Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the Agency of Transportation advertised for bids to reconstruct a half-mile section of North Main Street in downtown Barre. Luck Brothers submitted the low bid and was awarded the contract for the project, which it started in the summer of 2011. In June 2012, Luck Brothers submitted a claim to the Agency seeking approximately $855,000 in additional compensation beyond the bid amount based on alleged differing site conditions from those assumed in the contract. One year later, Luck Brothers submitted a supplemental claim, making the total claim approximately $1.1 million. Less than three months after submitting its $855,000 claim, Luck Brothers filed a complaint against the Agency in superior court seeking, among other things, declaratory relief and compensatory damages. Specifically, the complaint alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of an implied warranty on the part of the Agency, and sought penalties under the Prompt Pay Act. Luck Brothers appealed the superior court’s decision to grant the Agency’s motion to dismiss Luck Brothers’ lawsuit on grounds that the company failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before pursuing a remedy in the superior court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, but clarified the standard of review in appeals to the Vermont Transportation Board from Agency determinations under the claims process for construction contracts. View "Luck Brothers v. Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a trial court order granting summary judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was originally charged with aggravated sexual assault for allegedly penetrating his eight-year-old step-granddaughter with his finger. A presentence investigation report (PSI) contained statements referring to petitioner’s digital penetration of the victim. The probation officer recommended a sentence of eight-to-fifteen years, all suspended except eight years. In his written response to the PSI, petitioner focused on rebutting the contention that he had minimized his conduct and the impact that it had on the victim, and he highlighted mitigating factors, such as his age, health, and remorse. Petitioner did not object to the mention of penetration in the PSI. Petitioner’s trial counsel argued for a sentence of one-to-five years, all suspended but one year, but did not address the penetration issue. In response, the State argued only that petitioner’s allocution further illustrated his lack of empathy for the victim. The court sentenced petitioner to eight-to-fifteen years to serve. After sentence was imposed, petitioner’s attorney objected that “[t]his was a plea to [a charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child] and the court’s conclusions are clearly beyond the offense conduct relative to [the] alleged penetration.” He also asserted that the allegations of penetration “were never attested and were never probed” and that the State had conceded that the victim would not be able to substantiate penetration. In a direct appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by sentencing him based on digital penetration when this was a disputed issue, no evidence was presented concerning penetration at sentencing, and the State admitted that it could not prove this fact. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s assertion that he was not required to object to the mention of penetration in the PSI because the State had admitted that it could not prove penetration. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because petitioner did not challenge the reliability of the penetration evidence prior to being sentenced, he had waived any objection to the court’s use of this evidence on appeal. Petitioner then filed a PCR petition, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the allegation of penetration in the PSI, and that, but for this error, a reasonable probability existed that he would have received a lesser sentence. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that regardless of whether petitioner could establish deficient performance by counsel, he could not establish that the sentencing court relied on the finding of penetration in reaching its sentence, and thus, he could not show prejudice. The court granted summary judgment to the State. Upon review of petitioner's PCR appeal, the Supreme Court concluded petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Summary judgment was therefore properly granted to the State. View "In re Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court’s order revoking his probation. On appeal, he argued that he did not receive a “certificate explicitly setting forth” his probation conditions, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c), and that he did not have notice of the conditions. He also contended that the court did not make adequate factual findings regarding the credibility of defendant’s wife (the complainant), and that the court’s findings were erroneous. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant’s claim as to the failure to comply with the requirements of section 252(c) and reversed on that ground. View "Vermont v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

In a post-conviction relief (PCR) proceeding to vacate convictions based on a change of plea following a plea agreement, the court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. The PCR court concluded that the change-of-plea colloquy was fundamentally flawed because the criminal court did not specifically ask petitioner if his plea was voluntary and free of undisclosed coercion or promises as required by Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The State appealed that decision, arguing that the colloquy substantially complied with Rule 11, the record demonstrated the plea was voluntary, and petitioner failed to allege actual prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "In re Hemingway" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his underlying criminal case because his lawyers induced him to reject a plea bargain for a much lower sentence "by misrepresenting the potential maximum sentencing exposure petitioner was facing at trial." The superior court appointed a lawyer from the Prisoners’ Rights Office of the Defender General to represent petitioner in that court. The appointed public defender accepted representation and proceeded to represent petitioner throughout the trial court proceeding. The State moved to dismiss the petition under 13 V.S.A. 7134 because it was "a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." The public defender answered that the case did not fit within the statute because the theory on which this petition was based had not been raised in earlier PCR petitions because it was not available at the time of the earlier petitions. The superior court granted summary judgment for the State. Shortly thereafter, the public defender filed a notice of appeal on petitioner’s behalf. In a letter to petitioner, the public defender said she