Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case concerns appellants Sandra Baird and Jared Carter's standing to challenge the City of Burlington's recently adopted “Church Street Marketplace District trespass authority” ordinance (trespass ordinance). The Marketplace District is a quasi-public entity organized in 1979 pursuant to the Burlington city charter. It includes member businesses that pay for membership through extra tax assessments and/or membership payments and it is overseen by a Marketplace Commission, a private organization consisting of nine members with an Executive Director. Despite having the character of an outdoor pedestrian mall, Church Street is nevertheless a public right-of-way and is accessible to the public twenty-four hours a day. Thus, all state criminal statutes, rules of criminal procedure, and city ordinances apply within the Marketplace District. Appellants Sandra Baird, a social activist and adjunct college professor, and Jared Carter, an adjunct law professor, are Burlington residents and licensed Vermont attorneys. Both appellants pay real property taxes to the City as well as municipal sales tax on purchases in the city. Appellants also frequent Church Street and have been opposed to the trespass ordinance since its inception. Although appellant Carter has alleged that he was threatened with enforcement of the trespass ordinance on one occasion, neither appellant has in fact received a Marketplace District notice of trespass. appellant Baird filed a complaint against the City for declaratory and injunctive relief, which appellant Carter later joined, claiming that the trespass ordinance was both unconstitutional and ultra vires. In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, citing that neither Baird nor Carter had been directly injured by the ordinance. After a one-day hearing, the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss based on lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants Sandra Baird and Jared Carter appeal a final judgment by the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, granting appellee City of Burlington’s (the City) motion to dismiss for lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. View "Baird v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivan Alcide was charged with possession of heroin and cocaine and sought to suppress all evidence of drugs seized from his vehicle after a police dog indicated the presence of drugs. The trial court found that the contraband was obtained through the illegal expansion of the scope of a vehicle violation stop into a criminal drug investigation, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the charges. The State appealed the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress and dismiss. On appeal, the State argued that a minimal delay following the completion of a traffic stop for a dog sniff was reasonable under federal and state law and, in the alternative, that the trial court committed plain error in excluding evidence based upon an illegal detention when the evidence was unrelated to the detention itself. Defendant moved to dismiss the State's appeal on grounds the State untimely filed its notice of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court rejected defendant’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case against defendant. View "Vermont v. Alcide" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Peter Goewey, then age sixty-one, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault for repeatedly performing oral sex on a young man. At a contested sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to twenty years to life. Defendant challenged this sentencing decision, alleging various constitutional and procedural errors. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Goewey" on Justia Law

The State appealed Superior Court decisions to seal certain portions of competency reports prepared in connection with court ordered competency evaluations of Anthony Gotavaskas and Grant Bercik, defendants in two separate criminal cases. Gotavaskas was charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling in one docket and providing false information and operation without the owner’s consent in a second docket. At his arraignment, Gotavaskas raised the issue of his competency and the trial court ordered a competency evaluation. A competency evaluation concluded that Gotavaskas was competent to stand trial. The State offered the competency evaluation into evidence, contending that the entire report should be admitted under 13 V.S.A. 4816(e). Gotavaskas did not contest the competency finding, but he objected to the admission of the entire report and offered a redacted version excluding portions he claimed were not relevant. The State disagreed, contending that because the evaluating doctor relied upon all of the information in the report as a basis for his opinion, the entire report should be admitted for its relevancy on the issue of Gotavaskas’ competency. The court redacted the competency report to include only information regarding the evaluator’s impressions of Gotavaskas and specific findings as to competence. Bercik was charged with simple assault. He was arraigned and pled not guilty. Several months after arraignment, Bercik filed a motion for competency and sanity evaluations, which the court granted. A competency evaluation concluded that Bercik was incompetent to stand trial. A competency hearing was held, at which time the State sought a finding of incompetency and the admission of the entirety of the evaluator’s report. Although Bercik agreed that there should be a lack of competency finding, he opposed the admittance of the entire report, requesting that the court temporarily seal the report. The court made a finding of incompetency and received the evaluator’s report under seal, deferring ruling on the admission of the report pending further briefing by the parties. Although not admitted in evidence, the court based its finding of incompetence upon the conclusions contained in the report. In review of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not make specific findings on the record as to a threshold question: “the statute contemplates that some portions of a competency report might not be relevant, and thus not required to be admitted, it does not suggest that any other application of ‘relevance’ should be used in considering what portions of a competency report are relevant for competency purposes other than that which is set forth in V.R.E. 401, the test for relevancy in Vermont courts. Whatever standard the trial court used here, it did not apply a V.R.E. 401 analysis to its decision on what portions of the reports to admit and what portions to exclude. It should have done so.” The cases were remanded for the trial court to make findings pursuant to V.R.E. 401. View "Vermont v. Gotavaskas" on Justia Law

