Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Shirley Ann Carpin, who sued Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and Clifton Associates on behalf of her mother's estate for negligence and wrongful death. She alleged that the defendants caused the asbestos exposure that led to her mother's mesothelioma and subsequent death. Her mother, Shirley Hilster, was exposed to asbestos through her husband, who worked as a pipefitter and regularly came home with asbestos-contaminated clothes. Hilster's husband worked for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., where Clifton Associates had installed asbestos. Hilster was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in July 2020 and died three months later.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the twenty-year statute of repose under 12 V.S.A. § 518(a), finding the “last occurrence” to which her mother’s mesothelioma was attributed fell outside the repose period. Carpin appealed, arguing that her claims are not barred by § 518(a)’s repose period and, in the alternative, that § 518(a) violates the Vermont Constitution.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court determined that the “last occurrence” to which Hilster’s mesothelioma was attributed was her last known exposure to asbestos in 1995. The court further concluded that the statute was constitutional. The court rejected Carpin's argument that the “last occurrence” was the cellular changes that resulted in her 2020 mesothelioma diagnosis. The court also rejected Carpin's constitutional challenge, finding that the statute of repose did not arbitrarily disadvantage any part of the community and was a valid legislative prerogative. View "Carpin v. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Town of Ferrisburgh and 2078 Jersey Street, LLC, the latter of which had purchased a parcel of land in the town and began constructing an access road to an existing rock quarry on the property. The town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) issued a notice of violation to the company, stating that the construction required a permit. After the ZBA rejected the company's appeal of the notice of violation, the company filed for a conditional-use permit. The ZBA denied the permit, concluding that the construction of the road would substantially expand a nonconforming use of the property, in violation of local land use regulations.After the ZBA denied the permit, the company mailed a request for reconsideration to the ZBA. However, the company did not file an appeal to the environmental court within the thirty-day appeal period under Rule 5(b)(1) of the Vermont Rules of Environmental Court Proceedings. The ZBA did not take any action on the reconsideration request prior to the expiration of the time to appeal to the environmental court. After the expiration of the appeal period, the ZBA denied the request for reconsideration.The company then filed a notice of appeal with the environmental court. The town moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the company had failed to timely appeal. The court denied the motion, finding that, under Appellate Rule 4(b)(5), a request for reconsideration tolls the appeal deadline. The town then requested an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the environmental court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 4(b)(5) is inapplicable in this context and that tolling does not otherwise apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the company's appeal to the environmental court was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The case was remanded with orders that the company's appeal be dismissed. View "In re 2078 Jersey Street" on Justia Law

The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

A Vermont-based non-profit organization and an LLC challenged a superior court's dismissal of their complaint over a grant they did not receive. The plaintiffs, Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. and Lakemont Retirement Community LLC, argued that the grant provided by the Newport Development Fund Grant Committee to another organization was wrongly awarded. The plaintiffs also alleged a conflict of interest in the committee.However, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, reasoning that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the grant award. The court clarified that the plaintiffs had no legal right to receive the grant or to have any specific procedure in the allocation of the grant. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument of specific rules governing the grant process asserting that the grant process was discretionary, and the eligibility criteria did not guarantee any particular process.Consequently, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal for lack of standing, reinforcing that a legal entitlement or right is essential to establish an injury-in-fact for standing. View "Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Stowe Aviation, LLC and Stowe Airport Investment, LP, appealed from a denial of their motion to reopen a breach-of-contract case with the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development. The plaintiffs had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Agency in 2014, outlining their intention to develop and expand the Morrisville-Stowe State Airport using funds secured through the EB-5 program. However, the Agency later transferred its obligations under the MOU to the Department of Financial Regulation (DFR) without informing the plaintiffs, leading to the failure of the airport project.The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Agency, alleging that the Agency breached its contract by failing to perform under the MOU and by transferring its obligations to the DFR without notice. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the case was closed. The plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case and amend their complaint, but the trial court denied their motion. The plaintiffs appealed this order.The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could potentially obtain relief to cure a pleading deficiency under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and it was inappropriate for the trial court to deny relief simply because plaintiffs did not request leave to amend in their opposition papers before the court entered judgment. On remand, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment to prevent manifest injustice before they can file their amended complaint. View "Stowe Aviation, LLC et al. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

The Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a parentage action against Cody Thomas, alleging that he was the biological father of a child born in 2017. However, the complaint was lodged in 2021, beyond the two-year limitations period specified under 15C V.S.A. § 402. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division dismissed the action due to lack of standing. The OCS appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that its standing should be recognized as the action served the child's best interests. The Vermont Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower court's decision. The court determined that the two-year limitation for challenging parentage under § 402 was clear and unambiguous. It further noted that the statute provided for exceptions to this rule, none of which applied in this case. The court stated that allowing parentage claims beyond the two-year limit posed risks to a child's financial and psychological stability. Therefore, enforcing finality in parentage actions was in children's best interests, aligning with the overall purpose of the Vermont Parentage Act. The court concluded that the OCS lacked standing to challenge the child's parentage and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Booker v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In an appeal from the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss a case brought by H. Brooke Paige concerning the validity of the 2022 general election. Paige, a legal voter, contended that Act 60, which mandated mailing ballots and a postage-paid return envelope to all active voters due to the Covid-19 pandemic, invalidated all elections and public questions on the 2022 ballot. He argued that Act 60 contravened the Vermont Constitution's requirement for voters to cast ballots in person on election day. He also alleged that mail-in ballots were subject to fraudulent conduct, and separately, he claimed procedural deficiencies regarding the language of two public questions on the ballot. The lower court dismissed the case for lack of standing under § 2603, as Paige could not show that he had been personally injured by the alleged issues. In the appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court found that Paige failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as his complaint did not allege that the result of any specific election was invalid due to material vote irregularities. The court noted that § 2603 allows voters to contest a particular election or public question, but it does not provide a means to challenge every election and question on a single ballot without distinguishing among them. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Paige's complaint. View "Paige v. State of Vermont" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a no-stalking order against a man, John Langlois, who was found to have physically assaulted his neighbor, Gail Haupt, on two occasions. The altercations were the result of a property dispute between the two. The defendant argued that the court erred in considering his acts of physical violence as threats under the stalking statute, and that his actions were justified in defense of personal property. The court rejected both arguments.First, it held that physical violence can constitute a threat under the stalking statute because it communicates an intent to inflict physical harm. The court reasoned that by using violence against the plaintiff on two occasions, the defendant conveyed a message that he was willing and able to inflict physical harm, and therefore threatened the plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.Second, the court ruled that the common law defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order. The court noted that the purpose of the stalking statute is to protect individuals from "severe intrusions on personal privacy and autonomy" and to limit "risks to the security and safety" of the individual. The court concluded that the "critical question in such proceedings is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection." Therefore, the defendant's actions were not privileged and the court did not err in failing to consider his defense-of-property argument. As a result, the court upheld the no-stalking order against the defendant. View "Haupt v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In Vermont, a dispute arose among the owners of seven lots connected by a private road named Purple Mountain Road over how to allocate maintenance costs for the road. The plaintiffs, who own five of the seven lots, argued that each lot owner should contribute based on the percentage of distance traveled from the public highway along the private road to reach their respective lot. The defendants, who own the remaining two lots, argued that all parcel owners should divide costs equally. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that in the absence of an express agreement governing the maintenance of a private road, all parties deriving common benefit from the road must contribute "rateably," or in a manner that is reasonable and equitable given the benefits each owner receives, to the cost of maintaining the road, as per 19 V.S.A. § 2702. The court reasoned that all the parties have the right to use the entire private road at any time and share equally in the benefits offered by the road, such as enhanced private and commercial access to their properties and the privacy provided by the cul-de-sac. Therefore, all parties must pay an equal fee for the maintenance of the road. View "Rawley v. Heymann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Doherty appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant Alphonse Sorrentino. On the morning of November 8, 2019, plaintiff walked a short distance from the Village Inn to the Woodstock Inn in Woodstock, Vermont. It was not precipitating at that time. He remained at the Woodstock Inn for about fifteen minutes. It began to snow as he left the Woodstock Inn to return to the Village Inn. Plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk abutting 81 Central Street. Snow had lightly accumulated on the sidewalk. Defendant arrived after plaintiff fell but before an ambulance transported plaintiff to a local hospital. Defendant was also the sole owner of ACS Design Build and Construction Services, LLC, both of which had main offices at 81 Central Street. The sidewalk was owned by the Town of Woodstock. The Town had an ordinance that required owners of property abutting a [Woodstock] Village sidewalk clear accumulated snow or ice for pedestrian traffic to a minimum width of three feet, and within twenty-four hours of such accumulation. No accumulated snow had been cleared at the time plaintiff fell. Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant, in his personal capacity, breached a duty to plaintiff to clear the sidewalk of snow, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In moving for summary judgment, defendant argued that he owed no duty to plaintiff because: neither defendant nor the owner of the building, Tanglewood, owned or controlled the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell; landowners abutting public sidewalks owed no duty to the public to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition; and the municipal ordinance did not otherwise create a duty to plaintiff. The civil division awarded summary judgment to defendant concluding plaintiff did not bear his burden to show that defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. The court determined that plaintiff failed to offer any basis to reach defendant’s personal assets as sole shareholder of Tanglewood, and that plaintiff did not allege defendant owned or controlled the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The court found that the municipal ordinance did not create a duty of care to plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doherty v. Sorrentino, et al." on Justia Law