Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Miriam Lowell and Seth Healey, challenged the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) after being investigated for child abuse and neglect. DCF substantiated the allegations and notified the plaintiffs, who then requested an administrative review. The review process was delayed, and the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit claiming the process violated their due process rights. The federal court denied their injunction request, and the plaintiffs later filed a similar complaint in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandamus under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint, assuming the plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest but finding the administrative review process constitutionally sufficient. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims of potential procedural violations were speculative and not reviewable. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the administrative review process did not provide adequate due process protections.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed Lowell's claims as moot because the administrative reviewer overturned the substantiation against her, providing her with no further relief. For Healey, the court assumed a protected liberty interest but found the administrative review process constitutionally adequate under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. The court noted that the process provided sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, with a neutral arbiter and the ability to present evidence. The court emphasized the importance of DCF's interest in protecting children and the availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing before the Human Services Board, which offers more extensive procedural protections. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Healey's complaint, concluding that the administrative review process met due process requirements. View "Lowell v. Department for Children and Families" on Justia Law

In 2001, the defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault after shaking his five-week-old daughter, causing her severe neurological injuries. He pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and served ten years of a fifteen-year maximum sentence. The victim was placed in foster care, later adopted, and died in 2016, at age fifteen, from complications resulting from the injuries she received as an infant. In 2022, the State charged the defendant with second-degree murder relating to the victim's death. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the prosecution was barred by the common-law year-and-a-day rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and his plea agreement. The trial court dismissed the murder charge based on the year-and-a-day rule.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, abrogating the common-law year-and-a-day rule, which stated that no defendant could be convicted of murder unless the victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act. The court concluded that the justifications for the rule were no longer relevant due to advances in medical science and changes in the law. The court also held that the abrogation of the rule applied retroactively to the defendant's case. The court further found that the prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause or the defendant's plea agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The case involves Shirley Ann Carpin, who sued Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and Clifton Associates on behalf of her mother's estate for negligence and wrongful death. She alleged that the defendants caused the asbestos exposure that led to her mother's mesothelioma and subsequent death. Her mother, Shirley Hilster, was exposed to asbestos through her husband, who worked as a pipefitter and regularly came home with asbestos-contaminated clothes. Hilster's husband worked for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., where Clifton Associates had installed asbestos. Hilster was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in July 2020 and died three months later.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the twenty-year statute of repose under 12 V.S.A. § 518(a), finding the “last occurrence” to which her mother’s mesothelioma was attributed fell outside the repose period. Carpin appealed, arguing that her claims are not barred by § 518(a)’s repose period and, in the alternative, that § 518(a) violates the Vermont Constitution.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court determined that the “last occurrence” to which Hilster’s mesothelioma was attributed was her last known exposure to asbestos in 1995. The court further concluded that the statute was constitutional. The court rejected Carpin's argument that the “last occurrence” was the cellular changes that resulted in her 2020 mesothelioma diagnosis. The court also rejected Carpin's constitutional challenge, finding that the statute of repose did not arbitrarily disadvantage any part of the community and was a valid legislative prerogative. View "Carpin v. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of Vermont appealed the superior court’s dismissal of charges against defendant Michael Armstrong on speedy-trial grounds. It had been more than nineteen years since the charges against defendant were first brought and more than fifteen years since defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding that the State had failed in its obligation to reevaluate defendant’s competency, thereby violating defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the delay was primarily due to defendant's incompetency, which was not attributable to the State, and the State had no duty to seek a reevaluation of the defendant's competency absent an indication of changed circumstances. The Court concluded that the defendant did not make a sufficient claim of denial of his right to a speedy trial, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Defendant Edwin Rodriquez appealed the denial of his motion to be resentenced. Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault and related criminal counts for physically assaulting his then-romantic partner. After defendant pled not guilty, the trial court ordered defendant to be held without bail. While awaiting trial, defendant remained incarcerated throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and unsuccessfully sought to be released on bail based on health concerns arising from conditions of his confinement. At a change-of-plea hearing in December 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated domestic assault in the first degree and one count of domestic assault. As part of that plea agreement, the State agreed to a cap of twelve years of incarceration. in advance of his sentencing hearing, defendant submitted a sentencing memorandum in which he sought a 4- to 8-year sentence. Defendant referenced several mitigating factors in support of his sentence. The trial court evaluated the pertinent factors and arrived at what it considered an appropriate sentence: 9- to 12-years. