Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Dow Tillson underwent an elective procedure to remove a cataract in his left eye. Defendant Dr. Richard Lane, M.D., performed the procedure at Springfield Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that within twenty-four hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson’s left eye showed signs of infection. Dr. Lane made a presumptive diagnosis of endopthalmitis, but did not refer Mr. Tillson to a retinologist for treatment. Within forty-eight hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson was permanently blind in his left eye. Plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, and defendants the doctor and hospital, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the superior court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tillson v. Lane" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Bandler and MB&Co, Ltd. ("corporation") filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling that Bandler, a non-attorney, could not represent corporation in this case. Bandler was the sole shareholder and president of corporation. Bandler sued Charter One Bank, raising several claims based on the bank's alleged failure to honor advertising promises and other representations in connection with a checking account. He argued that the trial court violated his due-process rights by ruling on the basis of the parties' respective written submissions on the issue of representation without giving him prior notice of its concerns about his representation so that he could respond "by way of papers [or] argument" before the trial court issued its ruling. Having "serious concerns about Mr. Bandler's ability to present the Corporation's claims in this case," the trial court concluded that allowing Bandler to represent corporation would be unduly burdensome to the court. The Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention on appeal, finding the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding the pending motions without a hearing or argument and without soliciting further written argument from plaintiffs. View "Bandler v. Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer, LLP" on Justia Law

Equinox on the Battenkill Management Association, Inc., appealed a superior court's grant of summary-judgment denying insurance coverage. The appeal arose from a declaratory judgment action against management association’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, Inc., to determine coverage under a commercial general liability policy for damage to cantilevered balconies on condominium units it managed in Manchester. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether "Gage v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Co,." (169 A.2d 29 (1961)) was still good law with regards to the meaning of "collapse" and whether "Gage" controlled the result here. After review, the Court concluded that the policy language in this dispute was broader than the language in Gage and that therefore Gage did not control. The Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for that court to resolve disputed questions of fact and interpret the applicable policy language. View "Equinox on the Battenkill Management Assn., Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the parent-child contact and property division orders in a final divorce decree that assign her sole parental rights and responsibilities with regard to the parties' children. On appeal, she argued that the trial court was bound to consider findings of fact made by the presiding magistrate at a temporary hearing and that the court's findings did not support its conclusions. After consideration of the trial court's decision, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that at the final hearing the trial court was not bound to consider the findings from the temporary hearing and that its decision regarding parent-child contact was clearly supported by the evidence. Mother's other arguments failed because there was no clear error in the court's findings, and the findings reasonably support the court's conclusions. View "Frazer v. Olson" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a condominium construction project in Stratton. Owner-developer The Stratton Corporation and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively "Stratton") sued the project's general contractor, Engelberth Construction, Inc., seeking to recover for alleged construction defects and faulty workmanship that resulted in water damage to the project. Engelberth filed third-party complaints for indemnification against its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment to Engelberth on Stratton's claims, finding the claims barred by the statute of limitations. Given its summary judgment ruling, and without objection, the court dismissed Engelberth's third-party claims as moot. Engelberth later sought to amend the dismissal order to provide that the third-party claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court denied its request, and Engelberth appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stratton Corp. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Flex-A-Seal, Inc. appealed the dismissal of its complaint to renew a judgment against defendant Deborah Safford. In 2001, Flex-A-Seal sued Safford based on her alleged embezzlement of funds. The parties entered into a settlement agreement. In October 2002, the court issued a stipulated judgment order pursuant to the parties' agreement, granting judgment to Flex-A-Seal against Safford. Flex-A-Seal later filed a motion for trustee process against earnings, and in November 2004, the court issued two orders: (1) a bi-monthly wage attachment; and (2) a stipulated order stating the original judgment amount, the judgment amount with interest as of October 28, 2004, and providing for the suspension of post-judgment interest after October 28, 2004 as long as Safford maintained the same employment. The trial court found the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Flex-A-Seal argued that: (1) the controlling judgment for statute-of-limitation purposes was issued in 2004, not 2002; (2) the statute of limitations was tolled by the terms of a 2002 settlement agreement between the parties and by Safford's acknowledgment and partial payment of her debt; and (3) Safford should have been equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision: "[b]etween 1797 and 1972, the law provided that 'all actions of debt or scire facias on judgment' must be brought 'within eight years next after the rendition of such judgment, and not after.'" The statute was modified in 1972 to read: "Actions on judgments and actions for the renewal or revival of judgments shall be brought within eight years after the rendition of the judgment, and not after." The statute was amended again in 2010: "[a]ctions on judgments and actions for the renewal or revival of judgments shall be brought by filing a new and independent action on the judgment within eight years after the rendition of the judgment, and not after." The 2010 modification followed Supreme Court precedent, in which the Court concluded that, under the common law and 12 V.S.A. section 506, a party must file "a new and independent suit commenced in accordance with [Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure] 3" to renew a judgment, and that judgments could not be renewed by motion. View "Flex-A-Seal, Inc. v. Safford" on Justia Law

