Employer Maple Leaf Farm Association, Inc. appealed a decision of the Employment Security Board finding that its former employee Katherine Kelley was involuntarily terminated from her position and therefore eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Employer operated an intensive inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. Claimant worked for employer as a part-time treatment counselor for seven years. Due to a conflict with a supervisor, claimant resigned from her position in writing on August 29, 2013. She stated in her letter to employer that her last day would be September 19, 2013, and employer allowed her to continue working. Four days later, on September 3, employer terminated her employment and escorted her off the premises. Claimant applied for unemployment compensation. The claims adjudicator determined that she was not entitled to benefits for the first two weeks after her termination because the accrued vacation pay that employer paid her during that period was in excess of her weekly benefit amount. The claims adjudicator further determined that claimant was not entitled to benefits because she had left employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer. Employer appealed the referee’s decision to the Employment Security Board, which adopted the referee’s findings and affirmed its conclusions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Kelley v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire attempted to extradite Vermont resident and petitioner William LaPlante for failing to appear at a 2009 hearing allegedly related to a criminal conviction in New Hampshire in 1998. Following a Governor’s warrant from Vermont, petitioner requested a writ of habeas corpus from the Vermont superior court in Rutland, which was granted on grounds that the warrant lacked information required by statute. Vermont appealed this grant of habeas corpus relief, contesting the court’s holding and its findings regarding the contents of the Governor’s warrant. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaPlante" on Justia Law

In December 2011, wife Andrea Joseph filed for divorce after twenty-three years of marriage to husband Neil Joseph. In October 2012, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to equally divide certain joint Morgan Stanley accounts. They also agreed in the stipulation that husband would continue to pay, out of the portion of the joint accounts designated to him, “those obligations that were being paid prior to the divorce action, which would include but not be limited to: mortgages, taxes, insurance and utilities for the properties that are owned by either one or both of the parties.” The trial court approved the stipulation and entered it as a court order. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the effect of an arrearage accrued under a temporary order following a final divorce decree when the arrearage was not incorporated into the final order or otherwise reduced to judgment. Wife appealed the family court’s denial of her motion to enforce husband Neil Joseph’s obligations under the temporary order after the final divorce decree issued. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis as to the impact of the final divorce order on the allegedly unsatisfied obligations pursuant to the temporary order, and affirmed. View "Joseph v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rodney Demag worked for a car dealership which also provided automobile service. As a convenience for customers, he picked up vehicles belonging to customers, leaving his own vehicle and returning the customer’s vehicle at the end of the day. Plaintiff provided this service to defendant Better Power Equipment, Inc.'s (BPE) general manager and his wife, picking up their cars from BPE’s parking lot. This occurred five to six times a year. The arrangement had existed for approximately ten years. In 2009, plaintiff drove to defendant for scheduled service, parking in his usual spot next to the vehicle of the general manager and his wife. Although this area was not generally used for parking by BPE customers, the general manager and his wife typically parked there, and other employees sometimes parked there in the winter. Plaintiff spoke briefly with the general manager about the service needed for his vehicle. Plaintiff then returned to his own vehicle, retrieved a few items, took a step and fell into an uncovered storm drain. He filed this case to recover damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of that fall. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment against him in the resulting personal injury case. The trial court found that plaintiff was a licensee of defendant, [ . . .] rather than an invitee. It concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a lesser standard of care from BPE, which allowed for summary judgment against him. The Supreme Court determined "that the time has come to abolish Vermont’s common-law negligence distinction between licensees and invitees" and reversed and remanded. View "Demag v. Better Power Equipment" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Girouard appealed the superior court’s denial of a motion to reopen his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 post-conviction relief petition and to order the Department of Corrections (DOC) to release him on furlough. Petitioner argued that the superior court’s 2009 order directing DOC to evaluate petitioner for furlough was the law of the case and the superior court had “inherent authority” to enforce it. Petitioner alleged that DOC’s actions constituted a “bad faith evasion” of the court’s order and argued that the superior court erred by failing to develop a factual record to determine whether DOC followed the court’s mandate. The State counters that DOC complied with the 2009 superior court order, and that its programming decisions are unreviewable under Rule 75. "The fact that a colorable constitutional claim implicates a programming decision committed to the DOC’s discretion does not insulate the alleged constitutional violation from judicial review. [. . .] To the extent that petitioner is not merely challenging the propriety of the programming decision here, but is raising a colorable constitutional claim, his claim is reviewable. [. . . ] Petitioner’s allegations state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal." The Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Girouard" on Justia Law

Appellant-taxpayer Elaine Hoiska appealed the Vermont State Appraiser’s valuation of her property in the Town of East Montpelier. She argued that the appraisal incorrectly treated her property as comprising two contiguous lots under common ownership, and accordingly assigns a higher value to the property than if it were a single developable lot. More specifically, appellant took issue with the appraiser’s legal conclusion that she legally subdivided the land in 1978 by procuring a survey, not filed in the land records, that includes a line purportedly dividing the lot into two parcels. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state appraiser’s findings did not support the legal conclusion that appellant effectively subdivided her property in 1978, and reversed. View "Hoiska v. Town of East Montpelier" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the family court’s adjudication of her daughter B.A. as a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She argued that the court erred in combining the merits of the CHINS proceeding with the disposition of a concurrent delinquency proceeding. Mother contended that the court lacked statutory authority to combine the hearings and that striking the CHINS adjudication is necessary to cure the error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Edward Wesolow was among the signers of a petition to place two articles on the warning for the Town of Lowell’s 2012 annual meeting. One of those articles was an advisory article expressing opposition to a wind power development in town. The Lowell selectboard warned the article, designated "Article 8," and the article was duly introduced at the town meeting. After a motion to accept the article, and a second, but before any discussion, a motion was made to pass over the article. That motion to pass over the article passed on a voice vote, and the article was not discussed further at the meeting. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the question of whether 17 V.S.A. 2661 permitted a petition for reconsideration of an article "passed over" by vote of town residents at town meeting. The trial court concluded that it does. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wesolow v. Town of Lowell" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions.View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

The State appealed the grant of defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on his civil driver's license suspension. The trial court held that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 or above at the time he operated a motor vehicle. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.View "Vermont v. Nugent" on Justia Law