Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Patrick and Terese Ayer appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to Frances Harris and Louis Hemmingway, III. The dispute arose over plaintiffs' attempts to collect a debt from defendant Hemmingway individually, and doing business as Hemmingway Construction. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Hemingway in February 2001. Plaintiffs subsequently secured a nonpossessory writ of attachment against Hemingway's nonexempt goods and estate. In 2010, Frances Harris brought an unrelated action against Hemingway for damages. The trial court issued a stipulated judgment order that, among other things, awarded Harris judgment against Hemingway plus interest from September 8, 2005 until the release of the lien in favor of plaintiffs, required Hemingway to keep current on payments to plaintiffs pursuant to a written payment agreement signed by Hemingway and plaintiff Terese Ayer, and provided that if Hemingway defaulted on the lien, he would be liable to Harris for any costs, including attorney's fees, to obtain a release of the lien. In May 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on their judgment lien. Plaintiffs cited a 2006 trial court order as controlling and asked the court to renew or revive it. Hemingway filed an unverified answer to plaintiffs' complaint, acknowledging his debt to plaintiffs and offering to make immediate payments pursuant to the 2010 agreement. Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, but the court denied their request. Harris responded to this order; Hemingway did not. Harris later moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and default.  In January 2011, the trial court granted Harris's motion, and found that plaintiffs' judgment lien was no longer effective because more than eight years had elapsed from the issuance of the original final judgment on which it was based. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the 2001 judgment had been renewed or revived by the 2006 stipulated amended order. This appeal followed. Agreeing with the trial court's reason to dismiss plaintiffs' motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayer v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kelley O'Brien sued defendants Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) and FAHC nurse Catherine Synnott for drawing his blood at the request of law enforcement officers and without his consent, and for injuries he suffered when allegedly assaulted by police officers after defendants negligently allowed those officers unrestricted access to him in the hospital while he was recovering from surgery. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police officers would harm plaintiff if allowed unsupervised access, and that nurse had plaintiff's apparent consent to draw the blood. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that defendants should have anticipated that the police officers would attack plaintiff if left unsupervised. As the trial court noted, plaintiff was in police custody at the time, so some police presence around him was to be expected. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants could not be held liable for negligence on account of nurse's alleged conduct in leaving plaintiff alone with law enforcement officers even viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff. Given that the Legislature has not indicated an intent to limit the liability of medical personnel who draw blood at the request of law enforcement, the Court concluded that, at least in a situation as alleged by plaintiff here in which a patient is conscious and the authority to draw blood depends upon actual, as opposed to statutorily implied, consent the police officers’ request did not protect defendants from liability for drawing the blood without plaintiff’s consent. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claim), and reversed in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's battery claim). View "O'Brien v. Synnott" on Justia Law

"J.H." appealed an adjudication that she was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for being "habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance." J.H. contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the findings; and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the question of whether she was habitually truant "without justification." The only witness was a Bennington County deputy sheriff who testified that he served as the County's truancy officer. The officer testified that he ended up transporting J.H. to school on two subsequent days in January. On the third occasion, the officer served a "truancy notice," the purpose of which was to warn a parent or guardian that a truancy case could be brought if their child is continually absent. The officer went to the home twice more in January (the fourth and fifth visits that month) but there was no response from anyone at the residence. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, J.H.'s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.H. was habitually truant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that five truancy reports within "a matter of weeks . . . meet[s] the definition of being habitually not at school."  The court also observed it had "no evidence . . . of justification for [J.H.] not being in school." Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the record evidence was fundamentally insufficient to establish that J.H. was truant on the days alleged. "Inasmuch as the evidence here was plainly insufficient under [33 V.S.A. 5102(3)(D)], we are compelled to conclude that the adjudication of CHINS based on truancy must be reversed." View "In re J. H." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Carpenter appealed his sentence of five to fourteen years imprisonment under Vermont's Habitual Offender Act after pleading guilty to one felony count of violating an abuse-prevention order (VAPO) and five misdemeanors. Defendant contends that his five-year-minimum sentence was unlawful because the trial court was not authorized under section 11 to impose a minimum sentence greater than the maximum sentence of "not more than three years" for the underlying felony VAPO. The State argued that: (1) the plain language of the Habitual Offender Act permits a minimum sentence greater than the statutory maximum of the underlying offense; (2) a contrary interpretation of section 11 would produce irrational and absurd results; and (3) defendant failed to contest the enhancement below and cannot demonstrate plain error to overcome his waiver of objection. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed on the last point. "Defendant points to no compromise to the criminal justice system resulting from the claimed error, and none is discerned. As outlined above, defendant's plea agreement contemplated that the court could impose an aggregate minimum term close, but not identical, to eight years according to the underlying statutes proscribing the offenses. . . . Defendant's sentence of five to fourteen years is neither contrary to his agreement, nor inconsistent with the minimum authorized by statutes other than section 11, nor beyond the enhanced maximum allowed by the Habitual Offender Act. The sentence imposed was nothing defendant did not bargain for." View "Vermont v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant John Turner was arraigned on one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child and one count of unlawful restraint of a victim less than sixteen years of age. His first trial occurred in March 2010, and resulted in a hung jury. His second trial occurred in July 2010, and he was convicted of unlawful restraint and acquitted of lewd or lascivious conduct. He appealed, claiming his conviction must be reversed because he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Finding no violation of his Constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Turner" on Justia Law

