Plaintiff Nicholas Bonnano appealed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment against him and in favor of his employer, Verizon, and Verizon’s third-party claims administrator, Sedgwick Claims Management. Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from an alleged breach of a settlement agreement with employer regarding his workers’ compensation claim. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because there was a dispute of material fact as to the voluntariness of employer’s temporary total disability (TTD) payments made to plaintiff after the TTD termination date indicated in the settlement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Bonanno v. Verizon Business Network Systems" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal stems from a final judgment of divorce: whether, as husband contended, the trial court erred in its division of the marital estate by including an offset for the disparity in value between the parties' projected Social Security retirement benefits. The parties did not agree on the assets to be included in the marital estate. Wife submitted a list of assets with a total value of $1,152,325.86, including $88,158 identified as the difference between the present value of husband's and wife's projected Social Security benefits. The value was determined by wife's accountant and credited toward husband's suggested share of the marital estate, with a corresponding offset in value for wife. Wife proposed that she be awarded either sixty percent of the value of the entire estate plus spousal maintenance, or eighty percent without maintenance. Husband submitted a separate list of marital assets which totaled $978,504 and did not include the Social Security differential. Husband proposed an award to wife of sixty percent of the value of the estate plus rehabilitative maintenance for a period of several years. In its written ruling, the trial court found that wife's proposed property division was "a reasonable one" and gave her the option of choosing either the eighty/twenty division that she had proposed or an award of sixty percent plus maintenance until she reached the age of sixty-seven. Wife subsequently opted for the higher percentage of the marital estate without the maintenance, and the trial court entered a final judgment consistent with that choice and with wife's proposed division. Husband's two subsequent motions to reconsider were denied. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in treating the parties' respective anticipated Social Security benefits as assets of the marital estate, reducing them to a purported present value, allocating the differential to husband, and awarding wife a direct offset on account. "Omitting the value of these benefits only marginally affects the marital estate, valued at over $1 million, and we therefore remand for the trial court to recalculate the award pursuant to the original percentage division of eighty percent for wife and twenty percent for husband."View "Manning v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Appellee taxpayer Trevor Jenkins owned and lived on property in the Town of Milton. He failed to pay property taxes for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 tax years. The Town mailed him three delinquent tax notices, in June 2008, June 2009, and January 2010, respectively, advising him to take additional steps to avoid a tax sale. The notices were sent to taxpayer by first-class mail. He denied receiving them, and the notices were not returned to the Town. In 2010, a notice of tax sale was sent via registered mail, return receipt requested. Nearly two weeks before the tax sale, the notice sent to taxpayer by registered mail was returned to the Town’s attorney unclaimed after two attempts at delivery. The Town proceeded with the sale and Loren and Kathryn Hogaboom purchased taxpayer’s property at auction. On the day following the tax sale, the Town’s attorney sent a letter by first-class mail informing taxpayer that his property had been sold in a tax sale, he had one year from the date of sale to redeem the property, and interest would accrue on the purchase amount. This letter was not returned to the Town’s attorney. Taxpayer did not redeem the property during the one-year period, and the Town issued a deed to the purchasers. Purchasers filed a complaint for ejectment in 2011, seeking a writ of possession for the property. Taxpayer admitted his failure to pay taxes but denied ever having received notice of the tax sale. He filed a counterclaim against purchasers and a third-party complaint against the Town, seeking a declaratory judgment setting aside the tax sale as void. Purchasers and the Town both filed motions for summary judgment, contending that notice to taxpayer satisfied the requirements of due process. The Superior Court concluded taxpayer's due process rights were violated because of the undelivered notices. