Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Louis Fucci, Jr. pled guilty to two counts of soliciting another person for a murder-for-hire plot, and one count of obstruction of justice by seeking to have an opposing party in a civil lawsuit killed. The hiree turned out to be a confidential informant for law enforcement. The State originally charged defendant with two counts of attempted first-degree murder and two counts of inciting to felony. He appealed his conviction for obstruction of justice by challenging the validity of his guilty plea. He argued that: his conviction was void because the State failed to establish jurisdiction over the matter; the plea was unsupported by a factual basis; and, without establishing that he had the "requisite evil purpose" to obstruct the due administration of justice, his plea was involuntary. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Fucci" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the criminal division's denial of his motion to suppress and dismiss his charge for driving under the influence (DUI). In that motion, defendant claimed the evidence underlying his DUI charge should have been suppressed because the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop of his vehicle. The issue this case presented for review was whether all turns of the steering wheel require a signal. The trial court found that defendant violated Vermont's turn-signal statute, so the arresting officers had justification to pull him over. It accordingly denied defendant's motion. After review, the Supreme Court held that defendant did not violate that statute, and therefore reversed. View "Vermont v. Hutchins" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a fight between defendant and his brother. Defendant Gordon Noyes, Jr. appealed his convictions for disorderly conduct and simple assault by mutual affray following a jury trial. He argued these convictions should have been reversed because: (1) the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence suggesting that defendant was having an affair with his stepdaughter; (2) the court erroneously allowed the State to confront its witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (3) the prosecutor improperly led witnesses and made comments on the evidence; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his disorderly conduct conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Noyes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph Nelson, the former town manager of St. Johnsbury, appealed a trial court decision granting partial summary judgment to defendants, the Town of St. Johnsbury and its individual selectboard members (collectively "the Town"), on his claims of wrongful termination; violation of procedural due process under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983; violation of Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution; and promissory estoppel. In September 2010, the selectboard formally hired plaintiff as town manager after he served briefly on an interim basis. According to plaintiff, the Town's attorney advised him on three separate occasions that he could be removed only for serious misconduct, which the attorney assured was "an extremely high bar." As town manager, plaintiff undertook a major project to renovate and lease the Town's Pomerleau Building. He gained voter approval on a renovation budget and negotiated a lease with a potential tenant. The selectboard contended plaintiff made certain misrepresentations about the proposed lease, which plaintiff denied. Selectboard chair James Rust informed plaintiff that the board had concerns about his performance and gave him a letter stating that the board would be conducting an inquiry. Rust called plaintiff and notified him that the selectboard would be meeting but that plaintiff was not obligated to attend (plaintiff nonetheless attended). When the meeting convened that evening, the selectboard immediately recessed to executive session. After forty-five minutes, the board asked plaintiff to join them, at which time they discussed the lease. The selectboard asked plaintiff if he wanted to resign, and he declined. Consequently, the board returned to public session and passed a vote of "no confidence." According to plaintiff, he did not understand until that time that the selectboard was terminating his employment. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful termination, Civil Rights Act, and state constitutional claims. The Court affirmed the court's dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim and its grant of summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense. View "Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

E.W. was fifteen years old, in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and living in a foster home when in 2013, a Vermont state trooper in uniform arrived at E.W.'s foster home to investigate a break-in and motor-vehicle theft. E.W.'s foster father then spoke privately with E.W. and told him not to say anything to the officer until the foster father contacted DCF. When asked what he and E.W. discussed, the foster father responded, "[h]onesty," explaining that he was "trying to encourage E.W. to be honest," and how "[i]t's not always easy to do the right thing." He denied specifically directing E.W. to do the right thing, however, or telling him that he had to speak with the officer. The foster father telephoned for guidance from E.W.'s guardian ad litem (GAL), who told him that "[u]sually the attorneys do not like the children interviewed unless they are there." The GAL then attempted to reach E.W.'s attorney, leaving a voice mail, and then spoke with the foster father again. The GAL advised him to be present during any conversation between E.W. and the police officer. The GAL could not reach E.W.'s attorney. The interview was not recorded; no Miranda warnings were given. The foster father was present throughout. He recalled that the officer "asked E.W. about where the car was," informing him that the police "were aware" he had taken it to Derby "but didn't know where it had gone after that." The foster father also recalled that he twice interrupted the officer's questioning to speak privately with E.W. when it appeared that "the floodgates . . . opened" and E.W. started making admissions to offenses beyond those that the officer had described. E.W. was subsequently charged with two counts of burglary, four counts of unlawful trespass in an occupied residence, three counts of petit larceny, one count of unlawful mischief, and one count of operating a vehicle without owner consent. He moved to suppress his statements to the officer and dismiss all counts, asserting violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that E.W. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that Miranda warnings were therefore not required. E.W. then entered a conditional plea to all counts except the unlawful-mischief count, which was dismissed by the State, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, E.W. argued that his motion to suppress should have been granted under both the federal and state constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that E.W. was in custody, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. The trial court's judgment was reversed. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and his conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI). He argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds to stop him, and thus, the court should have granted his motion to suppress and dismiss. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Latonia Congress was convicted by jury of second-degree murder. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, in a murder prosecution, a jury can find a defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, on grounds that the evidence of defendant's actions were influenced by a serious psychological condition that does not rise to the level of insanity, and does not negate the defendant's specific intent to kill. The Court concluded after review of the particular circumstances of this case, that the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's psychological condition as a basis for convicting her of voluntary manslaughter, and rejected defendant's challenges on appeal to several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. View "Vermont v. Congress" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred by allowing certain hearsay testimony to be considered by the jury; (2) the trial court erred in scheduling a six-day delay between jury selection and trial without obtaining a waiver from defendant; and (3) the State's use of inflammatory language and arguments regarding complainant's character during closing arguments was plain error. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial on the first ground without reaching defendant's other arguments. View "Vermont v. Groce" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, defendants Brian Grenier and Jessica Harris's were charged with driving under the influence (DUI), and appealed the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress the results of their breath-alcohol tests taken by the DataMaster DMT machine. Defendants moved to suppress the evidentiary breath-alcohol test results, arguing (1) that the Vermont Commissioner of Health did not approve the DataMaster DMT machine used to obtain the breath-alcohol results, as required by statute and rules adopted by the Vermont Department of Health (DOH); and (2) that admission of the DMT results would violate defendants' due process rights under the United States and Vermont constitutions because of alleged ongoing mechanical problems with the machines and unprofessional practices by DOH employees. Defendants requested an evidentiary hearing on their claims. The court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, finding it unnecessary because, even taking defendants' allegations as true, the parties did not dispute the relevant material facts. At trial, defendants vigorously attacked the reliability of the test and urged the jury to give it no weight. In particular, defendants relied on evidence of ongoing technical problems with the machines and of unprofessional conduct within the DOH, allegations that a subsequent internal investigation determined to be unfounded. Defendant Grenier was convicted by a jury of DUI, and defendant Harris pled guilty to the same charge, but conditioned on her appeal of the trial court's rulings. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants' requests for an evidentiary hearing and that it erred in denying defendants' motions to suppress. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court's conclusions were supported by the record, and accordingly, affirmed that court's decision. View "Vermont v. Grenier" on Justia Law

Defendant Maureen Wilt appeals a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on grounds that the trial court improperly allowed a police trooper to testify about the results of a field-sobriety test he administered to defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Wilt" on Justia Law