Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Village of Waterbury terminated Adam Hubacz as one of its police officers. The Village appealed when the trial court granted Hubacz's Rule of Civil Procedure 75 petition overturning its employment action. On interlocutory appeal, the superior court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court: whether a State’s Attorney’s unilateral decision to refuse to prosecute any cases investigated by a particular municipal police officer, alone, a sufficient basis for termination of the officer pursuant to 24 V.S.A. 1931? The Supreme Court answered this question generally in the affirmative, but with the limitations. "[C]onsideration requires a finding that the officer in question cannot fulfill the duties associated with his employment and cannot be reassigned in such a way as to accommodate the nonprosecution decision." View "Hubacz v. Village of Waterbury" on Justia Law

Appellant Sulaiman Jadallah sought reversal of a decision that: (1) denied his request to vacate a settlement agreement between himself, appellee Gabriel Handy, and appellee Sidon Pantry, LLC under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b); and (2) granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Town of Fairfax and appellee Stacy Wells. In 1994, appellant began operating a restaurant situated on a parcel of real property that he owned. Nine years later in 2003, Handy loaned appellant money. To secure the loan, appellant executed a quitclaim deed for the real property to Handy, which the parties agreed Handy could record should appellant fail to repay Handy. Appellant repaid the loan and thus, Handy did not record the Deed. In 2007, appellant again borrowed money from Handy. Handy agreed to loan appellant money pursuant to terms laid out in a promissory note, which appellant signed. The loan was secured by a second quitclaim deed for the real property to Handy (2007 Deed). The promissory note and the 2007 Deed were signed by appellant and Handy and notarized by Wells. The Deed and note provided that, if appellant failed to make timely repayment of the loan, Handy would again record the 2007 Deed, which would transfer title of the property to Sidon Pantry, Handy’s company. Appellant was incarcerated for an unrelated legal matter and failed to make payments to Handy. He also failed to pay the State of Vermont for rooms and meals taxes. As a result, Handy recorded the 2007 Deed and Wells signed the attestation stamp. Handy filed the Vermont Property Transfer Tax Return (VPTTR) and paid the relevant transfer taxes and back room and meals taxes thereafter. When appellant was released from prison in mid-April 2008, Handy told appellant that he had recorded the quitclaim deed. In April 2008, a mortgagee of the property sent appellant a letter informing him that an unauthorized transfer of the property had occurred in violation with the mortgage’s provisions. In 2010, Handy cleared title to the property by paying off the two mortgages encumbering the property. In 2014, appellant purported to grant an easement in the property to his son. The easement deed referenced the 2007 Deed as a “fraudulent deed” that did not actually convey the property to Handy and his company. Appellant thereafter sued, naming Handy, his business, and the Town and Wells as parties. The trial court dismissed the settled claims; but the case against the Town and Wells continued. Appellant moved for relief from judgment, arguing Handy and his attorney allegedly engaged in fraud when drafting and obtaining appellant’s signature on the settlement documents. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for relief. Finding no reversible error in the denial of relief, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jadallah v. Town of Fairfax" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-inmate Kirk Wool appealed the dismissal of his claim that the Vermont Department of Corrections violated a statutory obligation to negotiate and award a contract to provide telephone services to inmates serving in state correctional facilities in a manner that provided for the lowest reasonable cost to inmates. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for money damages, but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for mandamus relief and remanded for further proceedings. As plaintiff alleged, DOC was required by Vermont law, albeit not specifically and exclusively by the statute he identified in his complaint, to use a competitive bidding process in contracting for telephone services for inmates. The Court found plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to confer standing and give fair notice to DOC of the claim and the grounds upon which it rested. View "Wool v. Menard" on Justia Law

