Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In 2012, the plaintiff was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to five years to life in prison. In August 2020, his conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was released after serving over eight years. In June 2023, the plaintiff sued the State of Vermont under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), seeking over $400,000 in damages for his imprisonment. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the VIPA only allows claims for those exonerated through DNA evidence proving actual innocence.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, granted the State's motion in January 2024. The court found that the VIPA's plain language limits claims to those exonerated through DNA testing. The court noted that the statute's language, particularly in § 5572, specifies that a person exonerated "pursuant to this chapter" must have been exonerated through the DNA testing process outlined in subchapter 1 of chapter 182 of Title 13. Since the plaintiff's conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, he did not qualify for compensation under the VIPA.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the VIPA's plain language clearly limits compensation to individuals exonerated through DNA testing. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute allows for broader claims of exoneration, emphasizing that the statute's provisions must be read together and that the only means of exoneration authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing. The court also denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff's claim survived his death under Vermont's survival statutes. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

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Two state senators filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that Governor Phil Scott exceeded his authority by appointing Zoie Saunders as Secretary of Education on an interim basis without the Vermont Senate's advice and consent. The Governor appointed Saunders after the Senate rejected her initial nomination. The senators contended that the Governor's action bypassed the Senate's constitutional role.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the suit on the merits. The court found that the Governor had the constitutional authority to make interim appointments without the Senate's advice and consent. It concluded that the relevant statutes did not apply to interim appointments and rejected the senators' arguments about bad faith and the invalidity of Saunders' actions.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found it moot due to subsequent events. In November 2024, the Governor appointed Saunders as Secretary of Education while the Legislature was in recess, and her nomination was later submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. This appointment superseded the earlier interim appointment, rendering the controversy over the April 30 appointment no longer live. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that any opinion on the April 30 appointment would be advisory and that the case did not meet the criteria for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. View "McCormack v. Scott" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendant, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after the defendant reported to the police that the plaintiff had sexually and physically assaulted her. This report led to the plaintiff being criminally charged, arrested, and held without bail for almost two years before being acquitted. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's report was false and made with malicious intent to harm him.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged as communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding. The court also granted the defendant's special motion to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1041, and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as an exercise of her right to petition the government.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, agreeing that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged. The Court held that public policy supports extending absolute privilege to such statements to encourage free and full disclosure to law enforcement without fear of civil liability. The Court also affirmed the trial court's application of the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the defendant's statements were made in connection with a public issue and were an exercise of her constitutional rights. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court had not adequately addressed. View "Talandar v. Manchester-Murphy" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Miriam Lowell and Seth Healey, challenged the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) after being investigated for child abuse and neglect. DCF substantiated the allegations and notified the plaintiffs, who then requested an administrative review. The review process was delayed, and the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit claiming the process violated their due process rights. The federal court denied their injunction request, and the plaintiffs later filed a similar complaint in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandamus under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint, assuming the plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest but finding the administrative review process constitutionally sufficient. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims of potential procedural violations were speculative and not reviewable. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the administrative review process did not provide adequate due process protections.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed Lowell's claims as moot because the administrative reviewer overturned the substantiation against her, providing her with no further relief. For Healey, the court assumed a protected liberty interest but found the administrative review process constitutionally adequate under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. The court noted that the process provided sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, with a neutral arbiter and the ability to present evidence. The court emphasized the importance of DCF's interest in protecting children and the availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing before the Human Services Board, which offers more extensive procedural protections. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Healey's complaint, concluding that the administrative review process met due process requirements. View "Lowell v. Department for Children and Families" on Justia Law

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In 2001, the defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault after shaking his five-week-old daughter, causing her severe neurological injuries. He pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and served ten years of a fifteen-year maximum sentence. The victim was placed in foster care, later adopted, and died in 2016, at age fifteen, from complications resulting from the injuries she received as an infant. In 2022, the State charged the defendant with second-degree murder relating to the victim's death. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the prosecution was barred by the common-law year-and-a-day rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and his plea agreement. The trial court dismissed the murder charge based on the year-and-a-day rule.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, abrogating the common-law year-and-a-day rule, which stated that no defendant could be convicted of murder unless the victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act. The court concluded that the justifications for the rule were no longer relevant due to advances in medical science and changes in the law. The court also held that the abrogation of the rule applied retroactively to the defendant's case. The court further found that the prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause or the defendant's plea agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

