Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

B.B. was charged with aggravated assault based on allegations from August 2016. In November 2018, B.B. was 20 years old, and filed a motion for youthful-offender status based on his age in 2016 . B.B. struggled with alcohol and heroin addiction, and his residential and employment situations were “unstable.” The State opposed the motion. There was prima facie evidence that B.B. “engaged in a new violent act” while he was “under the influence of alcohol,” even though B.B. was underage and was subject to a condition of release that required him to refrain from drinking alcohol. The youthful-offender statutory scheme would have allowed, if the criminal defendant was under twenty-two years old and was at least twelve years old at the time of the alleged offense, a motion to be filed with the criminal division requesting youthful-offender status. Attaining that status would provide for the defendant to obtain a battery of counseling and rehabilitation in addition to any punishment determined by the court. Only if the court finds that public safety will be protected may the court then go on to consider the other statutory factors. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that B.B. had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that public safety would be protected if he were granted youthful-offender status, and denied the motion. B.B. requested permission to appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, which was granted. However, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In re B.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Bovat was convicted of shooting a deer in violation of Vermont big-game-hunting laws and failing to immediately tag the deer. On appeal he claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional right to be free from warrantless government intrusions. In the early morning hours of Thanksgiving 2017, a resident of Huntington, Vermont was awoken by a gunshot close to his home. The concerned resident called the state game warden to report a possible deer jackIng. In the course of the ensuing investigation, wardens were lead to defendant’s house. Based in part on their observations through the garage window, wardens obtained a search warrant to seize defendant’s truck and collected samples of the blood they had observed, which matched a sample from the deer at issue. They did not photograph the truck until approximately five days after the seizure, during which time the truck had been left outside in inclement weather. Due to exposure to the elements, a smaller amount of blood than originally observed was visible, and deer hair was no longer visible. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the search warrant. While the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with defendant that his garage is within the curtilage of his home, it was unpersuaded by his remaining arguments. The Supreme Court found the wardens were conducting a legitimate police investigation, during which they observed defendant’s truck in plain view from a semiprivate area. The Court declined to address the merits of defendant’s remaining challenges and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Vermont v. Bovat" on Justia Law

