Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Anthony Davey appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition filed after the Department of Corrections (DOC) revoked his community-reentry furlough status. Petitioner argued that DOC’s procedural errors following his arrest, after he absconded from furlough for more than eighteen months, constituted a denial of his due process rights. He also contended that legislation governing appeals of community-reentry furlough revocations did not apply to him. While the Vermont Supreme Court agreed that DOC’s procedural errors raised legitimate concerns, petitioner did not avail himself of an appropriate alternative avenue to challenge DOC’s decision regarding his furlough status. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Davey v. Baker" on Justia Law

The State appealed a PCR court’s order granting petitioner’s motion to amend its previous order and vacate all thirteen convictions for which petitioner Brian Shannon entered pleas in 2014. Petitioner had two prior felony convictions when he was charged with three felony counts of aggravated domestic assault in June 2012. In June 2013, while the June 2012 case was awaiting trial, petitioner was charged with two new counts of aggravated domestic assault; one count of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI), third or subsequent offense; and seven misdemeanors. In January 2014, the State’s attorney sent petitioner’s lawyer a letter stating that if petitioner was convicted of the 2012 charges, the State would seek a sentence enhancement in connection with the 2013 charges. However, the law would not have permitted a habitual offender enhancement to be added to the 2013 charges, because a defendant could only be charged as a habitual offender if they committed a felony at a time when they already have three felony convictions. Despite this mistake of law, the State, petitioner’s two attorneys, and the trial judge in the 2012 case failed to catch the error. Although petitioner initially refused to plead guilty to a felony before trial, several concerns arose at trial which motivated him to enter a plea for the 2012 and 2013 cases. In February 2014, petitioner agreed to plead no contest to three felonies, for which the court sentenced him to one-to-five years on the three counts, two of the sentences to run consecutively. On the remaining ten charges, petitioner pled no contest and received deferred sentences with no required domestic-violence programming. The State argued that the PCR court erred because contract law required petitioner to be returned to the same position he was in before the plea agreement as to all thirteen charges even though petitioner received and completed deferred sentences for ten of these charges under the plea agreement. The Vermont Supreme Court found that because the PCR court did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s deferred sentences charges, it properly did not address the State’s substantive contract claims regarding those charges. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "In re Brian Shannon" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendants A.P. and Z.P. challenged a superior court’s denial of their motions for expungement. They argued the court erred by interpreting V.S.A. 7603(g) to provide an avenue for expungement only to individuals who have been arrested or cited, but not charged with criminal offenses by information or indictment. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded. View "Vermont v. A.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christopher McVeigh sought a declaration that defendant, the Vermont School Boards Association (VSBA), was the functional equivalent of a public agency for purposes of the Vermont Public Records Act (PRA), and therefore had to comply with plaintiff’s request for copies of its records. The civil division concluded that the VSBA was not a public agency subject to the PRA and granted summary judgment in favor of the VSBA. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "McVeigh v. Vermont School Boards Association" on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth MacFarland appeals convictions for resisting arrest and unlawful trespass following a bench trial in which the trial court refused to consider her diminished-capacity defense. Defendant was arrested following a night of drinking at a Brattleboro bar. In apparent response to the bouncer’s question, defendant spoke incoherently about politics and her family. The bouncer persisted and again asked her to speak with him outside. Defendant refused. The bouncer then pulled on defendant’s bar stool and told her she “had to leave.” Defendant stood up from her stool, ran to a corner, and muttered to herself. Soon thereafter, the bouncer called the police, and two Brattleboro police officers arrived a few minutes later. Officers asked defendant to step outside; officers stood defendant up by her arm but she went limp and had to be carried out. Relying on Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 and its own scheduling and discovery order, the trial court found that defendant failed to properly notify the State of her intention to argue diminished capacity. Defendant argued the plain meaning of Rule 12.1 did not require notice of diminished capacity when a defendant does not rely on expert witnesses, that the trial court’s scheduling order did not independently provide a basis for notice, and that, as charged, the notice element of misdemeanor unlawful trespass denoted a subjective standard. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in refusing to consider diminished capacity, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. MacFarland" on Justia Law

Defendant Devan Calabrese appealed his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and violation of conditions of release, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of a bullet on the ground at the site of the alleged crimes, and permitting the State to introduce evidence that he made certain racially charged statements. After its review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to the suppression question, and remanded for additional factfinding and a reassessment of the motion. With respect to the court’s admission of evidence that defendant made statements evincing racial animus, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. The Court thus reversed the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Calabrese" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State contested a trial court’s order granting defendant Shannon Barry’s motion to suppress statements she made to law enforcement officers before her arrest. In June 2019, the Barre City Police Department launched an investigation after Heather Larocque died from taking fentanyl-laced heroin. The investigation led the officers to believe defendant sold the fentanyl-laced heroin to Larocque. Officers found defendant enter a convenience store and asked to talk to her as she exited. At no point during the discussion, which lasted between ten and twenty minutes, did the officers tell defendant she was free to leave or to not answer their questions. Defendant never requested to leave but believed she would have been arrested if she had tried to do so. She did not feel threatened and did not feel the officers were being dishonest in their conversation with her. Throughout the conversation, defendant was not handcuffed, and the officers’ weapons remained holstered. At the conclusion of the conversation, the officers arrested defendant. At no time prior to her arrest was defendant informed of her Miranda rights. Defendant was charged with selling or dispensing a regulated drug with death resulting. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and had not been advised of her Miranda rights outside the convenience store, therefore the Court affirmed the suppression order. View "Vermont v. Barry" on Justia Law

Defendant Devan Calabrese appealed his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and violation of conditions of release, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress and permitting the State to introduce evidence that he made certain racially charged statements. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding the trooper’s search did not violate Article 11 and the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was thus error. With respect to the evidence that defendant made statements evincing racial animus, the Supreme Court did not specifically rule on defendant’s challenge, but set forth the principles that should guide the trial court if the issue arose on remand. View "Vermont v. Calabrese" on Justia Law

The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether evidence seized by federal Border Patrol agents during a roving patrol (pursuant to their authority to conduct warrantless searches under 8 U.S.C. 1357) was admissible in a state criminal proceeding when that search did not comply with Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Defendants Phillip Walker-Brazie and Brandi-Lena Butterfield argued that because the overwhelming purpose of Vermont’s exclusionary rule was to protect individual liberty, the Supreme Court should apply the exclusionary rule and suppress the evidence pursuant to Article 11. To this the Supreme Court agreed, holding that such evidence is inadmissible in Vermont criminal proceedings. View "Vermont v. Walker-Brazie" on Justia Law

Between 2010 and 2015, pursuant to a contract with the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC), Wellpath, LLC assumed responsibility for providing medical care to every person in state custody within Vermont. Pursuant to the Vermont’s Public Records Act (PRA), plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) requested from Wellpath any records relating to legal actions and settlements arising from this care. Wellpath declined to furnish the requested records, arguing that, as a private contractor, it was not subject to the PRA’s disclosure requirements. HRDC brought the instant suit, and the trial court entered judgment for Wellpath. The Vermont Supreme Court found the language of the PRA was unambiguous: "where the state contracts with a private entity to discharge the entirety of a fundamental and uniquely governmental obligation owed to its citizens, that entity acts as an 'instrumentality' of the State. ... But because here, for five years, Wellpath was the sole means through which the constitutional imperative that the DOC provide healthcare to those it incarcerates was carried out, Wellpath became an 'instrumentality' of the state, and was thus subject to the disclosure obligations of the PRA." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC et al." on Justia Law