Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Frank Driscoll was running along East Shore Road in Isle La Motte when he was struck by a trailer being pulled by a truck driven by Benjamin Wright, an employee of Wright Cut and Clean, LLC. Driscoll was running on the left side of the road, facing traffic, while Wright was driving in the same direction on the right side. As Wright's truck approached, Driscoll moved to the left edge of the road but was struck by the trailer when he moved back towards the center. Driscoll was unconscious when police arrived and had no memory of the accident.Driscoll sued Wright for negligence and Wright Cut and Clean for vicarious liability and direct negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Wright. The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, bifurcated the claims and held a jury trial on the negligence claim. Driscoll's expert, Dr. Jerry Ogden, testified about the dimensions of the trailer and the truck's speed but could not establish Driscoll's position before the impact or a clear causative link between Wright's actions and Driscoll's injuries. The court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, concluding that Driscoll failed to establish causation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Driscoll did not provide sufficient evidence of causation, as his expert could not definitively link Wright's actions to the injury. The court emphasized that without clear evidence showing that Wright's alleged negligence caused the injury, the claim could not proceed. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Wright and Wright Cut and Clean was affirmed, and the direct negligence claim against Wright Cut and Clean was also dismissed due to the lack of an underlying tort by Wright. View "Driscoll v. Wright Cut and Clean, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves RSD Leasing, Inc., a Vermont-based corporation that leases trucks to commercial operators. Between 2008 and 2014, RSD purchased forty trucks manufactured by Navistar International Corp. and Navistar, Inc. from a nonparty dealer. These trucks were equipped with an emission-control system known as an exhaust gas recirculation system. RSD alleged that the system caused the trucks to lose power, break down, and damage other engine components. RSD leased the trucks to other entities for four-to-six-year terms and intended to sell them at the end of the lease term. RSD filed a complaint against Navistar alleging violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), among other claims.In the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, Navistar moved for summary judgment on the VCPA claim, arguing that RSD is not a “consumer” under the VCPA and is therefore barred from recovery. The district court granted summary judgment on the VCPA claim, reasoning that RSD did not qualify as a consumer under the VCPA because it purchased the trucks for resale in the ordinary course of its business. RSD appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified the question of whether RSD qualified as a consumer under the VCPA to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that RSD is not a consumer under the VCPA. The court found that RSD's intent at the time it purchased the trucks was to lease them out and, after each lease term expired, sell them. The court held that the trucks were purchased for resale in the ordinary course of RSD’s business. Therefore, RSD did not qualify as a consumer under the VCPA. The court answered the certified question from the Second Circuit in the negative. View "RSD Leasing, Inc. v. Navistar International Corporation and Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law

A Vermont-based non-profit organization and an LLC challenged a superior court's dismissal of their complaint over a grant they did not receive. The plaintiffs, Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. and Lakemont Retirement Community LLC, argued that the grant provided by the Newport Development Fund Grant Committee to another organization was wrongly awarded. The plaintiffs also alleged a conflict of interest in the committee.However, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, reasoning that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the grant award. The court clarified that the plaintiffs had no legal right to receive the grant or to have any specific procedure in the allocation of the grant. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument of specific rules governing the grant process asserting that the grant process was discretionary, and the eligibility criteria did not guarantee any particular process.Consequently, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal for lack of standing, reinforcing that a legal entitlement or right is essential to establish an injury-in-fact for standing. View "Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gregg Beldock contracted to purchase four solar assets in development from VWSD, LLC. Following allegations of breach, VWSD sold three of the solar assets to a third party, Green Lantern. Beldock filed a complaint against VWSD alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, and against Green Lantern and its president alleging tortious interference with contract and unjust enrichment. VWSD counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendants on Beldock’s claims and in part in favor of VWSD on its counterclaim. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding all claims against Green Lantern and its president and the implied-covenant claim against VWSD. However, because portions of the contract were ambiguous and a genuine dispute of material facts remained, the Court concluded summary judgment was inappropriate for Beldock’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims against VWSD and VWSD’s counterclaim for breach of contract. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Beldock v. VWSD, LLC et al." on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case before the Vermont Supreme Court stemmed from a dispute between former business partners and the turnover of records pursuant to a stipulated judgment entered following the dissolution of their business relationship. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to enforce the judgment’s record turnover requirement, and pled various causes of action for injuries arising out of defendant’s refusal to turn the records over immediately after the judgment. The trial court dismissed the related claims as time-barred, and ultimately adjudicated the enforcement claim on the merits in favor of defendant. The Vermont affirmed the trial court in all but one aspect: because the Supreme Court came to a different conclusion on whether certain types of documents were subject to the stipulated judgment’s turnover requirement, the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to amend its judgment. View "Sutton v. Purzycki" on Justia Law

Insured Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. and insurer Huntington Ingalls Industries Risk Management LLC seek a declaratory judgment stating there is coverage under a property insurance policy for certain losses incurred by Huntington Ingalls Industries due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court concluded that the complaint did not allege facts that would trigger coverage under the policy and granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of reinsurers. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court disagreed, reversed the trial court. and remanded for further proceedings. View "Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. et al. v. Ace American Insurance Company et al." on Justia Law

