Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Stephen L. Eldert appealed the revocation of his probation resulting from a violation of a probation condition that he not purchase, possess, or consume alcohol. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court erred in admitting unreliable hearsay evidence at the revocation hearing, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Eldert" on Justia Law

Appellant Allstate Bail Bonds ("Allstate") challenged the trial court's decision to grant the State's motion for forfeiture of bond. Defendant was arraigned for grand larceny and possession of stolen property. Two days later, the court set bail at $35,000. Defendant posted bail on July 2, 2013 through a bond procured from Allstate. Allstate delivered a surety bond for defendant. On January 10, 2014, defendant was incarcerated in New York on separate charges. As a result of his incarceration, defendant failed to appear at Bennington Superior Court for final calendar call on February 4, 2014, a required appearance. The next day, the court issued a warrant for defendant's arrest. On March 11, 2014, the State filed a motion to forfeit bail due to defendant's failure to appear. On June 17, 2014, the court ordered full forfeiture, finding that defendant's incarceration did not justify relief from forfeiture. On appeal, Allstate argued that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to reduce the amount of bail forfeiture when Allstate could not produce defendant due to his out-of-state incarceration. The Supreme Court agreed that Allstate was entitled to a reduction in bail forfeiture, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Mottolese" on Justia Law

Defendant John Galanes appealed a superior court order that concluded he violated certain conditions of his probation, notably, the condition that required him to notify his probation officer if he was planning to begin a sexual relationship. Defendant was convicted of several felony and misdemeanor offenses and placed on probation. In August 2013, after two separate probation violations in 2010 and 2013, defendant was placed on stricter conditions regarding sexual relationships. The testimony of defendant and his housekeeper disclosed that, at the time of the encounter underlying this suit, the housekeeper did not know that defendant was at home and in the shower. Defendant came out of the shower in a towel while the housekeeper was in the bedroom folding laundry. At that point, the two had sex. The housekeeper testified that there was no planning on the part of either her or defendant. Although the trial court made no explicit findings on the number of incidents and when they occurred, its decision reflected that it was deciding the case based on the occurrence of only one sexual encounter after the date the probation condition was added. Consistent with the trial court's decision, the State based its argument on appeal on the same single incident and did not rely on multiple encounters. In revoking defendant's probation, the trial court acknowledged that defendant did not plan the sexual encounter with his housekeeper but that he should have anticipated the encounter based upon the close friendship between the two. The Supreme Court reversed, "[t]o anticipate that something may happen is not the same as to plan for it. In fact, the court concluded only that defendant should have anticipated the encounter, not that he actually did anticipate it. As such, even if we put aside the question of whether the term is ambiguous, we do not accept the trial court's conclusion as sufficient to support a finding that defendant violated the condition." View "Vermont v. Galanes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary and aggravated assault arising from an August 2012 incident in which he and a co-defendant entered a home in the Town of Enosburg, assaulted a resident, and stole prescription drugs. Defendant pled guilty to the charges in August 2013, and appeared for a contested sentencing hearing in February 2014. In addition to the burglary and assault, defendant was also appearing for sentencing on two unrelated convictions of grand larceny and simple assault. Defendant challenged his sentence of imprisonment for convictions of aggravated assault and burglary, asserting that the trial court improperly relied on evidence from his co-defendant's trial without providing defendant with notice and an opportunity to respond. After review, the Supreme Court agreed, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Vermont v. Delisle" on Justia Law

Defendant Lawrence Alers was convicted by jury of simple assault. He appealed, arguing: (1) that the trial court's admission of a particular out-of-court statement under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that without the offending evidence, the State did not present sufficient evidence of bodily injury to support the conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the out-of-court statement was testimonial, its admission did violate defendant's confrontation rights. Although the error was not harmless, the Court concluded that even in the absence of the offending evidence, the State presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Alers" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles (Hank) Madigan appealed his conviction on three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child. The charges related to three incidents which the victim, A.R., described in her testimony. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing two witnesses to testify to the victim's character and reputation for truthfulness; (2) that the trial court admitted impermissible hearsay; and (3) that the prosecution's closing argument was improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the admission of testimony to bolster A.R.'s truthfulness was admitted improperly; (2) the trial court indeed, admitted impermissible hearsay; and (3) the prosecution's closing argument was improper and not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Madigan" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Robert Vezina pleaded guilty to one count of petit larceny in connection with the theft of seven pieces of musical equipment in July 2012. Defendant's sentence included a restitution order. The items taken were from the victim's rare drumming equipment collection, much of which was no longer being produced. The court found that the items which were damaged or stolen were collector's items, for which there is no "blue book" value as there is for automobiles. They were in "impeccable" condition before the larceny, as the owner did not let others play or touch his drum equipment. Because they are no longer being produced, most of the items in the owner's collection, when they were intact, were probably more valuable than when the owner originally purchased them. The cymbals that were damaged are no longer valuable collector's items. Defendant challenged the restitution order for the cymbals, arguing the trial court erred by concluding that certain cymbals that had been stolen but then returned in a degraded but functional condition were worthless; by awarding restitution based on the subjective value of the cymbals to the victim; and by ordering defendant to pay restitution without making a finding on his ability to pay. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed on the first two issues, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings concerning defendant's ability to pay. View "Vermont v. Vezina" on Justia Law