initially thought there were no grounds for appeal, but then said "I changed my opinion and filed a notice of appeal for you." She added, however, that since filing the notice of appeal she discovered the Defender General’s office had a conflict of interest so the case had been assigned to conflict counsel. The first assigned conflict counsel withdrew because her firm had done a merits review for the Defender General on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in connection with a prior PCR action. Counsel concluded that the firm’s prior negative merits review created a conflict of interest. The case was then assigned to attorney Michael Rose. Attorney Rose filed a motion for leave to withdraw, citing Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 and case law. Because it became clear during the argument on that motion that the Defender General had not gone through the procedure it typically goes through before seeking leave to withdraw on the basis cited by Attorney Rose, the Supreme Court invited the Defender General to present its position on the motion. Upon further review, the Supreme Court granted Attorney Rose’s motion for leave to withdraw, and it did not appoint new publicly funded counsel. View "In re Bruyette." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Linda Stone sued the Town of Irasburg alleging that the selectboard had acted unlawfully in ordering her, as town treasurer, to raise her bond to $1,000,000. She sought monetary damages based on common law defamation, tortious interference with office, violation of the Vermont Constitution, and deprivation of due process. She also asserted that the Town was obligated to pay her attorney’s fees pursuant to statute. In several different orders, the trial court granted the Town summary judgment on all counts. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. The Court concluded plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a question of fact as to whether a July 12 hearing adequately protected her due process rights. "To remedy a stigma-plus violation through a post-deprivation name-clearing hearing, due process requires more than a chance to speak. It requires an opportunity to clear one’s name before a body which is sufficiently neutral that a person has some realistic chance of success. [. . .] It was error to make a contrary factual determination in favor of the Town in the context of summary judgment." The Court affirmed the trial court with regard to plaintiff's civil rights, tortious interference and defamation claims, and affirmed in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stone v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

Defendant Kyle Bolaski appealed his conviction for second-degree murder after a jury trial. He argued the trial court erred in: (1) not instructing the jury that the jury had to find an absence of passion or provocation; (2) excluding evidence of the victim’s mental health history in the months before the incident; and (3) dismissing a juror during the trial because she reported having followed the case during the time of the grand jury. On appeal, defendant argued that even though his case was presented as a self-defense case, there were sufficient facts in evidence to merit an instruction on passion or provocation for the second-degree murder charge. He also argued that the exclusion of the victim’s mental health evidence was error because it was admissible under Rule 404(b). And lastly, he argued that the dismissal of a juror partway through the trial because she admitted to having followed the story of the case during the grand jury phase was improper. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the instructions in this case were full, fair and correct on the elements of second-degree murder, assuming that the trial court’s decision to charge voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense was proper; nor could the Court conclude that the jury was not misled, despite the more accurate statement of the law in the voluntary manslaughter instruction. Some of the confusion in this case resulted from labeling defendant’s theory as trying to establish the victim’s motives for his actions. The Court concluded that the word was misused in this context. "If the medical records, for example, contained evidence that defendant had engaged in misconduct with respect to the victim’s girlfriend, we might describe that evidence as establishing a motive for the victim pursuing defendant with a splitting maul. Nothing like that is in the medical evidence. Instead, it relates generally to the victim’s mental health condition at the time of the killing, a circumstance that we would not describe in this case as motive." Based on its review of the excluded evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that in general it was relevant to defendant’s self-defense theory for the reason that defendant argued. The Court did not reach defendant's juror dismissal issue, and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Bolaski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Thomas and Marie Baptie, administrators of the estate of their son, John Baptie, appealed a superior court's decision granting defendant and former police officer Aron McNeil, summary judgment dismissing their negligence case against him. Specifically, plaintiffs argued the officer was liable for the death of their son as the result of the negligent investigation of their complaint against defendant Jonathon Bruno, the man who murdered their son four days after they made a complaint. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusions that defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from plaintiffs' lawsuit and that, they could not prove all of the elements of their negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. View "Baptie v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the civil suspension of his driver's license and the admission of the breath-test results in his criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Defendant contended on appeal that because the test results were obtained after the testing machine registered a "fatal error," the breath-test analysis did not meet the requisite performance standards, and thus the necessary foundation for admissibility was not laid. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying suppression in the criminal case, but reversed and remanded the civil suspension. View "Vermont v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Johnson appealed his convictions for attempted aggravated murder, kidnapping, lewd and lascivious conduct, unlawful trespass, and enhancement under Vermont's habitual offender statute. On appeal, he argue: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a member of the jury pool mentioned in front of prospective jurors that defendant had another case; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant's identity as the perpetrator or that he had the requisite intent to kill. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Johnson" on Justia Law