreement and created an illegal sentence, but argued that because defendant has completed the time-to-serve portion of his sentence, this appeal was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeal was not moot because defendant was still serving the challenged sentence, and that the amended mittimus violated Vermont's sentencing statute. View "Vermont v. Perry" on Justia Law

This case centered on a disputed permit for a wastewater system and potable water supply granted to applicants David and Martha Musto for a home on Lake Bomoseen. Next-door neighbor Carolyn Hignite appealed the environmental court's decision to deny her request to revoke the permit issued to applicants in 2009, and to dismiss her direct appeal of the permit. Applicants cross-appealed the environmental court's holding that neighbor had standing to appeal in either instance. Along with her brothers, Hignite was part owner of a lake property that has been in their family for sixty-two years. Applicants' property is a .38-acre lot on the western shore of the lake, which contained a single-story seasonal camp of about 960 square feet. In 2009, applicants submitted a permit application to the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to replace the camp's septic system and on-site water supply. On the permit application, applicants described the project as the "reconstruction of a 3 bedroom year-round single use family residence using a new wastewater disposal system and drilled bedrock water supply well." ANR issued the requested permit to applicants on March 30, 2009. In August 2009, Hignite filed a petition with ANR to revoke the permit, claiming that applicants submitted false or misleading information on the permit application regarding the number of bedrooms in the camp. ANR held a hearing in May 2010, and denied neighbor's petition to revoke the permit. Hignite subsequently appealed the permit to the environmental court in 2010, over a year after the permit was issued to applicants. Hignite also appealed ANR's denial of revocation in 2013. The environmental court reviewed both cases de novo but did not conduct a new hearing, instead basing its review on exhibits and testimony from the ANR hearing, as the parties stipulated. Hignite appealed the court's decision on both dockets. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's holding in both of the neighbor's appeals. View "In re Musto Wastewater System" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a superior court order concluding that defendant violated 13 V.S.A. 3701(c) by intentionally knocking down a tree that belonged to plaintiff and trespassed on plaintiff’s land, and granted plaintiff $1 in damages plus attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant violated the statute; (2) that nominal damages did not support an award of attorney’s fees; and (3) that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees of $22,406 based on $1 of actual damages. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Evans v. Cote" on Justia Law

Petitioner's state-appointed counsel filed an untimely notice of appeal of the trial court's denial of petitioner's first post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. It was uncontested that by failing to timely file a notice of appeal, counsel performed well below any recognized standard of care. The Supreme Court has held previously that where counsel negligently fails to perfect an appeal, the defendant has not knowingly and intelligently waived the appeal "there is per se ineffective counsel." The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner had a remedy for his counsel's failure to perfect his PCR appeal. Petitioner argued that his first PCR should be reinstated because the statutory right to PCR counsel includes a minimal level of competence, which was plainly violated in this case. The State supported petitioner's request to reverse the trial court and reinstate the first appeal. "Because this case presents an egregious example of injustice," the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the superior court with directions that petitioner's initial PCR be reinstated with a renewed opportunity for petitioner to file a notice of appeal. View "In re Babson" on Justia Law

Cases consolidated cases for appellate review stemmed from alleged injuries suffered by plaintiff Faye Ainsworth while she was at defendant Charles Chandler’s business, Chandler Electric. Plaintiff sued claiming she was injured when she tripped on a coil of wires that had been placed in the stairway. Defendant sued his insurer, Concord Insurance Group, arguing that insurer had wrongfully and in bad faith failed to provide adequate coverage for the claim. The insurer filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of noncoverage. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, concluding that plaintiff was a social guest of defendant at the time of her visit, that the duty of care defendant owed her was the lesser duty applicable to licensees under Vermont law (as opposed to that which is owed to business invitees), and that defendant did not breach this duty. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the insurer, on the basis that the underlying personal injury action had been dismissed and therefore no coverage was owed. Plaintiff and defendant both appealed, contesting the court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. Defendant contested the order granting summary judgment in favor of insurer. Upon review of the cases, the Supreme Court affirmed with respect to defendant’s motion to disqualify the trial judge, but reversed with respect to plaintiff’s suit and reversed and remanded for further proceedings with respect to defendant’s claim against the insurer and the insurer’s counterclaim for declaration of noncoverage. View "Ainsworth v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from a dispute over title to an old railroad bed adjacent to defendants' property that plaintiff purchased with the goal of creating a public recreational trail. Defendants challenged the trial court's determination that plaintiff acquired a valid fee simple interest in the property, asserting that title either reverted to them when the railroad abandoned the line or vested in them through adverse possession. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination. View "Old Railroad Bed, LLC v. Marcus, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sandra J. Murphy (as personal representative and administrator of the Estate of Christopher Murphy) appealed a superior court decision that vacated a jury verdict in her favor and entered judgment as a matter of law for defendant Sentry Insurance. The decedent died after a forklift he was operating for his employer, Pete's RV Center, tipped over. At the time of the accident, the decedent was operating a forklift equipped with an unapproved towing attachment, and using the forklift to tow a fifth-wheel camper. In its capacity as Pete's general liability insurer, Sentry had performed a safety survey at Pete's in April 2002. Plaintiff sued Sentry, alleging in relevant part that Sentry was negligent in performing the safety survey because it failed to identify and warn of the dangers of using forklifts with unapproved towing attachments. Plaintiff contended on appeal that there was sufficient evidence to establish Sentry's liability for her husband's workplace death under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based on a negligent inspection theory. Plaintiff also argued that the court erred in awarding costs to Sentry. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, assuming the risk of physical harm associated with the use of unapproved forklift attachments was present at the time of Sentry's inspection, nothing Sentry did increased the risk of physical harm to decedent from such attachments. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court that Sentry's liability could not be premised on section 324A(a). The Court found plaintiff's arguments with regard to whether the jury reasonably could conclude that through its inspection, Sentry assumed a portion of Pete's duty to provide a safe workplace to its employees, as unpersuasive. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.View "Murphy v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellants Amherst Realty, LLC, Richard Madowitz, and the personal representatives of the Estate of Douglas Kohl appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to The Woods at Killington Owners’ Association on Amherst Realty’s claim of breach of contract based on the Association’s alleged interference with its development rights at The Woods at Killington. The Association cross-appealed the superior court’s decision granting summary judgment to Amherst Realty on the Association’s consumer fraud counterclaim. This controversy the center of this case concerned the consequences of the attempt and ultimate failure to build 40 units at The Woods. But finding no reason to reverse the superior court on either parties' claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Amherst Realty, LLC v. The Woods at Killington Owners’ Association, Inc." on Justia Law