Defendant Gordon Campbell appealed two special sex-offender conditions of probation imposed upon him following being sentenced on a plea agreement for one count of aggravated assault and one count of sexual assault. The charges stemmed from an incident occurring earlier that March during which defendant, after drinking several pitchers of beer at several bars in downtown Burlington, was approached on the street by a young man looking for directions to a local house and for some cocaine. During the encounter, defendant offered the young man money in exchange for oral sex. The young man declined and began to walk away, but defendant followed him, repeatedly asking for oral sex and offering to pay. After the young man told defendant that he was not a "faggot," defendant physically and sexually assaulted the young man behind a restaurant. In March 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, defendant pled guilty to all counts and was sentenced that August. Subsequently, defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition in the civil division and moved for summary judgment. The civil division granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, vacated defendant's sentence, and remanded to the criminal division with leave for defendant to withdraw his plea. Thereafter, defendant and the State negotiated a new plea agreement where defendant agreed to plead guilty to the two assault charges and the State agreed it would dismiss the violation-of-conditions charge. A pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and psycho-sexual evaluation were ordered to accompany the new plea agreement, and the court delayed accepting the agreement until it had a chance to review the PSI. Defendant, upon receipt of the PSI and prior to the sentencing hearing, filed various written objections to the PSI with the court, including objections to the two special sex-offender conditions of probation, in the language originally proposed by DOC in the PSI. Specifically, defendant challenged condition 42, requiring that defendant submit to and pay for polygraph examinations; and condition 44, requiring that defendant reside and work only where approved by his probation officer. After the Supreme Court's review, defendant's sentence was affirmed in all respects except that the work / employment provisions of condition 44 were stricken and the matter remanded to the criminal division of the superior court for an opportunity to justify, revise, or remove those provisions of condition 44 consistent with the Court's opinion, and to make any findings the criminal division deemed necessary. View "Vermont v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of sexual assault and sexual assault of a vulnerable adult based on a single incident. Defendant was in his seventies at the time of the incident that led to the charges against him, and lived in the same residential facility for disabled adults and senior citizens as the complaining witness, a woman with intellectual disabilities. He argued on appeal of his convictions that the court erred by: (1) allowing a three-week separation period between jury selection and the commencement of his trial; (2) denying his motion to dismiss one of the convictions on double-jeopardy grounds; and (3) admitting the hearsay testimony of the complainant's brother under the excited-utterance exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the sexual assault conviction on double jeopardy-grounds, but rejected defendant's other arguments and affirmed his conviction of sexual assault of a vulnerable adult, as well as the sentence imposed for that conviction. View "Vermont v. Breed" on Justia Law

In June 2013, defendant was driving through downtown Bennington when he was stopped by a police officer. The officer stopped defendant after the officer saw a pine-tree-shaped air freshener hanging from the defendant's rearview mirror. As a result of observations the officer made in connection with the stop, and ensuing events, defendant was charged with driving over the legal limit and driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of the traffic stop based on the presence of that air freshener hanging from his rearview mirror, and his ensuing conviction. The State argued that hanging an air freshener from the rearview mirror violated 23 V.S.A. 1125. The defendant argued that hanging an air freshener from the rearview mirror did not violate that statute if the item did not materially obstruct the driver's vision. At the subsequent bench trial, the arresting officer testified that a driver of the car could "observe the road directly ahead," notwithstanding the presence of the air freshener. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on that statutory authority: whether 23 V.S.A. 1125 prohibited the hanging of any item on the inside of a windshield, including a pine-tree-shaped air freshener, without regard to whether the item materially obstructs the driver's vision. The Court concluded that the applicable statute did not per se prohibit the hanging of any item on the inside of a windshield without regard to whether it obstructs the driver's vision. However, because the officer's mistake of law on this point was objectively reasonable and thus justified the stop, the Court affirmed the judgment below. View "Vermont v. Hurley" on Justia Law