Twelve individuals and the Ferrisburgh Friends of Responsible Growth, Inc. appealed the Environmental Division’s affirming the grant of a conditional use zoning permit to Champlain Oil Company. The permit allowed Champlain Oil to construct and operate a gasoline and diesel station with a retail convenience store and a drive-through food facility, including parking lot and overhead canopies for the gas and diesel pumps. Appellants argued that the proposed uses for a convenience, retail and drive-in facility are explicitly prohibited by the Ferrisburgh zoning ordinance and would not be consistent with the town plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision.View "In re Champlain Oil Company Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ family began renting a lakeside property 1949 and eventually purchased it in 1976. Throughout their lease and ownership of the Mahoney Lot, and by the terms of their deed, plaintiffs enjoyed the use of approximately seventy-five feet of lake frontage. The adjacent lot to the northeast (the Tara Lot) was owned by Vermont Catholic Charities, Inc. (VCC) from 1958 until 2006 when it was sold to defendant. During VCC’s ownership of the Tara Lot, VCC recognized the disputed boundary line where plaintiffs believed it to be and marked it with signs. In 2007, defendant filed an application to subdivide the Tara Lot and included in the application a survey showing its southerly boundary line cutting plaintiffs’ beach in half (the Disputed Portion). In response to defendant’s development application, plaintiffs filed a complaint to quiet title in December 2007. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in January 2008, which the trial court granted, but did not file an answer or counterclaim, nor did it assert affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that they had acquired the land by adverse possession and remanded to the trial court for further development of the factual record to determine whether VCC’s use of the property qualified for the exemption. On a second appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ suit to quiet title and defendant’s unilateral grant of permission for plaintiffs to use the disputed land tolled the statute of limitations on their adverse possession claim, that 12 V.S.A. 462 did not apply to acquiescence claims, that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff’s predecessors did not acquire the property by acquiescence prior to 1949 when Camp Tara bought the property, and that, as a result of erroneous fact finding, the trial court failed to correctly determine the time during which the statute of limitations for adverse possession ran in plaintiffs’ favor. Though its reasoning was different in certain aspects, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Mahoney, et al. v. Tara, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Neal Fox’s brother adopted defendant Eugene Fox when defendant was an infant. On April 6, 2012, defendant, a New Hampshire resident in his sixties, and plaintiff, a Vermont resident, attended a probate court hearing in Manchester, New Hampshire. After the hearing, defendant followed plaintiff to his car and proceeded to punch, kick, and step on plaintiff. Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of the encounter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the context of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order. Nonresident defendant appeals the family court order granting plaintiff’s request for a final RFA order. Defendant argued: (1) the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over him to issue the final order; (2) defendant and plaintiff were not family members for purposes of the domestic abuse prevention statute; (3) plaintiff failed to establish that a final RFA order was necessary; and (4) the court erred in finding that defendant engaged in stalking, as defined in Vermont’s stalking statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a final RFA order, and reversed. View "Fox v. Fox" on Justia Law

The question in this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, in response to a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, the court erred in vacating petitioner Nick Manosh’s 1992 conviction for a misdemeanor count of driving under the influence (DUI) based on the sentencing court’s failure to comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in taking petitioner’s no-contest plea. The State appealed, arguing that the PCR court failed to take into account petitioner’s written waiver of his Rule 11 rights, and that the sentencing court’s colloquy substantially complied with Rule 11. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Manosh" on Justia Law