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The case involves Shirley Ann Carpin, who sued Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and Clifton Associates on behalf of her mother's estate for negligence and wrongful death. She alleged that the defendants caused the asbestos exposure that led to her mother's mesothelioma and subsequent death. Her mother, Shirley Hilster, was exposed to asbestos through her husband, who worked as a pipefitter and regularly came home with asbestos-contaminated clothes. Hilster's husband worked for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., where Clifton Associates had installed asbestos. Hilster was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in July 2020 and died three months later.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the twenty-year statute of repose under 12 V.S.A. § 518(a), finding the “last occurrence” to which her mother’s mesothelioma was attributed fell outside the repose period. Carpin appealed, arguing that her claims are not barred by § 518(a)’s repose period and, in the alternative, that § 518(a) violates the Vermont Constitution.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court determined that the “last occurrence” to which Hilster’s mesothelioma was attributed was her last known exposure to asbestos in 1995. The court further concluded that the statute was constitutional. The court rejected Carpin's argument that the “last occurrence” was the cellular changes that resulted in her 2020 mesothelioma diagnosis. The court also rejected Carpin's constitutional challenge, finding that the statute of repose did not arbitrarily disadvantage any part of the community and was a valid legislative prerogative. View "Carpin v. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation" on Justia Law

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The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

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In this case, the State of Vermont appealed the superior court’s dismissal of charges against defendant Michael Armstrong on speedy-trial grounds. It had been more than nineteen years since the charges against defendant were first brought and more than fifteen years since defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding that the State had failed in its obligation to reevaluate defendant’s competency, thereby violating defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the delay was primarily due to defendant's incompetency, which was not attributable to the State, and the State had no duty to seek a reevaluation of the defendant's competency absent an indication of changed circumstances. The Court concluded that the defendant did not make a sufficient claim of denial of his right to a speedy trial, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

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Defendant Edwin Rodriquez appealed the denial of his motion to be resentenced. Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault and related criminal counts for physically assaulting his then-romantic partner. After defendant pled not guilty, the trial court ordered defendant to be held without bail. While awaiting trial, defendant remained incarcerated throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and unsuccessfully sought to be released on bail based on health concerns arising from conditions of his confinement. At a change-of-plea hearing in December 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated domestic assault in the first degree and one count of domestic assault. As part of that plea agreement, the State agreed to a cap of twelve years of incarceration. in advance of his sentencing hearing, defendant submitted a sentencing memorandum in which he sought a 4- to 8-year sentence. Defendant referenced several mitigating factors in support of his sentence. The trial court evaluated the pertinent factors and arrived at what it considered an appropriate sentence: 9- to 12-years. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors presented and improperly relied on prior uncharged conduct. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "Vermont v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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Defendant Seth Alarie appealed a final relief-from-abuse (RFA) order requested by plaintiff Carissa Poss, his former girlfriend. On February 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a form RFA complaint alleging defendant physically abused and stalked her on two previous occasions. The family division issued a temporary RFA order on that date, and set a hearing for ten days later. Defendant was served with the complaint, both affidavits, the temporary order, and the notice of hearing at 4 p.m. on February 15. Both parties appeared at the hearing pro se. After the hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had abused and stalked plaintiff. The court issued its findings and conclusions orally from the bench and followed up with a written order prohibiting defendant from, among other things, contacting plaintiff or coming within 300 feet of plaintiff, her residence, place of employment, or car for one year. Represented by counsel on appeal, defendant attacked the proceedings, arguing that due process rights applied to RFA proceedings and that the court violated those rights by holding the hearing after he received less than twenty-four hours’ notice and not granting a continuance for defendant to retain counsel. He argued the trial court violated other due process rights when it did not permit him to cross-examine plaintiff and took testimony outside the scope of the facts alleged in the pleadings. Finding no deprivation of due process nor other reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Poss v. Alarie" on Justia Law