Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Michael Bandler and MB&Co, Ltd. ("corporation") filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling that Bandler, a non-attorney, could not represent corporation in this case. Bandler was the sole shareholder and president of corporation. Bandler sued Charter One Bank, raising several claims based on the bank's alleged failure to honor advertising promises and other representations in connection with a checking account. He argued that the trial court violated his due-process rights by ruling on the basis of the parties' respective written submissions on the issue of representation without giving him prior notice of its concerns about his representation so that he could respond "by way of papers [or] argument" before the trial court issued its ruling. Having "serious concerns about Mr. Bandler's ability to present the Corporation's claims in this case," the trial court concluded that allowing Bandler to represent corporation would be unduly burdensome to the court. The Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention on appeal, finding the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding the pending motions without a hearing or argument and without soliciting further written argument from plaintiffs. View "Bandler v. Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant David Tracy's daughter was one of fifteen girls on a junior high school girls’ basketball team. The basketball coach did not play defendant’s daughter in the first two games of the season. Shortly after the end of the second game, defendant approached the coach and the coach’s nineteen-year-old daughter in the school parking lot. The coach and the coach’s daughter both testified that defendant was calm at the start of the conversation, but that the exchange soon became heated and agitated. Defendant began by saying that “he just wanted to know why [the coach] wouldn’t put his daughter in a game.” That exchange lead to charges against defendant for disorderly conduct by “abusive . . . language.” The trial court, following a bench trial, concluded that defendant’s language was not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it constituted “fighting words.” On appeal, defendant argued that the “abusive language” prong of Vermont’s disorderly-conduct statute was overbroad and impermissibly chills a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech without serving a compelling state interest. He further argued that, even if the statute was constitutional on its face, the speech for which he was convicted in this case was constitutionally protected. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the speech for which defendant was convicted was beyond the reach of the abusive-language prong of the disorderly-conduct statute, and reversed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Tracy" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cherie Hyde brought an action for post-conviction relief (PCR), challenging her felony conviction and sentence for aiding another as an accessory to commit sexual assault on a child under the age of sixteen. She appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the State on that PCR petition, arguing: (1) the three-year statute of limitations governing aiding in the commission of a sexual assault had expired; (2) she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to raise the statute-of-limitations defense; and (3) the court failed to establish a factual basis for the claim, and therefore, her plea was not voluntary. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Cherie Hyde" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Brown petitioned for post-conviction relief following the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State based on a determination that the criminal court complied with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4) in deviating from the original plea agreement. In 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a minor and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. In total, petitioner agreed to a five-to-fifteen-year split sentence, with two years to serve, as well as the imposition of sex-offender probation conditions. Petitioner and the criminal court engaged in a colloquy, and the court accepted petitioner’s guilty plea but reserved final sentencing until after the release of the presentence investigation report (PSI). The criminal court reviewed the PSI, which differed from the original plea agreement in two important aspects: (1) the PSI recommended a three-to-twenty-year straight sentence; and (2) the report recommended three additional probation conditions. The State acknowledged that these conditions were not part of the original plea agreement and stated, “I suppose, in theory, if the court was not willing to accept the plea agreement without those conditions . . . then that would be a change in the plea agreement and the defendant would have a right to withdraw from it.” The court stated that it was going forward with the sentence as outlined in the original plea agreement, with the addition of the special probation conditions recommended in the PSI, minus the alcohol condition. Petitioner inquired about the two special conditions, which he felt were contradictory. The court explained the conditions and made sure that petitioner understood them; petitioner confirmed that he did. The court directed the clerk to impose the five-to-fifteen-year split sentence with the two added conditions. In 2014, petitioner filed his PCR petition, alleging that the criminal court violated Rule 11(e)(4) when it failed to explicitly inform him that he had the right to withdraw his plea after the criminal court imposed the additional probation conditions. Finding that the State was entitled to summary judgment based on its review of the criminal court record, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief. View "In re Derrick Brown" on Justia Law