Respondents Francis and Barbara Supeno, and Barbara Ernst, appealed an order of the Environmental Division imposing a penalty of $27,213 for water and wastewater permit violations. Respondents Francis Supeno and Barbara Supeno were siblings and jointly owned property in Addison. Barbara Supeno and Barbara Ernst lived adjacent to the property. In 2009, the siblings obtained a wastewater system and potable water supply permit, which authorized the replacement of a seasonal cottage with a year-round, one bedroom residence. The permit included the construction of an on-site well and wastewater disposal system. The water supply for the property was provided through a public water system. In 2014 the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) received a complaint of an alleged violation of the wastewater permit. ANR also became aware that the property was advertised as a two-bedroom, two-bathroom rental. An ANR enforcement officer went to the property and Barbara Supeno denied ANR access to the house. The Environmental Division granted ANR’s petition for an access order and ANR received access to the property. During the visit, the enforcement officer observed two water lines entering the basement; the officer also observed the permitted bedroom on the second floor and an additional non-permitted bedroom in the basement. Based on the officer’s observations, an emergency administrative order (EAO) was issued, wherein: (1) respondents failed to obtain a permit before modifying the rental home to add a second bedroom; (2) respondents spliced into the public water supply line serving the adjacent property and connected it to the rental property without obtaining a permit; and (3) respondents created an unapproved cross-connection at the rental property, which allowed it to switch between the well water and the public water system and created a risk that potentially polluted water could contaminate the public water supply. The EAO eventually became an Administrative Order (AO), imposing the penalty at issue here. Respondents argued that their due process rights were violated, the penalty assessment was precluded by res judicata, and the amount of the penalty was excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division. View "Agency of Natural Resources v. Supeno" on Justia Law

Following a decision from a three-justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court issued June 26, 2017 involving these parties and this litigation and affirming a final judgment order, the civil division attempted to conduct further hearings as if the matter had been remanded. The Poons challenged continuation of the litigation by the trial court, asserting that, in the absence of an express remand from the Vermont Supreme Court, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further hearings. The trial court denied the motion and the Poons were granted permission by the Supreme Court to appeal the denial on an interlocutory basis. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Poons were correct that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider this case further and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted. The judgment rendered June 26th by the Supreme Court did not include a remand, and was final. To remove uncertainty in the event of a future suit between these parties, the Court addressed the Poons’ additional contention that res judicata (also known as claim preclusion), barred the trial court from further consideration of any trespass claim for damages or injunctive relief as a result of the final judgment previously rendered. The final judgment in this case barred relitigation of an alleged trespass by the Poons that was or could have been litigated in this action. “A subsequent suit seeking an injunction or damages from trespass may not be barred, however, if it is based on facts that could not have been addressed in the first litigation because this would amount to a new cause of action.” View "Moyers v. Poon" on Justia Law

Following a decision from a three-justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court issued June 26, 2017 involving these parties and this litigation and affirming a final judgment order, the civil division attempted to conduct further hearings as if the matter had been remanded. The Poons challenged continuation of the litigation by the trial court, asserting that, in the absence of an express remand from the Vermont Supreme Court, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct further hearings. The trial court denied the motion and the Poons were granted permission by the Supreme Court to appeal the denial on an interlocutory basis. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Poons were correct that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider this case further and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted. The judgment rendered June 26th by the Supreme Court did not include a remand, and was final. To remove uncertainty in the event of a future suit between these parties, the Court addressed the Poons’ additional contention that res judicata (also known as claim preclusion), barred the trial court from further consideration of any trespass claim for damages or injunctive relief as a result of the final judgment previously rendered. The final judgment in this case barred relitigation of an alleged trespass by the Poons that was or could have been litigated in this action. “A subsequent suit seeking an injunction or damages from trespass may not be barred, however, if it is based on facts that could not have been addressed in the first litigation because this would amount to a new cause of action.” View "Moyers v. Poon" on Justia Law

The Vermont Department of Taxes appeals from trial court orders in favor of defendants in consolidated tax-collection cases. Defendants Thomas Tatro, Kenneth Montani, and Tyre Duvernay failed to file personal income tax returns for various years and the Department sent a First Notice of Audit Assessment to each that provided the amount of taxes due along with interest and penalties. These notices were issued more than three years after the date that the tax returns should have been filed. Defendants did not appeal the assessments to the Commissioner pursuant to 32 V.S.A. 5883. The issue before the superior court in each case arose in the context of a collection action brought by the Department. Defendants did not appear or participate in the collection cases or in these appeals. The Department moved for default judgment. The superior court sua sponte raised a statute-of-limitations challenge to the underlying tax assessments. The court concluded that the underlying tax debts were invalid because the Department issued its notices of deficiencies or assessments of penalty or interest to defendants more than three years after defendants’ tax returns were originally due. The Department argued on appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the validity of the underlying debts in these collection actions, and that, in any event, it erred in concluding that a three-year limitation period applied. The Supreme Court agreed with the Department on both points. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in the Department’s favor for the years covered in these cases. View "Vermont Department of Taxes v. Montani et al." on Justia Law

