Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In December 2006, petitioner Laura Hernandez was charged with two counts of selling or distributing heroin, based on two sales of heroin by petitioner to an informant. Petitioner’s first counsel was assigned in January 2007. The parties executed a discovery stipulation, requiring all affirmative defenses, including entrapment, to be noticed within ten days of the close of depositions. In September 2007, petitioner’s first counsel withdrew and new counsel was assigned. The parties engaged in extensive discovery, including depositions of various witnesses. Defendant did not notice any affirmative defenses. On the first day of trial, in January 2009, Attorney Kolitch filed proposed jury instructions and in that proposal requested an entrapment instruction for the first time. The court ultimately declined to instruct on entrapment, concluding that petitioner had not made a timely request in accordance with the parties’ stipulation and that this delay prejudiced the State. During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court asking whether it should consider whether petitioner was pressured by the informant to sell. The court answered: “You may consider the evidence of whether or not the defendant was pressured by the confidential informant and the terms of [the Informant Agreement] the same as you consider all other evidence.” The jury found petitioner guilty. Petitioner moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in declining to instruct on the entrapment defense. Before that motion was resolved, petitioner entered a plea agreement resolving this and other cases. As part of the plea, petitioner agreed to withdraw her motion for sentence reconsideration and to give up all rights of appeal in connection with the criminal charges involved in the plea agreement. In 2018, petitioner filed this PCR, arguing that Attorney Kolitch provided ineffective assistance of counsel in her criminal case by failing to timely raise an entrapment defense and to make constitutional arguments in support of allowing an instruction despite the late notice, and that she was prejudiced by Attorney Kolitch’s failures. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the undisputed facts demonstrated that any error by counsel did not prejudice petitioner, and therefore affirmed. View "In re Laura Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Hovey appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated sexual assault, arguing that the two convictions violated double jeopardy because, as charged under the circumstances, they constituted one offense. Additionally, defendant argued that probation condition 41, which required him to work and reside where his probation officer approved, was an improper delegation of power to his probation officer. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed that, as charged under the circumstances, defendant’s convictions violated double jeopardy and remanded for the State to elect which aggravated-sexual-assault conviction should stand. Furthermore, because the trial court failed to support condition 41 with findings, the case was remanded to give the trial court an opportunity to justify, revise, or remove the condition. View "Vermont v. Hovey" on Justia Law

Defendant Sanel Masic was convicted by jury of luring a child . On appeal, he argued 13 V.S.A. 2828 was an unconstitutional restriction on speech and void for vagueness under the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions. He further challenged the superior court’s imposition of a probation condition as part of his sentence. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but remanded for additional findings regarding the condition of probation. View "Vermont v. Masic" on Justia Law

Defendant Roy Kuhlmann was convicted by jury of unlawful trespass of an occupied dwelling, obstruction of justice, and unlawful restraint. The unlawful-trespass and obstruction-of-justice charges were based on defendant’s acts of entering complainant’s residence, hiding under her bed to listen to her telephone calls, emerging from under the bed and frightening her, and then, when the state police later arrived, urging her to tell them that nothing was wrong. Defendant argued on appeal there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for trespassing because he had permission to enter the complainant’s house. He claimed his statements in the presence of police were not threatening and were therefore insufficient to support the obstruction-of-justice charge. Finally, defendant challenged his conviction for unlawful restraint, which was based on an altercation that took place three months earlier during which he pushed the complainant onto her bed and held her down for five minutes. He contended the restraint was merely incidental to the assault that preceded it and could not support a separate conviction. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the unlawful-restraint conviction, but reversed defendant’s convictions for unlawful trespass and obstruction of justice because they were not supported by the record. View "Vermont v. Kuhlmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kaleb Vasseur, an elementary school student in Fayston, Vermont, filed a superior court action arguing that the way his school district elected its school board members violated the Vermont Constitution. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of constitutional standing. Plaintiff appealed the court’s order that denied his motion to amend the complaint because the proposed amended complaint also failed to satisfy the standing requirement. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Vasseur v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Defendant Gordon Noyes, Jr., was convicted by jury verdict of aggravated, repeated sexual assault of a child and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, second offense. On appeal, he requested vacatur of these convictions and remand to the trial court, arguing the trial court erred: (1) denying his motion for a mistrial following an expert witness’s hearsay testimony in violation of a pretrial order; (2) allowing the same expert to testify regarding sex- offender behavior; and (3) permitting the jury to see a video of the complaining witness’s statement to law enforcement in addition to her live testimony. In the alternative, defendant contended that if none of these individual circumstances merited reversal, their cumulative impact did. Finding no "miscarriage of justice here," the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. View "Vermont v. Noyes" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Bruyette appealed an order compelling him to provide a DNA sample for inclusion in the Vermont DNA database. Defendant was convicted of one count of burglary and three counts of sexual assault in 1990. He has been continuously incarcerated in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) since 1987. For most of this time, defendant has been held in facilities out of state. In 1998, the Vermont Legislature passed a law creating a state DNA database. Defendant’s convictions qualified as designated crimes under the law, so the statute required him to submit a DNA sample. He argued 20 V.S.A. 1933(b) excused him from providing a DNA sample because he has previously provided a sample. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s position that the statute exempted him from providing a subsequent sample. View "Vermont v. Bruyette" on Justia Law

