Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed a trial court’s order revoking his probation. In May 2009, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of sixteen, a felony, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. The charges arose from an April 2009 incident in which defendant, then age twenty, had intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl in the back of a car after a night of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. In June 2010, the State filed a violation-of-probation complaint against defendant, alleging that he had been out of state without permission in violation of one of the conditions in his deferred-sentence agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the probation conditions that the trial court determined he had violated are unenforceable because he claims the conditions were not part of “a certificate explicitly setting forth the conditions” of probation, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c). Defendant also raised challenges to specific conditions, arguing that they are contradictory or vague and not enforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed a trial court’s order revoking his probation. In May 2009, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of sixteen, a felony, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. The charges arose from an April 2009 incident in which defendant, then age twenty, had intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl in the back of a car after a night of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. In June 2010, the State filed a violation-of-probation complaint against defendant, alleging that he had been out of state without permission in violation of one of the conditions in his deferred-sentence agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the probation conditions that the trial court determined he had violated are unenforceable because he claims the conditions were not part of “a certificate explicitly setting forth the conditions” of probation, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c). Defendant also raised challenges to specific conditions, arguing that they are contradictory or vague and not enforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

In December 2014, defendant Jeremy Gates was charged with felony extortion, domestic assault, and unlawful mischief in the amount of $250 or less following an incident involving his mother. Defendant appealed a 2016 superior court ruling revoking his right to bail under 13 V.S.A. 7575 after repeated violations of conditions of release (VCRs). Defendant argued that the trial court ruled on inadequate grounds, without making the necessary findings, and based on probable cause affidavits, rather than on an independent determination by a preponderance of direct evidence required for bail revocation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that defendant had violated section 7575(1) so as to revoke his conditions of release. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Gates" on Justia Law

Defendant Tisa Farrow was arraigned on charges of driving under the influence (DUI). Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from evidence the arresting officer’s testimony about his observations and opinion regarding defendant’s performance of the “Modified Rhomberg Test” (MRT), as well as the videotape of the event. Defendant had previously declined to perform field sobriety tests. Thereafter, at the officer’s request, defendant began the exercise in question, which involved closing her eyes, leaning her head back, and counting thirty seconds. She stopped five to eight seconds later, indicating that she did not want to do the exercise. Defendant’s written motion stated that the MRT evidence was irrelevant because the exercise was never completed and was thus unreliable, and that even if the evidence was marginally relevant, any probative value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on the admissibility of evidence of defendant’s decision not to complete a field sobriety exercise as requested by a police officer in the context of an answer to a question the Court left open in a prior decision: Under the Vermont Constitution, is a defendant’s refusal or failure to perform voluntary field sobriety exercises admissible if the defendant was not advised at the time of the refusal that evidence of a refusal to perform the exercises may be admissible in court? The Court concluded that the refusal evidence was admissible without regard to whether police advised the individual that a refusal to perform the exercises could be admitted as evidence in court. Because the Court rejected defendant’s argument to the contrary on this point, as well as her arguments that on the record in this case the evidence in question was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Farrow" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of sexual assault. On appeal of that conviction, he argued: (1) the seating of two biased jurors deprived him of his right to an impartial jury; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error by prohibiting him from using a prior conviction to impeach a witness; and (3) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument violated his right to a fair trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atherton a/k/a Melton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a citizen of the Dominican Republic who lived and worked legally in Massachusetts as a permanent resident of the United States. In June 2013, he pleaded guilty to one charge of felony domestic assault stemming from a May 2013 incident in which he attempted to strangle his girlfriend at her home in Rutland. Defendant signed a written plea agreement prior to a change-of-plea hearing. Shortly after defendant was released on probation, the federal government issued a detainer to place him into deportation proceedings upon completion of his sentence. Then, in late October 2013, Rutland police responded to two calls in which defendant’s girlfriend alleged that defendant battered or otherwise assaulted her. As a result of the latter two incidents, in August 2014 defendant pleaded guilty both to a charge of violation of probation and to a second, misdemeanor charge of domestic assault. Again, defendant signed a written plea agreement prior to the change-of-plea hearing. The language of this agreement concerning the possible collateral consequences of a conviction on his immigration status was identical to that of the prior written agreement. In January 2015, defendant filed a motion to withdraw both of his guilty pleas on the basis that the court had not properly advised him that deportation was a risk of pleading guilty. The court denied this motion, finding that there was no substantive difference between what the court advised defendant and specifically telling him that he could be “deported.” Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in his two domestic assault cases. Defendant argued that the court erred by not using the term “deportation” or “clearly equivalent language” to advise him that deportation was a possible consequence of pleading guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Rosenfield appealed the denial of his motion, which requested that the trial court “correct the record” by amending his third driving-under-the-influence (DUI) conviction to appear as a DUI-1. Defendant filed the motion with the ultimate goal of reducing his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor to reduce its collateral consequences. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Rosenfield" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and a special condition of probation imposed following a guilty plea for sexual assault of a minor. He argued that probation condition 43, which gave his probation officer unbridled authority over where defendant lived and worked, was overbroad. Furthermore, defendant argued the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding he would be in breach of his plea agreement if he elected to argue for a lighter prison sentence. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s sentence apart from probation condition 43, which the Court held was imposed in plain error. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to justify, make more specific, or strike. View "Vermont v. Careau" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Bryan appeals appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw counsel and order finding him in violation of his probation. The critical question in this case was whether sexually touching a minor violated a probation condition prohibiting violent or threatening behavior. After review, the Supreme Court held that defendant’s act constituted violent behavior, and affirmed the trial court’s rulings. View "Vermont v. Bryan" on Justia Law

Defendant Shamel Alexander appealed his conviction for trafficking heroin. He argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Based on its review of the facts entered into evidence at trial, the Supreme Court agreed with defendant and reversed. View "Vermont v. Alexander" on Justia Law