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors presented and improperly relied on prior uncharged conduct. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "Vermont v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant Seth Alarie appealed a final relief-from-abuse (RFA) order requested by plaintiff Carissa Poss, his former girlfriend. On February 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a form RFA complaint alleging defendant physically abused and stalked her on two previous occasions. The family division issued a temporary RFA order on that date, and set a hearing for ten days later. Defendant was served with the complaint, both affidavits, the temporary order, and the notice of hearing at 4 p.m. on February 15. Both parties appeared at the hearing pro se. After the hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had abused and stalked plaintiff. The court issued its findings and conclusions orally from the bench and followed up with a written order prohibiting defendant from, among other things, contacting plaintiff or coming within 300 feet of plaintiff, her residence, place of employment, or car for one year. Represented by counsel on appeal, defendant attacked the proceedings, arguing that due process rights applied to RFA proceedings and that the court violated those rights by holding the hearing after he received less than twenty-four hours’ notice and not granting a continuance for defendant to retain counsel. He argued the trial court violated other due process rights when it did not permit him to cross-examine plaintiff and took testimony outside the scope of the facts alleged in the pleadings. Finding no deprivation of due process nor other reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Poss v. Alarie" on Justia Law

In October 1987, defendant William Wheelock, III shot and killed James Brillon with a shotgun. He was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to seventeen-years-to-life, with a split sentence to serve seventeen years. Following defendant’s release from probation in 1999, his Vermont probation officer (PO) filed three separate violation-of-probation (VOP) complaints against him in 1999, 2002, and 2003. In 2004, after the third VOP complaint was filed the year before, the VOP court concluded that defendant violated three probation conditions, revoked probation, and imposed the original sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant remained incarcerated since his 2003 arrest on the most recent VOP complaint, more than twenty years ago. In April 2018, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the 2004 revocation decision. The PCR court granted the petition and permitted defendant to appeal the 2004 violations and revocation of probation to this Court. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the probation violations and reversed and remanded the court’s revocation of probation. "When the VOP court revoked defendant’s probation after failing to consider all of the evidence but following consideration of prior conduct, in contravention of 28 V.S.A. § 303(b), it clearly prejudiced defendant’s defense and adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process. ... we conclude that defendant is entitled to a new probation-revocation-disposition hearing." View "Vermont v. Wheelock" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Parents challenged the termination of their residual parental rights to K.G. and L.G., and the denial of their post-termination motion to set aside the merits and disposition orders in this case under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Vermont Supreme Court found it was unnecessary to decide if parents had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in juvenile proceedings and affirmed both decisions. View "In re K.G. & L.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kyle Wolfe appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Vermont Digger and its editor (collectively, “VT Digger”), arguing that dismissal was improper and alleging that VT Digger’s publication of articles about him was defamatory and constituted a hate crime. VT Digger cross-appealed, arguing that its special motion to strike under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute should not have been denied as moot after its motion to dismiss was granted. In October 2021, plaintiff was arrested at the Vermont Statehouse on charges of aggravated disorderly conduct, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest based on conduct directed toward the Speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives. VT Digger published an article in October 2021, titled, “Man arrested at the Vermont Statehouse after threatening House speaker.” In December 2021, plaintiff was released on conditions that required him to stay in Rutland County and prohibited him from possessing firearms or contacting the House Speaker. The same day, VT Digger published an article titled, “Defendant who threatened House speaker released with several conditions.” In February 2022, plaintiff allegedly posted annotated photographs of firearms to his social media accounts, “tagged” the House Speaker in a Facebook post, and asked others to contact the House Speaker, noting in a comment on Facebook, “Yes, I am aware this is technically ‘illegal.’ ” Due to this conduct, plaintiff was charged in March 2022 with violating the anti-stalking order. VT Digger subsequently published an article on March 3, 2022, detailing plaintiff’s new conditions of release. Finally, on March 7, VT Digger published another article describing plaintiff’s social media posts that led to the charge of violating the order against stalking and his conditions of release. Plaintiff filed a complaint against VT Digger in May 2022 accusing it of defamation by libel and slander and requesting the civil division enjoin VT Digger from publishing further articles about him. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but concluded the trial court should have granted VT Digger’s motion to strike, and therefore reversed and remanded for the court to award attorney’s fees to VT Digger pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Wolfe v. VT Digger et al." on Justia Law