Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a condominium construction project in Stratton. Owner-developer The Stratton Corporation and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively "Stratton") sued the project's general contractor, Engelberth Construction, Inc., seeking to recover for alleged construction defects and faulty workmanship that resulted in water damage to the project. Engelberth filed third-party complaints for indemnification against its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment to Engelberth on Stratton's claims, finding the claims barred by the statute of limitations. Given its summary judgment ruling, and without objection, the court dismissed Engelberth's third-party claims as moot. Engelberth later sought to amend the dismissal order to provide that the third-party claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court denied its request, and Engelberth appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stratton Corp. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Flex-A-Seal, Inc. appealed the dismissal of its complaint to renew a judgment against defendant Deborah Safford. In 2001, Flex-A-Seal sued Safford based on her alleged embezzlement of funds. The parties entered into a settlement agreement. In October 2002, the court issued a stipulated judgment order pursuant to the parties' agreement, granting judgment to Flex-A-Seal against Safford. Flex-A-Seal later filed a motion for trustee process against earnings, and in November 2004, the court issued two orders: (1) a bi-monthly wage attachment; and (2) a stipulated order stating the original judgment amount, the judgment amount with interest as of October 28, 2004, and providing for the suspension of post-judgment interest after October 28, 2004 as long as Safford maintained the same employment. The trial court found the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Flex-A-Seal argued that: (1) the controlling judgment for statute-of-limitation purposes was issued in 2004, not 2002; (2) the statute of limitations was tolled by the terms of a 2002 settlement agreement between the parties and by Safford's acknowledgment and partial payment of her debt; and (3) Safford should have been equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision: "[b]etween 1797 and 1972, the law provided that 'all actions of debt or scire facias on judgment' must be brought 'within eight years next after the rendition of such judgment, and not after.'" The statute was modified in 1972 to read: "Actions on judgments and actions for the renewal or revival of judgments shall be brought within eight years after the rendition of the judgment, and not after." The statute was amended again in 2010: "[a]ctions on judgments and actions for the renewal or revival of judgments shall be brought by filing a new and independent action on the judgment within eight years after the rendition of the judgment, and not after." The 2010 modification followed Supreme Court precedent, in which the Court concluded that, under the common law and 12 V.S.A. section 506, a party must file "a new and independent suit commenced in accordance with [Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure] 3" to renew a judgment, and that judgments could not be renewed by motion. View "Flex-A-Seal, Inc. v. Safford" on Justia Law

The parties were adjoining property owners in the Town of Brandon. Michael and Jirina Obolensky owned forty acres of land, on which they operated a bed-and-breakfast in a large Victorian house located at the lower eastern end of the property. Although not directly visible from their house, there was a beautiful view of the mountains from the highest part of the land, accessible by walking from the house uphill through a field. The adjoining property owners were Robert and Sandra Trombley, who purchased 3.7 acres of land, and shortly after purchasing their parcel, built a home on the lot. The Trombleys' lot was at the top of the rise, adjacent to the Obolenskys' field; the Trombleys had a direct view of the mountains. Soon after the Trombleys built their home, the Obolenskys commissioned a surveyor to conduct a boundary survey. In fall 2007, Mrs. Obolensky placed "no trespassing" signs on a location that she believed (based on the survey) was within her lot. The signs were placed at a location eight feet within an area also claimed by the Trombleys, who had mowed the lawn in the area. A dispute followed, culminating in a call to the police. The police permitted Mr. Trombley to remove the signs that the Obolenskys had placed on the lawn. The Obolenskys subsequently filed suit to determine the boundary, and also raised claims of trespass. The superior court issued an order resolving the underlying case based on the parties' stipulation. Among other things, the stipulated order: (1) established an agreed-upon boundary line based on a survey done by the Trombleys' surveyor; (2) called for an independent surveyor to mark the boundary corners; and (3) provided that the parties "shall each be entitled to erect and maintain any fence allowed by law." The Oblenskys appealed the superior court's order requiring them to alter what the court called a "spite fence" on the Trombleys' land, and challenged the court's judgment concerning its claims of trespass. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Obolensky v. Trombley" on Justia Law