The parties were adjoining property owners in the Town of Brandon. Michael and Jirina Obolensky owned forty acres of land, on which they operated a bed-and-breakfast in a large Victorian house located at the lower eastern end of the property. Although not directly visible from their house, there was a beautiful view of the mountains from the highest part of the land, accessible by walking from the house uphill through a field. The adjoining property owners were Robert and Sandra Trombley, who purchased 3.7 acres of land, and shortly after purchasing their parcel, built a home on the lot. The Trombleys' lot was at the top of the rise, adjacent to the Obolenskys' field; the Trombleys had a direct view of the mountains. Soon after the Trombleys built their home, the Obolenskys commissioned a surveyor to conduct a boundary survey. In fall 2007, Mrs. Obolensky placed "no trespassing" signs on a location that she believed (based on the survey) was within her lot. The signs were placed at a location eight feet within an area also claimed by the Trombleys, who had mowed the lawn in the area. A dispute followed, culminating in a call to the police. The police permitted Mr. Trombley to remove the signs that the Obolenskys had placed on the lawn. The Obolenskys subsequently filed suit to determine the boundary, and also raised claims of trespass. The superior court issued an order resolving the underlying case based on the parties' stipulation. Among other things, the stipulated order: (1) established an agreed-upon boundary line based on a survey done by the Trombleys' surveyor; (2) called for an independent surveyor to mark the boundary corners; and (3) provided that the parties "shall each be entitled to erect and maintain any fence allowed by law." The Oblenskys appealed the superior court's order requiring them to alter what the court called a "spite fence" on the Trombleys' land, and challenged the court's judgment concerning its claims of trespass. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Obolensky v. Trombley" on Justia Law

Defendants Barrett and Linda Gregoire, sought to amend or set aside judgments of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff bank based on claims of fraud and misrepresentation. The dispute underlying this case concerned four multi-family rental properties: three in Washington County and one in Caledonia County that were part of defendants' rental-property business. The bank's loans to defendants were secured by the properties and were cross-collateralized with each other. In March and April 2010, the bank filed foreclosure complaints with respect to the properties. The parties executed a forbearance agreement under which defendants retained control of the properties as landlords, but the tenants were to pay rent directly to the bank. The parties stipulated to the appointment of a receiver to collect rent for the bank. The receiver filed a report with the court stating that defendant Barrett Gregoire was renting to new tenants and collecting rents and security deposits without turning over the funds to the receiver. Shortly thereafter, the bank filed an emergency motion to enforce the receivership order based on allegations that defendant Barrett Gregoire was substantially interfering with the receivership. The court issued a supplemental order, expanding the receiver's authority and placing the receiver in full control of the properties. The bank notified the court that the forbearance was no longer in place, and that it would proceed with foreclosure. The trial court denied the Gregoires' motions to set aside the trial court's grant of the bank's motions. On appeal, defendants argued that there was no final judgment so the order could have been amended without resort to post-judgment proceedings, and even if it was a final order, the court erred in denying their request for relief and in entering judgment of default. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "TBF Financial, LLC v. Gregoire" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marilyn Davis appealed the trial court's grant of defendants' Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss her claims, which sought to rectify alleged harms stemming from disagreements among Davis and various American Legion officials and staff. Davis brought her four-year-old granddaughter to karaoke night at The American Legion, Barre Post No. 10 club hoping to have her sing, but staff asked them to leave. Davis was a member of the Barre Post No. 10 Auxiliary Unit, a group affiliated with Post 10, but she is not a member of Post 10. Post 10's regularly scheduled karaoke nights, like the one in question, are open to the public. However, a Post 10 club rule explicitly prohibited minors at the club after 7:00 p.m., except by special permission of the governing body of Post 10, the Post 10 House Committee. Davis claims the Committee had previously granted her special permission to bring her granddaughter to karaoke night and stay until 7:30 p.m. At 7:00 p.m. on the night in question, however, on-hand staff monitoring the karaoke event sought to enforce the no-minors rule by asking Davis and her granddaughter to leave. Davis protested and followed a House Committee member into the parking lot. A disagreement ensued. Eventually, Davis and her granddaughter left the premises, but were not refunded their six-dollar combined entry fee. Over the next two days, feeling wronged by that night's events, Davis posted messages on the Legion Post Barre Facebook page criticizing the organization, certain members, and club staff. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling granting the motion to dismiss, and affirmed on substantially the same grounds. View "Davis v. American Legion" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case involved the rights of a former mother-in-law whose property interests were purportedly adjudicated in the final divorce decree between her son and his former wife in an action to which she was not a party. Appellant-former-wife Tammy Barrup appealed an order modifying a final property-division order to account for the recorded interest of her former mother-in-law in property that was purportedly divided in the final divorce decree, and also modifying spousal maintenance. The intervenor, the former mother-in-law Marilyn Barrup, cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, and affirmed the outcome. View "Barrup v. Barrup" on Justia Law