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hogaboom v. Jenkins v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Twelve individuals and the Ferrisburgh Friends of Responsible Growth, Inc. appealed the Environmental Division’s affirming the grant of a conditional use zoning permit to Champlain Oil Company. The permit allowed Champlain Oil to construct and operate a gasoline and diesel station with a retail convenience store and a drive-through food facility, including parking lot and overhead canopies for the gas and diesel pumps. Appellants argued that the proposed uses for a convenience, retail and drive-in facility are explicitly prohibited by the Ferrisburgh zoning ordinance and would not be consistent with the town plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision.View "In re Champlain Oil Company Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ family began renting a lakeside property 1949 and eventually purchased it in 1976. Throughout their lease and ownership of the Mahoney Lot, and by the terms of their deed, plaintiffs enjoyed the use of approximately seventy-five feet of lake frontage. The adjacent lot to the northeast (the Tara Lot) was owned by Vermont Catholic Charities, Inc. (VCC) from 1958 until 2006 when it was sold to defendant. During VCC’s ownership of the Tara Lot, VCC recognized the disputed boundary line where plaintiffs believed it to be and marked it with signs. In 2007, defendant filed an application to subdivide the Tara Lot and included in the application a survey showing its southerly boundary line cutting plaintiffs’ beach in half (the Disputed Portion). In response to defendant’s development application, plaintiffs filed a complaint to quiet title in December 2007. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in January 2008, which the trial court granted, but did not file an answer or counterclaim, nor did it assert affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that they had acquired the land by adverse possession and remanded to the trial court for further development of the factual record to determine whether VCC’s use of the property qualified for the exemption. On a second appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ suit to quiet title and defendant’s unilateral grant of permission for plaintiffs to use the disputed land tolled the statute of limitations on their adverse possession claim, that 12 V.S.A. 462 did not apply to acquiescence claims, that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff’s predecessors did not acquire the property by acquiescence prior to 1949 when Camp Tara bought the property, and that, as a result of erroneous fact finding, the trial court failed to correctly determine the time during which the statute of limitations for adverse possession ran in plaintiffs’ favor. Though its reasoning was different in certain aspects, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Mahoney, et al. v. Tara, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Neal Fox’s brother adopted defendant Eugene Fox when defendant was an infant. On April 6, 2012, defendant, a New Hampshire resident in his sixties, and plaintiff, a Vermont resident, attended a probate court hearing in Manchester, New Hampshire. After the hearing, defendant followed plaintiff to his car and proceeded to punch, kick, and step on plaintiff. Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of the encounter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the context of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order. Nonresident defendant appeals the family court order granting plaintiff’s request for a final RFA order. Defendant argued: (1) the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over him to issue the final order; (2) defendant and plaintiff were not family members for purposes of the domestic abuse prevention statute; (3) plaintiff failed to establish that a final RFA order was necessary; and (4) the court erred in finding that defendant engaged in stalking, as defined in Vermont’s stalking statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a final RFA order, and reversed. View "Fox v. Fox" on Justia Law

The question in this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, in response to a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, the court erred in vacating petitioner Nick Manosh’s 1992 conviction for a misdemeanor count of driving under the influence (DUI) based on the sentencing court’s failure to comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in taking petitioner’s no-contest plea. The State appealed, arguing that the PCR court failed to take into account petitioner’s written waiver of his Rule 11 rights, and that the sentencing court’s colloquy substantially complied with Rule 11. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Manosh" on Justia Law

Thirteen Town of Williston residents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division’s grant of a discretionary permit to All Metals Recycling, Inc., to establish an outdoor storage area and install a scale and scale house. The discretionary permit allowed All Metals to continue operating a previously unpermitted scrap-metals recycling business in Williston. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. View "In re All Metals Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court reviewed rulings by the environmental and civil divisions concerning a subdivision application for a property located within a residential development in the City of Burlington. Appellants’ principal contention was that the courts erred in concluding that the subdivision had the requisite access to a public road. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments. View "Regan v. Pomerleau, DeForest Realty, Inc. and City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Helena Murphy appealed a superior court judgment in favor of defendant, Patriot Insurance Company, her homeowner’s insurer. The dispute between the parties stemmed from storm damage done to plaintiff's house in 2007, and the subsequent claims she made on her insurance policy. On appeal of the superior court's ruling in Patriot's favor, plaintiff argued: (1) Patriot was estopped from denying coverage for the removal and replacement of a chimney on her home; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing claims for negligence and bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. Patriot Insurance Company" on Justia Law