Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review was whether Vermont or Georgia law applied to a coverage dispute between claimant Bestwall LLC and insurer Ambassador Insurance Company. Bestwall contended that the trial court erred in concluding that Vermont law applied following the special master’s prediction that Georgia courts would adopt the same loss-allocation method as Vermont. But because Georgia law was unsettled on this issue, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no conflict with Vermont law and accordingly, Vermont law applied. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Ambassador. View "In re Ambassador Insurance Company (Bestwall LLC, Appellant)" on Justia Law

New England Phoenix Company, Inc. appealed a trial court order denying its motion for a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure decree and an order confirming its purchase of a mortgaged property at a judicial sale. In 2010, Bank of America lent a veterinary hospital business in Grand Isle money. Paws and Laws, LLC owned the hospital’s real property, and Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital, Inc. owned the business assets. The bank lent Paws and Laws and Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital money separately: Paws and Laws' loan was secured by a mortgage on the real property, Grand Isle Veterinary was secured by the business' personal property and assets. In 2012, Paws and Laws violated the terms of the mortgage by conveying the real property by quit claim deed to Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital. In 2014, Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital gave Bank of America a second mortgage on the real property to secure its finance agreement. Soon thereafter the business defaulted on the loans and guarantor abandoned the property. Guarantor’s attempts to sell the property were unsuccessful. Bank of America did not initiate foreclosure proceedings on the loans, and instead, assigned the loans and mortgages to New England Phoenix. New England Phoenix filed this foreclosure action in April 2019. Guarantor did not participate in the proceedings. In late 2019, the trial court entered a default judgment and issued a foreclosure decree by judicial sale. Neither guarantor nor Grand Isle Veterinary redeemed the property, New England Phoenix submitted the winning bid and the judicial sale. In March 2021, the court issued an order confirming the sale and transferring title to the property to New England Phoenix. In a separate order, the court restated a request that New England Phoenix provide a 2010 appraisal before it would rule on the deficiency judgment. New England Phoenix argued, in effect, that the 2010 appraisal was immaterial to the court’s decision, and that in any case, by the time it took an assignment of the loans and mortgages, the property had long been abandoned and contained no business assets. In appealing the trial court's refusal to reconsider the deficiency issue, it argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that the trial court's reasoning for denying relief was made in error. The Supreme Court concurred with New England Phoenix that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider factors relevant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 80.1(j)(2), and by exercising its discretion to deny a deficiency judgment “for clearly untenable reasons.” View "New England Phoenix Company, Inc. v. Grand Isle Veterinary Hospital, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Rodrigue claimed defendant Attorney Vincent Illuzzi negligently advised plaintiff to sign a Vermont workers’ compensation settlement that contained a general release barring recovery otherwise available from the third-party who injured him. Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the entire original complaint for failure to state a claim, grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on an amended legal-malpractice claim, and denial of plaintiff’s request for findings following summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rodrigue v. Illuzzi" on Justia Law

The Vermont Environmental Division concluded that Snowstone, LLC, did not need an Act 250 permit to operate a small dimensional-stone extraction operation on a 0.93-acre parcel of land to be purchased from landowners Justin and Maureen Savage. It found the proposed sale between landowners and Snowstone was an arm’s-length transaction and that neither party would exercise “control” over the land to be held by the other such that they should be considered one “person” for Act 250 purposes. Neighbors challenged these conclusions on appeal, and challenged other aspects of the court’s merits decision as well. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division. View "In re Snowstone, LLC Act 250 Jurisdictional Opinion (Michael Harrington, et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Daniels appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Attorney James Goss, Attorney Matthew Hart, and law firm Facey Goss & McPhee P.C. (FGM), arguing the court erred when it concluded he could not prove defendants caused his injury as a matter of law. Defendants represented plaintiff in a state environmental enforcement action where he was found liable for a hazardous-waste contamination on his property. On appeal, plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly raise two dispositive defenses: the statute of limitations and proportional liability. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiff would not have prevailed on either defense if raised and therefore affirmed the grant of judgment to defendants. View "The Estate of Richard S. Daniels, by and through Julie Lyford in her capacity as Executor et al." on Justia Law

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christopher McVeigh sought a declaration that defendant, the Vermont School Boards Association (VSBA), was the functional equivalent of a public agency for purposes of the Vermont Public Records Act (PRA), and therefore had to comply with plaintiff’s request for copies of its records. The civil division concluded that the VSBA was not a public agency subject to the PRA and granted summary judgment in favor of the VSBA. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "McVeigh v. Vermont School Boards Association" on Justia Law

Husband’s estate, through a special administrator, appealed a family division’s order concluding that in light of husband’s death prior to entry of a final divorce order, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of the parties’ stipulated agreement. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family division correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction. "Although the parties’ agreement may be enforceable as a contract independent of the anticipated divorce, the civil division of the superior court, and not the family division, is the proper forum for litigating that issue." View "Maier v. Maier" on Justia Law

Masiello Real Estate, Inc. appealed a superior court’s conclusions of law on its breach-of-contract, quantum-meruit, and negligent-misrepresentation claims following a bench trial. Masiello’s claims stemmed from seller Dow Williams’ refusal to pay it a real estate commission under their right-to-market agreement. Seller owned a 276-acre property in Halifax and Guilford, Vermont. In 2013, he executed a one-year, exclusive right-to-market agreement with Chris Long, a real estate broker who worked for Masiello. Seller and broker agreed on a $435,000 asking price and a fixed $25,000 broker commission. The agreement had a one-year “tail” that compelled seller to pay the commission if, within twelve months of the agreement’s expiration, seller sold the property and Masiello was the procuring cause. The listing agreement would be renewed several times after negotiations with prospective buyers failed. Michelle Matteo and Torre Nelson expressed an interest in the property. Nelson, having obtained seller’s contact information from seller’s neighbor, contacted seller directly and asked if he was still selling. Between August and September 2016, Nelson and seller discussed the fact that seller wanted $400,000 for the property and buyers wanted seller to consider a lower price. No offer was made at that time. The tail of a third right-to-market agreement expired on September 30, 2016. Between September and November of that year, Nelson and Matteo looked at other properties with the other realtor and made an unsuccessful offer on one of those other properties. Returning to seller, Nelson, Matteo and seller negotiated until they eventually agreed to terms. Believing that it was improperly cut out of the sale, Masiello sued seller and buyers. The superior court concluded that because the property was not sold during the tail period, and because Masiello was not the procuring cause, no commission was due under the contract. The court further held that there was no negligent misrepresentation and that Masiello was not entitled to recovery under quantum meruit. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Masiello Real Estate, Inc. v. Matteo, et al." on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim. They contended dismissal was required because plaintiff did not file a certificate of merit (COM) with her complaint as required by 12 V.S.A. 1042(a) and the trial court did not find, nor did the complaint show, that this was a “rare instance” where expert testimony was unnecessary under section 1042(e). The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with defendants and therefore reversed the trial court’s decision. View "Bittner v. Centurion of Vermont, LLC et al." on Justia Law