New England Phoenix Company, Inc. appealed a trial court order denying its motion for a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure decree and an order confirming its purchase of a mortgaged property at a judicial sale. In 2010, Bank of America lent a veterinary hospital business in Grand Isle money. Paws and Laws, LLC owned the hospital’s real property, and Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital, Inc. owned the business assets. The bank lent Paws and Laws and Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital money separately: Paws and Laws' loan was secured by a mortgage on the real property, Grand Isle Veterinary was secured by the business' personal property and assets. In 2012, Paws and Laws violated the terms of the mortgage by conveying the real property by quit claim deed to Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital. In 2014, Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital gave Bank of America a second mortgage on the real property to secure its finance agreement. Soon thereafter the business defaulted on the loans and guarantor abandoned the property. Guarantor’s attempts to sell the property were unsuccessful. Bank of America did not initiate foreclosure proceedings on the loans, and instead, assigned the loans and mortgages to New England Phoenix. New England Phoenix filed this foreclosure action in April 2019. Guarantor did not participate in the proceedings. In late 2019, the trial court entered a default judgment and issued a foreclosure decree by judicial sale. Neither guarantor nor Grand Isle Veterinary redeemed the property, New England Phoenix submitted the winning bid and the judicial sale. In March 2021, the court issued an order confirming the sale and transferring title to the property to New England Phoenix. In a separate order, the court restated a request that New England Phoenix provide a 2010 appraisal before it would rule on the deficiency judgment. New England Phoenix argued, in effect, that the 2010 appraisal was immaterial to the court’s decision, and that in any case, by the time it took an assignment of the loans and mortgages, the property had long been abandoned and contained no business assets. In appealing the trial court's refusal to reconsider the deficiency issue, it argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that the trial court's reasoning for denying relief was made in error. The Supreme Court concurred with New England Phoenix that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider factors relevant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 80.1(j)(2), and by exercising its discretion to deny a deficiency judgment “for clearly untenable reasons.” View "New England Phoenix Company, Inc. v. Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

In 2003, Richard Howell invented a binding that has a “special, patented heel release designed to mitigate knee injuries . . . that are common in downhill skiing.” Howell formed a business relationship with John Springer-Miller, and the two signed transaction documents, which included an employment agreement, a stock-purchase agreement, an investor-rights agreement, and an amended certificate of incorporation. Howell and Springer-Miller’s working relationship “began to deteriorate almost immediately,” and the KneeBinding board voted to terminate Howell as president in September 2008. In prior proceedings, the Vermont Supreme Court in large part affirmed an August 2016 trial court decision, but reversed a decision to dissolve a March 2009 permanent injunction, and remanded the court’s award of attorney’s fees to KneeBinding, Inc. with directions to consider additional evidence of legal fees. On remand in August 2019, the trial court: (1) awarded additional attorney’s fees to KneeBinding; (2) issued a sanction for a May 23, 2018 finding that Richard Howell violated an August 10, 2017 injunction that was in place while "KneeBinding II" was pending; and (3) found Howell in contempt for violating the March 2009 permanent injunction that the Supreme Court restored in KneeBinding II. On appeal, Howell challenged the May 23, 2018, finding that he violated the August 2017 injunction and the August 2019 finding that he violated the March 2009 permanent injunction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell" on Justia Law

In May 2018, appellants Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC and its owner Matthew Lavigne, began selling fireworks from a retail store in Colchester, Vermont. As described in their complaint, the “intended purpose” for the store was “to sell retail fireworks to consumers.” In relation to the retail store, appellants obtained a license from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) as a “Type 53 - Dealer of Explosives.” They also got a building permit and a certificate of occupancy from the Town Zoning Administrator. These zoning permits were the only two permit applications appellants submitted to the Town. The issue this appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether 20 V.S.A. 3132(a)(1) authorized municipalities to grant permits for the general retail sale of fireworks to consumers who do not hold valid permits to display those fireworks. Appellants appealed the superior court's dismissal of two actions: (1) their appeal of the Town of Colchester selectboard’s denial of their application for a permit to sell fireworks pursuant to 20 V.S.A. 3132(a)(1); and (2) their request for a declaratory judgment that, even without that distinct permit, they had “all possible and applicable permits” and were permitted under section 3132 to sell fireworks in the manner described in their complaint. The Supreme Court concluded that section 3132(a)(1) required a distinct permit for the sale of fireworks, but did not authorize a permit for the general retail sale of fireworks along the lines proposed by appellants. The only fireworks sales authorized by statute were sales to the holder of a display permit for the purpose of the permitted display. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC, et al. v. Town of Colchester et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-investors appealed the dismissal of their claims against the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development (ACCD) and current and former state employees arising from the operation of a federally licensed regional center in the United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) EB-5 program. USCIS designated ACCD as a regional center in 1997, and ACCD began operating the Vermont Regional Center (VRC). It was not the only state-affiliated regional center, but it was the only one that represented itself as a “state-run agency.” The VRC billed itself as an attractive option for development and foreign investment due to its superlative “oversight powers,” the overwhelming investor confidence that came from its “stamp of approval,” and the State of Vermont’s backing that would result in a “faster path to approval.” ACCD employees represented to prospective investors, including plaintiffs, that the added protections of state approval and oversight made the "Jay Peak Projects" a particularly sound investment. They told prospective investors that the VRC conducted quarterly reviews to ensure that projects complied with all applicable laws and regulations and “engag[ed] in the financial monitoring and auditing of projects to ensure legitimacy,” and they represented that MOUs imposed “strict covenants and obligations on the project to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.” Unbeknownst to the investors, but known to the VRC officials, no such state oversight by the VRC existed. The VRC never issued any of the quarterly reports contemplated in the MOUs. In April 2016, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed a lawsuit alleging securities fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud against the Jay Peak Projects developers. On the basis of these and other allegations, plaintiffs, all foreign nationals who invested in the Jay Peak Projects, filed a multi-count claim against ACCD and several individual defendants. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint for a third time to a Fourth Amended Complaint, and then dismissed all thirteen counts on various grounds. Plaintiffs appealed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims of negligence against ACCD, gross negligence against defendants Brent Raymond and James Candido, and breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against ACCD. The Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Sutton et al. v. Vermont Regional Center et al." on Justia Law