Earl Scott appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the State of Vermont concerning his claim for compensation under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA). In April 2010, Scott was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a person under the age of sixteen. Scott was twenty-two at the time the charges were filed. The offenses were alleged to have occurred “sometime during 2003 or 2004.” Subsequently, Scott pleaded guilty to an amended charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and was sentenced to two to five years’ incarceration. He began serving his sentence in January 2012. While in custody under sentence, Scott brought a claim for post-conviction relief (PCR) in civil court. The claim was later amended to assert that the plea colloquy did not comply with the requirements of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11(f) and that his criminal counsel was ineffective on several other grounds. While the PCR claim was pending, Scott reached his maximum sentence date and was released in March 2016. In May 2016, the State conceded Scott’s plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11 and that his conviction should be vacated, resulting in the remand of the prosecution to the criminal division. Scott’s counsel submitted a proposed order vacating the criminal conviction in June 2016, providing Scott with a copy. Also, while the PCR claim was pending, Scott learned he had not been given proper credit for good time and had therefore served time beyond his actual maximum release date. He made a claim seeking compensation for the time he remained in jail beyond that point. In July 2016, with knowledge that his criminal conviction was going to be vacated, Scott signed a general release of claims against the State in exchange for $40,000. Scott filed the lawsuit at issue here, seeking recovery under the VIPA. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing the general release barred Scott’s claim. Alternatively, the State contended Scott was not entitled to relief because he was not “actually innocent,” and he either fabricated evidence or committed perjury during proceedings related to the charged offense. In ruling on the motion, the court held that the language of the release was unambiguous, and that it plainly operated to preclude Scott’s claim. The court also determined that, even setting aside the general release, plaintiff’s action could not proceed because he did not meet the VIPA’s actual-innocence requirement. It did not reach the State’s alternative argument. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s order, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the State. View "Scott v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Richards appealed after he was convicted by jury conviction on one count of misdemeanor unlawful trespass. He argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime, contending that 13 V.S.A. 3705(a) should have an implied mental state requirement, or knowledge element. Defendant also argued the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the probation condition that he not “engage in criminal behavior” because the condition was impermissibly vague. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Vermont Legislature intentionally omitted a knowledge element in the misdemeanor unlawful trespass statute, and that the probation condition provided sufficient notice of proscribed conduct. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Vermont v. Richards" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clayton Turner was convicted of absconding from furlough twice, once in November 2001 and once in January 2009. In June 2011, petitioner was charged with second-degree aggravated domestic assault, with a habitual-offender enhancement that was based in part on the two earlier absconding-from-furlough convictions. Petitioner left the state and was not arrested on the domestic-assault charge until November 2018. He was arraigned and held without bail. In December 2019, petitioner filed petitions to expunge the two absconding-from- furlough convictions, arguing, in relevant part, that he was entitled to expungement of those convictions under the terms of Vermont’s expungement statute because the Legislature had recently decriminalized absconding from furlough. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that expungement of petitioner’s prior escape convictions was not available to him under the governing law; accordingly, it affirmed the criminal division’s decision. View "Vermont v. Turner" on Justia Law