Negotiations Committee of Caledonia Central Supervisory Union (Committee) and Caledonia Central Education Association (Association) disputed whether collective bargaining negotiations between a school board negotiation committee and a teachers’ association constituted “meetings” under the Open Meeting Law and, if so, whether those meetings may be held in executive session. The Caledonia Superior Court dismissed Committee’s complaint seeking declaratory relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held Vermont’s Open Meeting Law did not apply to labor negotiations between a school district negotiating committee and a labor union. View "Negotiations Committee of Caledonia Central Supervisory Union v. Caledonia Central Education Assn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff built a home on leased property owned by the Town of Vernon. The property is part of glebe land1 first leased by the Town in the early nineteenth century. The instant claim is premised upon an alleged covenant of quiet enjoyment in an 1838 deed in which the Town leased the land for the lessee “to farm occupy” and “to hold said granted premises with all the privileges and appurtenances.” Plaintiff obtained his interest in the leased land through a quitclaim deed from his wife in 2013. Plaintiff and his wife had received their interest in the property from a company controlled by plaintiff and a friend. A superior court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment with respect to a claim Plaintiff made that the Town breached a covenant of quiet enjoyment implied in the lease by not providing him access to the property. The superior court found that the pertinent section of "Stebbins Road" had never been officially laid out as a public road and that, therefore, plaintiff never obtained an abutting right of access over the road that would have survived the Town’s later discontinuance of the road. The Vermont Supreme Court determined that the Town had not been joined to earlier litigation in this matter, making resolution of this case by summary judgment improper; the earlier litigation also alleged the Town had not laid out Stebbins Road properly. "Joinder [was] required 'if the action might detrimentally affect a party's or the absentee's ability to protect his property or to prosecute or defend any subsequent litigation in which the absentee might become involved.'" View "Daiello v. Town of Vernon" on Justia Law

This case was the second arising from the near-fatal assault of Michael Kuligoski by Evan Rapoza, who had previously been diagnosed with schizophreniform disorder. Here, members of the Kuligoski family(plaintiffs) brought suit against Evan’s grandparents, claiming that they were liable for Evan’s assault of Mr. Kuligoski while Mr. Kuligoski was repairing the furnace at their rental property. Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the grandparents were vicariously liable for Evan’s father’s negligent hiring or supervision of Evan, who was there to help his father repaint an apartment. On appeal, plaintiffs sought to reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred by determining that grandparents could not be held vicariously liable for the attack because it was not reasonably foreseeable. In granting the grandparents' motion, the trial court concluded: (1) to the extent plaintiffs were alleging direct liability on the part of grandparents based on a claim of negligent supervision, that claim failed as a matter of law because it was undisputed that on the day of the assault grandparents were unaware of Evan’s mental-health issues; and (2) notwithstanding the ambiguity as to whether father was grandparents’ employee, grandparents owed no duty to Mr. Kuligoski because Evan’s parents did not undertake to render services by monitoring Evan’s treatment after his release from the Brattleboro Retreat and because, even assuming that father was grandparents’ employee, Evan’s assault against Mr. Kuligoski was not foreseeable. Given the Vermont Supreme Court's determination that, as a matter of law, no employer-employee relationship existed between grandparents and father that would subject grandparents to vicarious liability for any negligence on father’s part in bringing Evan to the workplace on the day he assaulted Mr. Kuligsoki, plaintiffs’ remaining claim in this lawsuit was unsustainable. The Court therefore affirmed, but on grounds different than those used by the trial court. View "Kuligoski v. Rapoza" on Justia Law