Defendant Eric Manning was charged with possession of cocaine following a traffic stop. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the investigative detention, arguing that it was the result of an unlawful search and seizure that exceeded the scope of the suspended license investigation in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. He also moved to suppress statements made before the officer advised him of his Miranda rights, arguing that the questioning outside his vehicle amounted to a custodial interrogation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress, and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Manning" on Justia Law

Defendant Kent Richland was convicted by jury and sentenced to probation for enabling the consumption of alcohol by a minor. In 2013, defendant received a text message from a sixteen-year-old minor asking defendant to purchase alcohol for him. Defendant agreed but could not find his identification and instead arranged for a friend to purchase the alcohol. Later that day, defendant's friend purchased a bottle of gin for the minor at a local beverage store. The next day, the minor was found dead near his family home after crashing his all-terrain vehicle (ATV) while intoxicated. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that he had knowledge of the minor's age or that he created a direct and immediate opportunity for the minor to consume alcohol. The court denied defendant's motion, finding the evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty and reiterating its statement that the age element is strict liability and does not require proof of knowledge. Defendant was found guilty after a short jury deliberation and sentenced to twelve-to-twenty-four-months incarceration, all suspended except for six months to serve. Defendant raised four issues on appeal: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that 7 V.S.A. 658(a)(2) did not require knowledge of the minor's age; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove defendant enabled the minor's alcohol consumption; (3) the court's imposition of probation during the pendency of this appeal created a harsher, indeterminate term of probation, thereby penalizing defendant for exercising his right to appeal; and (4) the standard form probation conditions were invalid. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant on the first issue and held that section 658(a)(2) required the State to prove defendant had knowledge of the minor's age and that the court's error in instructing the jury to the contrary was not harmless. Because the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, it did not address the remaining three issues. View "Vermont v. Richland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of disorderly conduct and grossly negligent operation. He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant also challenged various conditions of probation. The charges stemmed from a March 2013 incident involving defendant and his neighbor. The neighbor was driving home on the dirt road. He was traveling approximately ten miles per hour and playing his music loudly with the windows rolled down. After passing defendant's house, the neighbor noticed a white car quickly coming up behind him. The car passed the neighbor on the left, pulled back into the middle of the road, and braked, turning sideways and blocking the road. Defendant got out of the white car and began screaming and swearing at the neighbor. He threatened the neighbor and said he was tired of the neighbor's loud music. Another person also witnessed defendant yelling. The neighbor took several pictures of the scene as he sat in his car, one of which was admitted into evidence. The picture showed tire marks across the road and defendant's car stopped in the middle of the road. The neighbor testified that had he not braked, he would have hit defendant's car. Defendant did not present any evidence on his own behalf. The jury found defendant guilty, and defendant was sentenced to two concurrent thirty-to-sixty-day sentences, all suspended, with two years of probation. With regard to probation, the State requested that the court impose the "standard conditions of probation," with the exception of restrictions on defendant's out-of-state travel, the imposition of a curfew, and the restriction on his associations (other than contacting, abusing, or harassing the neighbor). As a "special" condition, the State requested that defendant visit a mental-health counselor for an initial screening, follow any recommendations thereafter, and sign the necessary waivers to allow his probation officer to monitor his attendance and participation. Defendant also voiced concern over a mental-health condition, and over any "vague" release he may be required to sign in conjunction with mental-health counseling. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, but struck several of the probation conditions. View "Vermont v. Putnam" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that he was illegally seized when a police officer approached his parked car twice in a short period and, during the second encounter, asked him pointed questions about drugs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed and remanded the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Winters" on Justia Law

Defendant William Stanley, Sr., appealed his conviction of sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court: (1) erroneously permitted the trial and sentencing to proceed in his absence; (2) erroneously permitted the State to introduce an uncharged prior bad act as evidence; and (3) imposed the habitual-offender enhancement in a way that may have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Bandler and MB&Co, Ltd. ("corporation") filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling that Bandler, a non-attorney, could not represent corporation in this case. Bandler was the sole shareholder and president of corporation. Bandler sued Charter One Bank, raising several claims based on the bank's alleged failure to honor advertising promises and other representations in connection with a checking account. He argued that the trial court violated his due-process rights by ruling on the basis of the parties' respective written submissions on the issue of representation without giving him prior notice of its concerns about his representation so that he could respond "by way of papers [or] argument" before the trial court issued its ruling. Having "serious concerns about Mr. Bandler's ability to present the Corporation's claims in this case," the trial court concluded that allowing Bandler to represent corporation would be unduly burdensome to the court. The Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention on appeal, finding the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding the pending motions without a hearing or argument and without soliciting further written argument from plaintiffs. View "Bandler v. Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer, LLP" on Justia Law