In July 2014, defendant Kelly Taylor was stopped by a police officer in Lyndonville on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). At the stop, defendant submitted to a preliminary breath test showing an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Defendant was arrested and taken to the Vermont State Police barracks in St. Johnsbury, where she took an evidentiary breath-alcohol test using a DataMaster DMT breath-alcohol testing device. This test showed that defendant’s alcohol concentration was 0.158, above the legal limit. Defendant appealed the civil suspension of her driver’s license. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of showing that the breath-alcohol concentration “testing methods were valid and reliable” and that “[t]he test results were accurate and accurately evaluated,” when the printout (“ticket”) generated by the DataMaster device was not admitted into evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a minor under the age of thirteen. Defendant was the victim's uncle. After the incident, T.B. left the house and waited in the farm store across the street from her home until her aunt came home. Later that night, T.B. wrote a letter about the incident and about how she no longer felt safe in her home. The next morning on the bus, she showed the letter to a friend, who encouraged her to tell the school principal. T.B. showed the letter to the vice principal, and the school officials called the police and a Department for Children and Families case worker. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements under Vermont Rule of Evidence 804a; (2) admitting expert testimony under Vermont Rule of Evidence 702; and (3) coercing a jury verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Perley was charged with numerous crimes in March 2013, including: leaving the scene of an accident; violating conditions of release; operating with a suspended license driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; and refusing to submit to an evidentiary test. Defendant pled nolo contendere to the first three charges. Defendant appealed his conviction for refusing to submit to an evidentiary test, arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove the “reasonableness” of the State’s request for an evidentiary breath test beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Perley" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Aiken appealed a superior court order denying his motion to suppress his refusal to submit to an evidentiary breath test on grounds that he was denied his right to counsel. Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to operating the vehicle, and preliminary breath and field sobriety tests indicated that defendant’s blood-alcohol content was above the legal limit. Defendant was detained and taken to the police barracks for processing. During processing, the sergeant read defendant his rights under Vermont’s implied-consent law. Defendant asked to speak with an attorney, and two on-call public defenders were telephoned. Defendant explained to the sergeant that he had been on hold for ten minutes, the sergeant again attempted to call both public defenders. There was no answer at any of the numbers called for the on-call attorney, and the back-up attorney’s line was busy. The sergeant told defendant that he had ten more minutes and that if neither public defender returned his call he would have to decide whether or not to take the evidentiary breath test regardless of obtaining legal consultation. After the thirty minutes elapsed, the sergeant asked defendant if he would submit to the breath test. Defendant refused to answer, and the sergeant understood this as a refusal to take the test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant renewed on appeal his argument that Vermont case law holding that the defender general’s office had a statutory obligation to provide twenty-four-hour legal consultation to DUI detainees, and while he was on hold for a public defender, defendant received no substantive advice. "Although the consultation here was brief, an attorney-client relationship was formed," and the Supreme Court believed "that peering behind the veil of that privacy to ascertain the quality of the consultation would open the door to eroding the privacy afforded to detainees in their right to counsel." Because defendant failed to make a decision on whether or not to take the test, the trial court did not err in denying is motion to suppress. View "Vermont v. Aiken" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeremy Lucas appealed a trial-court order finding him in violation of a probation condition (imposed as part of a deferred-sentencing agreement) requiring prior approval from a probation officer before he changed his residence. Defendant argued that because his probation conditions included two inconsistent provisions governing his choice of residence, he did not have adequate notice that his conduct would violate the conditions of his probation. Defendant also argued that the condition at issue here contained an overly broad delegation of authority to his probation officer, and that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his deferred sentence because the violation was minor and the probation officer ultimately approved the View "Vermont v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a superior court decision that concluded he violated the condition of his probation requiring him to complete the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Abusers (VTPSA). The court found that defendant failed to complete the required program, but it refused to review the underlying disciplinary action of the Department of Corrections (DOC) that resulted in defendant's removal from the program. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the DOC's decision to terminate him from VTPSA. Specifically, defendant argued that: (1) the court was authorized by statute to make a final determination of whether there were grounds for revocation; (2) the court's delegation of decisionmaking authority to the DOC in a probation-violation matter violated the separation-of-powers doctrine; and (3) violation-of-probation hearings involved constitutional questions that the court had the power to review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the alleged substantive ground central to this appeal was a violation of VTPSA's cardinal rule against physical violence or threats of physical violence. The trial court failed to determine whether the requirement was violated. Nor did it exercise its discretion to determine whether the alleged violation was such that revocation should be ordered. Because the Supreme Court reversed on these bases, it did not reach defendant's other arguments. View "Vermont v. Cavett" on Justia Law