Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-landowner Donald Gould appealed three superior court rulings pertaining to the Town of Monkton’s new zoning regulations. Landowner alleged that the new zoning regulations under a "UPD" or "Unified Planning Document" interfered with his long-held development plans and reduced the potential economic return on his property in Monkton. On appeal of the superior court's rulings, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by finding: (1) that it had no jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the new zoning regulations; (2) that landowner had no due process interest in the process by which zoning regulations were adopted; and (3) that landowner had no due process property interest in the application of the previous zoning regulations. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gould v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Gilles Richard was convicted for driving under the influence (DUI). He appealed, arguing: (1) several important factual findings by the court were clearly erroneous; (2) that the court should have suppressed all evidence following his arrest as fruit of the poisonous tree because the trooper who arrested him did so without probable cause; and (3) the trial court should have suppressed his evidentiary breath test results because the Vermont State Police trooper deterred him from seeking an independent blood test and the trooper prevented him from seeking an independent blood test by jailing him. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed on all issues, upholding defendant’s conviction. View "Vermont v. Richard" on Justia Law

In 2001, defendant Jonathan Villeneuve pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. He appealed the denial of his motion to seal the record of his conviction on the ground that the underlying conduct took place prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one. The State conceded that the trial court erred in denying the application based on its conclusion that a conviction for a listed crime as defined in 13 V.S.A. 5301 was not eligible for sealing under the language of 33 V.S.A. 5119(g)(2). Based on the plain language of section 5119(g)(2), the Supreme Court held that the trial court’s denial was in error. In considering a petition to seal, the trial court must “determine that defendant committed the crime before turning twenty-one years old, that two years have elapsed since defendant’s final discharge, and that defendant has been rehabilitated.” Because the trial court failed to make findings as to whether defendant has been rehabilitated, the Court reversed and remanded for consideration of that issue. View "Vermont v. Villeneuve" on Justia Law

Defendant Glen Haskins, Jr. was tried for attempted murder. At trial, he theorized that a group of late-night club-goers with whom he was partying conspired to frame him for a stabbing that occurred in downtown Burlington shortly after two o’clock in the morning of January 15, 2012. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding exculpatory testimony and by giving misleading jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt and permissive inferences. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed on all issues and upheld defendant’s conviction. View "Vermont v. Haskins, Jr." on Justia Law

The altercation leading to defendant’s conviction occurred on July 29, 2014, at a Middlebury residential facility for persons with major mental illnesses. In a sworn statement admitted without objection, the complainant claimed that defendant initiated the altercation by pointing his finger at the complainant. The complainant responded by kicking defendant’s hand twice and telling defendant that he “needed a kick in the ass.” Suddenly, the complainant experienced blurred vision, pressure, and heat on the left side of his face. Although he initially did not know what had happened, after he saw defendant talking to him, he concluded that defendant had hit him. Defendant appealed his conviction for simple assault, arguing that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider simple assault as a lesser-included offense of domestic assault, the crime for which he was charged. Specifically, defendant contended: (1) that, as instructed to the jury, simple assault was not a lesser-included offense of domestic assault; and (2) that the court could not instruct the jury to consider a lesser-included offense over the defendant’s objection. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bean" on Justia Law

Petitioner D.C. appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging that the change-of-plea hearing that preceded his adjudication of juvenile delinquency was constitutionally inadequate. The superior court held that the PCR statute did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that the only remedy available to petitioner was through 33 V.S.A. 5113 and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but that route was foreclosed because petitioner’s claim was untimely raised. On appeal, petitioner argued that the case was not moot, despite the fact he was over the age of majority at the time of his appeal (and no longer committed to state custody), and that the PCR statutes permitted juveniles to collaterally attack their adjudications. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the superior court’s order dismissing petitioner’s PCR complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

The State appealed mental health orders involving D.H. and B.C. The State's Attorney contended it was entitled to a hearing on its motions for the continued treatment at the expiration of the mental health orders at issue; both D.H. and B.C. had been charged with criminal offenses. The criminal division found the State’s Attorney had no standing to seek continued treatment at the expiration of a mental health treatment order and denied the State’s motion. Finding no reversible error in the orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. B.C." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a road rage incident in which defendant Jason Gagne chased a couple across town, eventually pulling up next to their truck and pointing a rifle at them. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of an alcohol breath test on the ground that he was not able to meaningfully communicate with his lawyer before submitting to the test due to his belief (which turned out to be well-founded) that his conversation with counsel was being recorded by the police. The trial court denied the motion, and following trial, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, and negligent operation of a vehicle. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred: in denying his motion to suppress; failing to instruct the jury that the definition of “threat” for the purposes of aggravated assault and simple assault was based on an objective standard; and in allowing convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, and reckless endangerment for the same conduct, in violation of defendant’s double jeopardy rights. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion and reversed and remanded defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence. The Court upheld the trial court’s jury instructions; and affirmed the aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions. The simple assault conviction was reversed on double jeopardy grounds. View "Vermont v. Gagne" on Justia Law

Defendant Amy Koenig appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence that ultimately led to her arraignment for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant’s main argument on appeal was that the arresting trooper's entrance into the attached structure to her home (a "carport") and the resulting discovery of the damage to her vehicle constituted a warrantless search of the curtilage of her home in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Defendant contended that the trooper conducted an investigative stop in an area in which she had an expectation of privacy by approaching the residence through the attached structure, which was not a means of public access to the residence, and that a reasonable visitor would understand that the illuminated entranceway marked by a walkway was the normal access route. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by defendant's argument, concluding the trooper’s conduct was reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Article 11. View "Vermont v. Koenig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his “Petition for Extraordinary Relief” under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 21. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in construing and dismissing his pleading as a successive petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) that raised claims decided on the merits in an earlier PCR proceeding under 13 V.S.A. 7134. He argued that the bar on successive applications does not apply to his extraordinary relief petition and, in any event, his petition was not a successive application because his claims regarding his unlawful conviction, particularly those alleging he has endured “severe collateral consequences” as a result of the conviction, were never heard on the merits. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, despite plaintiff’s characterization of his petition as a pleading pursuant to Rule 75 and Rule 21, the trial court correctly recognized it as a successive PCR action and affirmed the dismissal. View "Chandler v. Vermont" on Justia Law