Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Timothy Wiley appealed the Windham Civil Division's denial of his request for DNA testing pursuant to Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Following an unsuccessful appeal of convictions for aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct stemming from charges that he raped his girlfriend's daughter, and for obstruction of justice in connection with threatening and encouraging the mother to commit perjury, petitioner claimed innocence and filed for relief under the Innocence Protection Act. Petitioner claimed the trial court erred in reaching its conclusion that his anticipated test results would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result had they been available at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's request on the ground that the testing he sought was not of any evidence "obtained during the investigation or prosecution of the crime" for which innocence is claimed, as required by the Act, rendering his request outside of the Act's relief. View "In re Wiley" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants Paul Edmonds and Francis Cobb appeared their conditional pleas to driving with a suspended license, claiming that the Windsor Criminal Division erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. Defendants argued that they were subject to investigative stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They alternatively argued that Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution affords greater protection against such detentions than does the Fourth Amendment, and that, even if lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the investigative stops in each case violated Article 11. The trial court, treating the reasonable suspicion standard as the same under the Fourth Amendment and Article 11, held that defendants' detentions were supported by reasonable suspicion that they were driving with suspended drivers licenses. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial.  He appeals that conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on a newly discovered witness corroborating defendant’s self-defense claim; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss two jurors for cause; and (3) the jury instructions on diminished capacity failed to inform the jury it must acquit defendant of second-degree murder if defendant could not form the specific intent for that offense due to diminished capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendant's contentions on appeal to be without merit and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlotte Rumsey appealed a decision by the Vermont Human Services Board which denied her Choices for Care (CFC) Services on a tie vote of the Board. The issue before the Board was whether petitioner met the eligibility requirements for either highest need or high need services. Petitioner was seventy-four years of age at the time of the Board's evidentiary hearing and lived alone. She suffers from chronic seizure disorder, osteoarthritis of the knees and ankles, cerebral vascular disease, depression, anxiety, and obesity. She applied for CFC benefits to obtain home-delivered services to allow her to remain safely in her home. To avoid being placed on a waiting list, she must meet eligibility requirements for highest need or high need services. The hearing officer issued her proposed findings of fact, a recommended decision to affirm the DAIL denial, and a statement of reasons. The Board met to consider this and other cases with six of seven members present. After hearing argument, the six members tied on whether to accept the hearing officer's recommendation. The Board did unanimously accept the hearing officer's findings of fact. It decided that in the case of a tie vote, the "Department's original decision stands." Following the Board decision, petitioner moved to reopen the case, seeking a Board decision based on the vote of all seven members. Petitioner also argued that the decision did not contain findings on the elements of the CFC eligibility standards. DAIL opposed the motion. The Board denied the motion. It concluded that the findings were complete. In response to petitioner's request for a vote by all seven members, the Board stated that, if the case were reopened, there would be no guarantee "that all seven members would be present." The Board noted that it was following the rule of courts for instances where there is a tie vote and that reopening would only delay an authoritative decision from the Supreme Court on the meaning of the CFC regulations. On appeal, both parties argued that the Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case; in the alternative, petitioner sought a remand for proper findings and to have all seven of the Board members decide the case. DAIL opposed the alternative and suggested that the Court instead declare the meaning of the regulations and remand for the Board to find the relevant facts and render a decision. The Board denied petitioner's motion to reopen in part because it did not want to delay the case reaching the Supreme Court for an authoritative interpretation of the CFC regulations. The Court did not agree with this reasoning. In its view, the quality of the Court's decision improved when it had "the informed analysis and decision of the Board. The decision before us has no reasoning or conclusions, and we do not know why either of the sides voted as it did." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Rumsey" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Brandt was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree aggravated domestic assault and one count of driving with a license suspended (DLS). On appeal to the Supreme Court, he raised three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges and grant him separate trials; (2) the jury instruction on excited utterances improperly bolstered the credibility of the complainant's out-of-court statement; and (3) the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments were inappropriate and denied him a fair trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Brandt" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Bourn was convicted in superior court of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon following an incident where he pointed an unloaded muzzleloader toward two police officers who were attempting to remove him from a home. He appealed his convictions, arguing first that the court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of specific intent to threaten, and second, that such intent may be negated by the defendant's diminished capacity. Holding that Vermont's aggravated assault statute requires specific intent, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Vermont v. Bourn" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner Paul Kirby was charged with five counts of possessing child pornography after a search of his computer revealed five different video depictions of sexual conduct by a child or children. Evidence suggested that each video was downloaded independently and stored as a separate file on petitioner's computer. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of possession in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two counts. Petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of four to fifteen years. In 2008, Petitioner acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), and amended the petition with the assistance of counsel in 2009. The petition contained two claims: (1) that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to research, investigate, and inform him of the possibility of asserting a challenge to the multiple charges of possession that could have resulted in the five charges being reduced to one; and (2) because counsel failed to advise him on this legal theory prior to entering his plea agreement, petitioner's subsequent guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The State opposed Petitioner's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on both claims. The superior court granted the State's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel's assessment of the viability of a multiplicity challenge under 13 V.S.A. 2827(a) was not unreasonable, and thus did not create a material misunderstanding upon which Petitioner based his guilty pleas. Petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily and therefore he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. View "In re Kirby" on Justia Law

Guardian appealed an order of the probate division directing that a court-ordered guardianship evaluation performed by Rutland Mental Health Services, Inc. (RMHS) be placed with the court under seal. Guardian argued that the court exceeded its authority, or abused its discretion to the extent that it had any, in directing RMHS to return the evaluation to the court to be sealed. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's conclusion after review of this case that the probate court had authority to restrict access to the original evaluation, it agreed with guardian that the court abused its discretion as a matter of law in ordering the sealing of this particular evaluation, given the circumstances of the case and the court’s reasoning for doing so. View "In re Guardianship of A.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Shaddy appealed a trial court's dismissal of his complaint against the Brattleboro Retreat and some of its employees. Plaintiff, a former Retreat employee, brought claims of defamation, obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and intentional interference with a contract, arising from the Retreat’s allegation that he unlawfully diverted regulated drugs from the medication room at its facility. The court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that, having been resolved in proceeding before the Department of Labor and in plaintiff’s criminal case, the issue of whether plaintiff diverted the drugs was res judicata. The court also stated alternative grounds for dismissing all of the claims against the individual defendants, as well as the IIED, obstruction-of-justice, and intentional-interference-with-a-contract claims against both the individual defendants and the Retreat. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in dismissing his claims on the basis of res judicata and by failing to properly consider his complaint in light of his pro se status. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s dismissal of the defamation claim against the Retreat, but otherwise affirmed its decision. View "Shaddy v. Brattleboro Retreat et al." on Justia Law

Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) appealed a decision of the Vermont Employment Security Board finding claimant, Abdullahi Mohamed, eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Board found that claimant’s discharge for off-duty criminal conduct did not constitute gross misconduct disqualifying him from unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, FAHC argued that the Legislature’s recent amendments to the Vermont Unemployment Compensation Act required the Board to disqualify claimants from receiving unemployment compensation benefits when an employer can no longer retain them as a result of off-duty criminal conduct. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mohamed v. Fletcher Allen Health Care" on Justia Law