Defendant Onix Fonseca-Cintron appealed his three domestic assault convictions. He argued the trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with a self-defense instruction. He also argued the underlying conduct supported only one criminal offense, not three. The State charged defendant with three counts of domestic assault: (1) first-degree aggravated domestic assault based on defendant’s attempt to strangle complainant; (2) first-degree aggravated domestic assault with a weapon based on defendant’s hitting the complainant with a sheathed machete and threatening to kill her; and (3) domestic assault based on defendant’s dragging complainant by the hair. The jury found defendant guilty on all three counts. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Fonseca-Cintron" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Sullivan appeals a trial court order granting summary judgment to the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) on his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 petition challenging the DOC’s decision to deny him reintegration furlough. Petitioner was convicted of one count of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor with death resulting, and one count of leaving the scene of a fatal accident. While serving a resulting incarcerative sentence, he sought Civil Rule 75 review of the DOC’s decision to deny him reintegration furlough and earned time toward such furlough, arguing that this denial was predicated on unlawful consideration of his convictions as indicative of a history of violent behavior The Vermont Supreme Court found the DOC could authorize reintegration furlough or an award of earned time toward reintegration furlough only where these decisions were made in accordance with rules promulgated by the DOC pursuant to the grant of authority at 28 V.S.A. 808c(c). During the pendency of this appeal, the DOC moved to dismiss the case as moot, contending that, because petitioner reached his minimum sentence on August 5, 2019, and was paroled on August 14, 2019, the requested relief could no longer be granted. Petitioner responded that the DOC failed to prove that this situation will not reoccur, observing that he could be reincarcerated and subsequently denied furlough on the basis of the same two convictions, which would remain on his record. In the alternative, he urged the Supreme Court to adopt a public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The Supreme Court concluded the case was moot, declined to adopt such an exception, and dismissed. View "Sullivan v. Menard" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Alzaga appealed his conviction for DUI refusal. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting testimony indicating that defendant had refused to take a preliminary breath test (PBT) and regarding the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test; (2) the court committed plain error in instructing the jury and designing the jury verdict form; and (3) the conviction was invalid because the jury did not enter a verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Alzaga" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Miles Otis Dow, Jr., filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) with the Windham Civil Division. He was convicted of aggravated assault stemming from events that occurred in March 2014. In March 2017, petitioner filed his initial PCR petition, alleging violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He asked that the PCR court vacate and set aside the trial court judgment against him or, in the alternative, grant a new trial or correct the sentence. Upon receiving the initial PCR petition, assigned counsel reviewed it and declined assignment of the case pursuant to 12 V.S.A. 5233(a)(3), indicating that “further representation of [petitioner] would require an attorney to advance frivolous claims.” Petitioner filed an amended PCR petition in January 2018, which was the petition at issue now before the Vermont Supreme Court. The amended petition sought relief based on several grounds. Most notably, petitioner added new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because petitioner’s attorney allegedly: (1) failed to object to the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion for a mistrial, thereby failing to preserve the issue for appeal to this Court; and (2) failed to reasonably and effectively prepare for sentencing by failing to investigate petitioner’s background and mitigating evidence regarding petitioner’s mental health or his education, employment, family, financial, and health records. In January 2018, the PCR court issued an entry order acknowledging the amended petition, which “provide[d] additional elaboration” for the claims in the initial petition, and stated that petitioner would be treated as pro se unless he hired counsel because the Defender General’s Office had already found the claims raised in the initial petition to be meritless. In February 2018, petitioner filed a motion for reassignment of counsel. His request for counsel was denied by order in March 2018 “for the same reasons as stated” in the January entry order. Thereafter, petitioner proceeded pro se. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the PCR court granted. Petitioner appealed the PCR court’s dismissal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the PCR court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment because it failed to properly address the claims petitioner raised in his amended petition. The Supreme Court concurred, reversed and remanded for the PCR court to conduct further proceedings. View "In re Miles Otis Dow, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant Stephanie Berard appealed a trial court’s denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal following her conviction for impeding or hindering a police officer. Trooper Wayne Godfrey of the Vermont State Police directed defendant to pull over her car after he observed her committing traffic violations. Defendant asked him to call another officer because she recognized him as someone she had interacted with on a previous occasion, when he “maced” her. The officer instructed defendant to provide him with her driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant replied that she had the requested documents in her car, but she would not provide them to him and asked him to call another officer. Trooper Godfrey continued to instruct defendant to provide the documents, and defendant refused to provide them to him. During their exchange, Trooper Godfrey called for another officer. The exchange proceeded for around six minutes, until the second officer arrived. Trooper Godfrey estimated at trial that he asked for defendant’s information around twenty-two times within those six minutes and said her delay in producing the documents was unreasonable. As Trooper Godfrey testified and the video shows, defendant was “[c]ombative” and “uncooperative” and her voice was “escalated and raised.” When the second officer arrived, defendant retrieved the documents and extended them out of the car. At that point, Trooper Godfrey grabbed defendant’s arm, physically pulled her out of the car, and arrested defendant for impeding a law enforcement officer. A jury found defendant guilty. In denying her motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court reasoned defendant had no legal right to refuse to provide the documents, and it had no grounds to disturb the jury's conclusion that defendant's refusal hindered the officer. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the State did not prove that defendant’s refusal to provide the documents was itself a criminal act; (2) defendant did not hinder the officer in investigating the alleged traffic infractions; and (3) extending criminal liability to failure to provide a driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance would render the impeding-officer statute unconstitutionally vague. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no question defendant's refusal was unlawful. However, when read broadly, the impeding-officer statute appeared to criminalize any unlawful action, no matter how slight or brief, that for any moment delays or interferes with the lawful execution of an officer’s duties. "Such a broad sweep is inconsistent with the text of [13 V.S.A. section] 3001 as a whole." The Court analyzed lesser penalties given for related conduct and could not conclude the Legislature intended section 3001 to include a civil violation of the motor vehicle code as a hindering action. Accordingly, the Court interpreted section 3001 narrowly and held that a civil violation of the motor vehicle code, on its own, could not provide the basis for an impeding-officer offense, even when that violation was intentional. View "Vermont v. Berard" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Gay, II appealed orders orders denying his motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). In 2014, defendant pled no contest to obstruction of justice. As part of his plea colloquy with the sentencing court, defendant acknowledged that by changing his plea from not guilty to no contest, he was giving up his right to appeal, which he would have had if he had maintained his not-guilty plea, gone to trial, and been convicted. The court imposed a sentence that was enhanced under Vermont’s habitual-offender statute, 13 V.S.A. 11. Between 2001 and 2006, defendant was convicted of four felonies that enhanced the sentence on the obstruction-of-justice conviction. He pled guilty to two of those convictions, false pretenses and grand larceny, at one proceeding in 2004. In 2018, defendant filed his PCR petition, seeking to vacate the sentence imposed on the 2014 obstruction-of-justice conviction. He argued that he was entitled to a resentencing because his pleas to the charges of false pretenses and grand larceny in 2004 were not made knowingly and voluntarily. Specifically, he alleged that the pleas were deficient because the court failed to elicit from him an admission to the factual basis supporting each of the charges. Defendant argued that without these two prior convictions, his sentence on the obstruction-of-justice conviction should not have been enhanced. In affirming the trial court, the Vermont Supreme Court concurred defendant waived his right to challenge the legality of his underlying convictions and the imposition of an enhanced sentence when he entered a knowing and voluntary plea to obstruction of justice. View "In re Jeffrey R. Gay II" on Justia Law

Defendant Ellie May Morse was charged with simple assault on a law enforcement officer, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest as a result of her encounter with law enforcement officers outside a motel in Bennington in August 2014. Police were called when one of defendant's teenaged sons got into an argument with the manager of the motel. As the first two officers approached the Fife and Drum, defendant, who had been outside smoking a cigarette, stepped in front of them to block them from going into the motel. Defendant then began moving toward the first pair of officers, who had their backs turned to her. As one of the second two officers tried to move past her, she raised her arm, and the officer reacted by grabbing her arm, spinning her around, and attempting to handcuff her. Defendant struggled and stiffened her arms, and her cigarette came in contact with the officer’s left forearm. Defendant was then placed under arrest. Defendant was convicted by jury of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest and acquitted of simple assault. After the verdict, defendant challenged her convictions through motions for a new trial and judgment of acquittal, alleging the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Defendant appealed the denial of those motions. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Morse" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Ray appealed the twenty years to life sentence he received for second-degree murder, which was imposed after a contested sentencing hearing following a plea agreement reducing the charge from first-degree murder. On appeal, he argued the sentencing court erred in finding the victim, Richard Vreeland, to be “particularly vulnerable” based solely on his being unarmed and within shooting range of defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "Vermont v. Ray" on Justia Law