Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A lender initiated a foreclosure action against a homeowner after the homeowner defaulted on a mortgage loan originally obtained in 2007. The mortgage was assigned several times before the foreclosure action began, and the lender’s predecessor filed suit in 2015. After a trial in 2018, the Vermont Superior Court, Civil Division, found in favor of the lender, concluding that the lender held the original note and mortgage at the time of filing and at trial, and that the homeowner had defaulted. The court issued a judgment of foreclosure by judicial sale, setting a redemption period for the homeowner.Following the expiration of the redemption period, the case was temporarily dismissed due to the homeowner’s bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy discharge, the lender successfully moved to reopen the case. The parties attempted mediation, which was unsuccessful. The lender then sought to substitute a new party as plaintiff due to post-judgment assignments of the mortgage, but later withdrew this request after issues arose regarding the validity of the assignments and the status of the note. The court vacated the substitution and ordered the lender to prove who the real party in interest was, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal for lack of prosecution. After a hearing, the court found the lender failed to establish the real party in interest, dismissed the case with prejudice, and vacated the foreclosure judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. The Supreme Court found no evidence of undue delay or failure to pursue the case by the lender, and concluded that the action could continue in the name of the original plaintiff under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the foreclosure judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ditech Financial LLC v. Brisson" on Justia Law

Defendants challenged the civil division’s order granting plaintiff Sharond Hill’s request to vacate its previous order dismissing her complaint. In February 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Springfield Hospital (Springfield) and Emergency Services of New England, Inc. (Emergency Services) alleging that defendants were negligent in failing to timely diagnose her with appendicitis when she went to the Springfield emergency department in April 2016. Both defendants filed answers denying plaintiff’s claims. In July 2019, Springfield notified the civil division and the parties that it had filed a voluntary petition of bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and that pursuant to § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, plaintiff’s claims against it were automatically stayed. In response, the civil division issued an order dismissing plaintiff’s case without prejudice. The civil division held a status conference in September 2020; plaintiff’s counsel indicated at the conference that Springfield Hospital may have emerged from bankruptcy and, if not, he might seek relief from the bankruptcy stay. The bankruptcy court issued an order closing Springfield’s bankruptcy case in July 2021. In October 2021, plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal and reopen her malpractice case. In her motion, plaintiff asserted that none of the conditions set forth in the dismissal order had technically occurred. Alternatively, plaintiff argued that even if one of the conditions had occurred, she should be excused for failing to file her motion to reopen within thirty days because she did not receive timely notice of the occurrence from defense counsel. Finally, she argued that her claim against Emergency Services should never have been dismissed because Emergency Services was not part of the bankruptcy proceeding. In March 2022, the civil division granted plaintiff’s motion, stating that it was “persuaded that there was no legal or equitable basis to dismiss the action simply because one of the two defendants filed a bankruptcy petition.” The court stated that it had intended to simply stay the action and that dismissal would be unjust. "The record is clear that plaintiff’s own lack of diligence, not the 2019 dismissal order or defendants’ conduct, is the reason for her situation." The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with defendants that there was no legal basis for the court to grant such relief, and therefore reversed. View "Hill v. Springfield Hospital, et al." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendants R. Brown & Sons, Inc., a scrap metal hauling company, and its principal, Robert Brown were found liable for breach of contract, common law fraud, trespass, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and consumer fraud.  Each of these claims stemmed from Defendants' commercial dealings with Plaintiff Rathe Salvage, Inc., a scrap metal salvage yard where Defendant would crush cars and transport the scrap for sale to steel mills.  Defendant was later granted judgment as a matter of law by the trial court overturning the jury's finding of a consumer fraud violation.  Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying judgment in its favor on the remaining claims because the verdicts were based on insufficient evidence; (2) it was entitled to a new trial because Rathe Salvage's attorney improperly argued to the jury that opposing counsel was implicated in withholding evidence; and (3) the case should be remanded due to the trial court's refusal to conduct a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of hauler's polygraph, or lie detector, testing before excluding such evidence from trial.  Rathe Salvage cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendant on the consumer fraud claim.  Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all four issues. View "Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law