Independent candidate Gary Trudell and voter Myron Dorfman challenged the constitutionality of Vermont’s schedule for filing candidate petitions, alleging that the uniform deadline for all party (major and minor) and independent candidates was discriminatory and impermissibly impinged upon the associational and voting rights of candidates and voters under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the filing deadline was a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation, justified by Vermont’s regulatory interests, the Court affirmed the lower court decision declaring the deadline constitutional. View "Trudell v. Vermont " on Justia Law

Defendant Rusty Brooks appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated sexual assault on a minor following a jury trial, alleging several errors. Defendant asserted that: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to suppress all statements made to the police; (2) by admitting evidence of defendant’s website-browsing history; (3) the introduction of previously excluded testimony at trial rendered the trial was unfair; and (4) even if none of his individual claims constituted reversible error, the cumulative effect of all errors denied him a fair trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant Shaun Freeman was given a twenty-year-to-life sentence following a plea agreement on assault charges. On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court, he challenged two of the probation conditions that were attached to his plea agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld one of the conditions but remanded the case for the criminal division of the superior court to reexamine and to justify, revise, or strike the other condition. View "Vermont v. Freeman" on Justia Law

New England Coalition, Inc. (NEC) filed a complaint to the Supreme Court seeking injunctive relief to enjoin Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) from continuing to operate the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. NEC alleged that Entergy was operating in violation of the Public Service Board’s final order approving the 2002 sale of the power plant to Entergy in Docket No. 6545. Finding no grounds to grant equitable relief, the Supreme Court dismissed NEC's complaint. View "In re Investigation into General Order No. 45" on Justia Law

Father appealed a superior court family division's order that upheld a magistrate’s denial of his motion to modify his child support obligation. Specifically, father argued: (1) that the magistrate erred in declining to impute income to mother; and (2) that the magistrate failed to properly apply a credit in his favor to account for derivative benefits paid directly to mother on behalf of the minor child by the Social Security Administration on account of father’s disability. Upon review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court found that although the magistrate properly invoked the methodology established in the Court's holding in "Cantin," it did not complete its analysis: "[t]he magistrate conducted the first step of the guidelines analysis properly, imputing the derivative benefit to father and calculating a child support obligation accordingly. . . . However, the magistrate [. . .] never actually took the second step described in Cantin of applying [a $190 as a] payment from father to mother as a credit toward his child support obligation. Had it done so, it would have found that mother owed father a substantial monthly child support obligation on account of the imputed payment of child support from father to mother, by way of the derivative benefit, well in excess of the nominal child support obligation from father to mother pursuant to the guidelines calculation." Accordingly the Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that in the absence of a deviation from the guidelines calculation, father was entitled to an award of child support in the amount of the credit to him for the derivative benefit payment to mother less his child support obligation pursuant to the guidelines. The Court found that neither the magistrate nor the family division specifically addressed the proper accounting with respect to a $4370 lump sum derivative benefit arrearage payment to mother on behalf of the minor child. Because the obligation in question was payable to a third party, on remand the magistrate was ordered ensure that mother applied the lump sum toward father’s share of the child's medical bills, and that father was credited accordingly. View "LaMothe v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law