Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Anthony Brunetta appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the criminal division erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence he alleged was obtained based on an illegal stop of his vehicle. Specifically, defendant claimed the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing to stop his car as required by the federal and state constitutions. At trial, the State played a dashboard video recording of the stop at issue, and the trooper who stopped defendant testified that he did not observe defendant use a turn signal at the intersection. On cross-examination, the trooper reiterated that defendant did not use his turn signal at the intersection, and that he would have seen the signal if defendant had used it. Defendant did not challenge the criminal division’s finding that he did not use his vehicle’s turn signal before changing direction at the intersection in question. He argued to the Vermont Supreme Court only that the state trooper had no reasonable basis to stop him without first confirming that he did not use a hand signal instead of the vehicle’s turn signal. The Supreme Court found Defendant correctly observed that 23 V.S.A. 1064(a) unambiguously allowed a driver to discharge the responsibility to signal a turn by using a hand signal rather than a mechanical or lighting signal. "But this does not mean that a law enforcement officer who is unable to see a hand signal even if one is given—whether due to darkness, weather conditions, or vantage point relative to the vehicle in question—may never form a reasonable suspicion that section 1064(a) has been violated. ... It follows that, where an officer suspects that a driver failed to signal a turn, but is unable to confirm or rule out the use of a hand signal, the officer may nonetheless have reasonable suspicion of a failure to signal sufficient to stop the car to further investigate the suspected traffic violation." View "Vermont v. Brunetta" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Caron, Sr. appealed his conviction by jury of sexual assault–no consent. In June 2018, complainant, then thirty-four years old, reported to the Bennington Police Department that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant when she was a child. Complainant had lived with defendant and his wife - a biological relative of complainant’s - since her birth in November 1983. She had not reported any of the alleged sexual assaults involving the defendant to the police before June 2018. On appeal, defendant argued the statute of limitations governing the sexual-assault charge against him had expired prior to the commencement of the prosecution, and thus the charge should have been dismissed. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with defendant that his prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations and therefore vacated his conviction and sentence. View "Vermont v. Caron" on Justia Law

Defendant Morris Nelson appealed his convictions for: (1) repeated aggravated sexual assault as part of a common scheme and plan; (2) sexual assault of a victim under the age of eighteen entrusted to his care by authority of law; and (3) sexual exploitation of a minor. He argued that the second charge was duplicative with both the first and third charges, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause; that the State’s evidence on the second charge was insufficient to prove the victim was entrusted to his care by authority of law; and that the jury instruction on the first charge constituted plain error because the court failed to give a unanimity instruction. Regarding defendant’s first argument, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that only the second and third charges were duplicative. Accordingly, the sexual-exploitation charge was vacated as requested by the State in the event the Court found the second and third charges duplicative. The Court rejected defendant’s other arguments and thus upheld the convictions on the sexual-assault and aggravated-sexual-assault charges. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court determined a remand for resentencing was not warranted. View "Vermont v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendants Peter Williams and Peter Boissoneault brought a consolidated appeal of the criminal court’s denial of motions to exclude evidence filed in their respective driving under the influence, third offense (DUI-3) prosecutions. They argued the trial court erred in declining to suppress their evidentiary breath test results as gathered pursuant to a warrantless search in violation of Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court correctly determined that these tests satisfied the consent exception to Article 11’s warrant requirement, and therefore affirmed. View "Vermont v. Williams" on Justia Law

Juvenile A.P. appealed an adjudication of delinquency based on “open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior” under 13 V.S.A. section 2601. Juvenile argued: (1) the evidence did not support a finding that his conduct was open or gross; (2) section 2601 was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable against him; and (3) section 2601 was unconstitutionally vague. The incident giving rise to the adjudication at issue here dated back to 2018, when Juvenile approached the complainant in the hallway of school. Complainant testified: “[A]ll of a sudden, he asked if he could touch my breasts, and then he just reached out, and his hand was on me.” No one else was present, although school was in session. When juvenile touched complainant’s breast with his hand, she turned around and ran. She was furious and upset. Juvenile testified that he reached out his hand toward complainant’s chest but never touched it. He testified that he regretted disregarding complainant’s feelings and felt his actions were “disgusting.” The family court found complainant to be credible. It concluded that juvenile had touched her breast and in doing so had committed a delinquent act. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court’s findings were supported by the record. The Court further concluded the statute unambiguously proscribes the type of conduct at issue here, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "In re A.P., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Stephens appealed after he was convicted by jury of attempted sexual assault. On appeal, he argued: (1) the State’s evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the offense charged in the State’s information, and the trial court’s instruction permitted the jury to convict him for conduct not charged by the State; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of an alleged prior sexual encounter between defendant and the complainant; (3) the court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of flight as consciousness of guilt and by not giving the jury a precautionary instruction on the limited probative value of that evidence; (4) the conviction must be vacated because the criminal case was not disposed of within the time frame set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD); and (5) the court erred by not granting him a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Defendant Jacob Rillo appealed his conviction for selling or dispensing a regulated drug (fentanyl) with death resulting, arguing that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence for that count. The matter was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the remaining counts. View "Vermont v. Rillo" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Welch was convicted by jury of lewd and lascivious conduct. At trial, the State introduced evidence that defendant fled when police tried to arrest him, and the court instructed the jury on the use of flight evidence as suggesting consciousness of guilt. Defendant argued on appeal that the court erred in failing to instruct jurors that they could not return a guilty verdict based solely on the evidence of flight. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Welch" on Justia Law

R.L. Vallee, Inc. appealed the superior court’s denial of its motion to intervene in a state condemnation action seeking property rights for a highway project. Vallee argued: (1) it had a right to intervene under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) because Vermont’s highway condemnation statute conferred an unconditional right to intervene; and (2) it had a right to intervene under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) because it had an interest relating to property that was subject to the condemnation action and intervention was necessary to protect that interest. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court held that Vallee had an unconditional statutory right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1), and accordingly, reversed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Hinton appealed a superior court’s sentence following his guilty plea to escaping from furlough. Defendant argued that new legislation decriminalizing the conduct should have been applied retroactively to him. Separately, he argued the court abused its discretion when it ordered the sentence to run consecutively to two other sentences. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hinton" on Justia Law