Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Applicants Cynthia and Charles Burns wanted to make modifications to a two-unit residential building they owned in Burlington. A group of nineteen Burlington residents (neighbors) appealed a Superior Court, Environmental Division decision declining to reach the merits of neighbors’ claim that applicants converted their home into a duplex without a zoning permit on the grounds that the challenge was precluded by a prior decision under 24 V.S.A. 4472(d) or to consider whether a permit was required for applicants’ other modifications. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, neighbors argued: (1) that their challenge was not precluded under section 4472(d) because the prior decision had not been rendered by the Burlington Zoning Administrator as the statute requires; (2) that preventing an appeal without affording notice and opportunity to be heard violated their due process rights; and (3) that they were entitled to a determination by the Environmental Division of whether applicants’ other modifications violated the zoning ordinance because they were done without a permit. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Burns Two-Unit Residential Building (Long, et al. Appellants)" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction by jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and disorderly conduct. Defendant was acquitted of reckless endangerment. Defendant was charged with these crimes after allegedly pointing a shotgun at and threatening to shoot two men who were repossessing a vehicle from a tenant parking lot on his property. Defendant admitted confronting the men with a gun, but steadfastly denied pointing it at them or threatening to shoot them. Defendant argued on appeal that the court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense, defense-of-others, and defense-of-property. He contended that the court compounded its error through its instruction on repossession of collateral. The Supreme Court found no plain error, and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Buckley" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted by jury of simple assault and placed on probation. He petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because the trial court improperly defined reasonable doubt for the jury, thus lowering the standard of proof. In the alternative, he raised three arguments regarding his probation conditions: (1) that they were unlawfully imposed on the grounds that the sentencing court mistakenly believed they were “standard”; (2) that the court failed to inform defendant of the content of the conditions at sentencing; and (3) that the imposed individual conditions were overbroad and vague, impermissibly delegated court authority to his probation officer, were unrelated to his offense, rehabilitation, or public safety, and were not supported by factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and conditions "H," "J," and "L," but remanded on condition "I" and struck all the other complained-of conditions. View "Vermont v. Levitt" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Kelley argued that the Vermont Supreme Court should have vacated his domestic assault conviction because numerous reversible errors occurred during his jury trial. Specifically, he claimed that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted two pieces of hearsay evidence; (2) that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) that the State made prejudicial remarks during its closing statement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a superior court’s order granting judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) challenging his third conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) following his sentencing for a fourth DUI offense that had been enhanced by the DUI-3 conviction. He argued that the trial court that accepted the plea agreement that led to his conviction for DUI-3 did not ensure his guilty plea was voluntary and supported by a factual basis as required by Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(d) and 11(f). As relief, he sought an order vacating the DUI-3 conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plea colloquy for the DUI-3 was inadequate to establish the factual basis required by Rule 11(f), but that Vermont's established law did not provide for an order vacating the DUI-3 conviction. Because the remedy for the improper conviction for the DUI-3 lied in the post-conviction challenge to the sentence for the DUI-4, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment vacating the 2014 sentence for DUI-4 and conduct a resentencing on that charge. View "In re Wight Manning" on Justia Law

The State appealed the dismissal of three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, filed against defendant Julianne Graham, a high school employee, based on her having engaged in sexual acts with a student over the summer break between defendant’s school contracts. The issue was whether the circumstances of this case supported the charges. The Supreme Court concluded that they did not, and affirmed the dismissal. View "Vermont v. Graham" on Justia Law

Police arrested defendant Stephen Howard for driving under the influence (DUI). The State appealed the granting of defendant’s motion to exclude evidence collected from a traffic violation stop of his car. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case because it concluded that the trooper who conducted the stop did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant committed a traffic violation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed: once "defendant crossed the center line, the trooper had a reasonable suspicion that defendant committed a traffic violation as soon as this crossing occurred." View "Vermont v. Howard" on Justia Law

Defendant James Anderson appealed a trial court’s decision finding he violated two conditions of probation for his failure to complete sex offender programming to the satisfaction of his probation officer during the unsuspended portion of his sentence. Defendant was convicted in 2003 and sentenced nineteen to twenty years, all suspended except eleven years. The sentencing court indicated that the split sentence was intended to deliver a “severe sanction” while giving defendant an option to make good on what he claimed was remorse and what he claimed to admit doing. For this reason, the trial court explained at sentencing that the split sentence was contingent on defendant completing sex offender treatment programming during the to-serve portion of his sentence. In 2014, while serving the unsuspended portion of his sentence, defendant entered the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Abusers, a six-month sex offender treatment program. On June 10, 2014, defendant was suspended from the treatment program for ninety days for his failure to admit responsibility for the sexual assault underlying his conviction. At that time, defendant was advised that readmission to the treatment program required that he answer and submit to his caseworker five standard questions no later than one week prior to the end of the ninety-day suspension period. In July, defendant’s probation officer filed a complaint, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his probation for failing to participate fully in and complete the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Offenders. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding no probable cause for a violation of probation because the affidavit in support of the complaint did not include an allegation that defendant had received written notice of the conditions of his release. Consistent with V.R.Cr.P. 36, the trial court subsequently directed its clerk to prepare a probation warrant placing defendant on probation with the standard conditions, specifically including special conditions "K" and "31." Two months later, defendant's probation officer again filed a complaint that he violated the special conditions of his probation. At a merits hearing, the trial court found defendant violated the special conditions. After review of defendant's arguments on appeal of the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant failed to meet his burden of persuasion that he did not violate his probation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Convicted sex offender, defendant Owen Cornell, appealed the imposition of six probation conditions ordered by the sentencing court. He argued four of the conditions, that he reside or work where his probation officer approves, attend counseling programs ordered by his probation officer, refrain from violent and threatening behavior, and avoid areas where children congregate, had already been deemed unlawful by the Vermont Supreme Court and should have been struck down. He further argued that the remaining two conditions, giving his probation officer warrantless search and seizure privileges and banning home computer and internet usage, imposed unduly restrictive and invasive terms that infringe upon defendant’s liberty, privacy, and autonomy rights. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with defendant as to the residence and employment, counseling, search and seizure, and home computer and internet use conditions, and remanded to the sentencing court for further justification, amendment, or elimination. The Court affirmed the imposition of the conditions prohibiting violent or threatening behavior and restricting access to areas where children congregate. View "Vermont v. Cornell" on Justia Law

Defendant Leo Reynolds was charged with four felony counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and one felony count of aggravated sexual assault on a victim younger than thirteen. Defendant was sixty-seven years old at the time of the charged conduct, and the alleged victim, defendant’s neighbor Z.Z., was seven years old. Defendant filed a motion to suppress in October 2014, arguing that the incriminating statements he made were the product of police coercion and thus taken in violation of his constitutional rights. In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged the trial court’s suppression of defendant’s pre-arrest confession to police. The State argued that the court erred in concluding that the confession was involuntarily made. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's suppression order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Reynolds" on Justia Law