Thirteen Town of Williston residents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division’s grant of a discretionary permit to All Metals Recycling, Inc., to establish an outdoor storage area and install a scale and scale house. The discretionary permit allowed All Metals to continue operating a previously unpermitted scrap-metals recycling business in Williston. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. View "In re All Metals Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court reviewed rulings by the environmental and civil divisions concerning a subdivision application for a property located within a residential development in the City of Burlington. Appellants’ principal contention was that the courts erred in concluding that the subdivision had the requisite access to a public road. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments. View "Regan v. Pomerleau, DeForest Realty, Inc. and City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Helena Murphy appealed a superior court judgment in favor of defendant, Patriot Insurance Company, her homeowner’s insurer. The dispute between the parties stemmed from storm damage done to plaintiff's house in 2007, and the subsequent claims she made on her insurance policy. On appeal of the superior court's ruling in Patriot's favor, plaintiff argued: (1) Patriot was estopped from denying coverage for the removal and replacement of a chimney on her home; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing claims for negligence and bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. Patriot Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts arising from the same alleged incident: (1) violation of a term of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order that required him to remain at least three hundred feet from his girlfriend and her residence; and (2) violation of a condition of release from an earlier criminal charge that prohibited him from contacting his girlfriend. Defendant appealed the jury verdict that he violated the temporary RFA order and violated conditions of release imposed. Defendant raises two unrelated questions for review: (1) the denial of his motion for mistrial; and (2) the validity of one of his probation conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to defendant's arguments on appeal, but remanded the case for the trial court to consider the parties’ stipulation with regard to defendant’s sentence. View "Vermont v. Pettitt" on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a dispute between a general partner and limited partners over the proceeds from the dissolution of their partnership. Appellant Alfred Lunde sought to reverse an arbitration award and a trial court order that assessed attorney’s fees and receivership fees and costs against his share of the partnership assets. The partnership agreement was for a thirty-year term that expired on December 31, 2009. At that time, the general partner was to liquidate the partnership’s assets “as promptly as is consistent with obtaining the fair value thereof.” The agreement called for fifty percent of the net proceeds to be distributed to the general partner and the remainder to be distributed to the limited partners. The partnership agreement included an arbitration clause that required arbitration of “[a]ny dispute or controversy arising in connection with this Agreement or in connection with the dissolution of the Partnership.” Lunde did not promptly liquidate the partnership’s assets after the agreement expired, and in February 2011 the limited partners filed suit in superior court seeking to have a receiver appointed to wind up the partnership, liquidate the assets, and distribute the proceeds. In March 2011 the trial court appointed a receiver who proceeded to wind down the business and sell the assets. A few months later the court removed Lunde as general partner after he failed to cooperate with the receiver, jeopardizing both the reauthorization of the apartment complex as Section 8 housing and the sale of the asset. Lunde filed a pro se demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the arbitration. The court denied the motion, holding that the arbitration clause governed the parties’ dispute. The court’s order denying the motion to stay created two exceptions for issues that it reserved for its own decision: plaintiffs’ claim of fraudulent conveyance concerning the transfer of certain funds by Lunde, and plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees “incurred in connection with all proceedings [in the trial court] with respect to the application to appoint a Receiver, through to conclusion of the Receiver’s duties pursuant to court order(s) . . . .” After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed on the legal issues, but remanded for a further hearing on a narrow issue regarding the amount of attorney’s fees assessed against Lunde. View "O'Rourke, et al. v. Lunde and The Housing Group Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

This property tax appeal centered on the valuation of five electrical substations, seven transmission lines, a fiber-optic line, land, and utility easements located within the Town of Vernon. Taxpayer Vermont Transco LLC challenged a decision of the state appraiser fixing the 2011 listed value of taxpayer’s utility property in the Town at $92 million. Taxpayer argued: (1) the state appraiser should have used an alternative nonlinear depreciation schedule (the “Iowa Curve” method) because that method was previously approved by the Supreme Court in reviewing the method of property tax appraisal; (2) the state appraiser’s decision on fair market value was not supported by a sufficient analysis of the “core factual issues, including whether fair market value is best estimated by the economic or physical life of the assets, and what those lives are;” (3) the state appraiser’s decision to follow the Town’s appraiser in not depreciating assets during the first year of service was wrong; and (4) the state appraiser’s decision to include an appraised value for the utility easements was also wrong. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further findings regarding the lifespan of the property to be used in calculating depreciation. View "Vermont Transco, LLC v. Town of Vernon" on Justia Law