Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was the question of whether defendant Hieu Tran was in police custody when two detectives questioned him in a police cruiser for one hour as part of an investigation into an assault and attempted robbery. The trial court concluded that the interview was a custodial interrogation conducted without the warnings guaranteed by "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and granted defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, the State argued that no warnings were necessary because defendant voluntarily spoke with detectives and was not in custody during the interview. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, and because such warnings were not provided, defendant’s statements made during the March interview should have been suppressed. View "Vermont v. Tran" on Justia Law

A Mother appealed a superior court's decision that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.C. D.C. spent the first years of his life with both parents, who at the time were not married. When his parents separated, the father took D.C. to stay with him. Although a child-custody order granted mother parental rights, she allowed father to take the child because she had difficulty finding a residence, and she knew that father had the support of his mother in caring for D.C. This arrangement lasted for a few years longer when mother obtained police help to assert her custodial rights to D.C. Mother moved into a motel with D.C., and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned that D.C. was a child in need of care due to a lack of proper parental care. The affidavit in support of the petition stated that: (1) five years earlier mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to an older child because of unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the child’s exposure to the risk of being sexually abused; (2) mother had a relationship with a known, untreated sex offender who had been seen frequently with mother at her motel room; (3) the motel room was filthy and unsanitary; (4) D.C. was suffering from an untreated respiratory illness; and (5) school officials had reported D.C. arriving at school hungry and not dressed properly for the cold. On appeal, mother argued that the termination order is invalid because the court failed to: (1) consider whether the State had met its burden of showing changed circumstances, which was required because the State’s termination petition sought modification of the initial disposition order; (2) determine by clear and convincing evidence that mother was presently unfit to care for D.C.; and (3) find that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of D.C. from his home. Finding that the record supported the family court’s undisputed findings that during the lengthy period when mother played a limited role in D.C.’s life and agreed to other family members assuming custody of the child, she made no progress in reaching a point where she could care for the child.  The Court concluded that Mother could not challenge the TPR order through a belated claim that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent D.C.’s removal from his home. Accordingly, the Court affirmed termination of Mother's rights. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

This decision resolved two consolidated appeals related to family division proceedings involving juvenile C.P. First, mother and father appealed termination of their parental rights to their son C.P. Father argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination proceeding. Mother joined father's jurisdictional argument and contended that the evidence and findings did not support the conclusion that termination was in C.P.'s best interests. Second, father challenged the court's post-termination order striking a sentence of the termination decision, and finding that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) made reasonable efforts toward achieving the permanency plan goal of reunifying C.P. with his parents. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no merit to either of the parents' arguments on appeal and affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "In re C. P." on Justia Law

Rosann Maggio, widow and primary beneficiary of the estate of Daniel Maggio, appealed a decision of the superior court which held that Daniel Maggio did not own an interest in real property in Holland, Vermont at the time of his death. Ms. Maggio argued that the trial court erroneously admitted statements from her interrogatory answers in violation of the best evidence rule, the dead man's statutes, and the requirement in V.R.E. 602 that testimony be based on personal knowledge; that the court's conclusions that the property in question was partnership property and that Daniel Maggio ceded his interest in the partnership to his partner, Paul Silas, prior to Mr. Maggio's death were unsupported by the evidence; and that the trial court erred in declining to apply the statute of frauds to the transfer of Mr. Maggio's interest in the partnership. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the transaction at issue in this case involved Mr. Maggio's relinquishment of his interest in the partnership, which left Silas fully vested in all remaining partnership assets, including the Holland property. "The pivotal distinction is between a transaction that constitutes a conveyance of an interest in a partnership, which is personal property regardless of whether the partnership assets thereby conveyed include real property, and a transaction that is a conveyance of the real property itself. The Court concluded that Ms. Maggio's arguments had no merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "In re Estate of Maggio" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a final divorce order granting father parental rights and responsibilities for the parties' two children and giving mother parent-child contact in stages beginning with supervised contact with progression through the stages determined by the children’s medical and mental health providers. Mother argued: (1) that the order impermissibly delegated the court's statutory responsibility to determine parent-child contact and parental rights and responsibilities; (2) that the court effectively terminated her parental rights without a finding of parental unfitness supported by clear and convincing evidence; (3) and that the court's findings were inadequate to support the contact provisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the order improperly delegated authority over parent-child contact to third parties, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Engel v. Engel" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Chittenden Criminal Division’s denial of its motion to seal search warrants and related materials generated during an ongoing investigation into a missing Essex couple. The court determined that the State failed to show with specificity that disclosure would cause “substantial harm to public or private interests.” The State asserted that there was neither a First Amendment nor a common law right of access to search warrant materials in an active, pre-arrest investigation, and argued that a presumptive right of access should not apply in such cases. Instead, the State urged the Supreme Court to hold that there is no right of access to such materials under the Vermont Rules for Public Access to Court Records (PACR Rules). Assuming that the pertinent case law applied to pre-arrest investigations, the State also claimed the criminal division erred by concluding that the standard for sealing was not satisfied. Finally, the State asserted that the court erred in turning down its request for an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court saw no error in the court’s refusal to conduct a further hearing, but reversed its determination that the State failed to cite sufficiently specific reasons to seal the warrant information. View "In re Essex Search Warrants" on Justia Law

The Vermont Human Rights Commission appealed a trial court decision interpreting 9 V.S.A. section 4554 as requiring all lawsuits brought by the Commission against the State of Vermont to be filed within a six-month conciliation period. The trial court held that because the Commission failed to file within this six-month period, its suit against the State was time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the Commission's claim. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Vermont Agency of Transportation." on Justia Law

In July 2010, Defendant Donald Shepherd pled guilty to charges of aggravated sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child in exchange for dismissal of several other pending charges. His victim was a ten-year-old child. Defendant was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison. At issue on this appeal was the court-ordered restitution for relocation expenses of the victim and his family. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the relocation in this case was a direct result of defendant’s criminal acts. Restitution was therefore appropriate, and the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Crannell appealed the decision of the Rutland Civil Division that he was no longer entitled to an appointed attorney to handle his post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings.  Appellant’s previously assigned counsel filed a notice of withdrawal based on lack of legal merit in the PCR. Appellant argued that, having filed his PCR petition before the Legislature enacted the amended version of the applicable statutory authority, he had a vested right to counsel under the pre-amendment version. Alternatively, Appellant argued that the Defender General’s Office waived its right to withdraw because it represented him in his PCR proceedings for nine years before seeking to do so. In addition, Appellant asserted that because counsel is necessary for effective advocacy in PCR proceedings at the trial court level, the Supreme Court should read the applicable statute to provide a right to assigned representation in such proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was correct that the old version of the statute still governed his right to assigned PCR counsel and granted him a statutory right to representation at his own, rather than the Defender General’s, discretion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Crannell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sally J. Taylor sued Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) for medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress in connection with her medical care following a surgery performed on her lumbar spine. After plaintiff failed to disclose any expert witness in response to discovery requests, FAHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law without an expert witness. The trial court granted FAHC’s motion. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this case was sufficiently complex that plaintiff could not prove her claims without expert testimony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. Fletcher Allen Health Care" on Justia Law