Defendants Barrett and Linda Gregoire, sought to amend or set aside judgments of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff bank based on claims of fraud and misrepresentation. The dispute underlying this case concerned four multi-family rental properties: three in Washington County and one in Caledonia County that were part of defendants' rental-property business. The bank's loans to defendants were secured by the properties and were cross-collateralized with each other. In March and April 2010, the bank filed foreclosure complaints with respect to the properties. The parties executed a forbearance agreement under which defendants retained control of the properties as landlords, but the tenants were to pay rent directly to the bank. The parties stipulated to the appointment of a receiver to collect rent for the bank. The receiver filed a report with the court stating that defendant Barrett Gregoire was renting to new tenants and collecting rents and security deposits without turning over the funds to the receiver. Shortly thereafter, the bank filed an emergency motion to enforce the receivership order based on allegations that defendant Barrett Gregoire was substantially interfering with the receivership. The court issued a supplemental order, expanding the receiver's authority and placing the receiver in full control of the properties. The bank notified the court that the forbearance was no longer in place, and that it would proceed with foreclosure. The trial court denied the Gregoires' motions to set aside the trial court's grant of the bank's motions. On appeal, defendants argued that there was no final judgment so the order could have been amended without resort to post-judgment proceedings, and even if it was a final order, the court erred in denying their request for relief and in entering judgment of default. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "TBF Financial, LLC v. Gregoire" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marilyn Davis appealed the trial court's grant of defendants' Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss her claims, which sought to rectify alleged harms stemming from disagreements among Davis and various American Legion officials and staff. Davis brought her four-year-old granddaughter to karaoke night at The American Legion, Barre Post No. 10 club hoping to have her sing, but staff asked them to leave. Davis was a member of the Barre Post No. 10 Auxiliary Unit, a group affiliated with Post 10, but she is not a member of Post 10. Post 10's regularly scheduled karaoke nights, like the one in question, are open to the public. However, a Post 10 club rule explicitly prohibited minors at the club after 7:00 p.m., except by special permission of the governing body of Post 10, the Post 10 House Committee. Davis claims the Committee had previously granted her special permission to bring her granddaughter to karaoke night and stay until 7:30 p.m. At 7:00 p.m. on the night in question, however, on-hand staff monitoring the karaoke event sought to enforce the no-minors rule by asking Davis and her granddaughter to leave. Davis protested and followed a House Committee member into the parking lot. A disagreement ensued. Eventually, Davis and her granddaughter left the premises, but were not refunded their six-dollar combined entry fee. Over the next two days, feeling wronged by that night's events, Davis posted messages on the Legion Post Barre Facebook page criticizing the organization, certain members, and club staff. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling granting the motion to dismiss, and affirmed on substantially the same grounds. View "Davis v. American Legion" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case involved the rights of a former mother-in-law whose property interests were purportedly adjudicated in the final divorce decree between her son and his former wife in an action to which she was not a party. Appellant-former-wife Tammy Barrup appealed an order modifying a final property-division order to account for the recorded interest of her former mother-in-law in property that was purportedly divided in the final divorce decree, and also modifying spousal maintenance. The intervenor, the former mother-in-law Marilyn Barrup, cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, and affirmed the outcome. View "Barrup v. Barrup" on Justia Law

Defendant Tiffanie Felix appealed her conviction for the sale or delivery of 200 milligrams or more of heroin following a jury trial. She argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to impeach the credibility of the State’s key witness in various ways, depriving defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Felix" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the family division had exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of marital property acquired during a marriage that ended in annulment. In 2011, wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Family Division of the Franklin Superior Court. Both parties represented themselves. Following a hearing, the family division determined that wife was still married to her first husband at the time of her marriage to husband in March 2000. Wife had received divorce papers filed by her first husband and believed that their marriage had ended in divorce. The family division initially ruled that the marriage between the parties in this case was void by operation of law. The only issue was division of property. Wife was ordered to turn over property belonging to husband. A few months later, the family division changed its mind concerning the property division: "[s]ince the marriage was void at its beginning, this court does not have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. The parties are referred to the civil division. Either party may start an action there. The family court’s case is closed." Husband followed the court's instructions, and subsequently filed two small claims cases against wife seeking money damages for property he claims was his. The small claims judge entered judgment in favor of wife. Husband appealed to the civil division, which held that the civil division and the small claims court lacked jurisdiction over the division of marital property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the civil division. View "Cameron v. Rollo" on Justia Law